I don't understand what you're talking about.
When we talk about "disinformation" this represents a tool rather than a practice. The larger "thing" it is practiced under will change depending on the specific nation, since they all have their own respective frameworks and views on the various topics and subjects that make up its practical use.
For the US, the larger structuring of these activities would fall under the various functional areas of Information Operations for the military. How our nation uses "disinformation" is quite distinct from how other nations, like our adversaries, do, for multiple reasons. Due to this, media largely represents conceptualizations, frameworks, and practices from nations adversarial to us, primarily authoritarian nations which have very distinct forms of practice. When "disinformation" is brought up surrounding the UAP topic, it is nearly always framed from authoritarian practice.
Elizondo, Grusch, and Mellon have all spent significant amounts of their careers working in different functional areas within Information Operations, the field under which "disinformation" would be used as a tool.
Some important terms:
-Disinformation, Misinformation, and Malign Information represent both categorization of information and tools.
-A
campaign in relation to these matters indicates a centralized set of efforts which act to achieve a
short term objective, usually one which is tactically oriented.
-A
program represents the same thing as a campaign, except it's structured differently and to achieve
long term OR more structured objectives. Programs split into supporting programs which act much like campaigns do.
The campaign and program split is important here for two reasons, the "whistleblowers" frequently use the term "campaign" where patently referencing what would be a "program". Further, the military specifically does not use "campaigns" as a reference here, this is a split that only exists in public communications fields. The reason the distinction doesn't really exist for the military is because "campaigns" for them reference literal military campaigns. Now, "campaign" does get used in relation to Covert Influence, although that's a practice directed by another part of the government outside of the DoD and it's so small in terms of manpower and resources, covering the entire globe, that it's not even worth theorizing connection to domestic UAP matters.
We can break the practices down into the relevant functional areas (foregoing cyberspace and electromagnetic due to limited relevancy; also not considering Public Affairs since using MDM is outside its practice), as we should since "disinformation" would never just be that, it'd be practiced as part of one of these larger functional areas that would inform their understanding, practice, and also the goals and intents of the effort;
Deception - Rather than breaking this portion down into the different types, three would be of relevance to us; Strategic and Strategic-Military Deception (these would be targeting foreign decision makers), and Deception in Support of Operations Security (targeting foreign intelligence collection tech and/or processes rather than individuals).
Deception itself is already an insanely small functional area and a very touchy one. If we get to the Strat and Strat-Mil side specifically, we're talking a group that's probably around the size of the active userbase here, and they're mostly acting as planners for others, not sitting in a circle together. This puts a hard barrier on the idea we're running what would be claimed as a blend of these, against our own populace, when we don't even have enough people to staff doing it against our adversaries, which is an ongoing debate for more resources and attention.
The further idea of deception efforts running consistently for decades is kind of contradictory if we consider specific claimed characteristics. Even in cases where there is consistent deception over a specific topic, this has been spread across multiple different distinct efforts and are not part of the same "campaign" or even part of the same program. The absolute closest comparative we have are Soviet and Russian Active Measure
planning, which,
at a policy level have goals planned out for decades, but these are "operationalized" by distinct bodies over the timeframe, which ends up cumulatively being a pool of dozens or 100s of distinct efforts, where the broader "deception" is an intended result of the cumulative effort (this is not how it is framed by the "whistleblowers" - rather, they frame it as a singular centralized effort of practice).
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/rgs_dissertations/RGSD300/RGSD370/RAND_RGSD370.pdf - This study, entitled "Deception in Covert Nuclear Weapons Development" hosts multiple case studies related to Covert R&D programs, primarily nuclear (though does give a biological & chemical example too). These tend to be the longest since they take on elements that blend multiple types for longer term objectives. For example most of these tend to blend both DISO and Strategic or Strat-Mil elements. It also provides a great study lesson for rudimentary understanding of counterdeception.
Psychological Operations - People tend to confuse this one a lot with the sorts of influence campaigns we hear our adversaries running. A majority of psychological operations are not internet enabled. Instead, it's stuff like mass dropping leaflets from planes and hijacking radio broadcasts to play your own. So far, well, we've seen none of this actually. If we dabble into internet-enabled campaigns and programs, the reality of our capabilities spells a far different story than what's claimed with our capabilities. In fact, it's not been until the past few years that the DoD has actually embraced and put resources into that part specifically, which was even more taboo than the larger practice.
https://theintercept.com/2022/12/20/twitter-dod-us-military-accounts/
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1165032.pdf
https://www.congress.gov/114/crpt/hrpt537/CRPT-114hrpt537.pdf
Here's the NDA from 2017 which included a lot of the initial effort and attention from Congress to bolster our capabilities here. Just sharing one snippet to prevent the post dragging even more but there's a bunch of relevant sections within this.
There is an element of practice here which does get used domestically, and that is Defense Support of Civil Authorities, more specifically "Civil Authority Information Support". In these cases, it's largely the same as the above just with a different goal, it's things like driving around natural disaster zones with a loudspeaker telling people where evacuation sites, medical aide etc is located.
https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_28.pdf
