He was not chief scientist at AATIP, he was chief scientist at more recent the UAPTF, and contributed to the UAP report last year.
And he, together with Lou, has contributed to an unprofessional AATIP/UAPTF modus operandi which even the AOIMSG seems to have inherited although neither of them are employed by this latest iteration of the same entity. Below I have listed four facts to demonstrate an AATIP/UAPTF MO of seeking out and being satisfied with incomplete Navy intelligence products (i.e. incomplete according to the Navy's own standards) that are sufficiently sketchy to whet the imagination and sufficiently trivial to be releasable/leakable to the public:
(1) The
July 17 video of a young SNOOPIE team leader narrating the "UAS" sighting onboard USS Russell follows a textbook recon report template (observer-location-description of activity). Hence, by default, the 'hazard' report does
not purport to be an exhaustive analysis of the sighted phenomena.
The work of a SNOOPIE team (similar to reconnaissance activities in the air force and the army) is time-critical due to operational or training requirements. These reports are therefore by default sketchy first glimpses rather than representing the final well-crunched product of DoD ISR. The latter is almost invariably internal and classified.
The time-critical work of a SNOOPIE team:
"Once the information is recorded, the team has less than an hour to upload the evidence, export the recordings, classify the final product and inform the proper personnel of the events that took place."
(2) The photographs or video footage filmed by SNOOPIE teams commonly reach public audiences far and wide.
The public end-users of SNOOPIE team records:
"According to Paulauskas, the recorded information can go anywhere in the world, including all major news channels and even on the desk of the president."
(3)
According to Luis Elizondo (as shared by
@NorCal Dave on another thread), his office (AATIP at the time)
"had multiple meetings with eyewitnesses to include pilots, radar operators, and ship's crew". In other words, Elizondo's modus operandi for the AATIP/UAPTF has been for the office to focus on interviewing
"eyewitnesses" at lower ranks and citing their sketchy and mildly bewildered-sounding initial contact reports, coupled with sketchy footage, as authoritative fully-vetted Navy intelligence products. This pattern obviously suits the UFO narrative of 'Pentagon, the world's top agency and best-resourced human institution for identification of stuff, being at a loss regarding these sightings'.
(4) Proper ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) is a much more broad, time-consuming, inter-disciplinary and rigorous process embedded into the core organization of most modern militaries. It is more 'scientific' than the fringe exercise that is the UAPTF's, while also not to be equated or confused with the scientific method owing to very different operational goals:
ISR is the coordinated and integrated acquisition, processing and provision of timely, accurate, relevant, coherent and assured information and intelligence to support commander's conduct of activities. Land, sea, air and space platforms have critical ISR roles in supporting operations in general. By massing ISR assets, an improved clarity and depth of knowledge can be established.
[5] ISR encompasses multiple activities related to the planning and operation of systems that collect, process, and disseminate data in support of current and future military operations.
[6][7]
Both surveillance and reconnaissance can include visual observation (for example soldiers on the ground covertly watching a target, unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) with cameras), as well as electronic observation.
The difference between surveillance and reconnaissance has to do with time and specificity; surveillance is a more prolonged and deliberate activity, while reconnaissance missions are generally rapid and targeted to retrieve specific information.
Once surveillance and reconnaissance information has been obtained, intelligence specialists can analyse it, fuse it with other information from other data sources and produce the intelligence which is then used to inform military and civilian decision-makers, particularly for the planning and conduct of operations.
The above four facts account for an unprofessional UAPTF pattern of data-collection and analysis, under the prestigious guise of "Pentagon", which the AOIMSG may well have inherited even after the recent 'purge' of its most famous UFO enthusiast members (Lou and Travis). An undisciplined MO of seeking out
incomplete ISR products (initial eyewitness interviews, initial recon reports and poor footage) directly from
low-ranking personnel, and being
contented in analyzing them in a
rushed fashion (read: sloppily) with
limited human and financial resources
in isolation from more detailed analysis carried out within or without the DoD on the same incidents, could explain why the AOIMSG does not quite yet:
(a) Spend sufficient time delving independently and scrupulously into footage analysis, or into triangulating internal Navy evidence with other data sources available outside the DoD for the general public, such as star maps and vessel locators;
(b) Enjoy sufficient internal DoD confidence to gain access to complete and classified DoD ISR products, including regarding the incidents under its 'investigation'. The political underpinnings of the outfit's very existence 'within' the Pentagon, and its highly public profile, may well add to this lack of internal trust.
It also demonstrates the ridiculousness and mismatch of the title "Chief Scientist" which is the first I've seen in any defense establishment. I work with one and can vouch we would never consider such a vague, childish and pompous title for even our best scientifically trained minds. The title has been all-too-obviously coined for public appearance of expertise (in order to hide the glaring lack thereof).
P.S. I vaguely remember having read somewhere (?) Lou mentioning that when he was with the UAPTF he became increasingly frustrated with his office's lack of access to classified DoD data, and with not being taken seriously, resulting in his 'resignation'. If so, it would indeed be indicative of a trust issue within the DoD towards a fringe outfit created and led by ufologists, routinely bypassing official chains. His later leaks would have only confirmed that those trust issues were well-founded and would probably take time to resolve even after his resignation.
