Can White Swans exist?

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I think I might understand Nathan Oakley's a bit more.

Starting this I thought the lack of white swans was a good argument against these. I think it still is for QE's modus tollens but I was confused why Nathan Oakley's seemed to embrace the idea of no white swans.

I think it's because white swans are supposed to be the great deception. You've been told all swans are white. You believe that all swans are white. You've been seeing black swans all your life but have been tricked into believing they are white. No swan was ever black enough to make you question white swans. But along comes a swan so black you can no longer deny that the swans you thought were white aren't actually white.
 
I think I might understand Nathan Oakley's a bit more.

I checked in on him this morning for the first time in a few years. I really don't think there's very much to understand, it's just very peculiar (and forceful) gobbledygook without any semblance of self-awareness or critical examination.

One might as well be frustrated at not being able to understand someone who imagines themselves to be speaking in tongues.
 
I checked in on him this morning for the first time in a few years. I really don't think there's very much to understand, it's just very peculiar (and forceful) gobbledygook without any semblance of self-awareness or critical examination.
I don't really agree. I think there's sense in all of them but they (not qe's) are worded in such a way that people get sidetracked by other things in the statement and never address the central point (it's not difficult to understand that those opposed to the idea are gonna be pedants). I think it's "cleverer" than people give it credit. Not clever in it's premise but clever in how it's delivered. Let's not forget that science is word games most globe deniers. And it's not aimed at scientists.
 
Oh for sure there's a cleverness about it: I wouldn't ever argue with that.

But it's still goobledygook. :)
 
I'm leaning towards it more like reading a foreign language and thinking it's gobbledegook than it actually being incomprehensible.
That's because the words no longer mean to them what they mean to us, the referents have changed. Orwell called it NewSpeak, @Rory calls it gobbledegook, but the effect is the same: that language prevents contact with reality, and it's hard to get around that.
 
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I'm leaning towards it more like reading a foreign language and thinking it's gobbledegook than it actually being incomprehensible.

One of the most important maxims of healthy skepticism:

Never allow yourself to be easily impressed by 'scienciness'.

When you do, you've taken the first step down a rabbit hole. Maybe you're teetering on the fence. Which is fine. But it's still good to be self-aware.

Scienciness is not science. It's pseudoscience. It's fancily worded ignorance (a.k.a. nonsense, blarney, yarn, drivel, baloney, balderdash, bunk, poppycock, hogwash, gobbledygook, pick whichever appellation best suits your predilection) just sufficiently peppered with scientific or logical buzzwords to fool the even-more-ignorant. Scratching just a little the sciency surface of FE fatuity reveals glaringly sloppy reasoning and an entire universe of blatant physics errors. But you need to know your physics basics first. Most people don't these days, hence their susceptibility to clever-sounding cockamamie.

Pseudoscience often stems from a paradoxical psychological fusion of blissful ignorance and a delusional presumption of scientific competence. Indeed, Oakley seems to me like the archetype of the Dunning-Kruger Effect.
 
Thank you. Unfortunately, it's not a quote, but a paraphrase.
I imagine it's taken from a video and maybe even people who support his arguments can't take too much of it. I'll give them the benefit of the doubt they did a half decent job. Definitely not gonna hunt it personally unless it's in some subtitles somewhere that google's read.
 
So I think I might've found a chink in Nathan Oakley's (paraphrased) statement that nicely illustrates the minds of these types of people.

Then you have a demonstration of something that says to your average village idiot, or somebody who hasn't experienced much of the world, a black swan, something that wasn't considered to be the norm, presumed not to exist at all.
It's this part of the statement I struggle to agree with cos I'm not sure who considered it the norm or who presumed it didn't exist at all or why they would presume it doesn't/can't exist.

How does your average village idiot, or somebody who hasn't experienced much of the world, know what is considered the norm or what might or might not exist?

Why would that person think that everything they know is EVERYTHING?

That's kinda exactly how a lot of these globe deniers act. They know practically nothing about a subject but that doesn't stop them proclaiming they know everything about it.

I just don't know if it's ironic in that statement or not.
 
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How does your average village idiot, or somebody who hasn't experienced much of the world, know what is considered the norm or what might or might not exist?
Because Oakley just told them.

The general tactic is to strawman some claim about the globe, the listener agrees, then that claim is disproven. The other side is never heard; or if it is, in NO's video talks, he usually shouts over them.
 
Because Oakley just told them.
That's not what I'm saying/asking.

I'm saying that "your average village idiot, or somebody who hasn't experienced much of the world" is not the kind of person who should be declaring things a black swan (or even white swans, isn't that kinda the point of the black swan theory?). And you'd hope they are humble enough to know that. But none of these people are.

P.S. I'm not even sure if we are in agreement at who he's calling "village idiots". I originally thought it was a dig a debunkers but don't any more.
 
"don't tell me what to do!"
this'll come across as patronizing
I'm not telling anyone what to do. I'm pointing out the irony in the argument of someone who hasn't much experience thinking there can only be one logical conclusion as to why observations of geometric things can look different to their physical properties.

I don't look at a circle from an angle and think it's a black swan of circles.

Could it be called a dunning kruger fallacy?
 
I'm thinking the major piece missing from the statement is that yes, physical things have physicality and limitations (with limitality) but for the rest to follow then it assumes that all observations of physical things must, and do, perfectly represent their physicality and limitations.
 
It kinda feels like...
If the Earth is a sphere with radius 3959 P then EVERY horizon distance measurement MUST BE NO MORE THAN 1.225 x square root of observers height in feet. Q
... mutated into...
It is asserted we have a geometric sphere beneath our feet and that sphere has physicality, which therefore has physical limitations. P. Most photographs presented look like they take place on a sphere. Q.

Make it less sciency but make it sound more sciency.

Q took a bit of a nose dive.

Not Q's where the magic happens.
 
I'm thinking the major piece missing from the statement is that yes, physical things have physicality and limitations (with limitality) but for the rest to follow then it assumes that all observations of physical things must, and do, perfectly represent their physicality and limitations.

Even a pancake earth or a disc earth has (1) a 'geometry', (2) a 'physicality' (since neither pancakes nor discs qualify as having a 'spirituality' :D which would be the alternative to 'physicality') and (3) 'physical limitations' owing to geometry. In other words, Oakley is redefining otherwise commonly understandable terms in an unusual, selective and self-contradictory way in order to make his point.

To recap Oakley's problem: Oakley's usage of modus tollens (MT is a valid inference rule in formal logic) is logically correct but scientifically nonsensical. If it were so simple that P (the earth's average radius) automatically implies the Q that no observer should ever observe even the slightest deviation from a geometric horizon (effectively ignoring the effects of atmospheric refraction, spheroid earth, etc.), Oakley would be absolutely correct insofar as demonstrating there's something wrong with the earth's radius hypothesis.

Since, indeed, there are such deviations all the time, and which he calls 'black swans', something's wrong with the globe theory according to the above simplistic reasoning. His appeal to MT and black swans are all part of his 'sciency' veneer, making something ridiculous sound reasonable and intellectual to the uninitiate.

However, he's obviously blatantly wrong on both counts which his 'scienciness' fails to cover up: (1) Earth's geometric radius is not perfectly symmetric even geometrically (earth is a spheroid rather than a sphere) (2) nor does the human observer ever eyeball the exact geometric horizon due to atmospheric refraction.

That's why I earlier said that the bottom line here is the false and Dunning-Krugery (read: presumptuous) assertion that the globe theory cannot tolerate even the slightest variation from Oakley's simplistic application of MT in order for it to be true.

P.S. In actual science modus tollens is indeed a very important logical rule which allows the scientist to infer observation outcomes from hypotheses and theories in order to either verify or falsify such outcomes by means of measurements and tests. But it cannot be used simplistically in a manner which ignores all the relevant variables affecting each calculation. There are many variables and the world is complex. Complexity is uncomfortable for the FEer who wants reality to fit a preconceived simplistic mould, such as a highly literalist Biblical understanding of the world.

P.P.S. The black swan metaphor is related to Carl Gustav Hempel's Raven Paradox which, imo, Oakley could have used instead to sound even more sciency. With the Raven Paradox Hempel attempts to demonstrate a type of hasty and faulty generalization perpetrated in lay reasoning:

Article:
Hempel describes the paradox in terms of the hypothesis:[3][4]

(1) All ravens are black. In the form of an implication, this can be expressed as: If something is a raven, then it is black.

Via contraposition, this statement is equivalent to:

(2) If something is not black, then it is not a raven.
 
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P.P.S. The black swan metaphor is related to Carl Gustav Hempel's Raven Paradox which, imo, Oakley could have used instead to sound even more sciency. With the Raven Paradox Hempel attempts to demonstrate a type of hasty and faulty generalization perpetrated in lay reasoning:

Article:
Hempel describes the paradox in terms of the hypothesis:[3][4]

(1) All ravens are black. In the form of an implication, this can be expressed as: If something is a raven, then it is black.

Via contraposition, this statement is equivalent to:

(2) If something is not black, then it is not a raven.

Yeah, but that's not the paradox bit. And there's nothing wrong with the first order logic being used there - it's not a "hasty and faulty generalization".
The paradox part is:
If you see *anything* non-black that's not a not a raven, such as a bus or the sun, it should strengthen your belief that all ravens are black.
Which is paradoxical because what you saw seemingly had nothing to do with ravens, yet it changes your belief about ravens. It's a dig at bayesianism, but one that's trivially dismissible once you accept that the numbers involved are unimaginably large and unimaginably small.
 
Yeah, but that's not the paradox bit. And there's nothing wrong with the first order logic being used there - it's not a "hasty and faulty generalization".

You misunderstood me but my poor wording admittedly contributed to it. Hempel's first lemma is 'the hasty generalization' of a lay person which he demonstrates to be problematic by applying strict formal logic to it.

The paradox part is:
If you see *anything* non-black that's not a not a raven, such as a bus or the sun, it should strengthen your belief that all ravens are black.
Which is paradoxical because what you saw seemingly had nothing to do with ravens, yet it changes your belief about ravens. It's a dig at bayesianism, but one that's trivially dismissible once you accept that the numbers involved are unimaginably large and unimaginably small.

No disagreement whatsoever.
 
The paradox part is:
If you see *anything* non-black that's not a not a raven, such as a bus or the sun, it should strengthen your belief that all ravens are black.
Which is paradoxical because what you saw seemingly had nothing to do with ravens, yet it changes your belief about ravens.
It's to do with colors.

Imagine a child's toy chest, the child says "all my ducks are yellow". You collect all toys that are not yellow, there's no duck among them: that proves it! And it's true even if the child owns no duck at all, as it should be.
 
It's to do with colors.

Imagine a child's toy chest, the child says "all my ducks are yellow". You collect all toys that are not yellow, there's no duck among them: that proves it! And it's true even if the child owns no duck at all, as it should be.

The bit I've bolded is nothing to do with this paradox. This is about tiny samples from unimaginably huge sets.
 
The bit I've bolded is nothing to do with this paradox. This is about tiny samples from unimaginably huge sets.
well, it's a 100% sample, not a tiny one
but the logic is similar

EXCEPT

for it to work for Bayesian analysis, you need a prior on the ratio of black to non-black ravens, anx if you've never seen one, you don't have it. So all your observation of non-black things cab do is push this ratio down, but to get it so low that it implies no raven, you need a huge number of samples.


if there's 1 million birds
and we do a random sample (e.g. n=20000) and find ~1000 of these are black ravens
then to push the probability(non-black raven|raven) under 0.1%
how many birds do we need to sample?

and if you can't push it that low with a reasonable sample (that's not approaching 100% anyway), can you really say that this sampling contributes to your knowledge?
 
well, it's a 100% sample, not a tiny one
but the logic is similar

EXCEPT

for it to work for Bayesian analysis, you need a prior on the ratio of black to non-black ravens, anx if you've never seen one, you don't have it. So all your observation of non-black things cab do is push this ratio down, but to get it so low that it implies no raven, you need a huge number of samples.


if there's 1 million birds
and we do a random sample (e.g. n=20000) and find ~1000 of these are black ravens
then to push the probability(non-black raven|raven) under 0.1%
how many birds do we need to sample?

and if you can't push it that low with a reasonable sample (that's not approaching 100% anyway), can you really say that this sampling contributes to your knowledge?

I'd be surprised if the answer deviated significantly from just the usual rule of three, which says just shy of 100000 birds. It would be interesting to see how the two approaches compare. I just wrote a little formula in Pari/GP to go straight to the answer, but I clearly made a horrific errors (probabilities greater than 1 emerged), someone well-versed in R is probably the better person to attack this question, rather than me having to roll my own primitives.
 
just the usual rule of three,
If you have a moment, could you explain what this is? I am familiar with a "Rule if Three" in the theater -- tell a joke once and get a laugh, tell it as second time get a bigger laugh and tell it the third time but subvert the expected punchline with a twist to bring the house down!

But I dont think that's the rule you are referencing!
 
In actual science modus tollens is indeed a very important logical rule which allows the scientist to infer observation outcomes from hypotheses and theories in order to either verify or falsify such outcomes by means of measurements and tests. But it cannot be used simplistically in a manner which ignores all the relevant variables affecting each calculation.
I don't know as the issue is ignoring variables as such (if you didn't know about refraction how can you ignore it) but more at just stopping at an incredibly ambiguous conclusion. Especially when it's the conclusion you so desperately want.

OK, it's not a sphere with a radius of 3959 miles. What is it then?

Anyone actually interested would investigate.

Avoiding doing that is, of course, just part of the "never make a claim of our own" tactic used by globe deniers.

It's quite weird how the black swan oil rigs photo is one of the only white swans for a flat earth version of the modus tollens too. I think I've got my colours the right way there.
 
The pigeon is the most appropriate bird for this conversation I think. And games of chess with em. :)
 
I'd be surprised if the answer deviated significantly from just the usual rule of three, which says just shy of 100000 birds.
Article:
The Rule of Three (R3) states that 3/n is an approximate 95% upper limit for the binomial parameter, when there are no events in n trials.

3/100,000 would give you 95% confidence that there are 30 or less white ravens among the non-black birds. Not enough to say there are none.
 
If you have a moment, could you explain what this is? I am familiar with a "Rule if Three" in the theater -- tell a joke once and get a laugh, tell it as second time get a bigger laugh and tell it the third time but subvert the expected punchline with a twist to bring the house down!

But I dont think that's the rule you are referencing!

If you see 0 cases after n samples, then [0 ... 3/n] is a fair stab (2 sigma) at the proportion. 4.6/n for a really good stab (the 0.1% requested)

But I'm with you on the other rule, the way I word it is "if a joke's worth telling, it's worth telling 3 times". It sometimes drives the g/f mad.
There's also the well-known blonde joke with the same set-up, of course. That also drives her mad...
 
Article:
The Rule of Three (R3) states that 3/n is an approximate 95% upper limit for the binomial parameter, when there are no events in n trials.

3/100,000 would give you 95% confidence that there are 30 or less white ravens among the non-black birds. Not enough to say there are none.

Nope, you've ignored what you have learnt about the proportion of ravens in the bird population, for a start. But I'm glad you're arguing against the non-bayesian argument, given that I'm bayesian.
 
If you see 0 cases after n samples, then [0 ... 3/n] is a fair stab (2 sigma) at the proportion. 4.6/n for a really good stab (the 0.1% requested)
that's not how I used 0.1%
if there's 1 million birds
and we do a random sample (e.g. n=20000) and find ~1000 of these are black ravens
then to push the probability(non-black raven|raven) under 0.1%
how many birds do we need to sample?
if you have ONE white raven and 999 black ravens, then the conditional probility P(bird is white | bird is raven) is exactly 0.1%. If your estimate interval for this probability includes 0.1%, you are not able to conclude that all ravens are black.

But I'm glad you're arguing against the non-bayesian argument, given that I'm bayesian
then it would be helpful if you actually clarified which rule you were referring to

my frequentist take is that if you want 95% confidence that "a counterexample exists" is false, you need to sample 95% of the counterexample space

if they have a prior on the distribution of counterexample probabilities, a Bayesian would probably sample the counterexample space only until they became confident they were living in a small-probability world—which would be tough because across species, albinism incidence does seem range from 1:1000 to 1:20000
 
if you have ONE white raven and 999 black ravens, then the conditional probility P(bird is white | bird is raven) is exactly 0.1%.

That's a frequentist statement, that I wholeheartedly disagree with.

If your estimate interval for this probability includes 0.1%, you are not able to conclude that all ravens are black.

A bayesian would never state that. There's no case to answer.
 
my frequentist take is that if you want 95% confidence that "a counterexample exists" is false, you need to sample 95% of the counterexample space

Nah, the rule of three. After seeing none in n, you have 95% confidence that there's fewer than a 3/n proportion, and 99% confidence that there's fewer than a 4.6/n proportion. (So 4600*20=92000 is my 100000 ballpark above)
 
FatMendel, settle down boys. Your mathematical di*k-waving derails our otherwise perfectly topical foray into metaphorical ornithology. :)
 
I don't know as the issue is ignoring variables as such (if you didn't know about refraction how can you ignore it) but more at just stopping at an incredibly ambiguous conclusion. Especially when it's the conclusion you so desperately want.
This statement is made attempting to give the creator of the modus tollens some benefit of the doubt.

But it becomes more obvious that that benefit cannot be afforded.

Nevermind getting the answer you want. This starts at the conclusion wanted and forms the question in a way to achieve it.

No measurements have been done for any of this. 3959 miles is a globe number. 9 miles to the oil rig was measured by globers. They're YOUR numbers that are set in stone if you are a globe defender.

But without measurements, how do I know that 3959 is the wrong one and not the 9 miles to oil rig that has changed?

If all I have is observation and I was to watch the scene change from oil rigs behind the horizon to oil rigs in front of the horizon then it would look like the oil rigs are moving.

For a true flat earther that would have to be a consideration. And given a 9 mile tape measure they would have to question how things can appear to move without physically moving.

Not that any of this is for proof of a flat earth. It makes no claims to the shape of the surface we stand on. It is purely about not wanting globers to have an r. It doesn't even care if earth isn't even physical with a physical limitation and I wouldn't be surprised if that's another reason for why it's worded like it is in its attempt to get its conclusion.

But if you believe in the geometry of 9 miles to the oil rig then that also comes with certain implications. Surely?
 
I'm wondering if a supporter of the black swan oil rig photo's conclusions of earth not having an r must also be backers of moving earth because how else can physical objects appear in different places without physically moving?

Not just the oil rig photo. Lots of long distance photographs show things in the distance that weren't there before and so must've physically moved somehow? If I stay still, for something to enter my field of view that I couldn't see before then that something must've moved. Are them's the rules?

I don't suppose anyone's felt it moving, have they?
 
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