Russia and Ukraine Current Events

[derwoodii]

Genuine offer or is this tactical spying to seek out Ukraine mode of internal comms and control hierarchy to exploit later. Id be very carful of how to answer and nego any offer & a third party nation be better option.

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-12-26/vladimir-putin-interview-russia-ukraine-war/101808490

• Vladimir Putin says Russia is committed to its goals, but would negotiate if Ukraine came to the table
• Ukrainian officials say the Kremlin needs to return to reality
• The CIA believes that Russia is not yet serious about a real negotiation to end the war

Russia is ready to negotiate with all parties involved in the war in Ukraine, but Kyiv and its Western backers have refused to engage in talks, President Vladimir Putin has said.

 

[Hevach]

Performance for the domestic/friendly foreign audience, more likely. "Look how hard we're trying they just love being at war!"

Likely the only offer they bring to the table is much like the offers that passed through third party countries throughout the year, which have generally been clearly bad faith demands Russia wasn't in a position to make.

 

[Mendel]

Genuine offer or is this tactical spying to seek out Ukraine mode of internal comms and control hierarchy to exploit later.

It's neither?

Russia is ready to negotiate with all parties involved in the war in Ukraine, but Kyiv and its Western backers have refused to engage in talks, President Vladimir Putin has said.

Russia wants to "freeze" the conflict now because they've lost the offensive, and if Ukraine manages to score another big win in the upcoming winter, their negotiating position would be much worse. They're using the terror bombing and the threat of a new offensive via Belorussia to pressure Kyiv to accede to that, but Zelenski isn't having that: the end result must be better for Ukraine than 2014 was if the country is to have peace. But as it stands now, Putin won't withdraw his troops.

Article:

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is reportedly preparing to present a peace plan in February 2023, which may be timed to exploit a failed Russian winter offensive. The Wall Street Journal, citing Ukrainian and European diplomats, reported on December 22 that Zelensky's team is planning to present an unspecified peace plan in February 2023.[21] Zelensky laid out a 10-point peace plan at the G20 summit in November 2022 that requires Russia to make concessions, including withdrawing all its troops from Ukraine and respecting Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity under international law.[22] Zelensky may be preparing to present this peace plan around an anticipated failed Russian military offensive in early 2023.

Source: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-23

Right now, there's just no way for negotiations to succeed.

 

[Ann K]

Russia says it wants to "negotiate", but Russia was the invader of a foreign country, the instigator of all this. The only way any negotiations should be considered is if the Russians first withdraw completely and go home. They are not in a position to come to the table until they do so.

 

[Mendel]

Russia says it wants to "negotiate", but Russia was the invader of a foreign country, the instigator of all this. The only way any negotiations should be considered is if the Russians first withdraw completely and go home. They are not in a position to come to the table until they do so.

I disagree. Peace talks and treaties are possible (in principle) that solidify a change of territory resulting from a military campaign. It's been done many times in history, the most relevant example may be the 2014 Minsk agreements.

Because the Minsk agreements failed, Ukraine is now demanding that any peace treaty must involve Russia withdrawing all of its troops and returning Ukrainian territory to Ukraine. They can do this because Ukraine still has a strong military, strong morale, and good Western support.

As another example, the 1979 Egypt–Israel peace treaty was successful even though Israel had not given up all of territory it had occupied in the 6-day-war. The occupying army doesn't always have to "withdraw completely and go home" for peace to be possible.

It is perfectly legitimate for Russia to try and negotiate a peace that does not involve them withdrawing from all of Ukraine. But it's futile to blame either side for not meeting the other side's terms.

 

[Mendel]

Article:

Ukrainian strikes on legitimate military targets far in the Russian rear continue to be points of neuralgia for the Russian milblogger community. Russian sources began reporting explosions near the Engels Airbase in Saratov Oblast on the night of December 25 and the morning of December 26.[12] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated that Russian air defense shot down a Ukrainian unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) that was approaching the Engels airfield at low altitude and that the wreckage of the UAV killed three Russian servicemen.[13] Several prominent Russian milbloggers latched onto the Russian MoD report on the incident as an opportunity to criticize domestic Russian air defense capabilities and question Russian authorities' handling of and response to reported Ukrainian strikes deep in the Russian rear. One Wagner Group-affiliated milblogger questioned why Russian air defense only "miraculously" prevents strikes "exactly above the airfield/military unit" and noted that the Engels airfield is 500km into Russian territory.[14] Former militant commander and prominent Russian milblogger Igor Girkin sarcastically congratulated Russian air defense for activating before striking the airbase and questioned why Russia is allowing Ukrainian drones so deep into its territory.[15] Several Russian milbloggers also criticized the technical capabilities of Russian air defense and electronic warfare systems and voiced their concern over Russian authorities' inability to protect critical Russian infrastructure.[16]

Source: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-26

My guess is that Russia has lost a fair amount of radar-guided anti-aircraft systems, and that they've moved some systems toward the front lines that are now missing elsewhere.

If Ukraine can actually destroy enough of these, they may gain air superiority; and that'll put a quick end to trench warfare, I hope.

The question is, is that actually possible? and how long will it take?

 

[Hevach]

I have to go back to memories of early year stuff, but Ukraine's air force wasn't large to start with and hasn't fared well. Russia can't manage air superiority because Ukraine's air defense (both large and man-portable) is very intact, but Ukraine can't capitalize on the clear skies.

Giving Ukraine planes has been a huge bottleneck, since they fly the MIG-29, so either one of the limited members of NATO with the same needs to give theirs up (Slovakia said back in June they were, but haven't delivered them yet) or somebody needs to arrange a whole new supply chain and pilot training to help them switch over to something new.

 

[Duke]

I have to go back to memories of early year stuff, but Ukraine's air force wasn't large to start with and hasn't fared well. Russia can't manage air superiority because Ukraine's air defense (both large and man-portable) is very intact, but Ukraine can't capitalize on the clear skies.

What you are describing is known as air denial.

Giving Ukraine planes has been a huge bottleneck, since they fly the MIG-29, so either one of the limited members of NATO with the same needs to give theirs up (Slovakia said back in June they were, but haven't delivered them yet) or somebody needs to arrange a whole new supply chain and pilot training to help them switch over to something new.

Agreed, but the latter is not a short term solution. Logistics and competent maintainers would be the long pole in the tent.

 

[Mendel]

Ukraine can't capitalize on the clear skies

except with drones

 

[TheNZThrower]

Neil Abrams linked to the US mission to the OSCE which claimed that the OSCE has observed the Russian military in the Donbas:


He seems to have linked to the wrong article, as the link doesn't say anything quoted in his screenshot. But that aside, does anyone know whether there exists OSCE documents verifying this?

 

[Mauro]

It's neither?


Russia wants to "freeze" the conflict now because they've lost the offensive, and if Ukraine manages to score another big win in the upcoming winter, their negotiating position would be much worse. They're using the terror bombing and the threat of a new offensive via Belorussia to pressure Kyiv to accede to that, but Zelenski isn't having that: the end result must be better for Ukraine than 2014 was if the country is to have peace. But as it stands now, Putin won't withdraw his troops.

Article:

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is reportedly preparing to present a peace plan in February 2023, which may be timed to exploit a failed Russian winter offensive. The Wall Street Journal, citing Ukrainian and European diplomats, reported on December 22 that Zelensky's team is planning to present an unspecified peace plan in February 2023.[21] Zelensky laid out a 10-point peace plan at the G20 summit in November 2022 that requires Russia to make concessions, including withdrawing all its troops from Ukraine and respecting Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity under international law.[22] Zelensky may be preparing to present this peace plan around an anticipated failed Russian military offensive in early 2023.

Source: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-23

Right now, there's just no way for negotiations to succeed.

Well said, I completely agree with you.

 

[Mendel]

But that aside, does anyone know whether there exists OSCE documents verifying this?

The mission's OSCE homepage links to an archive with all of the reports and releases. It's no secret at all.

Article:

The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) started its activities on 21 March 2014 and discontinued its operations on 31 March 2022.

The SMM was an unarmed, civilian mission, operating on the ground 24/7 Ukraine. Its main tasks were to observe and report in an impartial and objective manner on the security situation in Ukraine; and to facilitate dialogue among all parties to the conflict.

Source: https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine-closed

 

[MapperGuy]

This quote has been used many times, but I recall it being used during the Cold War to describe Moscow's position in negotiations with the West.

"What's our is ours, what's your is negotiable".

No proposal by Putin would ever involve giving up a single square meter of the ground currently occupied by the Russians, it would only involve the Ukranian's giving up ground they currently occupy.

 

[Hevach]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/putin-tells-erdogan-ukraine-must-113810318.html

Putin was a bit clearer with the "offer" talking to Erdogan: his red line is Ukraine giving up the territory newly claimed by Russia.

Note that a not insignificant portion of that territory is not even *held* by Russia anymore (some never even was), which highlights how bad faith the offer even is.

With the condition of the Russian army in Ukraine, even keeping the current lines as a new status quo isn't a demand Russia's in any position to make.

A good faith offer might look more like Donbass and Crimea, and I still think Ukraine would be well justified in telling Putin to walk into the ocean first.

 

[obiwanbenobi]

I've been interested to see how the "information space" is being used and abused by each side in this conflict. Not that this is the first relatively recent conflict with such things going on but up to this point I've largely not been much for digging in and reading about what is going on.

 

[Mendel]

I've been interested to see how the "information space" is being used and abused by each side in this conflict. Not that this is the first relatively recent conflict with such things going on but up to this point I've largely not been much for digging in and reading about what is going on.

look at https://www.metabunk.org/threads/media-information-control-and-misinformation.12315/

unfortunately, the thread had to be closed

 

[jplaza]

https://cadenaser.com/nacional/2022...tra-vez-en-la-embajada-de-ucrania-cadena-ser/

Una nueva carta ha sido interceptada este viernes en la sede de la embajada de Ucrania en Madrid, (...) Inicialmente la Policía lo comparó con el primer paquete y aseguraron que era similar a los anteriormente recibidos. Pero, tras las comprobaciones de los TEDAX, se ha verificado que no contenía ningún tipo de explosivos. Sí contenía, sin embargo, un ojo de animal aplastado. Interior lo relaciona ahora con el resto de cartas que se están recibiendo en otras embajadas ucranianas de Europa. La Policía llega a esa conclusión por su franqueo, que no es español.

A new parcel has been intercepted this Friday at the ukranian embassy in Madrid, (...) Initially, Police compared it with the first parcel and said it was similar to those previously received. But after investigation by TEDAX(*), it was verified that it did not contain any kind of explosive. It did contain, however, a smashed eye of an animal. Interior Ministry now relates it with the other letters being received in other ukranian embassies in Europe. The police reaches this conclusion due to postage not being spanish.

(*) TEDAX: Explosive deactivation units.

I can't find any reference now, what I heard this afternoon on the radio is that Police thinks this parcel containing eyes would be unrelated to the ones with explosives received in the last days at different places in Spain. Those were sent from somewhere Spain, it seems.

https://cadenaser.com/nacional/2023...-pedro-sanchez-y-varios-ministros-cadena-ser/

Detenido en Miranda de Ebro el presunto autor de las cartas bomba a Pedro Sánchez y varios ministros

Entre finales de noviembre y principios de diciembre se enviaron seis cartas bomba a distintos ministerios y embajadas como la de Ucrania en Madrid, donde fue herido un trabajador en una mano. La Policía Nacional ha detenido este miércoles en Miranda de Ebro (Burgos) a Pompeyo González —un hombre de nacionalidad española de 74 años— como presunto autor del envío de esas misivas. Es una persona muy activa en redes sociales y, según los investigadores de la Policía Nacional, tiene conocimientos técnicos e informáticos.

El diario The New York Times publicó hace unos días que funcionarios estadounidenses y europeos creen que un grupo supremacista blanco con sede en Rusia recibió órdenes de la inteligencia de ese país para enviar esas cartas con material explosivo que llegaron a La Moncloa —dirigida al presidente del Gobierno español, Pedro Sánchez— al ministerio de Defensa —para Margarita Robles—, a la embajada de Ucrania y la de EEUU, a la base aérea de Torrejón de Ardoz y a una empresa de armamento de Zaragoza.

Las cartas, de fabricación casera, tenían en común el remitente: una dirección de correo electrónico pero hasta el momento se desconocía el origen. Si bien se presume que el detenido confeccionó y envió los artefactos explosivos en solitario, la Policía Nacional no descarta la participación o influencia de otras personas en los hechos.

----------------
Arrested in Miranda de Ebro the presumed author of letter-bombs sent to Pedro Sánchez and several ministers

Between November and December six letter bombs were sent to different ministeries and embassies including the Ukranian one in Madrid, where a man was injuried in one hand. National Police has arrested this Wednesday in Miranda de Ebro (Burgos province) Pompeyo González - a 74 year old spanish male - as the presumed author of the sending of these parcels. He is a very active person in social media, and according to Nationa Police investigators, has technical knowledge.

The newspaper The New York Times published a few days ago that american and european officials believed that a group of white supremacists based in Russia received orders from the intelligence services of that country to send those letters with explosive material that reached La Moncloa - sent to the President of the Government, Pedro Sánchez - , to Defense Ministry - sent to Margarita Robles - to the Ukranian, US embassies, to Torrejón de Ardoz AFB and to a company of armament in Zaragoza.

The letters, which were handmade, had a common sender: an email address but until now the origin was unknown. Even if it is presumed that the arrested man fabricated and sent the explosive devices alone, National Police does not rule out the participation or influence of other people.

 

[Scaramanga]

I disagree. Peace talks and treaties are possible (in principle) that solidify a change of territory resulting from a military campaign. It's been done many times in history, the most relevant example may be the 2014 Minsk agreements.

Because the Minsk agreements failed, Ukraine is now demanding that any peace treaty must involve Russia withdrawing all of its troops and returning Ukrainian territory to Ukraine. They can do this because Ukraine still has a strong military, strong morale, and good Western support.

As another example, the 1979 Egypt–Israel peace treaty was successful even though Israel had not given up all of territory it had occupied in the 6-day-war. The occupying army doesn't always have to "withdraw completely and go home" for peace to be possible.

It is perfectly legitimate for Russia to try and negotiate a peace that does not involve them withdrawing from all of Ukraine. But it's futile to blame either side for not meeting the other side's terms.

Any negotiation that left Russia with more territory would essentially be rewarding them for their aggressive behaviour. To me it all smacks of being similar to the 'peace in our time' of the Sudetenland negotiation of 1938....and we all know how that one went.

 

[Hevach]

In 1938 nobody believed that was the end and even as the world sacrificed Czechoslovakia they were preparing for the inevitable war, not celebrating having prevented it. Nuclear weapons change the calculus too much, there is no inevitable larger war looming on the horizon, Ukraine *is* the war.

 

[Duke]

In 1938 nobody believed that was the end and even as the world sacrificed Czechoslovakia they were preparing for the inevitable war, not celebrating having prevented it. Nuclear weapons change the calculus too much, there is no inevitable larger war looming on the horizon, Ukraine *is* the war.

Actually they did both.

No larger war looming on the horizon? You can hope that, but I wouldn't count your chickens just yet. All it would take to kick off that larger war involving all of NATO is one misguided Russian missile or an over zealous Russian junior officer to lead to the invocation of Article 5 of the NATO charter.

 

[Scaramanga]

In 1938 nobody believed that was the end and even as the world sacrificed Czechoslovakia they were preparing for the inevitable war, not celebrating having prevented it. Nuclear weapons change the calculus too much, there is no inevitable larger war looming on the horizon, Ukraine *is* the war.

Chamberlain arrived home waiving his 'piece of paper, signed by Herr Hitler' and proudly announced 'peace in our time'. He clearly believed the Munich Conference had avoided war and that Hitler was sincere in his ' no more territorial demands'. Goering recorded that Hitler laughed at the naivety of 'that little worm', as he called Chamberlain.

Frankly, Putin's actions in eastern Ukraine have almost the exact same 'justifications' as Hitler's with the Sudetenland. It is eerily similar.

 

[DavidB66]

Chamberlain arrived home waiving his 'piece of paper, signed by Herr Hitler' and proudly announced 'peace in our time'. He clearly believed the Munich Conference had avoided war and that Hitler was sincere in his ' no more territorial demands

Nevertheless, Britain continued with its rapid rearmament programme, especially in fighter planes.

 

[Mendel]

2 months of war
[compare]

[/compare]
[compare]

[/compare]

 

[Mendel]

Article:

Footage posted on February 1 notably shows alleged Russian forces disguised as Ukrainian infantry attacking Ukrainian positions near Bilohorivka.[29] If Russian forces dressed in Ukrainian uniforms attacked Ukrainian positions, it would be a violation of the Geneva Convention on war crimes, which prohibits "making improper use of... the military insignia and uniform of the enemy."[30]

Source: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-3-2023

Source: https://twitter.com/MOCentrists/status/1620843178005004288


there is no legitimate reason at all for Russian combatants to wear the yellow tape on their arm. but note that the ISW is not yet considering this news as confirmed.

 

[derwoodii]

1 year on

Lives affected and statistics

From Reuters · Updated 6 hours ago
Deaths
At least 42,295 people
Non-fatal injuries
At least 56,756 people
Missing
At least 15,000 people
Displaced
Approximately 14M people
Buildings destroyed
At least 140,000
Property damage
Approximately USD 350B



https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/36a7f6a6f5a9448496de641cf64bd375

This interactive map complements the static control-of-terrain maps that ISW daily produces with high-fidelity and, where possible, street level assessments of the war in Ukraine.

 

[Mendel]

Lives affected and statistics

I'm having trouble sourcing the statistics, please help?

 

[derwoodii]

I'm having trouble sourcing the statistics, please help?

Yes me too the Reuters link now goes to news article.. id say it a agrégation of various reports as was on side google search bar summary

I looked found this but a lot work to break down and add up.. i happy with ISOW data as and better checked sources

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Casualties_of_the_Russo-Ukrainian_War

Total casualties

Breakdown	Casualties	Time period	Source
Civilians	9,000[71]–16,502[72] killed (conf.)[e]	24 February 2022 – 17 January 2023	Ukrainian government
7,199 killed, 11,756 wounded (conf. minimum, thought higher)	24 February 2022 – 12 February 2023	United Nations[73]
20,000 killed and wounded	24 February – 30 November 2022	EC estimate[74]
30,000 killed	24 February 2022 – 22 January 2023	Norwegian Chief of Defence[75]
Ukrainian forces (ZSU, NGU, SBGS, PSMOP)	100,000+ killed and wounded	24 February 2022 – 22 January 2023	Norwegian Chief of Defence[75]
120,000+ killed and wounded	24 February 2022 – 7 February 2023	The Telegraph estimate[76]
Ukrainian forces (ZSU)	10,000–13,000 killed	24 February – 1 December 2022	Ukrainian government[77]
Russian forces (VSRF, Rosgvardiya, FSB, FSO, PMCs Wagner & Redut, DPR & LPR)	180,000 killed and wounded	24 February 2022 – 22 January 2023	Norwegian Chief of Defence[75]
200,000 killed and wounded	24 February 2022 – 16 February 2023	US estimate[78]
175,000–200,000 casualties (40,000–60,000 killed)	24 February 2022 – 17 February 2023	UK MoD estimate[78]
43,000+ killed, 150,000+ wounded	24 February 2022 – 17 February 2023	BBC News Russian & Mediazona estimate[79]
142,860 killed[f]	24 February 2022 – 19 February 2023	Ukrainian government[80]
Russian forces (VSRF, Rosgvardiya, FSB, FSO, PMCs Wagner & Redut)	29,500+ killed (est., 14,709 conf. by names), 103,500+ wounded (est.)	24 February 2022 – 17 February 2023	BBC News Russian & Mediazona[79]
Russian forces (PMC Wagner)	9,000 killed, 21,000 wounded	24 February 2022 – 17 February 2023	US estimate[87]
1,521 killed (conf. by names)	24 February 2022 – 17 February 2023	BBC News Russian & Mediazona[79]
Russian forces (Donetsk & Luhansk PR)	4,163 killed, 17,329 wounded (DPR only)	26 February – 22 December 2022	Donetsk PR[88]
6,500+ killed	24 February 2022 – 17 February 2023	BBC News Russian & Mediazona[79]

 

[Duke]

"The inflated estimates of Russian military capacity and the downplaying of that of Ukraine had real consequences," said Eliot Cohen, professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. "They slowed down not only the supply of weaponry to Ukraine but also policymakers' assessment of the realities."

https://www.voanews.com/a/three-reasons-most-analysts-were-wrong-on-war-in-ukraine/6974782.html

Interesting article looking back one year on to the invasion of Ukraine and misjudgments by Western analysts. One thing I'm surprised wasn't mentioned was the number of "experts" in the West who believed the Russians would not invade because doing so would wreck their economy. Apparently that hasn't happened, at least not yet.

 

[Z.W. Wolf]

Very little of this comes from me. I've just assembled stuff from other sources. Stuff that makes sense to me.

Bakhmut - Ukraine could have refused this entire action and withdrawn to stronger positons to the west and held the line there against the Russian Winter Offensive on the Eastern Front. But Ukraine felt this wasn't enough. The Russian forces in the East are not very effective, but could be troublesome during the Ukrainian Summer offensives in the South. The strategic goal to this fighting withdrawal in Bakhmut was to degrade Russian forces in the East so that there would be no troublesome Russian counter-offensive there during the Summer, which would make it necessary to divert Ukrainian forces away from the South. Political pressure from Putin to take Bakhmut made the Russian forces come to the Ukrainians. There were three other major zones in the Russian Winter Offensive and some heavy fighting, which has been largely neglected in World News, but the Russians accomplished little in those other zones.

The real action right now is far in the rear where Ukrainian forces are preparing for the Summer Offensives.

-On the world stage, both Ukraine and Russia are relatively weak militaries with many problems. Russia's weakness and Ukraine's relative strength are the big surprises. Russia's weakness is due to more than the oft-cited ones - corruption, the inability to engage in combined arms combat, poor communications, etc. Even the regular Armed Forces are made up of units that are raised and supported in local regions; each one with its own agenda and goals. There's no central control; no strategic doctrine; no cohesive logistics support.

-Ukraine has no air power to speak of. That's a major weakness. They are relying on a hodge-podge of Western weapons which makes logistics tough. Some armored vehicles may have to be sent all the way back to Poland for maintenance and repair They may lack transport vehicles. They may run low on ground based anti-aircraft defenses. But you go to war with the army you have, not the army you want.

On the plus side, history shows that morale and competence count for a lot. They have been concentrating on combined arms combat training. They have a largely intact rail system in most of the country. Russia has not been able to hit a single moving train in Ukraine and that won't change.

Here's a likely scenario, but not the only possible scenario:

-Not one but several Ukrainian offensives during the Summer, each with limited objectives. This will require the Ukrainians to engage in combined arms obstacle-crossing to break into and penetrate Russian defenses, which include mines, anti-tank ditches, dragons' teeth and the enhancement of natural obstacles. A tough nut.

The Ukrainians are not masters of this kind of warfare, but they have significantly improved. They only need to be good enough to defeat Russian defensive postions. This is an entirely normal part of war.

-Ukraine will make probing attacks in different spots somewhere in the Zaporizhzhia region, while there is a smaller offensive or holding action in the East. They've tried to keep that as small as possible as explained above.

-During each successive offensive, Ukraine will find a weakness and concentrate on a ten to twenty kilometer front.

-There will be very heavy fighting against strong positions. Eventually poor Russian morale, poor logistics and communications, and their proven lack of competence in combined arms combat will lead to a Ukrainian breakthrough. There will be a disorganized retreat by Russian forces.

-Ukraine now has reserves who will be able to extend each offensive for some time, but eventually the Russian forces will bring up reserves and reform.

Two to Four offensives will occur by September. The focus will be operations to strike logistics hubs, rear bases and ammunition stores deep behind the Russians' front lines There will be punctuated advances, followed by an operational pause while the Ukrainians regroup.

-An example of thinking strategically, as one should, is to think about how Ukraine will keep up with an advance with an inadequate number of fuel trucks. There are many other boring things to think about.

-The objective for this Summer would be a push toward the Sea of Azov in the Zaporizhzhia region; and in particular the strategic city of Melitopol, which is a vital resupply point for the Russian forces. If the the Ukrainians managed to capture Melitopol they would effectively fracture the Russian occupying forces in two. The Russians would be in Luhansk and the Russians would be in Crimea but they would they have no connection between the two. This would also weaken Russia's foothold on the Sea of Azov.

They might then turn west on the south side of the Dnieper River without risking a major river crossing. However, even this successful push may result in the Ukrainians having at least two fronts to defend while still advancing.

-If that happens by Fall, Crimea could be seriously threatened by Ukrainian forces. But Crimea will probably not fall this year.

-The realistic long term Ukrainian Strategic Goal will not involve a military invasion of Crimea but to make it militarily untenable to the Russians and force a complete withdrawal. This would involve both cutting off supply routes and bringing Ukrainian long range precision weapons close enough for a strategic bombardment campaign.

-It's an ugly picture of two more years of war. Or three. Or...

-But if Russian forces collapse - if morale breaks - there's definitely a very slim chance that Ukraine could recapture Crimea with a military invasion this year.

-The recapture of Crimea would be game over. Ukraine would regain the strategic economic advantage. It would reestablish their ability to engage in international trade.

-On the other side: Russian forces – including some of their best divisions – have been trying to break down Ukrainian defenses in four main zones during their Winter Offensive on the Eastern Front. Apart from incremental gains in the Bakhmut area, they have made virtually no progress. Realistically, Russia is already in a defensive stance with no possibility for an effective Russian offensive in the foreseeable future. They might be able rebuild and reform their armed forces in... 3 to 5 years? Maybe?

-The Putin Regime is on shaky ground for many reasons. Politically, Putin cannot order full mobilization, but strategically he must order full mobilization. A fatal conundrum. The Russian economy is not collapsing but there is a slow but sure degradation at a time when an expansion is strategically crucial. Putin seems to have either no plan or is depending on the classic Russian strategy of "outsuffering" the West. He's probably hoping for a Trump inauguration in 2025, but there's almost no possibility of that due to changing demographics and eroding support.

-On the other side, Ukraine has to prove that they can use the support they're getting from from the West so that they can get further support in the years ahead. That's the realistic Ukrainian strategic goal this year. The long term Western strategy probably is not Ukrainian military victory by arms, but by outlasting the Putin regime, which is headed for inevitable collapse over a time frame of years rather than months.

-However the U.S. has consistently underestimated Ukraine and over-estimated Russia. That may still be the case.

-Another factor is that the U.S. is using the continued Russia/Ukraine War to contain the Russian threat in Europe while freeing up resources to face down China. China has about a three year window in which to pull off an invasion of Taiwan. So the Russia/Ukraine war only has to contain Russia for three years. That's the ugly but realistic picture.

What I worry about is this: Even if Russia completely withdraws from Ukraine, what's to stop them from bombarding Ukraine with long range weapons based inside Russia? And why would Ukraine hold back from the same? Are we headed toward a War of the Cities?

 

[Mendel]

Politically, Putin cannot order full mobilization, but strategically he must order full mobilization. A fatal conundrum.

I have trouble believing that Russia could equip a full mobilized armed force, without also restructuring parts of the economy to produce that equipment. And that is definitely politically impossible without a credible threat to Russia itself.

There were three other major zones in the Russian Winter Offensive and some heavy fighting, which has been largely neglected in World News

Vuhledar featured quite a bit in the segment of the news I expose myself to.

What I worry about is this: Even if Russia completely withdraws from Ukraine, what's to stop them from bombarding Ukraine with long range weapons based inside Russia? And why would Ukraine hold back from the same?

Precisely this would push both sides to a ceasefire in this situation. Retaliation.

There's no central control; no strategic doctrine; no cohesive logistics support.

I believe that these are, at best, half-truths.

I don't believe Ukraine is going to fight in Melitopol (same as they didn't fight in Kherson).

I believe Russia is going to hold the Crimea (if they can), but must evacuate some of the population if supply routes get cut.

I don't dare predict where Ukraine wants to strike and how successful they'll be. These decisions depend highly on intelligence, counter-intelligence, and counter-counter-intelligence. Ukraine has been most successful when it was able strike where Russia didn't expect them to. Logically, this means that most mainstream predictions are going to be wrong, unless Russia second-guesses them.

 

[Z.W. Wolf]

I don't dare predict where Ukraine wants to strike and how successful they'll be. These decisions depend highly on intelligence, counter-intelligence, and counter-counter-intelligence. Ukraine has been most successful when it was able strike where Russia didn't expect them to. Logically, this means that most mainstream predictions are going to be wrong, unless Russia second-guesses them.

Agree.

It's a dynamic situation.

Where Ukraine ultimately goes depends on the slight edges that only its strategists are aware of.

 

[Z.W. Wolf]

I believe Russia is going to hold the Crimea (if they can), but must evacuate some of the population if supply routes get cut.

A large civilian population is a hiding place for Russian deserters, pro-Ukrainian partisans, Ukrainian infiltrators...

 

[Duke]

What I worry about is this: Even if Russia completely withdraws from Ukraine, what's to stop them from bombarding Ukraine with long range weapons based inside Russia? And why would Ukraine hold back from the same? Are we headed toward a War of the Cities?

What long range/offensive weapons does Ukraine possess? Certainly the US/NATO have been reluctant to provide such weapons. The closest they've come to this was the one-off conversion of a 1970s era reconnaissance drone (Tu-141) to a primitive cruise missile that hit a Russian airfield. There have also been some pinprick type strikes with what were apparently modified commercial drones, but with limited damage.

I also think NATO would do everything in its power to preclude Ukraine from using such weapons even if they had them for fear of the Russian escalating to nuclear weapons.

 

[Mendel]

The source ISW, which Mendel often shares here, seems to be reliable

ISW posted about their methodology recently.

Article:

ISW's commitment to informing audiences – not convincing them – is demonstrated by ISW's extensive sharing of its sourcing. ISW makes available extensive footnotes detailing the evidence used to inform each assessment and has done so for Ukraine since Russia's current invasion began in February 2022. The investment in this level of evidence-sharing reflects ISW's commitment to ensuring that readers can form their own judgments on the basis of the evidence and ISW's reasoning and do not need to take ISW's word for anything. ISW also analyzes the various information operations directed at and interacting with the war in Ukraine and makes its sourcing available to provide transparency into ISW's own conclusions.

ISW is not a news organization, however. ISW products do not simply report facts but rather interpret available data to form assessments regarding what is occurring, has occurred, and could occur and the implications. Understanding the distinction between fact and assessment is critical for responsibly using ISW products. Assessments can be wrong. In fact, if an analyst is never wrong it is typically a sign that the analyst is doing more reporting than assessing. ISW analysts make calls about what they are seeing and its significance on the basis of data which is invariably incomplete and often contradictory. That data includes but is not limited to the data layers behind ISW's Ukraine map. ISW analysts also form and continually revise strategic assessments of key actors' intent, decision-making, capacity, and other factors. This holistic approach is intensive and comprises an analytic backend that is less visible than ISW's maps but no less vital. ISW's assessments are sometimes wrong, of course. Whenever ISW concludes that it has made a mistake it publishes a formal correction.

Source: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/statement-isw-methodology

When reading ISW, it's important to be aware of the distinction. They're quite conservative with their facts, which means they're never the first to report anything, but what they do report as fact is rarely wrong. As bunkologists, we know that even information people know is false can later be remembered as true, so it's very helpful that ISW doesn't report facts prematurely.

But it's also important that their opinions ("assessments") are fallible and often motivated. Whenever I quote those, I typically add cautionary comments; and have "ISW thinks this" in mind when I read them. It helps that their language is very clear about what's fact and what's opinion; and it helps that they lay out the facts that inform their opinions.

 

[Hevach]

I believe Russia is going to hold the Crimea (if they can), but must evacuate some of the population if supply routes get cut.

Ukraine is probably not going to be able to push Russia out of Crimea (at this time, that is - anything in the months to come or next year would depend on what happens with the likely upcoming renewal of offensives) but if the area immediately north of the peninsula is retaken they can make it very untenable.

Prior to the invasion last year, Russia was spending an incredible amount of resources making Crimea viable, because Ukraine cut them off from water, food, and power the area had depended on from the mainland. If Ukraine cuts them off again, the question then is whether Russia can start doing that again while still pursuing the rest of the war, or if their position in Crimea becomes unsustainable.

 

[Mendel]

Prior to the invasion last year, Russia was spending an incredible amount of resources making Crimea viable, because Ukraine cut them off from water, food, and power the area had depended on from the mainland. If Ukraine cuts them off again, the question then is whether Russia can start doing that again while still pursuing the rest of the war, or if their position in Crimea becomes unsustainable.

That's why I expect they'd need to reduce the amount of people consuming food and water, or put rationing in place.

 

[Mendel]

May 9th was "victory day" in Russia. Here's a comparison for 1 year of war.
[compare]

[/compare]
[compare]

[/compare]

The big changes were Kharkiv oblast and Kherson, and Kherson was already expensive. Given Russia is now a year more prepared, I have to admit that any gains on such a scale would very much surprise me this year, given that arms deliveries to Ukraine have not been that great.

A lot of Russians died in Ukraine to achieve very little. A lot of Ukrainians died, too, but they successfully defended their home and liberated half of two oblasts. These are the basic facts that shape morale.

 

[Mendel]

Article:

On Monday, Pulitzer Prize judges cited the work of the three Ukrainian journalists, along with Paris-based Lori Hinnant, in giving The Associated Press the prestigious award for public service.

Seven AP photographers, including Maloletka, also won a breaking news Pulitzer for their coverage of the war, including in Mariupol. The AP was also a finalist for a third award for work in Ukraine, this time for photography focused on the war's impact on the elderly.

Source: https://apnews.com/article/ap-pulitzers-mariupol-russia-d4bde22e1caf44ec4663b58723c403b7

See https://www.metabunk.org/threads/cl...-and-other-claims-by-russia.12332/post-267574 and https://www.metabunk.org/threads/cl...-and-other-claims-by-russia.12332/post-267941 for more context.

 

[Mendel]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-updates

Elements of the all-Russian pro-Ukrainian Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK) and Freedom of Russia Legion (LSR) conducted a raid into Belgorod Oblast on May 22. Russian sources began reporting on the morning of May 22 that a detachment of the RDK and LSR consisting of two tanks, an armored personnel carrier, and nine other armored vehicles crossed the international border and captured Kozinka, a settlement in the Grayvoron region of Belgorod Oblast within 600 meters of the border with Sumy Oblast.[1] Several Russian sources claimed that the grouping then captured the settlements of Glotovo and Gora Podol (3km and 5km from the border, respectively), although some milbloggers disputed claims that the attack completely captured Glotovo or Gora Podol, instead reporting that RDK forces only got to the Glotovo House of Culture.[2] ISW has not yet observed geolocated confirmation that the RDK or LSR reached Glotovo or Gora Podol. Geolocated footage posted on May 22 does confirm that the RDK struck a border post near Kozinka before crossing the border with at least one tank.[3] The RDK also posted footage reportedly showing the body of a Russian border guard in a border station, likely from the border crossing near Kozinka.[4] Russian milbloggers later claimed that Russian troops retook control of all three settlements.[5] Some Russian sources additionally reported that Russian forces repelled pro-Ukrainian sabotage groups near Dronovka, about 22km northwest of Kozinka.[6] The RDK additionally posted footage reportedly outside two settlements near the border area in Bryansk Oblast, but the nature of this incursion is unclear and ISW has not observed additional evidence or discourse surrounding actions in Bryansk Oblast on May 22.[7]

Ukrainian officials noted that they are aware of the attack but denied any direct involvement by the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Spokesperson Andriy Yusov noted that the RDK and LSR are comprised exclusively of Russian citizens and reported that the groups launched an operation in Belgorod Oblast to "liberate these territories...from the so-called Putin regime" and create a "security zone" by the border to protect Ukrainian civilians from further Russian shelling.[8] Advisor to the Head of the Ukrainian President's Office Mykhailo Podolyak stated that Ukraine is observing and studying the situation but "has no direct relation to it," noting that armed anti-regime Russian partisan movements are inevitable against the backdrop of the war.[9]

Russian forces likely pushed the RDK and LSR forces at least to the Kozinka border settlement and possibly out of Russian territory as of May 23.

 

[FatPhil]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-updates

Ukrainian officials noted that they are aware of the attack but denied any direct involvement by the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Spokesperson Andriy Yusov noted that the RDK and LSR are comprised exclusively of Russian citizens and reported that the groups launched an operation in Belgorod Oblast to "liberate these territories...from the so-called Putin regime" and create a "security zone" by the border to protect Ukrainian civilians from further Russian shelling.[8] Advisor to the Head of the Ukrainian President's Office Mykhailo Podolyak stated that Ukraine is observing and studying the situation but "has no direct relation to it," noting that armed anti-regime Russian partisan movements are inevitable against the backdrop of the war.[9]

I was hoping this would be brought up here, as it seems there's a wide range of (dis-)information floating around out there presently. One of the sources, I forget which one, implied that these insurgents were being fed and fueled by Ukraine, but not armed as such. As they retreat, of course, they're also given quarter. The groups seem to be Russian ethnonationalists, with no specific interest in "protect[[ing] Ukrainian civilians from further Russian shelling", it seems more like it's just a case of them having a common enemy; the reference link [8] supporting that statement leads nowhere: "На жаль, такої сторінки не існує" (page not found).
EDIT: It appears ISW can't construct URLs properly, and the hand-corrected link
https://suspilne.media/483544-u-belgorodskij-oblasti-zaavili-pro-proriv-ukrainskoi-drg-so-vidomo/ does work.
EDIT2: Quote found:

У пресслужбі легіону "Свобода Росії" Суспільному розповіли, що "ситуація складна, легіон та РДК створюють демілітаризовану зону на кордоні з РФ, звідки вони не зможуть обстрілювати Україну".

bolded: "demilitarised zone ... not be able to fire on Ukraine"