Very little of this comes from me. I've just assembled stuff from other sources. Stuff that makes sense to me.
Bakhmut - Ukraine could have refused this entire action and withdrawn to stronger positons to the west and held the line there against the Russian Winter Offensive on the Eastern Front. But Ukraine felt this wasn't enough. The Russian forces in the East are not very effective, but could be troublesome during the Ukrainian Summer offensives in the South. The strategic goal to this fighting withdrawal in Bakhmut was to degrade Russian forces in the East so that there would be no troublesome Russian counter-offensive there during the Summer, which would make it necessary to divert Ukrainian forces away from the South. Political pressure from Putin to take Bakhmut made the Russian forces come to the Ukrainians. There were three other major zones in the Russian Winter Offensive and some heavy fighting, which has been largely neglected in World News, but the Russians accomplished little in those other zones.
The real action right now is far in the rear where Ukrainian forces are preparing for the Summer Offensives.
-On the world stage, both Ukraine and Russia are relatively weak militaries with many problems. Russia's weakness and Ukraine's relative strength are the big surprises. Russia's weakness is due to more than the oft-cited ones - corruption, the inability to engage in combined arms combat, poor communications, etc. Even the regular Armed Forces are made up of units that are raised and supported in local regions; each one with its own agenda and goals. There's no central control; no strategic doctrine; no cohesive logistics support.
-Ukraine has no air power to speak of. That's a major weakness. They are relying on a hodge-podge of Western weapons which makes logistics tough. Some armored vehicles may have to be sent all the way back to Poland for maintenance and repair They may lack transport vehicles. They may run low on ground based anti-aircraft defenses. But you go to war with the army you have, not the army you want.
On the plus side, history shows that morale and competence count for a lot. They have been concentrating on combined arms combat training. They have a largely intact rail system in most of the country. Russia has not been able to hit a single moving train in Ukraine and that won't change.
Here's a likely scenario, but not the only possible scenario:
-Not one but several Ukrainian offensives during the Summer, each with limited objectives. This will require the Ukrainians to engage in combined arms obstacle-crossing to break into and penetrate Russian defenses, which include mines, anti-tank ditches, dragons’ teeth and the enhancement of natural obstacles. A tough nut.
The Ukrainians are not masters of this kind of warfare, but they have significantly improved. They only need to be good enough to defeat Russian defensive postions. This is an entirely normal part of war.
-Ukraine will make probing attacks in different spots somewhere in the Zaporizhzhia region, while there is a smaller offensive or holding action in the East. They've tried to keep that as small as possible as explained above.
-During each successive offensive, Ukraine will find a weakness and concentrate on a ten to twenty kilometer front.
-There will be very heavy fighting against strong positions. Eventually poor Russian morale, poor logistics and communications, and their proven lack of competence in combined arms combat will lead to a Ukrainian breakthrough. There will be a disorganized retreat by Russian forces.
-Ukraine now has reserves who will be able to extend each offensive for some time, but eventually the Russian forces will bring up reserves and reform.
Two to Four offensives will occur by September. The focus will be operations to strike logistics hubs, rear bases and ammunition stores deep behind the Russians’ front lines There will be punctuated advances, followed by an operational pause while the Ukrainians regroup.
-An example of thinking strategically, as one should, is to think about how Ukraine will keep up with an advance with an inadequate number of fuel trucks. There are many other boring things to think about.
-The objective for this Summer would be a push toward the Sea of Azov in the Zaporizhzhia region; and in particular the strategic city of Melitopol, which is a vital resupply point for the Russian forces. If the the Ukrainians managed to capture Melitopol they would effectively fracture the Russian occupying forces in two. The Russians would be in Luhansk and the Russians would be in Crimea but they would they have no connection between the two. This would also weaken Russia's foothold on the Sea of Azov.
They might then turn west on the south side of the Dnieper River without risking a major river crossing. However, even this successful push may result in the Ukrainians having at least two fronts to defend while still advancing.
-If that happens by Fall, Crimea could be seriously threatened by Ukrainian forces. But Crimea will probably not fall this year.
-The realistic long term Ukrainian Strategic Goal will not involve a military invasion of Crimea but to make it militarily untenable to the Russians and force a complete withdrawal. This would involve both cutting off supply routes and bringing Ukrainian long range precision weapons close enough for a strategic bombardment campaign.
-It's an ugly picture of two more years of war. Or three. Or...
-But if Russian forces collapse - if morale breaks - there's definitely a very slim chance that Ukraine could recapture Crimea with a military invasion this year.
-The recapture of Crimea would be game over. Ukraine would regain the strategic economic advantage. It would reestablish their ability to engage in international trade.
-On the other side: Russian forces – including some of their best divisions – have been trying to break down Ukrainian defenses in four main zones during their Winter Offensive on the Eastern Front. Apart from incremental gains in the Bakhmut area, they have made virtually no progress. Realistically, Russia is already in a defensive stance with no possibility for an effective Russian offensive in the foreseeable future. They might be able rebuild and reform their armed forces in... 3 to 5 years? Maybe?
-The Putin Regime is on shaky ground for many reasons. Politically, Putin cannot order full mobilization, but strategically he must order full mobilization. A fatal conundrum. The Russian economy is not collapsing but there is a slow but sure degradation at a time when an expansion is strategically crucial. Putin seems to have either no plan or is depending on the classic Russian strategy of "outsuffering" the West. He's probably hoping for a Trump inauguration in 2025, but there's almost no possibility of that due to changing demographics and eroding support.
-On the other side, Ukraine has to prove that they can use the support they're getting from from the West so that they can get further support in the years ahead. That's the realistic Ukrainian strategic goal this year. The long term Western strategy probably is not Ukrainian military victory by arms, but by outlasting the Putin regime, which is headed for inevitable collapse over a time frame of years rather than months.
-However the U.S. has consistently underestimated Ukraine and over-estimated Russia. That may still be the case.
-Another factor is that the U.S. is using the continued Russia/Ukraine War to contain the Russian threat in Europe while freeing up resources to face down China. China has about a three year window in which to pull off an invasion of Taiwan. So the Russia/Ukraine war only has to contain Russia for three years. That's the ugly but realistic picture.
What I worry about is this: Even if Russia completely withdraws from Ukraine, what's to stop them from bombarding Ukraine with long range weapons based inside Russia? And why would Ukraine hold back from the same? Are we headed toward a War of the Cities?
