Well, according to The Science Channel's series "Dark Matters: Twisted But True", Jose Manuel Rodriguez Delgado had developed a means by which to use electromagnetic waves as opposed to the invasive and indiscreet procedure of installing what he called a stimoceiver in a person's brain in order to carry out the means he discovered in the 1950s of controlling human thought, emotion, mood, and behavior.
And then there's this, from the paper From PSYOP To Mindwar, written by Temple of Set founder and Army officer Michael Aquino, though he is officially listed as co author:
"Psychotronic research is in its infancy, but the U.S. Army already possesses an
operational weapons systems designed to do what LTC Alexander would like ESP to do -
except that this weapons system uses existing communications media. It seeks to map the
minds of neutral and enemy individuals and then to change them in accordance with U.S.
national interests. It does this on a wide scale, embracing military units, regions, nations,
and blocs. In its present form it is called Psychological Operations (PSYOP).
Does PSYOP work, or is it a merely a cosmetic with which field commanders would
rather not be bothered?
Had the question been asked in 1970, the answer would have been that PSYOP
works very well indeed. In 1967 and 1968 alone, a total of 29,276 armed Viet Cong/NVA
(the equivalent of 95 enemy infantry battalions) surrendered to ARVN or MACV forces
under the Chieu Hoi amnesty program - the major PSYOP effort in the Vietnam War. At
the time MACV estimated that the elimination of that same number of troops in combat
would of cost us 6,000 dead.5
On the other hand, we lost the war - not because we were out-fought, but because we
were out-PSYOPed. Our national will to victory was attacked more effectively than we
attacked that of the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong, and perception of this fact
encouraged the enemy to hang on until the United States finally broke and ran for home.
So our PSYOP failed. It failed not because its principles were unsound, but rather
because it was outmatched by the PSYOP of the enemy. The Army's efforts enjoyed
some impressive successes, but our own PSYOP did not really change the minds of the
enemy populace, nor did it defend the U.S. populace at home against the propaganda of
the enemy. Furthermore the enemy's PSYOP was so strong that it - not bigger armies or
better weapons - overcame all of the Cobras and Spookys and ACAVs and B52s we
fielded. The lesson is not to ignore our own PSYOP capability, but rather to change it and
strengthen it so that it can do precisely that kind of thing to our enemy in the next war.
Better hardware is nice, but by itself it will change nothing if we do not win the war for
the mind."