Spurred in part by the growth of new media, conspiracism
has become a major subcultural phenomenon. This shift has not
gone unnoticed in academia. In recent decades, there has been
an explosion of research into the psychology of belief in conspiracy
theories. Much of this research interest has focused
on the individual correlates of conspiracy belief, but perhaps
the most consistent finding in the work on the psychology of
conspiracy theories is that belief in a particular theory is
strongly predicted by belief in others—even ostensibly unrelated
ones (Douglas & Sutton, 2008; Goertzel, 1994; Swami,
Chamorro-Premuzic, & Furnham, 2010; Swami et al., 2011).
For instance, someone who believes that the American government
was behind the 9/11 attacks is very likely to also believe
that Princess Diana was deliberately assassinated. One proposed
explanation for this connection is that beliefs in conspiracy
theories somehow support one another (Goertzel, 1994).
Even though the perpetrators may be different in each case, the
fact that one massive, sinister conspiracy could be successfully
executed in near-perfect secrecy suggests that many such plots
are possible. Over time, the view of the world as a place ruled
by conspiracies can lead to conspiracy becoming the default
explanation for any given event—a unitary, closed-off worldview
in which beliefs come together in a mutually supportive
network known as a monological belief system (Clarke, 2002;
Goertzel, 1994; Swami et al., 2010, 2011).
