Germanwings Airbus Crash: Factual Analysis

Yes, it's sad.

There has been going so much thinking into security and fail-proving the technology, as well as into training and vetting the human beings at the controls. And still there is a weak link in the chain now and then.
 
My study of this unusual story


"Perdita contatto radar - quota 2111m" = "Radar contact loss - altitude 2111 meters"

"Linea a quota costante di 2111m" = "Fixed-altitude line (2111 meters)"
 
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Regardless of the "why" this happened I come back to thinking about people who had perhaps 8 minutes pretty much sure they were going to die.....it is not a pleasant thought.

The recordings show that the passengers only panicked in the last moments.

It wasn't the whole 8 minutes, at least that .... :-(
 
The recordings show that the passengers only panicked in the last moments.

It wasn't the whole 8 minutes, at least that .... :-(

Well we couldn't hear screams until the last minute--but I'm sure there was plenty of anxiety hearing the pilot banging on the door.
 
For reference, some similar events in the past:

EgyptAir Flight 990
SilkAir Flight 185
LAM Mozambique Air Flight 470
JAL Flight 350
FedEx Flight 705

Reading through the Wikipedia entries it doesn't seem unusual for the hi-jacker to want to remain anonymous. No signaling of intent or bragging. I do wonder how effective psychological screenings really are with these types of people, and I guess it doesn't help they got rid of the flight engineer some decades ago. Atleast then you had three persons in cockpit which would make for an entirely different dynamic, I imagine.
 
Luckily aircraft remote-control and self-drive technologies are evolving quickly, together with immersive virtual reality sets.
Maybe in 10 years from now such events will be just impossible as overriden from ground. Bye bye hijackers and suicides, just sit there and wait for airport police.
 
Yes, it was unsettling. My three degrees of separation are that I have close family members living 15 miles east of the flight path, and about 25 miles from the point of impact. We stayed once off-season near the base of a ski lift, the top of which is about three miles from the crash site.
 
Barcelonette and its vicinity is a famous and busy glider flying destination, though not this time of year.
 
That's a question I have...is the cockpit relatively quiet where it is easy to pick up voices when they are not on their personal mics (the area microphone mentioned in the article) over the ambient sounds of the engines?
 
The area microphone on the overhead panel is very sensitive. In the past it has been used to determine engine speeds and such. Flight decks are relatively quiet these days.
 
My further analysis reveals a possible inconsistency between expected impact point and actual impact point, which may lead to think an attempt to recover some altitude:



But I have access only to coarse data, I may be wrong.
 
A question for Cobra or WW: When I was attached to the RAF, they often discussed hypoxia but I realise in a fast jet this is a very pressing concern.

I am assuming things will be more clear when the data recorder is recovered (and I think it was an error for the French investigator to immediately declare his opinion of deliberate crash), but am I correct that by the time one notices that you are affected by hypoxia, it is already too late?
 
"TWCobra" rightly mentioned that it's best not to discuss security procedures RE: the Flight Deck Doors. However, just this afternoon (PDT, West Coast USA) I heard on a Public Radio program a discussion with a former Aer Lingus pilot....and he really "spilled the beans", so to speak.

Elsewhere (perhaps this thread, perhaps in another) I floated the possibility of a pilot suicide. Early reports of recovered CVR recordings seem to be confirming that the F/O (or, "co-pilot") barred re-entry of the Captain, after he (Captain) exited for what I presume was a physiological need....aka, to use the lavatory.

It is heinous to consider, and at this stage perhaps a "rush to judgement" but....it fits the scenario, as described (at least to pilots who know how these airplanes are designed).

The looming question will be about motivation.

(I should also like to add something that doesn't, as far as I know violate any security concerns: The FAA mandated years ago that ALL U.S.-operated airlines always have at least two crewmembers on the Flight Deck at all times (post-9/11). This means that when either pilot (two-person crew, as are most airliners today) leaves for physiological, or other reasons, then another crewmwmber (can be a Flight Attendant) must stay in the cockpit, until the return of the pilot. Several reasons for this reasonable protocol, which should be self-evident. However, not all airlines in the world have adopted this protocol.

I expect this will now change, world-wide (amongst possible other more stringent procedures....yet to be determined, and of course meant to remain out of public knowledge, for the sake of security).
 
they often discussed hypoxia

Valid question. You may wish to Internet search "Time of Useful Consciousness". Modern airliners will provide an audible and visual cue alarm when cabin altitude exceeds ~14,000 feet. "T.U.C." applies more to an explosive decompression scenario, and presumes that the cabin almost immediately is vented to the airplane's actual pressure altitude. This relates to time needed to remain conscious long enough to don oxygen masks...."Quick Donning" O2 masks are standard, and it takes mere seconds at most.

In any event, seems these facts are moot at this point....the recovered audio files from the CVR have been made public in various media sources. Which point to no loss of cabin pressure, as the sounds of the Captain (hard-locked out of the Flight Deck) as he pounded on the door and shouted can be heard.
 
I am assuming things will be more clear when the data recorder is recovered (and I think it was an error for the French investigator to immediately declare his opinion of deliberate crash), but am I correct that by the time one notices that you are affected by hypoxia, it is already too late?

No doubt the pilots will know far more, but as a World War II aviation buff, I've read of pilots' being trained to recognize oxygen deprivation in its early stages. RAF photo reconnaissance pilots at that time flew in unpressurized cabins at altitudes close to today's airliners, and they were trained to quickly identify the signs (fuzzy thinking, etc.) and lower altitude or check the oxygen line before they blacked out.

EDIT: Nevermind, wheedwhacker got to it!
 
I've read of pilots' being trained to recognize oxygen deprivation in its early stages.

This is actually something taught to pilots in Primary training, not just military or airline. I won't clutter the thread, but one can find numerous video examples on YouTube for instance...just search "altitude chamber" to gain a few selections.
 
does this sound pretty accurate?

Yes..to re-iterate: Although there is indeed an "unlock" code (depending on the actual design as purchased by any particular airline) the "hardened" doors DO have an over-ride feature, controlled from inside. At my airline, once we pushed the (what we called "hard-lock" button) a timer started...30 minutes. Meaning, the door was dead-bolted....could not be opened at all. After 30 minutes, if the situation warranted, the "hard-lock" timer could be re-started, for another 30-minute cycle....over and over again, as necessary.

The "unlock" code is merely there for those instances when a door might close when on the ground, and no-one on the Flight Deck...or for a valid concern as to a possible pilot incapacitated event.

It is quite logical, once you think about it....(in a "Post 9/11 mindset", that is.....).

EDIT to add: Each airline buys a design that meets requirements, but might operate slightly differently...however in all cases, the EXACT details of operation, up to and including the "codes" (or other procedures) for emergency entry from the Cabin side remain confidential.
 
I don't know.
They're just data.
But viewing them in 3d is easier then reading them on a newspaper: plane didn't just fall, it "almost landed" (only twice the vertical speed of a normal landing).

Instead, a further and closer analysis shows something more interesting:


It looks to me that expected impact site should be at 1900m, not at 2500m on the side of the mountain.
This could suggest a final attempt to recover altitude... or wrong data :) Unfortunately flightradar24 data are very coarse; isn't there any site where to download from full data? (latitude, longitude, altitude, and exact timing with seconds)

Can the Flight Management System "decide" to recover altitude although programmed to reach 100 feet altitude, if it detects a mountain?
 
I know that this crash has all the makings of a murder/suicide, and one of despicable tragedy.
But I don't see that we can completely rule out pilot incapacitation yet.

I'm trust that the co-pilot was alone in the cockpit, and the pilot was trying to get in.

For this to be a murder/suicide crash, the co-pilot would have to do TWO things :
- Put the door system to 'lock' position, so that the pilot could not enter, and
- Gradually adjust the altitude of the plane to the point where it slammed into that mountain.
It is claimed that the clicks of the altitude adjustment were audible in the CVR, but did anyone hear these , and that these clicks were really from the altitude adjustment controls ?
And even if that is so, shouldn't the click of the door system switched to 'lock' position also be audible ?
Did that register on the CVR ? Did not hear anyone claim that yet.

The question is : Given the evidence we have, can we truly rule out the scenario that the co-pilot became incapacitated ?

I'm thinking of the following scenario where the co-pilot (alone in the cockpit) became incapacitated (for whatever reason) and :
- The plane was still set to 'manual' mode, meaning that it is controlled by the joystick on the left of the seat, which the incapacitated co-pilot may be touching into a gentle 'nose down' position, and
- The pilot, in panic trying to get in, forgot the code to enter the cockpit from outside.

Can we truly rule-out that scenario, given the evidence at hand, or not ?
 
- The pilot, in panic trying to get in, forgot the code to enter the cockpit from outside.
I think there are other members of the flight crew who know the code. In the badly acted video posted earlier (post 70) in this thread "Sally" the flight attendant (who couldn't pronounce her own name) knew the code. Also reports indicate that the pilot left the flight deck at 9.30 UTC and the descent was initiated by the co-pilot at 9.31 UTC

That being the case there would have to be some malfunction with the door coinciding with an incident that only affected the cockpit, didn't trigger any alarms, incapacitated the co-pilot and caused him to accidentally put the plane into a controlled dive, all within 1 minute of the pilot stepping out of the cockpit.

As much as I prefer the idea that this was just a terrible accident, it doesn't appear that would be the most likely explanation for the crash.
 
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- Gradually adjust the altitude of the plane to the point where it slammed into that mountain.
I read that copilot set the Flight Management System to automatically bring the plane down to 100 feet.
I also read that, even if it wished, it couldn't just "put the nose down and crash" because safety system would block such a manuevre.
Don't know what is true and what is guessing.

There's a humongous forum here, where people can only write if pay, which contains around 3000 messages about the topic. It's almost impossible to read all of them as they come, so quickly the threads grow! But posts look quite professional.
http://www.airliners.net/aviation-forums/general_aviation/read.main/6355861#menu91
 
A summary I found yesterday on that forum (bold are mine):

4U9525 departed BCN at 10.01 heading to DUS
Reached cruise at FL380 at 10.45
Left cruise at 10.46
Decent for 8 minutes, ATC lost signal at 10.53 at 6000ft
Crashed into the valley of white on one side of the mountain of the Three Bishoprics. Rough terrain up to 3000m high
Weather was good
A320 D-AIPX ex LH cn 147, manufactured November 1990, delivered 29/11/90, with 4U since January 2014
58,300 flight hours, 46,700 cycles
Last A Check Monday 23rd March 2014
Last C Check in summer 2013
Captain with LH & 4U for 10 years, 6000 flight hours on A320
144 passengers and 6 crew on board
Known nationalities include
Germany 72
Spain 35
Australia 2
Argentina 2
Iran 2
Venezuela 2
US 2
UK 1
Netherlands 1
Columbia 1
Mexico 1
Japan 1
Israel 1
Denmark 1
Belgium 1
Other nationalities to be confirmed 25
CVR found, damaged but readable
BEA leading investigation, assisted by BFU and Spanish equivalent
Technical advisors from Airbus, Germanwings & Lufthansa assisting
Reports FDR found (though nothing confirmed), severely damaged with memory chip dislodged and missing
NYT Report – one of the pilots outside of cockpit, co-pilot alone in cockpit while pilot went to the toilet
First 20 minutes on CVR reveal both pilots exchanging in a normal way
Captain then prepares briefing for landing in DUS. Co-pilot answers seem to be brief
Captain then ask co-pilot to take command of aircraft, sound of a seat moved backwards then a noise of a door being locked
Co-pilot alone in cockpit, manipulates switches of the flight monitoring system to activate decent
Co-pilot did not answer when pilot wanted to enter cockpit, co-pilot refused to open door
Breathing heard inside cockpit until crash
ATC requested pilots to declare 7700 emergency but no answer, no mayday or emergency called
ATC requests other aircraft to do radio relay to get in contact with Germanwings
Alarms were triggered to alert proximity to the ground, loud knocks are heard as to violently break down the cockpit door
Alarms which are pullups to straighten back the aircraft trigger just before final impact, probable sound of first impact on an embankment
Prosecutor concludes in his statement that the above actions as a ”will to destroy the aircraft”
Victim Identification starts today, 26 march 2015
Current investigation makes it likely that co-pilot crash the plane deliberately, more details on co-pilot’s background to be provided later
Co-pilot Andreas Lubitz, 28 from Germany, Worked with Germanwings since September 2013, not thought to have a terrorist background
 
For this to be a murder/suicide crash, the co-pilot would have to do TWO things :
- Put the door system to 'lock' position, so that the pilot could not enter, and
- Gradually adjust the altitude of the plane to the point where it slammed into that mountain.

All reports so far are suggesting that this is exactly what he did.

The question is : Given the evidence we have, can we truly rule out the scenario that the co-pilot became incapacitated ?

Again, all the preliminary reports say yes - he was heard with regular breathing pattern up to the time of the crash. I know it's possible for regular breathing to occur even when unconscious, but exactly what would have caused such a rapid incapacitation?

I know what you are saying - it's not a nice thought that perhaps this potentially innocent person is being thrown under the bus. However I don't think the investigators would flippantly (and publicly) throw around such accusations without having at least reasonable evidence to do so.

The evidence is pretty damning at this stage, especially with current revelations re his depression and recent breakup with a fiance and so forth. It goes beyond mere speculation and at this point is a reasonable conclusion to make.
 
News sources are reporting that a sick note has since been found, which started on the day of the crash. This was found torn up. Think that sorts of concludes the case now.

The only real positive here is that families and friends have been given a clear answer as to what has caused this crash in three days. This will provide some sort of comfort I think. Not knowing the answers and being kept in the dark, and even worse, not finding your loved one's remains is simply unimaginable sustained pain.

A very sad week for aviation.
 
I'm thinking of the following scenario where the co-pilot (alone in the cockpit) became incapacitated (for whatever reason) and :
- The plane was still set to 'manual' mode, meaning that it is controlled by the joystick on the left of the seat, which the incapacitated co-pilot may be touching into a gentle 'nose down' position, and
- The pilot, in panic trying to get in, forgot the code to enter the cockpit from outside.

Can we truly rule-out that scenario, given the evidence at hand, or not ?

ModeS data from the transponder is capable of showing the altitude that was set for the autopilot (MCP/FMC). The co-pilot set the altitude to its lowest setting, 100 feet.

09:30:51Z.127 T,3c6618,43.119095,5.674247,38000,GWI18G
09:30:51Z.636 T,3c6618,43.120453,5.675092,38000,GWI18G
09:30:52Z.386 MCP/FMC ALT: 38000 ft QNH: 1006.0 hPa
09:30:52Z.567 T,3c6618,43.122208,5.676482,38000,GWI18G
09:30:53Z.036 T,3c6618,43.122894,5.676993,38000,GWI18G
09:30:53Z.546 T,3c6618,43.124271,5.678166,38000,GWI18G
09:30:54Z.083 MCP/FMC ALT: 13008 ft QNH: 1006.0 hPa
09:30:54Z.096 T,3c6618,43.125295,5.678689,38000,GWI18G
09:30:54Z.676 T,3c6618,43.125961,5.679421,38000,GWI18G
09:30:55Z.156 T,3c6618,43.127157,5.680259,38000,GWI18G
09:30:55Z.397 MCP/FMC ALT: 96 ft QNH: 1006.0 hPa
09:30:55Z.453 MCP/FMC ALT: 96 ft QNH: 1006.0 hPa

Between 09:30:52 and 09:30:55 we can see that the autopilot was manually changed from 38,000 feet to 100 feet and 9 seconds later the aircraft started to descend, probably with the "open descent" autopilot setting.
The reason why the selected altitude is 96ft is that least significant bit for altitude setting equals 16 ft, and we suspect that you can’t set autopilot to 0000 altitude, so the minimum would be 100ft down rounded to 96ft in binary representation in BDS40h register.

http://forum.flightradar24.com/thre...transponder-of-4U9525-and-found-some-more-dat
 
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The Airbus Flight control system is sophisticated, but not "intelligent".

To clear up some growing misconceptions...

It won't avoid a mountain.
It won't avoid another aircraft.
It won't avoid a thunderstorm.
It won't configure flaps and gear for an Autoland.
It can't Autoland on every runway.
It can't Autoland in any weather conditions.
It can't program itself.
It can't takeoff by itself.
It can't abort a takeoff by itself.
It won't avoid restricted airspace by itself.
It won't follow air traffic control instructions by itself.
It can't operate the speedbrakes, or the gear or the flaps by itself.
It can't figure out what speed and configuration to land at in abnormal conditions.

All those things must be done by the pilots

It will allow the aircraft to run out of fuel.
It can be placed in situations where it will allow a stall or a massive overspeed.
You could even roll it if you knew the system well enough.

It's just an aircraft.

Pilot incapacitation: there is no "click" when using the switch to deny entry. Three separate autopilot selections must be made to make the aircraft descend at VMO. It cannot happen by accident.

In open descent, the thrust will be at idle. Idle thrust increases as the aircraft descends due to increasing air pressure. That flattens out the descent profile as you get closer to the ground. Wind changes during descent will also affect an open des profile.
 
The Airbus Flight control system is sophisticated, but not "intelligent".

To clear up some growing misconceptions...

It won't avoid a mountain.
It won't avoid another aircraft.
It won't avoid a thunderstorm.
It won't configure flaps and gear for an Autoland.
It can't Autoland on every runway.
It can't Autoland in any weather conditions.
It can't program itself.
It can't takeoff by itself.
It can't abort a takeoff by itself.
It won't avoid restricted airspace by itself.
It won't follow air traffic control instructions by itself.
It can't operate the speedbrakes, or the gear or the flaps by itself.
It can't figure out what speed and configuration to land at in abnormal conditions.

All those things must be done by the pilots

It will allow the aircraft to run out of fuel.
It can be placed in situations where it will allow a stall or a massive overspeed.
You could even roll it if you knew the system well enough.

It's just an aircraft.

Pilot incapacitation: there is no "click" when using the switch to deny entry. Three separate autopilot selections must be made to make the aircraft descend at VMO. It cannot happen by accident.

In open descent, the thrust will be at idle. Idle thrust increases as the aircraft descends due to increasing air pressure. That flattens out the descent profile as you get closer to the ground. Wind changes during descent will also affect an open des profile.
Is it possible that the co-pilot could have become incapacitated BEFORE the other pilot tried to gain entry to the cabin? And as for the lock on the inside of the cockpit door, would it be a standard procedure to lock it, even though it is already locked, just to prevent anyone who may be able to figure out the code from gaining entry? Like a terrorist that may have figured out what the codes were for the airline? If that is so then that may explain why he did not open the door for the other pilot, and why the plane was headed down (co-pilot incapacitated) while the other pilot was trying to gain entry. It is a stretch, but what do you all think? I am also very perplexed at how this could have happened or what could have went wrong with the co-pilot.
 
As I understand it the entry system will allow someone outside ht cockpit to enter after a delay when entering the code - so if the co-pilot had been incapacitated the door would have unlocked at some time - depending on the delay the airline set.
 
Correct. You don't get in instantly, and entry can be denied after code use.

The aircraft won't descend just because someone is incapacitated. Pushing on the sidestick won't do anything either if the autopilot is engaged.
 
I know it's possible for regular breathing to occur even when unconscious, but exactly what would have caused such a rapid incapacitation?

As I've pointed out, and other media sources have reported (even was admitted to by a representative of a German airline pilots association) the only way for a trained crew-member (the Captain) to have remained locked out is by a deliberate activation of an over-ride from inside the cockpit.

This rules out incapacitation of the First Officer.

Seeing as how this was (allegedly) a deliberate act, doesn't seem to have any bunk attached to it. There no doubt may be bunk bubbling up by concerted conspiracy theorists in days and weeks to come, however.
 
Mode S transponder read outs appear on ATC screens, so they can tell if a pilot has selected the correct cleared altitude. Before this aircraft descended, apparently mode S showed 100 feet selected. That can only be done by a human. No electronics drive that selector.

There are too many things happening all at once here for it to be anything but deliberate.
 
I see Barcelona has a runway which points out over the Med, I'd assume they just carry on the way they're heading when they take off with a gentle turn towards their destination

Having lived in Barcelona for over 6 years, and having flown from there to Ireland, Finland, and Germany, I can attest to the fact that all flights from that airport I've ever been on head out over the Med, and likewise those arriving also come into the airport from the Med. It's quite beautiful to look out and see the city spread out to your right as you arrive. Of course, it helps no end knowing that you'll soon be back in BCN, it's an amazing city to live in - once you get used to taking care of your stuff when you're out. Pickpockets are rampant there, many fly in from South America every summer just for that reason.
 
Having lived in Barcelona for over 6 years, and having flown from there to Ireland, Finland, and Germany, I can attest to the fact that all flights from that airport I've ever been on head out over the Med, and likewise those arriving also come into the airport from the Med. It's quite beautiful to look out and see the city spread out to your right as you arrive. Of course, it helps no end knowing that you'll soon be back in BCN, it's an amazing city to live in - once you get used to taking care of your stuff when you're out. Pickpockets are rampant there, many fly in from South America every summer just for that reason.
That actually surprises me unless they have more than one runway. They tend to take off and land in the same direction to avoid any potential head on incidents. I know at Bristol though they DO change which direction they do both in, presumably due to wind direction.
either that or they come in from the med and then loop round.
 
I'm not a pilot, so I don't know how many runways there are, but I always got the impression there was more than one.
 

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I'm not a pilot, so I don't know how many runways there are, but I always got the impression there was more than one.

Yes, many International airports have more than one runway....but really, it isn't that relevant here. Sorry.

Perhaps Mick West would suggest such conversations go into "Chit-Chat"? (Just a thought...)...
 
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