Russia would, and they weren't sent there, the agents were already there before they arrived (assuming there was more than one). Risk can be reduced by instructing them to:
1) Make entry through the parking lot (see animation in post
#12);
2) Do not split;
3) Head to the theater's main entrance;
4) Engage people along the way;
5) Do not engage the balcony area;
6) Start a fire in the theatre;
7) Leave the theatre through the same path;
8) Leave the building through the parking lot.
With the instructions above, all the agents needed to do was to remain in the theatre, in the balcony area, and wait for their arrival and exit of the terrorists.
That would be the means for the goals, not the goal itself. It would be the goal for ISIS, whatever that means for ISIS (their relationship with ISIS is still not conclusively established, by the way).
Things being possible do not make things being probable. Yeah, they could have done that, but why send an own operative in the middle of a killing spree, why not send the terrorists alone? What was the purpose of the hidden agent, except than risking to be killed? C'mon.
So far, no one tried to make a case for 3, hence my post stating there are only two hypotheses in this thread.
I tried to make a case for 3), and failed to find any meaningful probability for it. While the first part of my post was a direct answer to you, the second part was a general discussion on what I think could have being possible and the relative probabilities (btw, in the meantime I thought a couple other possibilities with even smaller probabilities than 1), 2), 3), but at least with a probability which is not essentially zero (ie.: a rogue faction of Russian, or even Ukrainian, services or groups).
The false flag can be used for justification of escalation, Putin speaks to his internal audience as much as the external. I can think of several reasons where he would try to make the most out of a false flag in relation to Ukraine, but I also do not think that was his main goal under hypothesis (2).
All good points, and true. However (as I already said) Putin is no more in the same position as, say, 1999. Today his power is (at least seen form the outside) rock-solid. He surely cares about internal audience, but, if he wants, he can escalate whatever he wants and just quell any dissent by force. In effect, I think he risks more from the Russian elite (his close associates) than from the general public.
No, the news agency historically associated with ISIS published a text that looked suspicious. Then a photo was published with blurred faces and masks, the only relation with the photo and the suspects is the clothing. Then the footage appeared. Was it a live stream? Was it sent to ISIS during their escape?
Was it taken directly from their phone after capture?
I have no idea. But surely claims of responsibility from ISIS (which is not known to make false claims), plus an (albeit blurred) picture, plus a video, are some good evidence that ISIS did it (while we have no comparable evidence that ISIS did
not do it, no evidence at all, actually).
Still, ISIS could have used them, the secret services took notice (the Western services certainly did), and the FSB decided to let them do it by creating the necessary conditions and shaping the plan (2a). Or there was never any ISIS, only the FSB (2b).
Surely both Western and Russians (and Chinese, Israeli, and every other secret service in the world) took notice. If and what the FSB did to 'shape the plan' after the fact I don't know, nor it's relevant. 'There was never any ISIS, only the FSB' is not hypothesis 2b), it's just the plain 2) hypothesis (it was a false flag), for which a estimate a 'very low probability' (for reasons stated in post
#36)
It depends on how you define "evidence", certainly there is suspicion, and the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.
What I consider 'evidence' is clearly (I surmise) stated in post
#36
Evidence for 3), Ukrainian involvement, is just Putin's words, which are unreliable by themselves (he, and his mouthpieces, lied shamelessly multiple times) and suspicious (because he benefits by saying that). They are also counterbalanced by Ukainians denies (which are as suspicious as Putin's words for the same reason, but with the advantage Ukrainian were never caught saying a lie so big, contrary to Putin), and they are gainsayed by the closest ally Putin has (Lukashenko).
But I'll reword it to clarify: we have two parties, let's call them party R and party U, with opposite interests and saying the exact opposite thing. Any bet on who is reason is as good as any other one at this point: 50% R has the reason, 50% U does . However one of the parties is a notorious shameless liar, while the other one is not known to ever have said a lie as big as this one: this skews the probabilities, say they become 30% for R, 70% for U, just to make an example. Then we come to know a close friend of R (which cannot be suspected to have any sympathies for U) contradicts what R himself says. This evidence skews the probabilities again, say 10% for R and 90% for U, and in the end, from the evidence we have, we see U claims to be 9 times more probable to be true than R's (90% vs. 10%).
Whatever numbers you decide to use for the probabilities, it's still a fact that there is
more evidence for U to be the truthful party than for R.
Of course, if you have more evidence (I stress 'evidence', not 'speculations'), you're welcome.
