Crocus City Hall Moscow Terrorist Attack

So far, no one tried to make a case for 3, hence my post stating there are only two hypotheses in this thread.
If a false flag, has anyone made a case for a rogue operation by FSB and/or Russian military to embarrass/weaken Putin? Less than a year ago there was an attempted coup by Prigozhin that was rumored to have been supported, or at not opposed, by some senior officials. There must be those within Russian officialdom who are not happy Putin has decimated the Russian military in this misadventure.

The false flag can be used for justification of escalation, Putin speaks to his internal audience as much as the external. I can think of several reasons where he would try to make the most out of a false flag in relation to Ukraine, but I also do not think that was his main goal under hypothesis (2).
Short of employing NBC weapons, how do you escalate a war in which you were the aggressor and has been on going for over two years? I mean, if the Russians had more troops, planes, artillery, missiles, drones, etc., to retaliate for an action such as this, wouldn't they have used them to try for a knockout blow at some point? As it is, they are down to employing poorly/untrained troops as fodder, relying on artillery shells and missiles from the DPRK, and buying drones from a developing nation like Iran while fighting a war of attrition.
 
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Russian volunteers have repeatedly breached the border away from the frontlines.
That's true, but hardly relevant imho. A full-fledged (albeit limited) military operation with heavy equipment is one thing, four people with at most light weapons trying to sneak past the Russian lines towards a closed border is a totally different matter.

That's up north where the suspects were headed. Their plan A may have been to cross into Belarus and enter Ukraine from there.
We really don't know what their plan was. Just, the Belarus border (or any other border actually, except wirh Ukraine) is much more easy to cross than the Ukrainian one (Belarus of course would no be safe for the terrorists, but I guess it's then easier to move somewhere else from Belarus than from Russia).

I'm simply assuming that Ukraine won't extradite people to Russia, and that Russian secret service can't easily reach them there.
Fair assumptions. I too don't think Ukraine would have extradited the terrorists to Russia (but more for humanitarian reasons than for anything else). They would have been probably detained indefinetly. This, however, does not make crossing the Ukrainian the border easier, and the difficulty of crossing the border is the main problem of the 'they planned to flee to Ukraine' narrative.

You seem to assume the culprits wouldn't want to remain unknown.
Not sure what you mean by this (usually terrorists want to be known), but I can't understand which relevance this has.

Yes. Doesn't prevent the culprits from wanting to seek refuge there, though.
Of course it doesn't: if the original plan goes astray and (for instance) Belarus border turns out to be impassable they might as well try to go to Ukraine no matter the slim chances of succeeding (it's always better than zero chances), and does not imply any Ukrainian abetting at all. They may have just done that (according to Lukashenko).
 
I can think of several actions they could have carried out to make sure the terrorists and the operation would succeed:
  • Arrive early at the scene;
  • Make sure security and police enforcement are either sent home, or significantly reduced, unarmed/outgunned, and stationed away from the entrance, and the path to the theatre;
  • Take over the command of the security/police enforcement left, so they can be ordered to not engage;
  • Keep clear the driveway towards the entrance;
  • Take control of CCTV;
  • Lock emergency exits along the way to curral people towards certain parts of the building (reduces casualties, and the probability of last second heroes);
  • Identify, remove or protect people who shouldn't be there;
  • Make sure the theater is destroyed in case the terrorists fail to do so;
  • Make sure a stash of ammo and weapons is placed somewhere they know about, in case they need;
  • Make sure the terrorists leave safely;
  • Park a backup vehicle in the designated location they know about, and keep the exit clear;
  • Make sure the terrorists escape through the planned highway route in an obvious, and possibly tracked, car.
For most of these actions, personnel would be better placed elsewhere than in the balcony of the theatre.
That's already an established fact.
If you mentioned it on this thread, I must have overlooked it. My apologies.
 
That's true, but hardly relevant imho. A full-fledged (albeit limited) military operation with heavy equipment is one thing, four people with at most light weapons trying to sneak past the Russian lines towards a closed border is a totally different matter.
Yes. Much easier to sneak for four people, coming from the direction that the Russians are not watching.
Not sure what you mean by this (usually terrorists want to be known), but I can't understand which relevance this has.
You made a point about whether Ukraine would welcome them, which supposed that Ukraine could identify them. But if they hid (which I think they would, assuming they could get past Ukrainian border guards), do you think Ukraine would look very hard for them?
 
Russia would, and they weren't sent there, the agents were already there before they arrived (assuming there was more than one). Risk can be reduced by instructing them to:

1) Make entry through the parking lot (see animation in post #12);
2) Do not split;
3) Head to the theater's main entrance;
4) Engage people along the way;
5) Do not engage the balcony area;
6) Start a fire in the theatre;
7) Leave the theatre through the same path;
8) Leave the building through the parking lot.

With the instructions above, all the agents needed to do was to remain in the theatre, in the balcony area, and wait for their arrival and exit of the terrorists.
That would be the means for the goals, not the goal itself. It would be the goal for ISIS, whatever that means for ISIS (their relationship with ISIS is still not conclusively established, by the way).
Things being possible do not make things being probable. Yeah, they could have done that, but why send an own operative in the middle of a killing spree, why not send the terrorists alone? What was the purpose of the hidden agent, except than risking to be killed? C'mon.


So far, no one tried to make a case for 3, hence my post stating there are only two hypotheses in this thread.
I tried to make a case for 3), and failed to find any meaningful probability for it. While the first part of my post was a direct answer to you, the second part was a general discussion on what I think could have being possible and the relative probabilities (btw, in the meantime I thought a couple other possibilities with even smaller probabilities than 1), 2), 3), but at least with a probability which is not essentially zero (ie.: a rogue faction of Russian, or even Ukrainian, services or groups).

The false flag can be used for justification of escalation, Putin speaks to his internal audience as much as the external. I can think of several reasons where he would try to make the most out of a false flag in relation to Ukraine, but I also do not think that was his main goal under hypothesis (2).
All good points, and true. However (as I already said) Putin is no more in the same position as, say, 1999. Today his power is (at least seen form the outside) rock-solid. He surely cares about internal audience, but, if he wants, he can escalate whatever he wants and just quell any dissent by force. In effect, I think he risks more from the Russian elite (his close associates) than from the general public.

No, the news agency historically associated with ISIS published a text that looked suspicious. Then a photo was published with blurred faces and masks, the only relation with the photo and the suspects is the clothing. Then the footage appeared. Was it a live stream? Was it sent to ISIS during their escape?
Was it taken directly from their phone after capture?
I have no idea. But surely claims of responsibility from ISIS (which is not known to make false claims), plus an (albeit blurred) picture, plus a video, are some good evidence that ISIS did it (while we have no comparable evidence that ISIS did not do it, no evidence at all, actually).

Still, ISIS could have used them, the secret services took notice (the Western services certainly did), and the FSB decided to let them do it by creating the necessary conditions and shaping the plan (2a). Or there was never any ISIS, only the FSB (2b).
Surely both Western and Russians (and Chinese, Israeli, and every other secret service in the world) took notice. If and what the FSB did to 'shape the plan' after the fact I don't know, nor it's relevant. 'There was never any ISIS, only the FSB' is not hypothesis 2b), it's just the plain 2) hypothesis (it was a false flag), for which a estimate a 'very low probability' (for reasons stated in post #36)

It depends on how you define "evidence", certainly there is suspicion, and the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.
What I consider 'evidence' is clearly (I surmise) stated in post #36
Evidence for 3), Ukrainian involvement, is just Putin's words, which are unreliable by themselves (he, and his mouthpieces, lied shamelessly multiple times) and suspicious (because he benefits by saying that). They are also counterbalanced by Ukainians denies (which are as suspicious as Putin's words for the same reason, but with the advantage Ukrainian were never caught saying a lie so big, contrary to Putin), and they are gainsayed by the closest ally Putin has (Lukashenko).
But I'll reword it to clarify: we have two parties, let's call them party R and party U, with opposite interests and saying the exact opposite thing. Any bet on who is reason is as good as any other one at this point: 50% R has the reason, 50% U does . However one of the parties is a notorious shameless liar, while the other one is not known to ever have said a lie as big as this one: this skews the probabilities, say they become 30% for R, 70% for U, just to make an example. Then we come to know a close friend of R (which cannot be suspected to have any sympathies for U) contradicts what R himself says. This evidence skews the probabilities again, say 10% for R and 90% for U, and in the end, from the evidence we have, we see U claims to be 9 times more probable to be true than R's (90% vs. 10%).

Whatever numbers you decide to use for the probabilities, it's still a fact that there is more evidence for U to be the truthful party than for R.

Of course, if you have more evidence (I stress 'evidence', not 'speculations'), you're welcome.
 
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Yes. Much easier to sneak for four people, coming from the direction that the Russians are not watching.
You are perfectly entitled to believe this of course. I rather would find it easier to pass from an open and normally used border than from a closed border where noone is allowed to pass, and on a active war frontline on top of this. But it's just me.

You made a point about whether Ukraine would welcome them, which supposed that Ukraine could identify them. But if they hid (which I think they would, assuming they could get past Ukrainian border guards), do you think Ukraine would look very hard for them?
That's true, but I made the point in the context of Ukraine having helped the Crocus attack terrorists (and to have presumably organized their flight too, the 'window' Putin spoke of), which obviously implies they would have known who they were.
 
The false flag narrative has a few issues, I think. If we assume it is 100% true, the Russian way of presenting the link to Ukraine is very poor. Why would you not create a link that is very strong, and hard to deconstruct? For example, if the purpose is to link the attack to Ukraine to escalate, to make mobilization easier for the Russian state, etc. why wouldn't the perpetrators carry Ukrainian names, Ukrainian passports, etc. ?

Another thing to consider is the differences between propaganda that is intended for domestic and foreign audiences. As I see it, the false flag narrative is actually beneficial to Russia(from foreign perspective), it distracts Ukrainians and their supporters from the possible fact that the Russian regime is having issues with security--a far more damaging narrative than "Putin is an evil mastermind".

If we consider the false flag as true, presumably the two attacks that happened in early March as reported by Russian state media / FSB would also be false flags? What would be their purpose? Almost nobody in western media talks about them, the narrative in most mainstream western media is that the USA warned Russia about the attack, which then Russia ignored. I'd add that the particular warning that is being referred to, happened after both of those two attacks on 7th and 8th of March.

My final question would be(again, assuming the false flag is true), what is the purpose of Putin saying a few days before the attack that the warnings from US are "blackmail" that is intended to destabilize the country?

I think for most of these to make sense you have to basically make some sort of argument that says that Putin/Kremlin/FSB are making sure they're not "too obvious" with their plans--as if they needed to be, given the population they are primarily targeting with propaganda is domestic anyway.

edit: forgot to also add, there will always be a problem when opportunism is part of the game. Most historical analysis today accepts that the Reichstag fire wasn't a false flag--but the response to it(opportunism) muddied the waters so heavily that when you look at the consequences it is almost impossible to not come to the conclusion that it was not planned. If tomorrow Putin decides to heavily escalate(let's say nuclear use even) and pins the justification all on this attack; it would be very hard to argue against it being a false flag.
 
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This thread, not having enough noise yet despite Minsk[*]'s contributions, needs more quotes from random people tangentially related to the Kremlin. So I bring you a man with a reputation for accuracy[**], Kadyrov!

Now I don';t know which of the three languages on the page the interview took place in, so I will only quote the Russian, as I presume that's the one that people will be most able to do pattern-matching on to get a vague feeling that the English translation of the sentences I shall embolden is a fair one.

https://telegra.ph/Intervyu-Glavy-C...va-informacionnomu-agentstvu-Al-Arabiya-01-28
Интервью Главы Чеченской Республики Рамзана Кадырова информационному агентству «Аль-Арабия»
Журналист Ханин ас-ШулиJanuary 28, 2024

[...]

[Al Arabiya] - Вы говорили о том, что голоса мусульман обеспечивают победу на выборах. Считаете ли Вы, что Россия стала исламским государством?

[Kadyrov] - Россия православная страна, но большинство населения России- мусульмане! Чечня- исламское государство! Когда шайтан развалил СССР, Аллах дал на защиту России мусульман и поэтому она не развалилась!

[Al Arabiya] - Но если в государстве большинство мусульман, то правителем его должен быть мусульманин. Так сказано в Коране.

[Kadyrov] - А кто сказал, что так не будет?! Аллах лучше знает, когда Россию возглавит истинный Мусульманин. Владимир Владимирович Путин очень уважительно относится к Исламу. Он читает + Священный Коран. Он главнокомандующий Священного Джихада. Может, Великий Аллах призовет его в Правоверные. Или надоумит его в нужный час передать власть в руки истинного Правоверного!
Content from External Source
And the sentences in bold translate to:
"Putin is very respectful of Islam. He reads the Holy Koran. He is the commander-in-chief of the Holy Jihad."
hopefully, 'Putin', 'Islam', 'Koran', 'commander', and 'Jihad' should jump right out - but use your own preferred translation tool.

Now you know!

[* When I saw that update, it was not explicitly Lukashenko who was the source: "Belarus helped prevent escape of "terrorists" across border, ... Ambassador Dmitry Krutoy said Saturday, according to Belarus’ official news agency BELTA." https://edition.cnn.com/europe/live...g-03-23-24/h_aeb69fd2854849cb9a2e4bc14a24293d (ellision's a bit naughty, but increases infomation density)]
[** a poor one, obviously]
 
Almost nobody in western media talks about them, the narrative in most mainstream western media is that the USA warned Russia about the attack, which then Russia ignored.
Strong point, though it can be made to swing either way.


Most historical analysis today accepts that the Reichstag fire wasn't a false flag
I wouldn't dare to commit to anything more definite than "it's controversial" after perusing the German wikipedia entry.
 
If a false flag, has anyone made a case for a rogue operation by FSB and/or Russian military to embarrass/weaken Putin?
I heard it in the Ukrainian channels before the arrests, as it was such a blatant failure when Putin himself downplayed the warnings and accused the West of scaremongering and blackmailing, only for it to happen. And on top of it, the terrorists managed to leave the scene after the special forces and police failed to show up. However, right after the arrests, the Ukrainians reinforced their view that it's indeed a false flag, because Putin is currently making the most out of it, and the presence of secret service agents at the scene is becoming more apparent.

One youtuber who frequently speaks about "the behind the scenes", or as he sometimes puts it "the kitchen talk", if you understand the reference, is Civil Engineer, Russian businessman and Christian, Constantine, from "Inside Russia". This video is 2 days old, so he might have changed his mind already, as he will often come forward and admit he was wrong in some of his views, and then explain why. I believe he's going to change his position to "false flag" soon, in light of the latest developments, and because that was his first thought:

He talks about why it's not a false flag attack from (08:03) but the whole video is relevant.


Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zd_daLQBvWk&t=483s


There must be those within Russian officialdom who are not happy Putin has decimated the Russian military in this misadventure.
About a year ago, before Girkin's arrest, retired officers, visibly very nervous, launched their own presidential candidate. They expressed their dissatisfaction with the state of the armed forces and the country. Then they quietly disappeared from public view. There's a careful balance to keep the military in check: restocking the army+corruption, mobilisation+corruption, war economy+corruption, stabilisation of the frontline, purges, punishments, and demonstrations of strength and popularity. Constantine has several lives about what might be happening behind the scenes around Putin, and the people around him who want to see him gone (Constantine mostly does lives, and past lives are available in his channel in the Lives tab).
 
Short of employing NBC weapons, how do you escalate a war in which you were the aggressor and has been on going for over two years?
It depends on the perception of the audience. From an external audience viewpoint, Putin has exhausted his military capacity for escalation short of NBC. However, Trump has not won yet, and Putin has not declared war yet, which would give him access to additional meat (regardless of how it might turn out in practice in a modern war, he still can do a lot of damage with just meat, if he can control the meat).

In his mind, and the internal audience's mind away from Belgorod, this is still the SVO, it didn't affect them that much, will eventually go away. Thus, in order for Putin to have access to a much larger army (not that it's his main goal, it's one of his options), he needs to proceed with his shaping operations, as planned by the KGB (FSB): establishing war economy, tightening control at home (narrative+legislation+surveillance+fear, which a false flag can be a half-step), cause very serious disturbances worldwide, make NK, China, Iran, terrorist groups, dictatorships and the so-called "useful idiots" support him.
 
Strong point, though it can be made to swing either way.



I wouldn't dare to commit to anything more definite than "it's controversial" after perusing the German wikipedia entry.
Huh, I looked it up; apparently there's been some new information since 2010s. I've mostly relied on Ian Kershaw and Richard Evans, who are perhaps the most prominent scholars of that era. Still, the point remains even if the example isn't the best; opportunism is hard to distinguish from conspiratorial planning.

To return to Russia, I forgot to mention news of another attack which happened in Turkey towards the end of January; because I didn't want to speculate too much--but you mentioned that the reasoning can swing either way; which is fair. — Two masked assailants attacked a Roman Catholic church in Istanbul during a Sunday Mass, killing one person, Turkish officials said. As the news reports, one of the assailants was from Tajikistan, and one from Russia.

It seems likely that it is the same terrorist cell.

Here and here are also the news about the attack on 7th of march(1 day before US public warning), that I didn't link in previous comment. I can't find the news of the attack on 8th of march; so maybe I'm just misremembering that second one. But the article does mention that FSB claims to have stopped another attack earlier in the month.

When you put all these together, taking FSB/Russian sources at their word; seems to indicate that there's been many many attacks. I'd argue that makes the false flag scenario less likely(is anyone even talking about these events inside Russia? they certainly aren't in most mainstream western news outlets).
 
I think it extremely unlikely that Ukraine, or any pro-Ukrainian groups, had anything to do with the Crocus theatre attack.

As other posters have pointed out, if the attackers were heading to Ukraine, it wouldn't be with the assistance or knowledge of that nation's government. If they had reached Ukraine it would have been an enormous embarrassment for the Ukrainians, and a propaganda triumph for Putin.

If the similarities between a man in the theatre audience and one of the personnel involved in the terrorist's capture was first noticed by a Ukrainian organisation, we should bear in mind that there is a propaganda war going on, and we know there are decent coders/ programmers in Ukraine.

To clarify, I think that "deep fakery" is unlikely. But had it been used, hypothetically, to embarrass the Putin government or raise doubts in the minds of the Russian public, I wouldn't consider it morally reprehensible, given the context of the unjustifiable Russian invasion and ongoing attacks.
 
For most of these actions, personnel would be better placed elsewhere than in the balcony of the theatre.
You are assuming they were only in the balcony.

If you mentioned it on this thread, I must have overlooked it. My apologies.
Not exactly, what I'm saying is that, if you watch the attack from the various viewpoints that were published on the internet so far, and then watch the "blue men" in the balcony, you would know right away it's the same event. For instance, I trimmed the footage I published in my original post to cut out what happened right after, but the full version is easy to find.
 
Things being possible do not make things being probable
A hypothesis is based on at least possible things, no matter how improbable, but in this case there is historical precedence for the practice, hence there's even a name for it. In any situation, we're limited by the information that is available, and score the probability similarly to how you've done. The aim of the discussion is to summarise the pros and cons for each side, so the score can be more objectively set, as right now there are several millions believing hypothesis (2), including Russians, and the Ukrainian government is supporting it too in the (dis/mis) information space.

why send an own operative in the middle of a killing spree, why not send the terrorists alone?
Because there is a risk of failure in a country where the stakes are high, and failure can lead to severe punishment.

What was the purpose of the hidden agent, except than risking to be killed?
The purpose of the agent would be to make sure the terrorists would succeed in reaching the theatre (through preparation), be the first at the scene to destroy any evidence that could expose the hypothetical false flag, ensure the theatre is burned down, and ensure they will initially escape. Agents risk their lives routinely, you can watch how calm the agent is.

I thought a couple other possibilities with even smaller probabilities than 1), 2), 3), but at least with a probability which is not essentially zero (ie.: a rogue faction of Russian, or even Ukrainian, services or groups).
Duke also mentioned internal dissent for letting the terrorist attack happen to make Putin look bad, that would make the list: 1) Classic terrorism 2) False flag 3) SBU/GUR 4) Internal dissent (sharks) 5) Rogue faction (bottom feeders?). Not necessarily in order of likelihood, as I'd move (3) all the way to the end. I've come across with all 5 claims in the (dis/mis) information space, but they are evolving day-by-day.

he can escalate whatever he wants and just quell any dissent by force
Not yet, he can't declare war. Declaring "partial" mobilisation already cost him dearly, in exchange for preventing the full collapse of the invasion and prolonging the situation, thus he was desperate enough at the time. He rather acquire the means for declaring war, than try to do it out of the blue, risking a worse scenario than before. Right now, he can only do it covertly and he's comfortable with it. His propagandists have spoken extensively about the measures that need to be in place in order to make the move.

we have no comparable evidence that ISIS did not do it, no evidence at all, actually
We can focus on the reasons why ISIS-K would accept responsibility to shed light on whether they can be expected to speak the truth. For instance, ISIS has no relevance anymore, they were defeated, and terrorist groups compete with each other, notoriety is the main form for attracting new members to grow in relevance again. The KGB (FSB) can easily buy ISIS cooperation, so they would accept the responsibility in exchange for weapons/intelligence/carte blanche in Syria.

'There was never any ISIS, only the FSB' is not hypothesis 2b), it's just the plain 2) hypothesis (it was a false flag), for which a estimate a 'very low probability' (for reasons stated in post #36)
It's a variation of the false flag that only exists because ISIS may or may not have been involved. It leads to either ISIS planning and executing it, and the FSB helping them with or without their knowledge, or the FSB posing as ISIS on Telegram to recruit the individuals.
 
Not exactly, what I'm saying is that, if you watch the attack from the various viewpoints that were published on the internet so far,
and what I'm saying is to please put enough information in your posts that metabunk members can peruse your evidence without looking around elsewhere.
 
It's worth pointing out that we do not really know for a fact that they were actually captured at that spot, rather than being moved there for a convenient photo-shoot ' on the road to Ukraine'.
That's true, they could have been transported there for a staged capture. The geolocation is important because there were two claims at the time: a) They were captured near Belarus b) They were captured near Ukraine. If the geolocation showed they were close to Belarus, that would have clarified (a) was most likely true. The negative from the geolocation is not an indication they weren't close to Belarus in the "actual capture".
 
and what I'm saying is to please put enough information in your posts that metabunk members can peruse your evidence without looking around elsewhere.
I think the evidence you speak of is inappropriate, as it shows executions and it's against the rules. This is perhaps a unique limitation to this thread.
 
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I think the evidence you speak of is inappropriate, as it shows executions and it's against the rules. This is perhaps a unique limitation to this thread.
The evidence I spoke of was the time and lication of your theatre clip and screenshots.
 
The evidence I spoke of was the time and lication of your theatre clip and screenshots.
The footage is interrupted right before the terrorists make way underneath the balcony. The screenshots in that post are frame grabs from the same short footage that was uploaded to the post. The screen grab below is from another footage I have not uploaded, it shows the location of the agent discussed in the post. (Astra is a watermark in the original footage).

1711585072610.png

The frame below is from the footage published in that post. The white arrow below is the general location of the person recording the footage above. The terrorists entered the theatre a few seconds after this frame. The people seen standing ducked between the seats. The agent is behind the person recording, on their left side.

1711578188824.png
The person recording close to the agent is next to seat 156 (155). Unfortunately, there was no seat numbering for the person recording on the opposite end, thus their location is approximate.

1711579606159.png
I have attached the full seat map for the theatre. In the cropped version below, I have marked the approximate locations of the notables in the referred footage: Red quadrilateral in row 15, seat 155 - Camera operator, Blue slashed quadrilateral in row 16, seat 162 - Agent; Purple crossed quadrilateral in row 10, seat 148- Blue man "Shvets" who pushed the woman and shouted to close the doors; Orange Circle at row 15 - Standing blue man who shouted instructions to the people across his location.

1711582883206.png
The location below is approximate for the first screen grab on this post.

1711584030843.png
 

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Reuters reports that Iran warned them before the attack.

In the deadliest attack inside Russia in 20 years, gunmen opened fire with automatic weapons at concertgoers on March 22 at the Crocus City Hall, killing at least 144 people in violence claimed by the Islamic State militant group.

The United States had also warned Russia in advance of a likely militant Islamist attack but Moscow, deeply distrustful of Washington's intentions, played down that intelligence.
It is harder, however, for Russia to dismiss intelligence from diplomatic ally Iran on the attack, which has also raised questions over the effectiveness of Russian security services. Moscow and Tehran, both under Western sanctions, have deepened military and other cooperation during the two-year Ukraine war.

"Days before the attack in Russia, Tehran shared information with Moscow about a possible big terrorist attack inside Russia that was acquired during interrogations of those arrested in connection with deadly bombings in Iran," one of the sources told Reuters.
Content from External Source
https://www.reuters.com/world/iran-...-before-moscow-attack-sources-say-2024-04-01/
 
Results from the Financial Times of 652 Russians on whom they think was behind the attack.

isis.jpg
According to FT [ https://www.ft.com/content/e5b52757-1faf-4e6c-9adf-5c018dbf24e6 ], sociologists polled 652 individuals. 27% of respondents attributed the attack to the radical group Islamic State, while another 6% blamed the so-called “collective West” for the assault.

FT respondents aged 18 to 30, who are anti-war, are inclined to blame the Islamic State for the attack rather than Kyiv. Among opponents of the war in general, 50% accuse jihadists of the terrorist act, while among supporters of the war, only 12% do so.

Russians aged 31 to 50 have the highest number of those who believe Ukraine was involved in the attack: over 50%, according to the poll.
Content from External Source
-- https://euromaidanpress.com/2024/04...-of-attack-at-crocus-city-near-moscow-survey/

Alas the FT link is paywalled.
 
A Russian (defector's) take:

Ex-Wagner fighter lays blame for concert hall massacre on Putin
...
Gabidullin’s intelligence contacts allegedly told him that, in February, the Russian government learned that fighters from the Ingush Liberation Army (a Caucuses-based independence movement affiliated with ISIS) was sent from Syria to Turkey, where they received training from the Grey Wolves (a jihadist organization) to sow terror in Russia. The group then allegedly entered Russia via Georgia.
...
Moscow’s unpopular rule over the Muslim-majority north Caucasus region has made Russia an ongoing target for jihadist violence. Thousands of independence fighters from the region joined ISIS in the mid 2010s, forging a bond between their political movements. Over the past two years, pro-independence activism in the Caucuses, some of which is jihadist in nature, has noticeably intensified.

Gabidullin suspected that the Ingush fighters were involved in the concert hall attack, but admitted that this belief was based on circumstantial evidence. At the very least, the fact that Russia allegedly knew of their infiltration only underlines the imminent danger posed by jihadists and the stupidity of ignoring international terrorism warnings.
Content from External Source
https://nationalpost.com/opinion/ex-wagner-fighter-lays-blame-for-concert-hall-massacre-on-putin
 
Moscow’s unpopular rule over the Muslim-majority north Caucasus region has made Russia an ongoing target for jihadist violence. Thousands of independence fighters from the region joined ISIS in the mid 2010s, forging a bond between their political movements. Over the past two years, pro-independence activism in the Caucuses, some of which is jihadist in nature, has noticeably intensified.
motive & opportunity

too bad that the K in ISIL-K doesn't stand for "Kawkas"

but hey, at least the "two years" puts the blame back on Ukraine for being the target of the special military operation in that time. :p
 
too bad that the K in ISIL-K doesn't stand for "Kawkas"
If ISIS-KCKBOICD becomes too unwieldy, you could truncate it, perhaps?

(Karachey-Cherkessia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Ossetia, Ingushetia, Chechnya, Dagestan)
 
@FatPhil re: your humor post:
Article:
ISIL Khorasan (ISIL - K) announced its formation in an online video on January 10, 2015. The group was led by a former Tehrik-e Taliban (QDe.132) commander, , and was established by former Taliban faction commanders who swore an oath of allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) (listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115)) leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (listed as Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri al-Samarrai (QDi.299)). On January 26, 2015 ISIL spokesman Abou Mohamed al Adnani (QDi.325), announced ISIL’s expansion into the area historically known as Khorasan, by acknowledging ISIL – K’s leader’s pledge of allegiance to al-Baghdadi and claiming al-Baghdadi accepted the pledge and appointed him as governor of the Khorasan Province.

That's why it's ISIL-K, even though the "IL" in ISIL refers to a different geographic area.

It reads kinda like French-Guiana, British-Borneo, Dutch-East Indies or German-South-West Africa, I guess.
 
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