SUPREME COURT MENTAL HEALTH PRECEDENT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS (9/09)
By Mary Ann Bernard, J.D.
University of Chicago 1978 Cal. Bar # 211417
author of the current NCCUSL proposal for a Model/Uniform Commitment Law.
I. PRECDENTS: COMMITMENT AND TREATMENT STANDARDS (in chronological order):
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972). Held: mentally ill criminal defendants who are incompetent to stand trial cannot be indefinitely committed on that basis alone. The nature and duration of civil commitment must bear a reasonable relationship to the purpose of the commitment.
O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). Mentally ill plaintiff was confined without treatment for 15 years. Held: states cannot constitutionally confine, “without more,” a person who is not a danger to others or to himself. The latter category includes the suicidal and the “gravely disabled,” who are unable to “avoid the hazards of freedom” either alone or with the aid of willing family or friends. 422 U.S. at 575 and n.9. As the plaintiff received no treatment, the Court expressly reserved the question “whether the provision of treatment, standing alone, can ever constitutionally justify involuntary confinement or, if it can, how much and what kind of treatment would suffice. . . . “ Id. at n.10. The Court has never revisited this issue.
http://laws.findlaw.com/US/422/563.html
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979). Plaintiff, who disputed his dangerousness, was indefinitely committed based on a history of mental illness, threats, and several in-hospital assaults. Held: jury instruction requiring “clear and convincing evidence” that plaintiff required commitment “for his own welfare and protection, or the protection of others” was constitutionally adequate.
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982). Mentally retarded, assaultive plaintiff challenged his right to treatment but not the propriety of his commitment. Held: there is a constitutional right to the minimally adequate training/habilitation that an appropriate professional would consider reasonable to ensure safety and freedom from undue restraint. The constitutional standard is lower than malpractice standard, requiring only that professional judgment be exercised.
Rennie v. Klein, 483 U.S. 1119 (1982). Case involving involuntary administration of psychiatric medications to mentally ill plaintiff remanded for reconsideration in light of the “professional judgment” standard in Youngberg v. Romeo.
Washington v . Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990). Held: mentally ill state prisoner prone to violence without medication has no constitutional right to competency hearing and court approval of forced medication using a “substituted judgment” standard. Sufficient due process for forced medication order was provided by hospital committee consisting of psychiatrist, psychologist and hospital official not currently involved in inmate’s diagnosis and treatment. “Substituted judgment” standard rejected as ignoring State’s legitimate interest in treating prisoner where medically appropriate for the purpose of reducing his dangerousness. Proposed alternatives of physical restraints or seclusion rejected as risky and having more than de minimis costs to valid penological interests.
Olmsted v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999). Held: Title II of the ADA requires services provided in the “most integrated setting appropriate to” the needs of the disabled, considering available resources.