US$1.50 or 3.00).
Materials and procedure.
Participants were directed to read a
brief summary of the official story of Osama bin Laden's death,
including the details regarding the refusal to release pictorial
evidence and the burial at sea, followed by a short paragraph
explaining that some people doubt the official story. They were
then asked about their opinion of the official story, followed by
three conspiracy items:
1. Osama bin Laden was killed in the American raid.
2. Osama bin Laden is still alive.
3. When the raid took place, Osama bin Laden was already
dead.
4. The actions of the Obama administration indicate that they
are hiding some important or damaging piece of informa-
tion about the raid.
Each of these statements was followed by a series of ques-
tions based on the composite endorsement measure used by
Douglas and Sutton (2011). This asked participants to rate their
agreement with each statement on a scale from 1 (
strongly dis-
agree
)to6(
strongly agree
), as well as to what degree they
4
Social Psychological and Personality Science 00(0)
found the statements plausible, convincing, worth considering,
and coherent, again on a scale from 1 (
notatall
)to6(
very
much
). These ratings were then averaged to obtain a composite
measure of endorsement for each statement (
a
> .87 for each
statement). While the original measure used by Douglas and
Sutton also asked participants to
judge the interestingness of
each statement, there is no contradiction in finding two rival
theories equally interesting, so we excluded interestingness
from the present study in order to avoid artificially inflating the
relevant correlations.
Results and Discussion
The idea that bin Laden was killed in the raid enjoyed a high
level of endorsement (
M
¼
5.00,
SD
¼
1.19), indicating a fairly
high level of trust in the official story, though participants on
average found the Obama administration's actions to be suspi-
cious (
M
¼
4.74,
SD
¼
1.41). Participants seemed less likely
to endorse the idea that bi
n Laden is still alive (
M
¼
3.05,
SD
¼
1.39) or was already dead (
M
¼
3.19,
SD
¼
1.39). In a
replication of our Study 1 resul
t, a correlational analysis
revealed a significant positive correlation between composite
endorsement ratings of the two contradictory conspiracy the-
ories,
r
¼
.21,
p
¼
.04.
We next examined the contribution of belief in a cover-up to the positive relationship between the two contradictory theories using a hierarchical multiple regression analysis. Endorsement of the cover-up item significantly predicted endorsement of
the ''bin Laden is still alive'' theory,
b
¼
.373,
t
(97)
¼
4.04,
p
< .001 (the same was true of the already-dead theory,
b
¼
.346,
t
(97)
¼
3.63,
p
< .001). Adding endorsement of the contradictory theory ''bin Laden was already dead'' to the regression equation, however, explained no additional variance
(
D
R
2
¼
.006), and this theory was not itself a significant predic-
tor,
b
¼
.086,
t
(96)
¼
0.86,
p
¼
.40. This indicates that the cor-
relation in endorsement of the t
wo contradictory theories is
explainable entirely by their connection with belief in a decep-
tive cover-up by authority (see Figure 1). The degree to which
someone believes in a cover-up helps determine their endorse-
ment of the official story, and of both conspiracy theories as
well. This result is in line with our predictions and supports the
idea that conspiracy theories are defined not by adherence to a
particular alternative account but by opposition to the official
story and a belief that deception is taking place.
General Discussion
While it has been known for some time that belief in one con-
spiracy theory appears to be associated with belief in others,
only now do we know that this can even apply to conspiracy
theories that are mutually contradictory. This finding supports
our contention that the monological nature of conspiracism
(Goertzel, 1994; Swami et al., 2010, 2011) is driven not by con-
spiracy theories directly supporting one another but by the
coherence of each theory with higher-order beliefs that support
the idea of conspiracy in general. As demonstrated in Study 2,
perceived deception by authority is one such belief, and it is
likely that there are many others as well. For those who hold
such beliefs, the specifics of a conspiracy theory do not matter
as much as the fact that it is a conspiracy theory at all.
There are strong parallels between this conception of a mono-
logicalbeliefsystemandAdornoetal.'s(1950)workonprejudice
and authoritarianism. In an attempt to explain the strong positive
correlations between contradictory antisemitic beliefs, Adorno
suggested that incompatibilities between beliefs at a local level
are dwarfed by coherence with broader beliefs about the
world—''nuclear ideas'' which ''tend to 'pull in' numerous other
opinions and attitudes and thus to form a broad ideological sys-
tem.''(p.92).Suchasystem''providesarationaleforanyspecific
idea within it and a basis for meeting and assimilating new social
conditions'' (p. 93). Our findings support an equivalent explana-
tion for beliefs in contradictory conspiracy theories, with a belief
in deceptive officialdom as the nuclear idea in question.
If Adorno's explanation for contradictory antisemitic beliefs
can indeed be applied to conspiracy theories, conspiracist
beliefs might be most accurately viewed as not only monologi-
cal but also ideological in nature. Just as an orthodox Marxist
might interpret major world events as arising inevitably from
the forces of history, a conspiracist would see the same events
as carefully orchestrated steps in a plot for global domination.
Conceptualizing conspiracism as a coherent ideology, rather
than as a cluster of beliefs in individual theories, may be a fruit-
ful approach in the future when examining its connection to
ideologically relevant variables such as social dominance
orientation and right-wing authoritarianism.
Figure 1.
Illustration of the observed correlations in endorsement of
Study 2 items. The two conspiracy theories display a significant zero-
order correlation (above) but have no significant direct relationship
when belief in a cover-up is taken into account (below).
Wood et al.
5
Although we have demonstrated the importance of a belief
in deception by authority as an important antecedent of conspi-
racy belief and a partial explanation for correlations between
contradictory theories, there are certainly other broad beliefs
which could make a similar contribution. For instance, conspi-
racy theories would seem much more plausible to those with a
belief in the effectiveness of intimidation and bribery. In a
more abstract sense, a belief in the essential malevolence of
officialdom—or in the specific malevolence of a certain pow-
erful entity—would make many conspiracies seem more likely.
The social element must not be neglected either; many conspi-
racy theories are associated with specific groups or even orga-
nized movements, such as the 9/11 Truth Movement. Clarke
(2007) found a trend of increasing vagueness in these modern
conspiracist communities, which he characterized as a reaction
to the antagonistic atmosphere of Internet discourse. Our
results suggest an alternative possibility: A genuine uncertainty
within individuals regarding the true nature of the conspiracy
behind a particular event (beyond the fact that there was one),
and a willingness to consider and even endorse mutually con-
tradictory accounts as long as they stand in opposition to the
officially sanctioned narrative. There may also be an element
of self-presentation and conflict avoidance in the vagueness
observed by Clarke: If multiple contradictory theories are
simultaneously believed by many in a conspiracist community,
endorsing one in particular is tantamount to denying the others
and may provoke a backlash. In any event, the development of
conspiracy theories almost certainly owes a great deal to social
engagement and discussion of alternative narratives, and the
dynamics of conspiracist communities may be a fruitful avenue
for future investigation with reference to previous work on
opinion-based groups (e.g., Musgrove & McGarty, 2008).
Conspiracist belief systems may also be well captured by con-
nectionist models of social inference such as Thagard's (1989)
ECHO. ECHO has been shown to accurately predict the degree
to which higher-order beliefs about social actors affect judge-
ments of their actions as sinister or innocent, honest or deceptive
(Read & Miller, 1993). However
, there has been little or no
investigation into the ability of ECHO to model the influence
of broad worldviews. Based on the present research, one would
expect that when broad beliefs are relevant to the interpretation
of a particular situation, they serve as a constraint on the conclu-
sions that are likely to be drawn from it in the same way as spe-
cific beliefs about the actors and situations involved. A
conspiracist belief system consisting of many such beliefs would
inhibit the acceptance of official narratives but may not discrimi-
nate among several different conspiracy theories. Some might be
discarded, but even contradictory theories might be simultane-
ously accepted. Almost any account of events which accords with
the broader beliefs in question is likely to garner some endorse-
ment by adherents of a conspiracist worldview. Modelling such a
network might provide an instructive insight into the processes
underlying the development of conspiracist beliefs, and of other
beliefs influenced by superordinate ideological considerations.
It must be noted that not all conspiracy theories fall under
the ''deceptive officialdom'' umbrella. Antisemitic conspiracy
theories are a notable and historically important exception; instead of alleging abuse of power by elites, historical theories of Jewish conspiracy usually detailed supposed attempts by a minority to seize power for themselves (Graumann, 1987). It would be instructive to examine whether beliefs in such conspiracies are correlated with belief in those that fit more closely into the ''deceptive officialdom'' template, and if such relationships are mediated to the same degree by endorsement of that central belief. In any case, the evidence we have gathered in the present study supports the idea that conspiracism constitutes a monolo-gical belief system, drawing its coherence from central beliefs such as the conviction that authorities and officials engage in massive deception of the public to achieve their malevolent goals. Connectivity with this central idea lends support to any
individual conspiracy theory, even to the point that mutually contradictory theories fail to show a negative correlation in belief. Believing that Osama bin Laden is still alive is apparently no obstacle to believing that he has been dead for years.
Declaration of Conflict of Interest
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interests with respect
to the authorship and/or publication of this article
