In her paper Climates of suspicion: 'chemtrail' conspiracy narratives and the international politics of geoengineering, researcher Rose Cairns suggests that mainstream treatment of the "chemtrail" movement is overly dismissive. She notes that the the spectrum of concerns of many chemtrail believers overlaps with the concerns of people who are concerned about geoengineering happening in the future - and if we broadly dismiss chemtrail believers as irrational and irrelevant, then we appear to be dismissing their valid concerns along with their unfounded concerns.
However I recognize that the perception of "dismissal" is one that is present in the minds of the chemtrail believers. Over and over I will explain how a particular claim is incorrect (for example, the claim that contrails did not persist - or even very minor points, like contrails appearing in old movies), and the response will invariably be "well, that does not prove it [chemtrails/covert geoengineering] isn't happening". They assume that I'm arguing that because I've found one flaw in their argument, then I'm then asserting their entire argument is bunk, and should be dismissed.
This of course is a failure of communication on my part. I'm failing to clarifying that I'm simply looking at an individual claim of evidence, and not the entire theory. Cairns seems to suggest that it's worse than this - not only do they extend their perception of my claim of falsification to their broader theory, they also extend it to their broader concerns. In many cases those are quite reasonable concerns (about pollution, complexity, cost, aesthetic, politics, and other issues related to geoengineering). The concerns are valid, but are tinged by them being concerns about something they believe is happening now, rather than concerns about something that might happen in the future.
What I need to do is ensure that communication is clear. Perhaps I need to emphasis at the outset of a discussion that I am just just looking at a particular claim of evidence, and not at the broader theory. I also need to strive to not invalidate any legitimate concerns that they might have, perhaps by addressing them directly, and empathically. We all share concerns about pollution, and about the overreaches of those in power. By establishing that I agree with people on many points, it hopefully becomes fare less likely that I will be perceived as rejecting their entire position when I correct them on a single point.
One must do all this with honesty, not in an attempt to win some argument, but in an effort to communicate science by establishing as much common ground as possible. The perception of dismissal is something we should actively seek to avoid, by being as open as possible, and by understanding the full range of concerns that are involved.
But she concluded on a pessimistic note:For example, the importance of trust in the justification of beliefs is underscored by the chemtrail belief, and signals what is likely to be a perennial problem with any solar geoengineering program in the international sphere, where trust is often lacking. The chemtrail belief hints at the probability that a program of solar geoengineering would have destabilising regional political effects, resonating with local political realities and suspicions of global economic powers. Likewise the moral outrage accompanying the chemtrail belief, based on the revulsion at the idea of powerful elites controlling the climate, is not something that can be dismissed as ‘irrational’. [...] Likewise the powerful emotional connections to weather and climate that are central to the chemtrail narrative, foreground the personal or spiritual dimension of discussion around climate engineering that is rarely heard in more mainstream discourse.
And repeats a common criticism of skepticism (and debunking):It would appear that the chemtrail narrative has crossed the line from ‘distrust to disgust’ in which those actively involved in the conspiracy are characterised as fundamentally evil, and unbelievers are characterised as ‘mentally retarded, clinically blind or paid liars’ (GeoEngineering Watch 2014b), which makes meaningful engagement particularly difficult. Furthermore, the association of the narrative with extreme forms of climate scepticism further limits the possibilities for critical engagement with other strands of environmental discourse.
This all speaks to what I've personally been trying to do with debunking - specifically being polite, trying to establish common ground, and focussing on individual claims of evidence. Getting away from debunking as a sport. So I was a little sad when she referenced my sites thusly:
Arguably the chemtrail conspiracy narrative shares many of the traits of organized scepticism, as identified by Stevenson and Dryzek, and likewise, ‘cannot provide grist for productive contestation, for at its heart is the construction of opponents not as adversaries to be respected, but as enemies to be defeated’
In some ways there's a false dichotomy here. The choice is not to "dismiss" or "engage" the chemtrail theorists. In fact I focus very strongly on engagement, and the notion of "dismissing" a theory is something I stay far away from, preferring instead to focus in individual claims of evidence, where some common ground can be found.
Where it has been recognised, the chemtrail view has been dismissed as an unfounded conspiracy theory (Rayner 2008; Smith 2013), ‘for the gullible’ (Brewer 2007), and most engagement to date has taken the form of attempts to ‘debunk’ the belief (E.g. Contrail Science 2011; Metabunk 2014).
However I recognize that the perception of "dismissal" is one that is present in the minds of the chemtrail believers. Over and over I will explain how a particular claim is incorrect (for example, the claim that contrails did not persist - or even very minor points, like contrails appearing in old movies), and the response will invariably be "well, that does not prove it [chemtrails/covert geoengineering] isn't happening". They assume that I'm arguing that because I've found one flaw in their argument, then I'm then asserting their entire argument is bunk, and should be dismissed.
This of course is a failure of communication on my part. I'm failing to clarifying that I'm simply looking at an individual claim of evidence, and not the entire theory. Cairns seems to suggest that it's worse than this - not only do they extend their perception of my claim of falsification to their broader theory, they also extend it to their broader concerns. In many cases those are quite reasonable concerns (about pollution, complexity, cost, aesthetic, politics, and other issues related to geoengineering). The concerns are valid, but are tinged by them being concerns about something they believe is happening now, rather than concerns about something that might happen in the future.
What I need to do is ensure that communication is clear. Perhaps I need to emphasis at the outset of a discussion that I am just just looking at a particular claim of evidence, and not at the broader theory. I also need to strive to not invalidate any legitimate concerns that they might have, perhaps by addressing them directly, and empathically. We all share concerns about pollution, and about the overreaches of those in power. By establishing that I agree with people on many points, it hopefully becomes fare less likely that I will be perceived as rejecting their entire position when I correct them on a single point.
One must do all this with honesty, not in an attempt to win some argument, but in an effort to communicate science by establishing as much common ground as possible. The perception of dismissal is something we should actively seek to avoid, by being as open as possible, and by understanding the full range of concerns that are involved.