Russia and Ukraine Current Events

[derwoodii]

Putin plotted to assassinate the CEO of Rheinmetall

Germany says it won't be cowed by Russia after reported plot to kill Rheinmetall CEO

By Matthias Inverardi , Matthias Williams and Steve Holland
July 13, 20246:05 AM GMT+10Updated 15 min ago

https://www.reuters.com/world/europ...eported-plot-kill-rheinmetall-ceo-2024-07-12/

DUESSELDORF/WASHINGTON, July 12 (Reuters) - Berlin is taking reports of a plot to assassinate the chief executive of arms manufacturer Rheinmetall (RHMG.DE), opens new tab very seriously and will not be cowed by Russian intimidation, the German government said on Friday.
A source familiar with the situation confirmed reporting by CNN and others that U.S. intelligence officials warned the German authorities this year that Russia was plotting to assassinate Armin Papperger, the head of Europe's biggest weapons producer, which has produced artillery shells and military vehicles for Ukraine.


CONFLICTSGERMANY

Rheinmetall assassination plan: Why is the company a target?

Dirk Kaufmann
3 hours ago3 hours ago
Unnamed sources have stated that Russia planned to assassinate a German arms manufacturing executive. Rheinmetall CEO Armin Papperger has been criticized for profiting from arms deliveries to Ukraine.
https://www.dw.com/en/rheinmetall-assassination-plan-why-is-the-company-a-target/a-69648164


Rheinmetall has been supplying Kyiv with artillery shells and military vehicles since the war began, as well as operating a repair facility for combat vehicles in Ukraine. The company also has plans to open Ukrainian plants for the production of ammunition and armored vehicles.

On Friday, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov dismissed the report, saying it "cannot be taken seriously."

A spokesperson for the German Interior Ministry, Maximilian Kall, declined to comment on "individual threat situations," but stated, "we know that [Russian President Vladimir] Putin's regime wants above all to undermine our support for Ukraine in its defense against the Russian war of aggression."

 

[JimJam]

Ukraine has launched a rather large incursion into the Kursk region of Russia. Below in blue is the areas Ukraine has supposedly advanced to as reported by the Institute of War https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-7-2024

This is a big escalation from previous Ukrainian attacks on Russia which were until now had been largely drone based with tacit support for Russian splinter groups making very small raids across the border.
It's still unclear exactly what Ukraine is hoping to achieve potentially opening up a new front, there is some criticism of having such a large concentration of troops so far away from the Donbass region, where Russia has been making slow, but steady advances lately.

There is a lot of speculation and conflicting information on twitter, the Ukrainian force is reported as being anywhere from a few hundred men, to several thousand with a mass of armoured vehicles as support. It's an interesting time to launch a massive attack since it coincides with the arrival of F-16s to the Ukrainian air force.

 

[Mendel]

Thank you for posting this, I'd heard it on the radio but then forgot about it because life got in the way.

Ukraine has launched a rather large incursion into the Kursk region of Russia.

if that's a "large" incursion, how big would a small one be? It's still a lot less than what Russia did to Ukraine in February 2022 (or when it took the Crimea), and quite a bit less than what Ukraine did to take back Kharkiv oblast or Kherson.

Compare:

Article:

Ukrainian forces have made confirmed advances up to 10 kilometers into Russia's Kursk Oblast amid continued mechanized offensive operations on Russian territory on August 7.

Source: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-7-2024

with

It's about the same scale of attack; actually, the Ukrainian attack is still smaller right now.

The new Ukrainian attack is about 200 km north-west of the recent Russian attack:

It feels like it's retaliation, or maybe the basis for a mutual withdrawal agreement.

 

[JimJam]

if that's a "large" incursion, how big would a small one be? It's still a lot less than what Russia did to Ukraine in February 2022 (or when it took the Crimea), and quite a bit less than what Ukraine did to take back Kharkiv oblast or Kherson.

Large is a relative thing I guess, I don't think it is big enough to be considered strategic level invasion of Russia, but on a tactical scale I think it is much larger than previous incursions. It is unlikely Ukraine intends to hold all of this territory against a Russian response. This is also the first time I can find any reports of regular Ukrainian troops being deployed into Russia itself, they have much more mechanized support than previous raids and incursions. Actual Ukrainian troop commitments aren't being reported accurately right now.

Moscow is the only source giving estimates, in this Al Jazeera piece they claim 300
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024...rce-battles-against-invading-ukrainian-forces

The incursion was carried out by about 300 soldiers, 11 tanks and more than 20 armoured vehicles, Moscow said.

A day later it's up to 1000
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024...-major-provocation-in-attack-on-russias-kursk

At the meeting with Putin, Valery Gerasimov, the chief of Russia's General Staff, said Russian forces had halted an attack by as many as 1,000 Ukrainian soldiers

Both articles from Al-Jazeera have claims from Russia that they have destroyed or halted the assault, but in the incredibly murky world of twitter reporting I can't find any proof of that. It's a developing situation, so we'll see how things progress over the next few days.

 

[FatPhil]

It feels like it's retaliation, or maybe the basis for a mutual withdrawal agreement.

It's multiple things.

Firstly, it is a valid military objective - Sudza is on one of the main supply lines to Belgorod, so this helps the defence of Kharkiv.
Secondly, it's brings "feel good" headlines to Ukrainian newspapers at a time when morale is flagging.
Thirdly, it brings embarassment to Russia, in particular if their officials tweet about the attack being repelled, and then get forced to delete that tweet later after a russian guy posts a video where he says ~"Sudzha. I was just in the center. Everything is more or less intact. The prosecutor's office is f%ked. There is a Ukrainian flag hanging on the city administration...".
Fourthly, similar to the second point, it encourages third parties to keep up their support.
Fifthly, there's the game-theoretic risk-taking of breaking new ground, and seeing if it's considered an escalation that would bring about further escalation from Russia. An absense of such would feed back into point four, perhaps having them reduce restrictions on how their military aid is used.
SIxthly, in part there may be some nudging of Russia towards withdrawal as you mention - but I'm not sure Ukraine really want that right now. They'd rather have the /Vae Victus/ card to put on the top of the pile at the end.
Seventhly, an extension of number two, there might even be a bit of shitlordery regarding Russian military history and Kursk, a battle considered by many to be the turning point of the war (WWII obvs), complete with its "you used to be competent, just look at you now" implications for extra windup value.

I'm not expecting Ukraine to keep this territorial gain, I don't think that's the point at all. I suspect they are trying to trick Russia into committing a few brigades worth of troops to get the area back, and will do a slow and steady, and technical, fighting withdrawal as the meatgrinder waves approach them. Less pressure elsewhere, and more attrition that you're in control of, it's a sound tactic.

 

[Z.W. Wolf]

This offensive is a geopolitical move.

A small win: Another hard Red Line has been crossed, with no consequences. Which further diminishes the status of the Putin regime. The nukes certainly won't fly. So go ahead, Putin, and make another veiled threat about nuclear war. Or any kind of dangerous move. Western Allies will be less concerned about giving further support to Ukraine, and more likely to feel a bit more aggressive. That's human nature. It's been a stepwise process.

A good win: It's been a long tough war for the Ukrainian people and they've been on defense for a long weary time.. They need an offensive win. Something like the Doolittle Raid, but bigger.

A potential big win: If the Russian residents in the area now under nominal Ukrainian control don't care that they've been invaded, that apathy would be a very dangerous signal. I think that's the realistic best case scenario. One could wish that they'd openly rebel against the Putin regime, but that's a bridge too far.

 

[FatPhil]

This offensive operates at the deepest level: the geopolitical level.

A small win: Another hard Red Line has been crossed, with no consequences. Which further diminishes the status of the Putin regime. The nukes certainly won't fly. So go ahead, Putin, and make another veiled threat about nuclear war. Or any kind of dangerous move.

A potential big win: The Russian population in the area now under nominal Ukrainian control doesn't care that they've been invaded. I think that's the realistic best case scenario. One could wish that they'd openly rebel against the Putin Regime, but that's a bridge too far. Apathy will be very damaging.

Ah, yes, I forgot to support my (#3) quote with a link - your final paragraph reminded me of the rest of it:

Source: https://x.com/EuromaidanPR/status/1821268359050149893#m

Specifically the "Honestly, I don't give a shit what flag we live under. The main thing is that it's peaceful. If ours can't protect us, maybe at least the Ukrainians can." bit.

My knowledge of slavic languages isn't far above pitiful, but I recognise enough words in the video (although I was expecting more swearing, that I would recognise!) to feel confident the English translation is a fair one.

 

[FatPhil]

My knowledge of slavic languages isn't far above pitiful, but I recognise enough words in the video (although I was expecting more swearing, that I would recognise!) to feel confident the English translation is a fair one.

Listening to it again, to see if I could extract more this time I did notice one thing that's not represented in the translation given - the very first time he refers to Ukraine, he uses the term "ukrop", and then immediatly corrects it to "ukrainian", which he uses exclusively thereafter. I'll let wikipedia explain that word:

Ukrop (Russian: укроп, pronounced [ʊˈkrop]; literally "dill") is a Russian-language ethnic slur for Ukrainians. The term is a reference to the dill plant and bears a superficial syntactical similarity with the first half of the Russian word for Ukrainians.[1][2]

It was reclaimed as an ironic nickname by Ukrainian soldiers in 2014 during the war in Donbas, and a shoulder patch was designed by Andriy Yermolenko.[3] The ironic use lost popularity after it was adopted as the name of the Ukrainian political party UKROP.[citation needed]

-- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukrop
Here's President Poroshenko proudly promoting the patches in 2014:

OT Aside: I was going to append that as an "EDIT:" to my previous post, but took a bit too long composing it and hunting out the image, so thought it was better as a separate post. What is an acceptable "edit" delay for expanding on what you've already posted? It somewhat irks me when I see something that I know I've already seen has changed, so I set my threshold pretty low (10-15 minutes).

 

[JMartJr]

Large is a relative thing I guess, I don't think it is big enough to be considered strategic level invasion of Russia, but on a tactical scale I think it is much larger than previous incursions. It is unlikely Ukraine intends to hold all of this territory against a Russian response.

I am not a military strategist, but could it be at least in part a feint to draw forces away fro Donbass, in hopes of halting the "slow and steady" progress being made by Russia there??

 

[Mendel]

OT Aside: I was going to append that as an "EDIT:" to my previous post, but took a bit too long composing it and hunting out the image, so thought it was better as a separate post. What is an acceptable "edit" delay for expanding on what you've already posted? It somewhat irks me when I see something that I know I've already seen has changed, so I set my threshold pretty low (10-15 minutes).

I think if you edit within 5 minutes, there's no "edited" message.
When I add content (rather than correct/rephrase things), I leave a note on the post, and notify anyone who may have reacted. But usually I create a new post for new stuff, which costs nothing and makes replies easier.

 

[Mendel]

I am not a military strategist, but could it be at least in part a feint to draw forces away fro Donbass, in hopes of halting the "slow and steady" progress being made by Russia there??

That's why I was comparing it to the Russian offensive near Kharkiv, which is said to have a similar purpose.

 

[Tezcatlipoca]

I am not a military strategist, but could it be at least in part a feint to draw forces away fro Donbass, in hopes of halting the "slow and steady" progress being made by Russia there??

Chiming in here as the resident nerd on Influence and Deception Activities.
Generically possible - yes.

It would be analytically issued here to give you a conclusion beyond that without going through the proper processes for potential Deception Activities.

Analyzing Deception Activities is, very removed from all other sorts of analysis. It even uses adjusted tools (eg ACH-CD is used instead of ACH since ACH can leave analysts more vulnerable to Deception Activities). This is not really something you can call out looking at twitter posts and maps either, formal CDA is conducted with all-source intelligence and generally CDA shops are cleared for more access than most other analytical functions. This is a very small functional area and none of the "OSINT" personalities or anything you see even study this area, let alone practice it. At the most, they could be incidentally correct though their processes would be issued.

If anyone would like too, I'd be happy to run through a proper analytical process with them on this, although it takes time and effort.

 

[Gary C]

Firstly, it is a valid military objective - Sudza is on one of the main supply lines to Belgorod, so this helps the defence of Kharkiv.

Making it a spoiling attack. An effort to limit the enemy's freedom of action in another part of the battlespace. If this were just a raid to disrupt supply lines, they would have begun to withdraw already.

It will be interesting to see how well they interdict the expected Russian response and how hard they decide to make the Russian's fight to push them out again.

 

[FatPhil]

Making it a spoiling attack. An effort to limit the enemy's freedom of action in another part of the battlespace. If this were just a raid to disrupt supply lines, they would have begun to withdraw already.

It will be interesting to see how well they interdict the expected Russian response and how hard they decide to make the Russian's fight to push them out again.

Further inside the border would give them more opportunities to disrupt logistics in and around Kursk, so I'd expect them to try to get a bit more from these temporary gains before the Russian pushback occurs. I'm not sure what they took with them, but if they have their 2S22s or Zuzana 2s, then their extended range of 50km makes a lot of things now reachable that previously weren't.

 

[FatPhil]

Further inside the border would give them more opportunities to disrupt logistics in and around Kursk, so I'd expect them to try to get a bit more from these temporary gains before the Russian pushback occurs. I'm not sure what they took with them, but if they have their 2S22s or Zuzana 2s, then their extended range of 50km makes a lot of things now reachable that previously weren't.

It seems some Russkies differ - they think Ukraine's intent might be to keep it. The Beeb's russian correspondent, Steve Rosenberg, reports that Izvestia quotes a russian lieutenant colonel in the reserves saying "the second probable aim is to secure a foothold in Kursk region that can be traded at any future talks".

Source: https://x.com/BBCSteveR/status/1821798655818383635#m

 

[Gary C]

IDK. It looks way to small to be defensible against any serious Russian counter attack.

 

[Mendel]

IDK. It looks way to small to be defensible against any serious Russian counter attack.

Ukraine held Robotyne for 9 months.

 

[Hevach]

Ukraine as a whole looked too small to be defensible against any serious Russian attack two and a half years ago and here we are.

A repeat problem Russia has had is being overcommitted, leaving them slow to react and correct. Not everything about a war is about destroying enemy units - sometimes just forcing them to defend something they thought was safe is a greater victory than any number of bullets and bombs can achieve.

 

[Alexandria Nick]

sometimes just forcing them to defend something they thought was safe is a greater victory

Look at the Falklands. The Black Buck raids were of very limited operational utility against the Argentine occupational forces. They never knocked the runway out of service. But, they did present a real concern that if any Argentine air superiority fighters were stationed at Port Stanley, they could get caught on the ground and destroyed, given how poor their detection of inbound raids was. They had to keep their limited number of Mirage IIIs on the mainland instead.

 

[LilWabbit]

Ukraine's Kursk incursion is not a small operation by any means when measured against the full strength of Ukraine's armed forces. At least several brigades (several thousand men) are likely involved which is almost all the remaining ground forces not deployed to defend Donbass. The motives remain unknown. Speculatively, it serves not only the purpose of Russian humiliation and momentary disorientation but also, as mentioned earlier, distraction from Donbass and the weakening of Russian momentum there. Also, the proximity of the Kursk Nuclear Plant is potentially a significant strategic advantage for Ukraine.

 

[JimJam]

It's been about a week since Ukraine began it's incursion Zelensky has finally made a statement

https://www.france24.com/en/europe/...n-ukraine-as-kyiv-touts-gains-in-kursk-region

Ukraine now controls 74 settlements in Russia's Kursk border region, the country's President Volodymyr Zelensky said Tuesday.
"There are 74 settlements under the control of Ukraine," Zelensky said in his evening address.
In a video call with military chief Oleksandr Syrsky, the president added that "despite difficult, intense fighting, the advance of our forces in the Kursk region continues".
The governor of the Kursk region, where Ukraine is mounting a week-long incursion, previously said Monday that Ukraine controls 28 settlements.

The map from ISW yesterday shows Ukraine seems to be ensuring they do not over extend themselves too much. If the reports of Ukrainian activity in the near Giri are accurate then I would expect them to start trying to take control of the roads and more areas in the south of this theatre over the coming days.

It looks like Ukraine intend to stay for at least a little while.

 

[MapperGuy]

Ukraine's Kursk incursion is not a small operation by any means when measured against the full strength of Ukraine's armed forces. At least several brigades (several thousand men) are likely involved which is almost all the remaining ground forces not deployed to defend Donbass. The motives remain unknown. Speculatively, it serves not only the purpose of Russian humiliation and momentary disorientation but also, as mentioned earlier, distraction from Donbass and the weakening of Russian momentum there. Also, the proximity of the Kursk Nuclear Plant is potentially a significant strategic advantage for Ukraine.

What this incursion is demonstrating is the overall weakness of the Russian military machine. Any army can concentrate a large number of people in a small area for purposes of pushing back their enemy, as the Russians are doing to the Ukrainians in some places. But they risk making themselves weak everywhere else at the same time. The Ukrainians are demonstrating that most of the Russian border is at best only weakly held, by conscripts with little training and few weapons. Not a good look for Putin.

Speaking of Putin, he has repeatedly threatened that there are Red Lines that cannot be crossed, with threats of nuclear attacks in response if Ukraine or NATO does this or that. Over time the Ukrainians have crossed just about every one of those red lines. Invading Russian territory was the last one, and one that you would expect would have caused a stronger response.

Russia is a Paper Tiger, or a paper Bear if you prefer.

 

[Duke]

What this incursion is demonstrating is the overall weakness of the Russian military machine. Any army can concentrate a large number of people in a small area for purposes of pushing back their enemy, as the Russians are doing to the Ukrainians in some places. But they risk making themselves weak everywhere else at the same time. The Ukrainians are demonstrating that most of the Russian border is at best only weakly held, by conscripts with little training and few weapons. Not a good look for Putin.

Speaking of Putin, he has repeatedly threatened that there are Red Lines that cannot be crossed, with threats of nuclear attacks in response if Ukraine or NATO does this or that. Over time the Ukrainians have crossed just about every one of those red lines. Invading Russian territory was the last one, and one that you would expect would have caused a stronger response.

Russia is a Paper Tiger, or a paper Bear if you prefer.

Impressive intel staff work to determine where and when to hit the Russians, even more impressive the Ukrainians were able to keep the Russians in the dark with their preparations and logistical build-up/support prior to the attack.

 

[LilWabbit]

According to President Zelenskyi, the primary purpose of the Kursk incursion is to create a buffer zone to prevent cross-border attacks and to strengthen Ukraine's negotiating position with respect to the much greater Russian incursion into Ukraine.

Article:

Ukraine's military incursion into Kursk aims to create a "buffer zone" to prevent cross-border attacks by Moscow's forces, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky confirmed Sunday, as his troops blew up a second bridge in the Russian border region.

Ukrainian forces are inching forward in Kursk amid fighting following the launch of their surprise military operation there nearly two weeks ago. But Ukraine also remains under pressure in its occupied east as Russian forces advance toward a key military hub.

The Kursk offensive has left Russia struggling to shore up its own territory. Kyiv seems to have multiple goals with the assault, from boosting morale after a torrid few months to stretching Russia's resources. A Ukrainian presidential aide said the incursion aimed at ensuring a "fair" negotiation process.

For the first time, Zelensky on Sunday stated the strategic ambitions of the operation, saying, "It is now our primary task in defensive operations overall: to destroy as much Russian war potential as possible and conduct maximum counteroffensive actions."

Those include "creating a buffer zone on the aggressor's territory," the president said in his latest address.

"Everything that inflicts losses on the Russian army, Russian state, their military-industrial complex, and their economy helps prevent the war from expanding and brings us closer to a just end to this aggression," Zelensky said.

Source: https://edition.cnn.com/2024/08/18/europe/zelensky-kursk-incursion-second-bridge-intl/index.html

There are likely other purposes that remain undisclosed to preserve military advantage. Kursk's proximity not only to the Kursk Nuclear Plant but also to Moscow are credible strategic goals impacting both the war effort and any prospective negotiations.

Personal speculation: If Kiev is primarily concerned with the prevention of cross-border attacks, choosing Kursk as a buffer zone instead of Belgorod bordering Kharkiv is a curious choice informed possibly by lesser Russian military resistance in Kursk and the strategic importance of Kursk to both the Russian war effort and to its economy and energy infrastructure.

 

[FatPhil]

Personal speculation: If Kiev is primarily concerned with the prevention of cross-border attacks, choosing Kursk as a buffer zone instead of Belgorod bordering Kharkiv is a curious choice informed possibly by lesser Russian military resistance in Kursk and the strategic importance of Kursk to both the Russian war effort and to its economy and energy infrastructure.

Whilst I agree, I am reminded of my time captaining the college table-footie team. We thrashed all of our first opponents, and eventually some opponents simply stopped turning up, so we'd be awarded whitewashes for those. Which persuaded later opponents to not bother turning up either. If Kursk routed, and the Ukrainian flag's now flying there, doesn't that tell Belgorod that, as soon as Ukraine starts making motions in their direction, the quicker they hightail it the better?

 

[Mendel]

There are likely other purposes that remain undisclosed to preserve military advantage.

Please do not confuse propaganda with actual intentions.

The "buffer zone" rhetoric implies that Ukraine could strike (surprisingly! as demonstrated) at any point along its Russian border. This implies, one would hope, that Russia needs to reinforce its defenses along the full length of that border, and the ensuing diversion of Russian material and personnel may well be Ukraine's true (if unstated) intention. In that case, Ukraine may not actually intend to create a "buffer zone", but saying they do serves their true intentions.

 

[LilWabbit]

Please do not confuse propaganda with actual intentions.

A buffer zone in Kursk now actually exists. It's a fact and not mere propaganda. But what is likely propaganda is Zelenskyi declaring it as the primary purpose of the incursion.

The main intent be as it may, you don't blow up bridges in Kursk only to divert Russian troops from Donbass, unless you're an idiot. You blow up bridges to slow down fighting troop and materiel advance as well as logistics lines (fuel, ammunition, materiel repair and maintenance, food and reinforcements). That is to say, in plain English, to create a "buffer zone".

The "buffer zone" rhetoric implies that Ukraine could strike (surprisingly! as demonstrated) at any point along its Russian border.

The buffer zone of Kursk is currently pretty much a fact rather than a mere rhetoric. But unlikely Ukraine's only nor even main intent.

This implies, one would hope, that Russia needs to reinforce its defenses along the full length of that border, and the ensuing diversion of Russian material and personnel may well be Ukraine's true (if unstated) intention. In that case, Ukraine may not actually intend to create a "buffer zone", but saying they do serves their true intentions.

Maybe not primarily. But it now actually has created one.

Russian troop diversion (at least a brigade's worth) to Kursk is also now a fact and according to most analysts a key objective of the incursion

 

[JimJam]

There are likely other purposes that remain undisclosed to preserve military advantage. Kursk's proximity not only to the Kursk Nuclear Plant but also to Moscow are credible strategic goals impacting both the war effort and any prospective negotiations.

Personal speculation: If Kiev is primarily concerned with the prevention of cross-border attacks, choosing Kursk as a buffer zone instead of Belgorod bordering Kharkiv is a curious choice informed possibly by lesser Russian military resistance in Kursk and the strategic importance of Kursk to both the Russian war effort and to its economy and energy infrastructure.

One specific reason for choosing Kursk over Belgorod is that Russia has a large concentration of troops in Belgorod currently, and it is a staging ground for a Russian attempt to push into South Ukrainian territory towards Kharkiv. The Russian attempt here has largely stalled, but the high amount of Russian troops would make a counter-attack very difficult.

The lack of troop concentration across much of the rest Ukraine Russian Border has allowed Ukraine to implement maneuver warfare and exploit confusion in Russian communications. Ukraine has captured the town of Sudzha in the Kursk region. Sudzha is a railway hub near the border with Ukraine and was one of the rail lines connecting Moscow with Belgorod. Although it wasn't the most direct route, there is now only a single rail-line into Belgorod that isn't under Ukrainian control. Ukraine gets far more bang for it's buck by weakening the supply to Belgorod than attempting to attack the force concentrated there head on.

 

[LilWabbit]

One specific reason for choosing Kursk over Belgorod is that Russia has a large concentration of troops in Belgorod currently, and it is a staging ground for a Russian attempt to push into South Ukrainian territory towards Kharkiv. The Russian attempt here has largely stalled, but the high amount of Russian troops would make a counter-attack very difficult.

View attachment 70915

The lack of troop concentration across much of the rest Ukraine Russian Border has allowed Ukraine to implement maneuver warfare and exploit confusion in Russian communications. Ukraine has captured the town of Sudzha in the Kursk region. Sudzha is a railway hub near the border with Ukraine and was one of the rail lines connecting Moscow with Belgorod. Although it wasn't the most direct route, there is now only a single rail-line into Belgorod that isn't under Ukrainian control. Ukraine gets far more bang for it's buck by weakening the supply to Belgorod than attempting to attack the force concentrated there head on.

In other words, Zelenskyi using the term 'buffer zone' is not too far-fetched to describe an actual military objective rather than being mere rhetoric.

Article:

Buffer zone: An area of land that separates two other areas and that is designed to prevent fighting or harm coming to something

Source: https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/buffer-zone#

 

[LilWabbit]

One specific reason for choosing Kursk over Belgorod is that Russia has a large concentration of troops in Belgorod currently, and it is a staging ground for a Russian attempt to push into South Ukrainian territory towards Kharkiv. The Russian attempt here has largely stalled, but the high amount of Russian troops would make a counter-attack very difficult.

View attachment 70915

The lack of troop concentration across much of the rest Ukraine Russian Border has allowed Ukraine to implement maneuver warfare and exploit confusion in Russian communications. Ukraine has captured the town of Sudzha in the Kursk region. Sudzha is a railway hub near the border with Ukraine and was one of the rail lines connecting Moscow with Belgorod. Although it wasn't the most direct route, there is now only a single rail-line into Belgorod that isn't under Ukrainian control. Ukraine gets far more bang for it's buck by weakening the supply to Belgorod than attempting to attack the force concentrated there head on.

Flushing out Russian troops from Belgorod from threatening Kharkiv could indeed be the primary diversion objective of the Kursk incursion in addition to creating a buffer zone and serving to divert other Russian brigades further south in the Donbass.

 

[FatPhil]

A buffer zone in Kursk now actually exists. It's a fact and not mere propaganda. But what is likely propaganda is Zelenskyi declaring it as the primary purpose of the incursion.

The main intent be as it may, you don't blow up bridges in Kursk only to divert Russian troops from Donbass, unless you're an idiot. You blow up bridges to slow down fighting troop and materiel advance as well as logistics lines (fuel, ammunition, materiel repair and maintenance, food and reinforcements). That is to say, in plain English, to create a "buffer zone".

As it stands, I'd not say it acts as a buffer zone yet - it's simply not wide enough, nothing needs to be further away from the du jure boundary in order to attack Ukrainian territory yet. However, the blowing up of bridges, which now seems to be confirmed by both sides and independents does work towards that end. In the current situation (according to presumably "Агентство Новости" https://t.me/agentstvonews):

blowing up bridges as much complicates a retreat as much as it prevents an advance. A slowed retreat could lead to more PoWs, and a more panicked retreat could lead to more abandoned materiel, neither of which is a Bad Thing(tm).

 

[FatPhil]

Nothing stands still:

Following significant damage to multiple bridges in the Kursk region, Russian forces appear to have constructed alternative routes across the river Seym.

BBC Verify has identified what appear to be two pontoon bridges, on either side of the town of Glushkovo: one around 1.8km (1.1 miles) to the east, and another nearly 4km (2.5 miles) along the river to the northwest.

-- https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/live/cjdk2eyryn8t

I notice that someone even added the pontoon bridge to OpenStreetMap.org just a couple of minutes ago! (https://www.openstreetmap.org/way/1308832465 , and the other one's easily locatable from the river shape.)

 

[AllTheQuestionsToday]

I notice that someone even added the pontoon bridge to OpenStreetMap.org just a couple of minutes ago! (https://www.openstreetmap.org/way/1308832465 , and the other one's easily locatable from the river shape.)

Ought to be noted that the first time Russia moves anything critical over those pontoons, they're gonna get pounded into the silt by Ukraine. Those "bridges" are I believe more than well within drones range and are definitely within artillery and missile range from the Ukrainain military.

 

[Hevach]

The things Zelensky said are going to be at best surface level. It's important to view any public statements during a war through the lens of the war, because information and rhetoric are as much a part of that war as guns and tanks.

1. Everything is filtered for political agenda, which will be different depending on the audience. In this case as a statement to the foreign a major point is going to be Ukraine blatantly waltzing past yet another of Putin's lines in the sand without escalation. In the past doing this has led to Ukraine getting new kinds of weapons as many of the lines drawn in foreign aid (like main battle tanks and long range guided missiles) were also because of fears of escalation.
2. Everything is filtered for military value. Never, ever give an enemy free information. If Russia doesn't already know something you don't tell them. If Russia does know something you tell them something else in hopes of giving them pause.

On some level everything is true, but at the same time on some level everything is a lie.

 

[Gary C]

As it stands, I'd not say it acts as a buffer zone yet - it's simply not wide enough, nothing needs to be further away from the du jure boundary in order to attack Ukrainian territory yet. However, the blowing up of bridges, which now seems to be confirmed by both sides and independents does work towards that end. In the current situation (according to presumably "Агентство Новости" https://t.me/agentstvonews):

blowing up bridges as much complicates a retreat as much as it prevents an advance. A slowed retreat could lead to more PoWs, and a more panicked retreat could lead to more abandoned materiel, neither of which is a Bad Thing(tm).

Choosing to blow those particular bridges suggests it's to secure the left flank of the penetration and encourage any remaining Russian defenders to evacuate while they can. The next logical goal is to cut the road and rail connections along the E38, further complicating Russian logistics in the Kharkiv region. If the ZSU can't reach the the E38 on the ground, they can still keep it under observation and artillery fire making it unusable.

 

[LilWabbit]

The things Zelensky said are going to be at best surface level. It's important to view any public statements during a war through the lens of the war, because information and rhetoric are as much a part of that war as guns and tanks.

Thank you for a more nuanced appraisal. Rather than there being a universal hard and fast rule on everything being a lie and a truth at the same time during a war, perhaps the more precise characterization is that the best war propaganda employs facts (say, the tactically perfectly well-founded Ukrainian military goal of establishing a buffer zone to prevent cross-border attacks) in a successfully misleading way (distracting targeted audiences from an undisclosed primary objective).

To say that 'buffer zone' is merely rhetoric runs counter to facts on the ground inasmuch as it would be naivete to uncritically regard any publicly announced objective of an active military operation as the primary one.

 

[FatPhil]

Ought to be noted that the first time Russia moves anything critical over those pontoons, they're gonna get pounded into the silt by Ukraine. Those "bridges" are I believe more than well within drones range and are definitely within artillery and missile range from the Ukrainain military.

It may also be noted that this has already happened:

Source: https://twitter.com/kromark/status/1825637544408789053

My only question about that is how *little* effort it took!

(And in case twitter embedding doesn't work that's a before/after comparison with the comment:
"Mark Krutov @kromark
A low-res @planet satellite image taken today, Aug. 19th, shows that the Russian pontoon bridge between Zvannoye and Glushkovo in Kursk oblast is gone, with smoke rising 500 meters away from where it used to be, on the 'Russian' bank. Makes sense if we speak about the withdrawal.")

 

[LilWabbit]

Rhetoric or not, according to MP Maria Mezentseva the Kursk incursion serves primarily the purpose of targetting assets deep inside Russia in the absence of long range weaponry which the West has failed to provide. She suggests Ukraine was "forced" into this position.

Article:

Maria Mezentseva says Ukraine wants the ability to use such weapons to strike air bases and missile launch sites deep into Russian territory.

If it had this, Ms Mezentseva says, Ukraine would not have been "forced" into creating a "buffer zone" inside Russia.

Source: https://news.sky.com/story/ukraine-russia-latest-invasion-kursk-incursion-war-putin-live-updates-12541713?postid=8130630#liveblog-body

 

[Duke]

Russian foreign affairs and defense ministries announced that new recruits will be sent to North Korea for joint military training. It is reported that during their stay there, Russian soldiers will have to obey the laws of the country.

Russian soldiers will have their phones taken away until the end of the program, they will be forbidden to move freely without an escort. There will also be restrictions on the use of foreign currency and purchase of goods.

Russian defense ministry assures that the soldiers will "get a unique experience" by observing how the country lives under conditions of constant combat readiness.

Source: https://x.com/Gerashchenko_en/status/1849050183339765772


Would be interesting to see a copy of their "status of forces" agreements. As we've seen with US forces in Japan, particularly Okinawa, a few knuckleheads can disrupt diplomatic relations between friendly nations. Of course the odds are, if Russian recruits cause problems in NK (or deployed NK troops cause problems in Russia) the information would in all likelihood be suppressed as it would not serve either nation to make such issues known.

Wonder if the PRC was consulted concerning these joint training and NK troop deployment programs, and if so, what their concerns were/are?

 

[Hevach]

https://apnews.com/article/north-korea-russia-troops-ukraine-b664f8c1164e9ef859b7a618ffa92140

US sources are saying about 3000 North Korean troops. Which isn't much in the grand scheme of things, about two days worth of Russian losses through much of this year. They're not likely to be better equipped and are almost certainly less experienced than existing Russian troops.

The U.S. said Wednesday that 3,000 North Korean troops have deployed to Russia and are training at several locations, calling the move very serious and warning that those forces will be "fair game" if they go into combat in Ukraine.

The deployment raises the potential for the North Koreans to join Russian forces in Ukraine and suggests expanded military ties between the two nations as Moscow seeks weapons and troops to gain ground in a grinding war that has stalemated after more than two years.

Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin called it a "next step" after the North has provided Russia with arms, and said Pyongyang could face consequences for aiding Russia directly.

As for China, their relationship with North Korea has always been contentious. For most of my life it's been China that yanks the leash when Kim Jong Il or Kim Jong Un got too overt in their behavior. North Korea runs their counterfeit currency and drug economy through China and China has never been happy but also never willing to do what it takes to clean up the mess of a country to stop it. China gets very little out of the arrangement. North Korea is a buffer state but would still serve that purpose if it was Russia's ally.

Honestly from their POV I think the possibility of North Korea becoming somebody else's problem isn't a bad thing, especially as China has been eroding Russia's sphere of influence for years and as Russia's economy falters likely hopes to drag Russia all the way into its orbit.


Now, the opposite side of this is that direct involvement is a line that even Belarus hasn't crossed yet. And Belarusian entanglement with Russia run deep enough that the two share a seat on CSTO as a hypothetical future Union State rather than as two independent members. Russia has crossed the line of third party troops entering the field, which means things that were just idle joking speculation become a lot less funny suddenly - like a mysterious squadron of Ukrainian pilots with Polish call signs clearing the skies like a swarm of mach five bumblees.

It's also likely to solidify South Korea as a provider to Ukraine. So, you know, if you had "Korean War Proxy Conflict" on your parley card pencil in the win I guess.