DOW-UAP-PR072, ADMINISTRATIVE REVISION IIR 1777 J0032 22 Kazakhstan

[Starflint]

Given that many media outlets have recently chosen the more visually impactful videos from this document when reporting related news, I believe it is worth analyzing the file:
https://www.dvidshub.net/search/2.0?q=DOW-UAP-PR072&type=video

From a geographical and imaging logic perspective, Kazakhstan's Karaganda International Airport (Sary-Arka Airport, KGF) is located to the south and slightly east of Russia's overall territory; if referenced against European Russia and Western Siberia respectively, it can be summarized as being in the southeast or due south-by-east region.

Among the launch sites most relevant to rocket plume observations, the one closest to Karaganda—and most likely to cause "high-altitude luminous cloud" misidentifications—is not a launch center within Russia itself, but rather the Baikonur Cosmodrome, which has long been operated by Russia.

Looking at the approximate geographical relationship from the airport to Baikonur, the two are about 800 to 900 kilometers apart, in a west-southwest direction. This distance is entirely consistent with the visibility of high-altitude rocket plumes; as a rocket traverses the twilight layer at high altitudes, its propellant plume is illuminated by the sun. Even if night has already fallen on the ground, bright spots, light clusters, diffusing clouds, radial wakes, or even a "jellyfish-like" appearance can still manifest in the sky. Such phenomena have been misidentified as UFOs numerous times across the globe.

Source: https://youtu.be/_AM6OYZf6hA?si=ppabeZf6OcqPtTfx&t=249


Source: https://youtu.be/m5VqSSqySRM?si=G7W8YxgYK4EDSVaY&t=452


Tracing back further to Russian rocket activity prior to April 2023, the candidate event that best matches the timing, location, and visual characteristics is the Soyuz MS-22 launch on September 21, 2022.

Source: https://x.com/Space_Station/status/1572591766804520961?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1572591766804520961%7Ctwgr%5E3733703bacc8a74f429f8904c24c52a4a8f1e0a2%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Ffactcheck.afp.com%2Fdoc.afp.com.338Y3WM

https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_ne...chiysya-obyekt-zasnyali-nebe-gorodami-478438/

Public fact-checking information indicates that the "mysterious light trails" in Kazakhstan first appeared in late September 2022 and are highly consistent with the characteristics of high-altitude plumes following a Soyuz rocket launch ("giant fireball," "diffuse trail," and "jellyfish-like light cloud")

Its geographical location, time of dissemination, and visual appearance all align with the UAP footage near Karaganda. Therefore, based on currently verifiable public evidence, the most plausible explanation for PR072 is a high-altitude rocket plume. However, I have not yet identified the specific filming location and orientation in the original video, which requires further confirmation.

https://earth.google.com/web/search...SxvqEJAQgIIAToDCgEwQgIIAEoNCP___________wEQAA

 

[Starflint]

Although AARO's transparency statement explicitly mentions that redactions are intended to protect sensitive information—including witness identities, military facility locations, sensor capabilities, and operational platforms—the remarks in PR072 also contain the phrase "this media was digitally modified prior to being uploaded to the classified network." This indicates that some of the masking may have existed before the material ever reached the Department of Defense's classified network, potentially originating from the uploader's own processing, modifications made during forwarding, or edits performed by a third party for anonymization purposes.

One or more users have repeatedly uploaded these files and videos to the classified national network. I do not believe that the Department of Defense cannot track down exactly who this user is through user login audits, file access logs, download records, MAC addresses, terminal IDs, user certificates, CAC card records, and similar means.

Furthermore, I believe this case is relatively simple, and it is impossible that the Department of Defense's intelligence analysis capabilities couldn't deduce what it was. Therefore, regarding the entire UFO disclosure event, I believe what is more important than one blurry image after another is exactly who released these videos and for what purpose.

 

[jarlrmai]

Although AARO's transparency statement explicitly mentions that redactions are intended to protect sensitive information—including witness identities, military facility locations, sensor capabilities, and operational platforms—the remarks in PR072 also contain the phrase "this media was digitally modified prior to being uploaded to the classified network." This indicates that some of the masking may have existed before the material ever reached the Department of Defense's classified network, potentially originating from the uploader's own processing, modifications made during forwarding, or edits performed by a third party for anonymization purposes.

One or more users have repeatedly uploaded these files and videos to the classified national network. I do not believe that the Department of Defense cannot track down exactly who this user is through user login audits, file access logs, download records, MAC addresses, terminal IDs, user certificates, CAC card records, and similar means.

Furthermore, I believe this case is relatively simple, and it is impossible that the Department of Defense's intelligence analysis capabilities couldn't deduce what it was. Therefore, regarding the entire UFO disclosure event, I believe what is more important than one blurry image after another is exactly who released these videos and for what purpose.

I think there is some tacit view in the UFO community that somehow these videos were subject to deep time consuming analysis by some sort of internal highly qualified team that spent time and money on analysis and couldn't come up with anything.

But it seems clear that this would be AARO and before AARO, no-one, and as such this has not happened here for any of these videos if they have not been submitted to AARO.

But it's also possible that a few people with access to this footage have realised there is some sort of market for these videos and thus submit them to the system and leak them and their existence on US mil servers (so requests for them can be made) and also they may be UFO believers and as such resist submitting them to AARO as that organisation is poisoned by the UFO community (despite recent confusing mixed messages from Luna)

The real question for me is why do the US military seemingly not care about Jeremy Corbel consistently receiving leaked unredacted footage from these platforms.

 

[Starflint]

The real question for me is why do the US military seemingly not care about Jeremy Corbel consistently receiving leaked unredacted footage from these platforms.

Just speculation, perhaps some kind of tacit approval? Manipulated leak?

 

[Starflint]

View attachment 91023

Given that many media outlets have recently chosen the more visually impactful videos from this document when reporting related news, I believe it is worth analyzing the file:
https://www.dvidshub.net/search/2.0?q=DOW-UAP-PR072&type=video

View attachment 91022

The most eerie part of this video is that, in addition to being deliberately edited, the footage appears to have been highly compressed vertically. This flattened the rocket's light spot—which should have appeared circular—into a classic saucer shape. This seems to be a deliberate attempt to mislead the audience

 

[jarlrmai]

Just speculation, perhaps some kind of tacit approval? Manipulated leak?

I kinda wish some politician would query it but it seems that might be an unpopular move amongst anyone who cares about UFOs and its a move that can only hurt you (even if slightly) for no real gain other than to understand why it keeps happening.

 

[jarlrmai]

The most eerie part of this video is that, in addition to being deliberately edited, the footage appears to have been highly compressed vertically. This flattened the rocket's light spot—which should have appeared circular—into a classic saucer shape. This seems to be a deliberate attempt to mislead the audience

It's 16:9

is likely derived from a commercially available cellular device's rear-facing camera

Would seem to be consistent with not being stretched

However the person seen is seemingly clearly stretched

 

[jarlrmai]

Not sure if this is the lens distortion or editing though

 

[jarlrmai]

If you gamma boost it this appears for a frame at ~3 seconds in

Claude AI analysis

This appears to be a cover/title slide from a classified U.S. intelligence document. The visible text shows:

• Dissemination Date: 20220224 (February 24, 2022)
• Classification: SECRET // REL TO USA, FVEY
• Classified By: 1A0321
• Derived From: DIA SCG dated 20070108
• Declassify On: 50 [years, redacted]

"REL TO USA, FVEY" means it was releasable to the Five Eyes intelligence alliance (USA, UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand). It originates from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).

 

[jarlrmai]

The dissemination date 20220224 (February 24, 2022) is a few days before the given incident date

03.01.2022

is likely derived from a commercially available cellular device's rear-facing camera in March 2022. A user uploaded this video to a classified network in April 2023

 

[jarlrmai]

But the VIRIN states :

Date Taken: 03.01.2022
Date Posted: 05.22.2026 07:30
Category: B-Roll
Video ID: 1007788
VIRIN: 220301-D-D0360-9680
Filename: DOD_111720752
Length: 00:00:17
Location: KZ

 

[jarlrmai]

The date in the cover is the same day Russia invaded Ukraine

 

[Starflint]

Coincidentally, after a re-examination, I did indeed find this frame. I used AI to perform a content analysis on it and obtained some information:

The text within it appears to show that the PR072 raw footage is more likely an authentic U.S. military/intelligence document rather than a later civilian-forged template. This is because standard classified header information appears in the frame, such as "SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY," "Dissemination Date: 20220224," "Classified By: 1A0321," "Derived From: DIA SCG dated 20070108," and "Declassify On: 50X1-HUM." This indicates that it belongs to classified intelligence material under the DIA system that can be shared within the Five Eyes alliance, with its security focus primarily on sources, sensors, and platforms.

The most critical part is "Dissemination Date: 20220224," which indicates that this material had entered the distribution chain by February 24, 2022, at the latest. Therefore, it cannot correspond to the Soyuz MS-22 launch in September 2022, and the previous assessment directly linking PR072 to that rocket needs to be corrected.

Moreover, the AI specifically emphasized this date: Furthermore, February 24, 2022, is an extremely sensitive date: the day of the full-scale escalation of the Russia-Ukraine War. This means that at that time, the Five Eyes intelligence systems were in a state of high-intensity missile early warning and ISR monitoring over Russian airspace in the direction of Kazakhstan.

Consequently, it is actually very logical that a high-altitude rocket plume or missile trail would be rapidly reported and entered into the FVEY intelligence chain. This does not overturn the general direction that a "rocket plume or missile trail was misidentified as a UAP"; rather, it suggests that this is more likely a genuine record of an aerial anomaly that entered the intelligence system in early 2022 and was later declassified and released.

The flight of the Soyuz 2-1b upper stage over the observatory during the launch of the Radarsat-2 spacecraft on September 17, 2009.

 

[jarlrmai]

Please let people know if you use AI text here

 

[Starflint]

However the person seen is seemingly clearly stretched

I restored the video to 4:3, 1:1, and 9:16 aspect ratios respectively, but ultimately found that in the 3:4 frame, the figures look normal and the rocket's glow appears approximately circular

 

[Starflint]

Not sure if this is the lens distortion or editing though

Forcing a distortion from a 3:4 aspect ratio to a 16:9 ratio—I believe there is a very high probability that this was done intentionally

 

[jarlrmai]

Why would a cell phone video be 4:3 though it's odd, they are generally 1080p, how does resizing it to as if it were taken vertically and expanded look?

 

[Starflint]

Why would a cell phone video be 4:3 though it's odd, they are generally 1080p, how does resizing it to as if it were taken vertically and expanded look?

The phone camera should allow you to manually set the aspect ratio, which should include a 4:3 option; alternatively, it is possible that the top and bottom sections were cropped after shooting in a 16:9 ratio

 

[JMartJr]

Is it just me. or does that look rather like the moon peeking through a gap in clouds? Which, if that were the case, might account for how short the clip is -- if it was longer it might reveal that it's just the moon as more of it becomes visible!

I'm not arguing that that is what this actually is, I think the case for it being a rocket launch is pretty solid, and note that if THIS bit is correct:

I restored the video to 4:3, 1:1, and 9:16 aspect ratios respectively, but ultimately found that in the 3:4 frame, the figures look normal and the rocket's glow appears approximately circular

...THAT looks a lot less like the moon in clouds and more like a rocket.

But I mention the "moon hypothesis" to make the point that the "A" in "UAP" might better stand for "ambiguous" than "anomalous" -- the video as originally presented does not do anything anomalous, it is just too short (and, likely, distorted on top of that!) to be instantly identifiable. However, it does instantly present the viewer with one or two possibilities that can be narrowed down pretty quickly to a likely answer!

Looking at the original video, nobody with any experience with these things should have though "Wow, that's anomalous, no way to figure out what THIS one is!"

 

[MonkeeSage]

What does "Derived From: DIA SCG dated 20070108" mean? I am guessing SCG means something like "Security Classification Guidelines" from that date, and not an original video date from 2007?

 

[NorCal Dave]

What does "Derived From: DIA SCG dated 20070108" mean? I am guessing SCG means something like "Security Classification Guidelines" from that date, and not an original video date from 2007?

Just throwing it out for fun, but 2007 Lacatski is reading Hunt for the Skinwalker and he is literally the DIA guy that tracks missile and rocket threats:

In 2007, Dr. James T. Lacatski was an intelligence officer serving in the Defense Intelligence Agency's Defense Warning Office (DWO). He served as Team Leader for writing the annual Missile Defense Threat Environment series, the SECRET-level threat documents used by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA).

IF the date is January 8, 2007, then it's before AAWSAP gets rolling and supposedly before Lacatski reads the book and heads to Skinwalker Ranch to check it out, but the subject and time frame is an interesting coincident.

 

[Jack]

What does "Derived From: DIA SCG dated 20070108" mean? I am guessing SCG means something like "Security Classification Guidelines" from that date, and not an original video date from 2007?

Security Classification Guides (SCGs) are the prescriptive guidance laid out by original classification authorities (OCAs) to protect sensitive national security information. They include handling requirements, downgrading and declassification timelines, and exemptions from automatic declassification under which certain materials may be withheld beyond standard declassification schedules. In this case, the fact that the underlying media is classified under a Defense Intelligence Agency SCG implies that the mission, personnel, or deployment context is associated with a DIA equity. The details governing the specific handling of this material are unlikely to be publicly released in the foreseeable future, but that is just my own inference.

Systematic Declassification Review (SDR) is the government-initiated process by which classified materials are assessed to determine whether they remain sensitive enough to warrant continued protection. In cases where information can no longer be considered sensitive, e.g., an assessment of future enemy force projection and operational plans whose predictive window is now in the past, SDR is intended to prevent over-classification of non-sensitive information. The methods used to generate those assessments and to obtain the underlying intelligence information generally remain classified, however (sources and methods). Where an authorized requester believes specific classified records warrant review, they may separately petition through Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR), a distinct, requester-driven process under Executive Order 13526. Exemptions from automatic declassification must fall within specific categories enumerated under EO 13526.

Derivative classification authorities, such as AARO, are required to adhere to SCGs when they handle a data-owning partner's media or information, e.g., a UAP report and attendant supporting documentation (typically, videos, MISREPs, Range Foulers, FAA Pilot Reports, etc.). Because AARO is not an OCA, the office cannot classify, reclassify, or declassify information, but it is responsible for assessing and mitigating the aggregation of classified or unclassified materials in a manner that would pose a risk to national security. This limitation is likely why many of their published materials refer to reporting sources under their geographic combatant command or military department rather than more recognizable subunits. The combatant commands own the mission space and the military departments, with caveats, own the platform/weapon system/sensor.

 

[MonkeeSage]

Security Classification Guides (SCGs) are the prescriptive guidance laid out by original classification authorities (OCAs) to protect sensitive national security information. They include handling requirements, downgrading and declassification timelines, and exemptions from automatic declassification under which certain materials may be withheld beyond standard declassification schedules. In this case, the fact that the underlying media is classified under a Defense Intelligence Agency SCG implies that the mission, personnel, or deployment context is associated with a DIA equity. The details governing the specific handling of this material are unlikely to be publicly released in the foreseeable future, but that is just my own inference.

Systematic Declassification Review (SDR) is the government-initiated process by which classified materials are assessed to determine whether they remain sensitive enough to warrant continued protection. In cases where information can no longer be considered sensitive, e.g., an assessment of future enemy force projection and operational plans whose predictive window is now in the past, SDR is intended to prevent over-classification of non-sensitive information. The methods used to generate those assessments and to obtain the underlying intelligence information generally remain classified, however (sources and methods). Where an authorized requester believes specific classified records warrant review, they may separately petition through Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR), a distinct, requester-driven process under Executive Order 13526. Exemptions from automatic declassification must fall within specific categories enumerated under EO 13526.

Derivative classification authorities, such as AARO, are required to adhere to SCGs when they handle a data-owning partner's media or information, e.g., a UAP report and attendant supporting documentation (typically, videos, MISREPs, Range Foulers, FAA Pilot Reports, etc.). Because AARO is not an OCA, the office cannot classify, reclassify, or declassify information, but it is responsible for assessing and mitigating the aggregation of classified or unclassified materials in a manner that would pose a risk to national security. This limitation is likely why many of their published materials refer to reporting sources under their geographic combatant command or military department rather than more recognizable subunits. The combatant commands own the mission space and the military departments, with caveats, own the platform/weapon system/sensor.

Where are you learning all that from?

 

[Jack]

Where are you learning all that from?

The full text of EO 13526, the legal instrument that governs the classification system, is available online at the National Archives website. (ref: https://www.archives.gov/isoo/policy-documents/cnsi-eo.html) The most relevant sections are summarized and quoted below:

Part 1, Sec. 1.1, (a) of that order lays out the standards for classification, including requiring that an entity hold original classification authority to create a classified record.

Part 1, Sec. 1.3, (a) enumerates the specific persons within the executive branch vested with original classification authority and establishes that those individuals may delegate such authority only when necessary.

" Agency heads are responsible for ensuring that designated subordinate officials have a demonstrable and continuing need to exercise this authority."

Paragraph (c) of the section goes into significant depth on the circumstances allowing for delegation and the limitation on re-delegation.

Part 1, Sec. 1.4 lays out the specific categories of information eligible for classification.

"Information shall not be considered for classification unless its unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause identifiable or describable damage to the national security."

The specific categories include what you might expect, e.g., military plans, intelligence activities, etc.

Part 2, Sec. 2.1 lays out the use of derivative classification, the manner in which those authorities are applicable to the operations of federal agencies and departments, and the responsibilities inherent in carrying out those authorities.

Part 2, Sec. 2.2 establishes the requirements that SCGs must abide by and the officials who are authorized to create them.

Part 3, Sec. 3.4 describes the SDR mechanism, which creates a duty on the part of data holders to periodically ensure that information held in their custody requires continuing protection under the classification schedule.

" Each agency that has originated classified information under this order or its predecessors shall establish and conduct a program for systematic declassification review for records of permanent historical value exempted from automatic declassification [...]"

It also establishes that such records, where applicable, must be accessioned to the National Archives in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2203.

Part 3, Sec. 3.5 describes the MDR mechanism, which lays out particular circumstances under which any person or entity with standing may challenge the continued classification of specific classified records held within U.S. Government custody.

In a 2025 information paper, "AARO and the Declassification Process," the office states that it does not have the authority to unilaterally declassify materials.

"AARO cannot declassify information on its own because the classified information relevant to the UAP reports was created by other government entities outside of AARO – for example, the Military Departments. The office that originally created the information has the primary authority to declassify it. As such, AARO experts must work with the owners of classified information across the U.S. Government every day to facilitate the declassification and release of UAP records without compromising the security of its partners."

This paragraph suggests to me that the office does not hold OCA authority, and therefore must work with data partners to declassify materials originating within the military services, the Military Departments, the Intelligence Community, or the combat support agencies, like DIA. Consequently, AARO acts as a coordinating body (aligning with its statutory duties as contemplated in 50 U.S.C. Sec. 3373(c)) that must solicit declassification reviews from the data owners, who ultimately determine if the information can be released in its entirety, requires redaction, or must remain classified to prevent damage to national security.

(ref: https://www.aaro.mil/Portals/136/PDFs/Information Papers/AARO_Declassification_Info_Paper_2025.pdf, ref: https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=(title:50 section:3373 editionrelim)

Inferences based upon information contained in these sources are my own views (informed by my professional experience) and are characterized as such.