When Conspiracists Psychoanalyze

Really? Intuition is reliable? Even more than that, it's as reliable as science? Some intuitions may be reliable, just as a stopped clock, the big problem being you then need a means to tell which among the innumerable intuitions are the reliable ones. That is to say, science.

I didn't discuss intuition as a generic vague quality in my response to your question but a very specific type of abstract awareness of a mind-independent reality or an epistemological question. So therefore it's already a derailment for us to discuss 'intuition' and what 'intuition' means or doesn't mean. Rather, you should address my specific response and pinpoint errors in it.

Most scientists base their whole work on this cognitive faculty (awareness of a mind-independent reality as an obvious truth). How can such a faculty, when fully alert, then be considered less reliable than the entire domain of inquiry based on it.

Btw: we're drifting much off-topic. This exchange would be better moved to rambles I think.

You're probably right, albeit this does relate to the psychology of a skeptic as stated in the initial fallacy.

The burden to prove that there are no other reliable means to acquire knowledge besides science is on the claimant/upholder of this philosophical belief (i.e. scientism) which assumes without evidence the relative unreliability of all other means of inquiry. There's basis to say some other means of inquiry -- such as fuzzy logic, blind belief or intuition when intuition is defined as a cursory first impression on things -- are generally less reliable. But not the specific type of abstract awareness of reality or 'intuition' I referred to in my response.

Unless of course you demonstrate those particular abstract experiences (of a mind-independent reality and your epistemological question) aren't reliable.
 
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use anecdotal evidence

Article:

Bin Laden's global financial reach detailed

September 26, 2001
i'm iffy that one article is evidence of what mainstream view is.

Article:
Indeed, it began on the very day of bin Laden's greatest triumph. At first glance, the 9/11 assault looked like a stunning win for al-Qaeda, a ragtag band of jihadists who had bloodied the nose of the world's only superpower.

...
Editor's Note: Peter Bergen, CNN's national security analyst, is the director of the national security studies program at the New America Foundation. His latest book is "The Longest War: The Enduring Conflict Between America and al-Qaeda." This article first appeared at Time.com.


or even two
Article:
The story of how a small but influential cadre of Saudi officials supported a ragtag band of operatives from Osama bin Laden's al-Qaida terrorist network in 2001 has quickly become one of the most diplomatically delicate and anger-inducing pieces of the 9/11 narrative.


or three.
Article:
FP: . I think we have consistently described certainly the Taliban or AQ or ISIS as "ragtag group of" fill in the blank, and it diminishes from a consciousness level, what that threat might be. Because they don't look like us, they live differently than us.
 
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I'm very familiar with Fran Shure's arguments about cognitive dissonance. The idea that Americans are psychologically unable to accept the notion that their government could do something as bad as 9/11 has been massively debunked by history. Currently something like 20-30% of Americans believe a baby-eating cabal stole an election. And another 30% think that America is little more than a systemically racist genocidal settler patriarchy. Doesn't seem like it's hard at all for Americans to think ill of their government. So the aging Truthers have to come to terms with the fact that their whole movement failed to convince most people of anything and the absence of deathbed confessions gets louder and louder.
 
Which other reliable means of acquiring knowledge would you suggest?
Depending on who you ask mathematics is or isn't a science.

I get the feeling that all this turns on how reliable it needs to be to count as reliable. As reliable as science in the long run? Not much if anything in my opinion.
 
Depending on who you ask mathematics is or isn't a science.

I get the feeling that all this turns on how reliable it needs to be to count as reliable. As reliable as science in the long run? Not much if anything in my opinion.

Mathematical truth isn't a scientific truth in that it doesn't require observation for verification/falsification. It's a good example of a non-scientific field of inquiry into reliable truths about inferences regarding purely intellectual constructs. Some science relies on mathematics as a tool but this fact doesn't equate mathematics with science.

To recap, the epistemologically untrained (skeptic or not) often fail to realize that our consciousness experiencing and understanding profound mathematical, philosophical, political, ethical and even aesthetic ideas are abstract 'observations', sometimes compelling sensations of what is real similar to physical observations except for their abstraction. They can be consistent, repeatable, inter-subjective (objective) and dispassionate observations in much the same way physical scientific observations are. Sometimes even more so. One such abstract observation is us being aware that this is an epistemological discussion. Another one is us being aware that there's a world outside my imagination that is independent from it despite the fact that theoretically it could be just an amazingly persistent and consistent dream.

A sane and rational investigator may justifiably accept them as truths but only after examining them carefully and after they meet the foregoing epistemological standards. These abstract experiences are so real and so mundane in our everyday life that sometimes we forget they are actually 'metaphysical' in the sense that they haven't been successfully reduced to known physical properties. Scientifically we may say that they may or may not be successfully reduced to neuroscientific properties in the future. But that's another debate and speculation.

Which brings us back to the Skeptic's Paradox or the Materialist's Paradox, depending on which of these theories it's applied to. The paradox does not really concern the 'moderate skeptic/agnostic/materialist' who simply honestly acknowledges not consciously knowing things beyond the ken of physical science or immediate observations to exist while not ruling out the possibility of knowing in the future. The 'strong' skeptic, however, is usually either an unwitting or a conscious proponent (a swankier word for 'believer') of a positive philosophical claim, better known as empiricism and/or scientism. That is, the belief that only what is scientifically provable or physically observable is reliably knowable.

Which is simply not true as demonstrated earlier.

Logically, to make a positive claim on reliable knowledge being restricted to the domain of science, is to pronounce a blind metaphysical belief in a universe where any other possible domain of inquiry outside science and physical observation is forever bound to be inaccessible to reliable knowledge. Scientifically, however, there is no possible way to know such a sweeping truth about all reality. It's purely speculative. Such a notion resides principally in the realm of philosophy, unapproachable by science.

Scientism is just another scientifically unfalsifiable and unverifiable philosophical theory, often motivated by an understandable historical yet emotional aversion to the intrusive preachiness of fanatics and superstitious believers, insisting that you blindly swallow evidently absurd, and even harmful, ideas as truth, while judging you fiercely for their rejection.

Against this backdrop scientism is understandable and a logical counter-reaction. But in so doing it allows the pendulum to swing to another epistemological extreme and ending up becoming another belief-system.
 
Depending on who you ask mathematics is or isn't a science.
Mathematics is the science of (abstract) structures of thought.

When we look at reality, our brain tries to make sense of it by recognizing structure: for example, similar objects can be counted. Mathematics is a method to talk precisely about those structures, and to "prefabricate" insights that always apply to structures with certain properties.

Computer science is related to mathematics in that it deals with abstract processes.
They're both sub-fields of philosophy, in that they examine aspects of how we think.

When precise thinking is needed, but people avoid mathematics, that's usually a sign of underlying issues with that endeavour: there's a structure to their thinking that's supposed to stay hidden.
 
Mathematics is the science of (abstract) structures of thought.

Article:
Mathematics is certainly a science in the broad sense of "systematic and formulated knowledge", but most people use "science" to refer only to the natural sciences. Since mathematics provides the language in which the natural sciences aspire to describe and analyse the universe, there is a natural link between mathematics and the natural sciences. Indeed schools, universities, and government agencies usually lump them together. (1) On the other hand, most mathematicians do not consider themselves to be scientists and vice versa. So is mathematics a natural science? (2)The natural sciences investigate the physical universe but mathematics does not, so mathematics is not really a natural science.
 
The natural sciences investigate the physical universe but mathematics does not, so mathematics is not really a natural science.
Yes. I disagree with that, for the reasons stated. The structure of the physical universe is part of the physical universe.
 
Yes. I disagree with that, for the reasons stated. The structure of the natural universe is part of the natural universe.

I think it's a false dichotomy to argue 'this definition is science' but 'the other is not'. It just depends in which sense we speak about science. If we speak about science in the overly generic sense of any systematic methodology of pursuing knowledge, then all sorts of things can be considered science. But this definition also suffers from blurry boundaries.

If, on the other hand, we talk about science in its historical context of how it emerged into a powerful domain of inquiry, the fundamental methodology of natural sciences (the systematic and integrated use of hypothesis-formulation, logical deduction and empirical observation) offers the basic model.
 
The world is super complex and there is rarely a simple explanation of anything, this is is my claim at least. What yourself might see as simple (mathematics, phography, etc), can be completely out of range for others. Yes there is conspiracies, but not all events are. Yes there are many unexplained phenomena, but it does not mean it it's not at trivial or natural thing. And, just because you don't understand something, does not mean it is not understood by someone else. Sometimes the simple explanation is the best one, but it can also be too simple. It's not that simple at all. The way I approach complex topics or tasks, is to break it down to elements I understand well, and try to build on that with new knowledge. One step at a time. That goes also when explaining something to others. Start with what they already understand well and build on that. Off course "understand" is a subjective term, so sometimes the discussion is about that, what we mean by "understand".
 
If, on the other hand, we talk about science in its historical context of how it emerged into a powerful domain of inquiry, the fundamental methodology of natural sciences (the systematic and integrated use of hypothesis-formulation, logical deduction and empirical observation) offers the basic model.
citation needed

in the "historical context", universities have always included mathematics and liberal arts among their areas of inquiry.

hypothesis-formulation and logical deduction are fundamental methodologies of mathematics, they originate in that field

don't build a "no true scotsman" fallacy with your "powerful domain of inquiry" rhetoric
 
in the "historical context", universities have always included mathematics and liberal arts among their areas of inquiry.

Also philosophy. None of these facts render classical philosophy, mathematics or liberal arts as science in the sense understood when we talk about natural sciences.

hypothesis-formulation and logical deduction are fundamental methodologies of mathematics, they originate in that field

Not hypothesis-formulation but logical deduction, yes. Logical deduction, alone, doesn't make anything a science without the empirical component. Citation is needed to demonstrate the far more extraordinary claim (rather than my obvious statement) that science, in order to be a proper science, doesn't require the empirical component.
 
I think it's a false dichotomy to argue 'this definition is science' but 'the other is not'. It just depends in which sense we speak about science. If we speak about science in the overly generic sense of any systematic methodology of pursuing knowledge, then all sorts of things can be considered science. But this definition also suffers from blurry boundaries.

If, on the other hand, we talk about science in its historical context of how it emerged into a powerful domain of inquiry, the fundamental methodology of natural sciences (the systematic and integrated use of hypothesis-formulation, logical deduction and empirical observation) offers the basic model.
Indeed. I'm at my core a pure mathematician, who will often be heard distancing maths from science in what appears to be a clear binary: it's not at one extreme edge of science - it's outside science. Clearly my default is to view science as natural science, which I flavour with liberal lashings of Popper and Bayes. However, when I encounter some definitions of science that deviate from that, I definitely don't consider them wrong, I will happily include mathematics in that fold. Different definitions can be useful in different contexts for different reasons. Dogmatically sticking to your own definition and rejecting others does nothing to help advance the discourse. This is why I like the logical distinction between axioms and postulates. I am prepared to put my postulates to one side, and run with yours - valid deductions will still be arrived at, as long as we do the process correctly.

This took far too long to find, possibly because I'd forgotten who'd said it, but the pith of it resonated and is relevant here. A philosophy prof, who had expected me to already be familiar with it, and thus it would be good common ground from where we could work, brought up this article during a late night discussion, and it touches upon how cleanly-defined, or otherwise, science is or should be. Here's the pith:
External Quote:
The remedy for all this confusion is simple: We must abandon the idea that science is distinct from the rest of human rationality. When you are adhering to the highest standards of logic and evidence, you are thinking scientifically. And when you're not, you're not.
-- https://www.samharris.org/blog/our-narrow-definition-of-science
The difference between the science vs. philosophy dichotomy-or-not, and the maths vs. science one is mostly unimportant.

Were I to put my mathematician's hat on again, and desperately want to emphasise the separation, perhaps the wider field that contains both science and mathematics should be called "rationality". After all, you're not a true philosopher unless you've introduced new terminology, or at least mangled the old terminology!
 
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Also philosophy. None of these facts render classical philosophy, mathematics or liberal arts as science in the sense understood when we talk about natural sciences.
Thanks, your distinction between "science" and "natural sciences" supports my point.
Just say "natural sciences" when you mean that.

Not hypothesis-formulation but logical deduction, yes.
Fermat's Last Theorem may be the most famous hypothesis ever.

in order to be a proper science,
there's the "no true scotsman" I expected
 
Thanks, your distinction between "science" and "natural sciences" supports my point.

Not your ignorant implication that science (yes, proper science, no moving of goal posts) need not have an empirical component which you happily ignored when pointed out. And instead thought invoking the True Scotsman goal-post analogy to my argument would obfuscate your blatant error.

Fermat's Last Theorem is a theorem. Math has lots of theorems. Not hypotheses which usually belong to science.
 
Up until 1994 it was nothing more than a conjecture. Which is a hypothesis, to be proven.

In pure math people rarely talk about hypotheses (I've never heard, in fact) and you shouldn't mix mathematical proofs with scientific proofs. Totally different. Open up a thread and we can go deeper into these differences. They're not trivial.
 
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In pure math people rarely talk about hypotheses (I've never heard, in fact)

Except the Riemann hypothesis? The most famous problem of all mathematics.

1659513400840.png

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Riemann_hypothesis
 
In pure math people rarely talk about hypotheses (I've never heard, in fact)

Grrr - you were warned there's someone who identifies as a pure mathematician in this thread! The Riemann Hypothesis, with its extended and generalised forms, is literally one of the biggest things in pure maths. So much swings on it. It'll be an interesting result either way when it is finally resolved. It's even one of the few Millennium Prize problems from the Clay Institute - worth a sweet million if you get there first, alongside the Poincare Conjecture (the only one that's been proved, by Perelman 2 decades back), the Birch Swinnerton Dyer Conjecture, a solution to Navier Stokes (which is an odd one out, there's no reason to expect a solution to even exist), and P vs. NP.

External Quote:
RH and Generalized RH implications include
* Almost every deep question on primes
* Ranks of elliptic curves, Orders of class groups
* Quadratic forms (eg. Bhargava & Conway-Schneeberger style)
* Maximal orders of elements in permutation groups
* Running times for primality tests
* Thousands of results proved assuming the truth of RH and GRH
--
Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OPGaSuhp7Tk
about 48 minutes in (emphasis in original)

Being non-experimental, there's very little difference between "conjecture" and "hypothesis" in mathematics - so "conjectures" fall into the same category as @Mendel's "hypotheses", they can have the same level of heuristic support, if you reject the importance of hypotheses, you must also reject the conjectures too. You don't want to go there, you'll see several references to important examples of those in this very post.
 
Grrr - you were warned there's someone who identifies as a pure mathematician in this thread! The Riemann Hypothesis, with its extended and generalised forms, is literally one of the biggest things in pure maths.

But is it common to use the term "hypothesis" in pure math beyond the Riemann Hypothesis? It's common in natural science. Most of the pure mathematicians I've hung out and conversed with on the philosophical foundations of mathematics and formal logic (my training, we do have hypotheses in formal logic but it's quite different from a scientific hypothesis) do not refer to 'conjectures' as 'hypotheses'.

Article:
In mathematics, a hypothesis is an unproven statement which is supported by all the available data and by many weaker results. An unproven mathematical statement is usually called a "conjecture", and while experimentation can sometimes produce millions of examples to support a conjecture, usually nothing short of a proof can convince experts in the field. But when a conjecture is supported not only but all the available data but also by numerous weaker results, it is upgraded in label to a hypothesis. The most famous conjecture in mathematics is the Riemann hypothesis, which despite many attempts at a proof, is supported by many related results. The convexity conjecture, on the other hand, is considered "incompatible" with the nn-tuples conjecture and more results appear to support the latter, thus neither is upgraded to hypothesis.


And to repeat the pertinent point before veering entirely off topic, pure mathematical proof doesn't require empirical observation but logical deduction. Science does in order to be considered well-founded. 'Scientism' as an epistemological belief in the skeptic's psyche is usually a strongly empiricist philosophy
 
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But is it common to use the term "hypothesis" in pure math beyond the Riemann Hypothesis? It's common in natural science. Most of the pure mathematicians I've hung out and conversed with on the philosophical foundations of mathematics and formal logic (my training, we do have hypotheses in formal logic but it's quite different from a scientific hypothesis) do not refer to 'conjectures' as 'hypotheses'.

Article:
In mathematics, a hypothesis is an unproven statement which is supported by all the available data and by many weaker results. An unproven mathematical statement is usually called a "conjecture", and while experimentation can sometimes produce millions of examples to support a conjecture, usually nothing short of a proof can convince experts in the field. But when a conjecture is supported not only but all the available data but also by numerous weaker results, it is upgraded in label to a hypothesis. The most famous conjecture in mathematics is the Riemann hypothesis, which despite many attempts at a proof, is supported by many related results. The convexity conjecture, on the other hand, is considered "incompatible" with the nn-tuples conjecture and more results appear to support the latter, thus neither is upgraded to hypothesis.


And to repeat the pertinent point before veering entirely off topic, pure mathematical proof doesn't require empirical observation but logical deduction. Science does in order to be considered well-founded. 'Scientism' as an epistemological belief in the skeptic's psyche is usually a strongly empiricist philosophy

Nowadays we do generally call them conjectures, but Riemann's has long standing. To be honest, the only other one with the name hypothesis that I can think of is the Continuum Hypothesis in set theory (there's no cardinality between that of the naturals and the reals). There are only two primes not of the form 6n+/-1. I've found counter-examples to your presumption, theoretically my work is done.

However, @Mendel was explicitly referring to conjectures, using the word "conjectures". His explication of his point contained the word hypotheses, and you jumping on that was definitely an unnecessary derailing of the thread. He knew what he was saying, I knew what he was saying. What were you digging for?
 
Nowadays we do generally call them conjectures, but Riemann's has long standing. To be honest, the only other one with the name hypothesis that I can think of is the Continuum Hypothesis in set theory (there's no cardinality between that of the naturals and the reals). There are only two primes not of the form 6n+/-1. I've found counter-examples to your presumption, theoretically my work is done.

Thanks, useful clarification and not in disagreement with my earlier point on it being a rarity.

However, @Mendel was explicitly referring to conjectures, using the word "conjectures".

He was conflating mathematical conjecture with a hypothesis which is incorrect as demonstrated in the previous citation. There are many mathematical conjectures that are not mathematical hypotheses. But all (the few) mathematical hypotheses are also mathematical conjectures. The former is a subset of the latter. As a mathematician you know full well that precision matters.

His explication of his point contained the word hypotheses, and you jumping on that was definitely an unnecessary derailing of the thread. He knew what he was saying, I knew what he was saying. What were you digging for?

The derailment occurred earlier when he introduced a far more generic and blurry definition of science as an exclusive one (the false dichotomy between definitions of science, remember, which you agreed to being unnecessary and unhelpful) as if it had any bearing on the earlier points made on scientism as an unwitting or conscious assumption in many a skeptic's psyche. An assumption in which empirical evidence is considered a fundamental standard for reliable knowledge. Hence any reference to a 'science' where it's not employed as a standard is irrelevant and a derailment unless purporting to demonstrate that pure math needs no physical observation to produce reliable knowledge. Which I agree with 100 %.

Anyway, clarifying what we mean by science when we discuss the psychology of the skeptic regarding it the supreme standard of knowledge is, on second thought, not off-topic at all.
 
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I also believe a large majority of conspiracy believers do so to ' belong'.
Some may just not feel particularly special / wanted / appreciated / elevated in life.
Along comes something they can chew on and others applaud them that are likeminded.

That feel good factor we all chase consciously or otherwise is in abundance in the conspiracy brigades of the world.

I have read articles or opinions attempting to debunk the debunker and yet it is with pathetic almost juvenile retort with no basis in any consideration outside of the ' conspiracy group ' all joining hands to sing the conspiracy 'Kumbaya ' together.

Perhaps simple elements of human nature forge themselves within similar personalities.
 
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I have read articles or opinions attempting to debunk the debunker and yet it is with pathetic almost juvenile retort with no basis in any consideration outside of the ' conspiracy group ' all joining hands to sing the conspiracy 'Kumbaya ' together.
I've noticed that in what feels like the comment section of any facebook post that even vaguely references a topic that's big with conspiracy theorists.

Some ancestry site decided to have a picture of Neil Armstrong as a part of their advertising and the comment section seemed to fill up quickly with moon landing deniers.

What gets me is when they say "everyone knows/agrees that (insert popular theory here)". It kind of feels like a propaganda strategy; that if they say something is true with enough confidence people will believe them, regardless of what the evidence actually suggests.
 
There's a selection bias when looking at FB groups/comments, though. It's like when people say they find vegans annoying and pushy... Well, you're only going to notice the vegans who are pushy with their veganism, not the ones who keep to themselves.
 
There's a selection bias when looking at FB groups/comments, though. It's like when people say they find vegans annoying and pushy... Well, you're only going to notice the vegans who are pushy with their veganism, not the ones who keep to themselves.
That's a fair point; basically if you walk into a green field you shouldn't act surprised or annoyed by everything being green.
 
So in essence they're picking and choosing the details without considering the further ramifications of what they're suggesting?
Many people fall for confirmation bias. To give a simple example, people who believe in an afterlife often do so because they want there to be an afterlife, so they'll look up articles, books, videos that claim there's an afterlife. Personally I hope there's an afterlife but can't believe it because there isn't solid evidence for that. People who believe in the illuminati often feel like they don't have control over their lives, search for reasons why their lives aren't going well, so they blame it on some sinister outside force.
 
To give a simple example, people who believe in an afterlife often do so because they want there to be an afterlife

It's interesting: I hear that notion often and though I know an absolute TON of people who believe in the afterlife I don't know a single one of them who believes because that's what they want there to be.

Is that idea not just one of those things that people repeat but haven't really checked?
 
It's interesting: I hear that notion often and though I know an absolute TON of people who believe in the afterlife I don't know a single one of them who believes because that's what they want there to be.

Is that idea not just one of those things that people repeat but haven't really checked?

They look forward to one. Positively. How's that different from them "wanting" it? That's even been explicitly in the creed for any denomination I've ever encountered.

Of course, psychologists have some input on this matter too:
External Quote:
Abstract

Belief in some form of life after death is widespread, and the question is raised what psychological processes give rise to it. The sample in the present study consisted of 85 first-year undergraduate psychology students at the University of Adelaide. General belief in life after death was found to be high, and was related to a desire for there to be an afterlife, to adherence to a dualistic philosophy, and to low death anxiety. Subdivision of subjects into the different forms of afterlife believed in showed that reincarnationists exhibited the strongest adherence to a dualistic philosophy and the highest level of belief in, and alleged experience of, ESP and psychokinesis.
-- https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0191886996001675
That was literally the first academic paper hit from the Stargpage search engine when given the search string ``psychology why do people believe in an afterlife'', I specifically did not prime it with desire.

It might not be the sole reason, but it is part of the reason, and thus can't be dismissed as not being part of it. The above paper implies it's a significant part of it. Of course, it's not necessarily a primal cause - the desire is quite possibly a consequence of a natural tendency towards both dualism and an element of selfishness.
 
They look forward to one. Positively. How's that different from them "wanting" it?

I think if there is a difference it's that Danny said they believe in it because they want it, whereas looking forward to it is "they believe in it and they want it".

It might not be the sole reason, but it is part of the reason, and thus can't be dismissed as not being part of it.

That's true. I didn't mean to dismiss it and I'm sure it sometimes is the case, if not in my experience.
 
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Trying to psychoanalyze conspiracy theorists is just weird to me. I see so many authority groups try to explain away conspiracy theorists via whatever means. You want to know the root? It's very simple: the people at the top of the food chain are corrupt, and large organizations work in lockstep and consistently and knowingly lie to you, and censor the truth. It's that simple. If those three things were fixed I would instantaneously stop being a conspiracy theorist, as the problem would be resolved. authorities are crooked and liars, and I do not believe such people. What's so hard to understand about that? You want to know where my mind is at? Look at people like Bernie Sanders. Same perspective. Everyone intuitively knows the rich are corrupt, that they deliberately cause problems, yet when we specify what exactly they do, it's a conspiracy theory? Tell me, if there's some fault with conspiracy theorists and indeed the rich people in charge are focused on helping us, why on earth does the USA not have single payer healthcare like the rest of the world? You go, "oh it's the republicans!" but then I point out: they too are rich people. Democrats have the majority, Biden is president, yet nothing happens. The "good guys" on the dem side won! Where's the M4A? Huh? Biden explicitly said during the primary that he supports medicare for all, and yet here we are over a year later and still there has not been a single step taken towards that promise. Are we supposed to forget the past? I recall when all the democrats, in lockstep, said to not get the covid vaccine, because it was the "trump vaccine". I'm a conspiracy theorist for then taking their advice? I feel like I'm taking crazy pills or something because I have a memory longer than a goldfish!
 
Source, please.
GOP talking point, with some spin

Source: https://twitter.com/TrumpWarRoom/status/1288610192712704005


Article:
Published July 31, 2020 2:26am EDT

"How are you going to distribute the vaccine when it arrives, when it arrives, when it's there?" Biden asked Tuesday. "And the question of whether it's real, when it's there, that requires enormous transparency. You got to make all of it available to other experts across the nation, so they can look and see. So there's consensus, this is a safe vaccine.

"Because already you have, what percent is American people saying if the vaccine were there tomorrow, they wouldn't take it? And it's not the usual anti-vaccine crowd. It's beyond that because people are losing faith in what the president says. Think about it."


Article:
Democrats Spent 2020 Recklessly Undermining The Public's Confidence In The Vaccine

BIDEN AND HIS ADVISORS SOWED DOUBT ABOUT THE SAFETY OF COVID-19 VACCINES
....

DEMOCRAT GOVERNORS UNDERMINED VACCINE CONFIDENCE

Governor Andrew Cuomo (D-NY), in October: "I believe all across the country you're going to need someone other than this FDA and this CDC saying it's safe.".... Governor Jay Inslee (D-WA) .... make sure that Donald Trump's fingerprints are not on it."Inslee, when asked if he would be willing to take a vaccine released before the election, wouldn't commit to doing so, saying "I would have to look at the science."

CONGRESSIONAL DEMOCRATS QUESTIONED THE SAFETY OF THE VACCINES

Rep. Ilhan Omar (D-MN): "We can't trust the President and take his word, and take a vaccine that might cause harm to us."Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI) said the FDA and CDC "have gotten screwed up by President Trump" .... Sen. Richard Blumenthal (D-CT) ... Sen. Patty Murray (D-WA).... Sen. Tina Smith (D-MN) suggested that if a vaccine was announced before election day, it would be because of political pressure.

PROMINENT DEMOCRATS SAID THEY WERE "HESITANT" TO GET THE VACCINE

Former Rep. Katie Hill (D-CA) .... Senate candidate Cal Cunningham ...

I am seeing this as Dems trying to prevent Trump from short-circuiting the vaccine trials for a pre-election proganda boost; even given that Trump has influenced the CDC's Covid messaging, that looks like a bit of a conspiracy theory, I think?
 
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GOP talking point, with some spin

Source: https://twitter.com/TrumpWarRoom/status/1288610192712704005


Article:
"How are you going to distribute the vaccine when it arrives, when it arrives, when it's there?" Biden asked Tuesday. "And the question of whether it's real, when it's there, that requires enormous transparency. You got to make all of it available to other experts across the nation, so they can look and see. So there's consensus, this is a safe vaccine.

"Because already you have, what percent is American people saying if the vaccine were there tomorrow, they wouldn't take it? And it's not the usual anti-vaccine crowd. It's beyond that because people are losing faith in what the president says. Think about it."

I'm ...confused. How on earth is "transparency" equated to "undermining confidence"?
 
? I recall when all the democrats, in lockstep, said to not get the covid vaccine, because it was the "trump vaccine". I'm a conspiracy theorist for then taking their advice?
Their advice was to look at the science. Now that the vaccine is out and in broad use, what does the science say?
 
I'm ...confused. How on earth is "transparency" equated to "undermining confidence"?
I've amended my post.

Basically, the Dem talking point is to not trust the Trump administration in this because they might put propaganda above science. It's really more fitting for the "that's what they want you think" thread, because it's ultimately about establishing whom to trust.
 
I've amended my post.

Basically, the Dem talking point is to not trust the Trump administration in this because they might put propaganda above science. It's really more fitting for the "that's what they want you think" thread, because it's ultimately about establishing whom to trust.

It still in no way supports the claim that all Democrats said something in lockstep. And anyway, ignoring the absurd "all" aspect, statements about the potentially damaging nature of Trump's association with the vaccine are different from statements about efficacy properties of the vaccine, and whether it should be taken or not.
 
It still in no way supports the claim that all Democrats said something in lockstep. And anyway, ignoring the absurd "all" aspect, statements about the potentially damaging nature of Trump's association with the vaccine are different from statements about efficacy properties of the vaccine, and whether it should be taken or not.
that claim is kinda hard to support, but they showed a lot of democrats basically said, "don't trust the CDC/FDA, don't trust a rushed vaccine", with not much support for that. It feels at least reasonable to claim that, with the then context of the vaccine (and the trial data) not yet available.

The claim is that Trump's association with it puts claims about it in so much doubt that transparency must be demanded before the vaccine is administered. It's sowing distrust of the health agencies.

We do have transparency now, so belaboring that point 2 years later is a bit strange. "Let's go with what these guys told me 2 years ago when they said we don't know enough" is a kind of intentional blindness to progress.
 
I recall when all the democrats, in lockstep, said to not get the covid vaccine

That's a bold claim: that all the Democrats said "don't get the vaccine".

Are you sure that's true?

As for your explanation of why people believe conspiracy theories: sure, some at the top lie and collude and do dodgy things but I dont think it's all of them. I have friends who are rich, who work in government, and I know it's not the case for them, that they're as disturbed by corruption as you or I.

It's a big jump though to go from "some rich and powerful people put their own interests first and make selfish and dishonest decisions that affect other people negatively purely for power and money" to things like chemtrails, flat earth, 9/11 truthing, Qanon, etc.

I think those are the things we think of as conspiracy theories rather than just thinking big business and government is often corrupt. And believing in those things because, basically, "some people in power sometimes conspire and lie" doesn't seem like a logical step to me.
 
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