A Study from University of Kent, Canterbury, UK, looks at logic and contradictions in conspiracy theories. Excerpt from the abstract:
The present research shows that even mutually incompatible conspiracy theories are positively correlated in endorsement. In Study 1 (n = 137), the more participants believed that Princess Diana faked her own death, the more they believed that she was murdered. In Study 2 (n = 102), the more participants believed that Osama Bin Laden was already dead when U.S. special forces raided his compound in Pakistan, the more they believed he is still alive.
Bottom line is that obvious contradictions in varying conspiracy theories are sort of levelled out by the believe in the "common enemy", the ones charged with the covering-up.
I think these contradictions come about because the theorists do not actually fully embrace any particular alternative narrative, other than a very strong disbelief in the official story. They will tall you that 9/11 was a controlled demolition, but will be very light on the details, allowing them to fluidly shift between a variety of techniques.
Some contradictions are from just a basic lack of understanding of simple science. In the chemtrail theory, you often get people who claim to notice a strange smell, and feel ill, just a few minutes after a plane passes overhead. They hold this observation simultaneously with complaining about how the trail then hangs oddly in the sky for hours
They see no contradiction between something that:
A) Hurtles towards the ground invisibly at 100mph
and
B) Remains visible, yet weightlessly suspended six miles overhead (and generally 5-20 miles to the side)
Nor are they aware of any contradiction between saying contrails should evaporate, but clouds should.
Often things that are seemingly contradictory are bizarrely combined into one meta-theory. A normal person would think the idea of spraying substances into the air to simultaneously detect UFOs and spread Morgellons disease to be a rather odd idea. Yet Carnicom manages to hold these two ideas and five other simultaneuoulsy in his mind.
In the ExopoliticsTV interview, Mr. Carnicom details seven weapons applications of the covert global sprayed aerosols program that are being used to carry out over-all the goal of “absolute control” over the global human population. These seven weapons applications of the sprayed aerosols are: 1. Biological operations, including the use of apparent bio-warfare, such as Morgellons disease, in the sprayed aerosols, constituting war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the Geneva conventions. 2. Military Operations, such as advanced radar applications, anti-missile Star Wars applications. 3. Electromagnetic Operations, including HAARP directed energy scalar weapons and mind control weapons applications, constituting war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the Geneva conventions. 4. Environmental modification and weather wars. Mr. Carnicom stated he has concluded that the covert aerosol-spraying program has transformed the atmosphere of the planet into plasma capable of sustaining weaponized applications since its acceleration in 1999. This constitutes a violation of the 1978 Treaty against Modification of the Environment. 5. Geophysical operations, including tectonic (earthquake) warfare, constituting war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the Geneva conventions. 6. An advanced surveillance system capable of covert surveillance of the entire human population. 7. Detection of exotic propulsion systems, including detection of off-planet or interdimensional UFOs.
How do you tell a chemtrail from a persistent contrail?
Vapour trail evaporates and con/chemtrails stay and spread, you see contrail is a chemtrail no matter how you explain it, water fuel fumes gas all chemicals also, therefore if it comes from a plane and stays around, it's a chemtrails.
This reminds me of a conspiracist in my family. He says the moon landing was a hoax because of some radiation belt (that no person can survive) somewhere between the earth and the moon, yet he believes there are man-made structures on the moon.
In the conclusion of the study (p.6), the authors reflect about the social/group aspects:
There may also be an element
of self-presentation and conflict avoidance in the vagueness
observed by Clarke: If multiple contradictory theories are
simultaneously believed by many in a conspiracist community,
endorsing one in particular is tantamount to denying the others
and may provoke a backlash.
In the conclusion of the study (p.6), the authors reflect about the social/group aspects:I wonder what that would mean for the debunking side. What would be the expected reaction if the contradictions are pointed out emphatically?
Once "The Great Culling" is out, there may be an opportunity for a nice case study ...
Interesting. So, conspiracists are conspiring to not acknowledge contradictions in their conspiracies in order to protect their conspiracies! LOL!
But seriously, we should begin a list of contradictions contained in all these conspiracy theories. I'd love to see some of these conspiracists get caught between contradictions.
Agreed. Attempting to characterize conspiracy theorists as a bunch of 'crazy people', and those 'crazy people' as being inherently prone to violence is also just ignorant and offensive bullshit. Which of those themes is more dominant in this thread, when looking at it with as unbiased an eye as you can manage?
I'm really not inclined to sift through 4 pages of this thread to see who said what and how their comments could or could not have been misinterpreted in an attempt to determine the prevalence of themes.
I will say that claiming conspiracy theorists are inherently prone to violence is demonstrably false.
I would support the suggestion that conspiracy theorists tend to be somewhat irrational.
Believing the Impossible and Conspiracy Theories
Los Angeles, CA (January 25, 2012) - Distrust and paranoia about government has a long history, and the feeling that there is a conspiracy of elites can lead to suspicion for authorities and the claims they make. For some, the attraction of conspiracy theories is so strong that it leads them to endorse entirely contradictory beliefs, according to a study in the current Social Psychological and Personality Science (published by SAGE).
People who endorse conspiracy theories see authorities as fundamentally deceptive. The conviction that the "official story" is untrue can lead people to believe several alternative theories-despite contradictions among them. "Any conspiracy theory that stands in opposition to the official narrative will gain some degree of endorsement from someone who holds a conpiracist worldview," according to Michael Wood, Karen Douglas and Robbie Sutton of the University of Kent.
To see if conspiracy views were strong enough to lead to inconsistencies, the researchers asked 137 college students about the death of Princess Diana. The more people thought there "was an official campaign by the intelligence service to assassinate Diana," the more they also believed that "Diana faked her own death to retreat into isolation." Of course, Diana cannot be simultaneously dead and alive.
The researchers wanted to know if the contradictory beliefs were due to suspicion of authorities, so they asked 102 college students about the death of Osama bin Laden (OBL). People who believed that "when the raid took place, OBL was already dead," were significantly more likely to also believe that "OBL is still alive." Since bin Laden is not Schrödinger's cat, he must either be alive or dead. The researchers found that the belief that the "actions of the Obama administration indicate that they are hiding some important or damaging piece of information about the raid" was responsible for the connection between the two conspiracy theories. Conspiracy belief is so potent that it will lead to belief in completely inconsistent ideas.
"For conspiracy theorists, those in power are seen as deceptive-even malevolent-and so any official explanation is at a disadvantage, and any alternative explanation is more credible from the start," said the authors. It is no surprise that fear, mistrust, and even paranoia can lead to muddled thinking; when distrust is engaged, careful reasoning can coast on by. "Believing Osama is still alive," they write, 'is no obstacle to believing that he has been dead for years."
I'm really not inclined to sift through 4 pages of this thread to see who said what and how their comments could or could not have been misinterpreted in an attempt to determine the prevalence of themes.
I will say that claiming conspiracy theorists are inherently prone to violence is demonstrably false.
I would support the suggestion that conspiracy theorists tend to be somewhat irrational.
Believing the Impossible and Conspiracy Theories
Los Angeles, CA (January 25, 2012) - Distrust and paranoia about government has a long history, and the feeling that there is a conspiracy of elites can lead to suspicion for authorities and the claims they make. For some, the attraction of conspiracy theories is so strong that it leads them to endorse entirely contradictory beliefs, according to a study in the current Social Psychological and Personality Science (published by SAGE).
People who endorse conspiracy theories see authorities as fundamentally deceptive. The conviction that the "official story" is untrue can lead people to believe several alternative theories-despite contradictions among them. "Any conspiracy theory that stands in opposition to the official narrative will gain some degree of endorsement from someone who holds a conpiracist worldview," according to Michael Wood, Karen Douglas and Robbie Sutton of the University of Kent.
To see if conspiracy views were strong enough to lead to inconsistencies, the researchers asked 137 college students about the death of Princess Diana. The more people thought there "was an official campaign by the intelligence service to assassinate Diana," the more they also believed that "Diana faked her own death to retreat into isolation." Of course, Diana cannot be simultaneously dead and alive.
The researchers wanted to know if the contradictory beliefs were due to suspicion of authorities, so they asked 102 college students about the death of Osama bin Laden (OBL). People who believed that "when the raid took place, OBL was already dead," were significantly more likely to also believe that "OBL is still alive." Since bin Laden is not Schrödinger's cat, he must either be alive or dead. The researchers found that the belief that the "actions of the Obama administration indicate that they are hiding some important or damaging piece of information about the raid" was responsible for the connection between the two conspiracy theories. Conspiracy belief is so potent that it will lead to belief in completely inconsistent ideas.
"For conspiracy theorists, those in power are seen as deceptive-even malevolent-and so any official explanation is at a disadvantage, and any alternative explanation is more credible from the start," said the authors. It is no surprise that fear, mistrust, and even paranoia can lead to muddled thinking; when distrust is engaged, careful reasoning can coast on by. "Believing Osama is still alive," they write, 'is no obstacle to believing that he has been dead for years."
Seems like the writers made up a load of junk for the consumption of the gullible and you seem to have swallowed it.
I note they cite no sources: "Believing Osama is still alive," they write, 'is no obstacle to believing that he has been dead for years."
Are we seriously expected to believe: People who believed that "when the raid took place, OBL was already dead," were significantly more likely to also believe that "OBL is still alive."
or
The more people thought there "was an official campaign by the intelligence service to assassinate Diana," the more they also believed that "Diana faked her own death to retreat into isolation."
They are obviously promulgating that conspiracy theorists are delusional idiots. Who on earth would believe OBL was already dead before the raid and then maintain he is still alive after?
It is similar to the debunker theory that the Boston bombers acted because of 'conspiracy theories'.
I thought you had more sense T... but then we can all make mistakes... Hope you recover soon
Contact: Michael Wood, Postgraduate Researcher, Department of Psychology, University of Kent, Canterbury, United Kingdom. Phone: +44 (0)1227 823428, Fax: +44 (0)1227 827030, email: mw337@kent.ac.uk.
Contact: Michael Wood, Postgraduate Researcher, Department of Psychology, University of Kent, Canterbury, United Kingdom. Phone: +44 (0)1227 823428, Fax: +44 (0)1227 827030, email: mw337@kent.ac.uk.
BTW, this is exactly what I was talking about in post #133 above. You blurt out a comment without even doing the very minimum of research. Had you at the very least done a search on the title, it would have taken you to the abstract where you would have found the sources yourself. sigh.
The abstract is completely unrepresentative and IMO shows gross professional misconduct/ineptitude/disinformation. Complete and utter FAIL
What it actually says is, People who believe OBL was dead before 2011 raid and people who believe he is still alive are both likely to believe there is a cover up
Well that would not even constitute a theory, because if either one is true the cover up must be FACT.
Trigger Hippie posting Bunk... Keep on the straight and narrow or you will become the debunkers version of AJ
US$1.50 or 3.00). Materials and procedure. Participants were directed to read a brief summary of the official story of Osama bin Laden’s death, including the details regarding the refusal to release pictorial evidence and the burial at sea, followed by a short paragraph explaining that some people doubt the official story. They were then asked about their opinion of the official story, followed by three conspiracy items: 1. Osama bin Laden was killed in the American raid. 2. Osama bin Laden is still alive. 3. When the raid took place, Osama bin Laden was already dead. 4. The actions of the Obama administration indicate that they are hiding some important or damaging piece of informa- tion about the raid. Each of these statements was followed by a series of ques- tions based on the composite endorsement measure used by Douglas and Sutton (2011). This asked participants to rate their agreement with each statement on a scale from 1 ( strongly dis- agree )to6( strongly agree ), as well as to what degree they 4 Social Psychological and Personality Science 00(0)
found the statements plausible, convincing, worth considering, and coherent, again on a scale from 1 ( notatall )to6( very much ). These ratings were then averaged to obtain a composite measure of endorsement for each statement ( a > .87 for each statement). While the original measure used by Douglas and Sutton also asked participants to judge the interestingness of each statement, there is no contradiction in finding two rival theories equally interesting, so we excluded interestingness from the present study in order to avoid artificially inflating the relevant correlations. Results and Discussion The idea that bin Laden was killed in the raid enjoyed a high level of endorsement ( M ¼ 5.00, SD ¼ 1.19), indicating a fairly high level of trust in the official story, though participants on average found the Obama administration’s actions to be suspi- cious ( M ¼ 4.74, SD ¼ 1.41). Participants seemed less likely to endorse the idea that bi n Laden is still alive ( M ¼ 3.05, SD ¼ 1.39) or was already dead ( M ¼ 3.19, SD ¼ 1.39). In a replication of our Study 1 resul t, a correlational analysis revealed a significant positive correlation between composite endorsement ratings of the two contradictory conspiracy the- ories, r ¼ .21, p ¼ .04. We next examined the contribution of belief in a cover-up tothe positive relationship between the two contradictory theoriesusing a hierarchical multiple regression analysis. Endorsementof the cover-up item significantly predicted endorsement of the ‘‘bin Laden is still alive’’ theory, b ¼ .373, t (97) ¼ 4.04, p < .001 (the same was true of the already-dead theory, b ¼ .346, t (97) ¼ 3.63, p < .001). Adding endorsement of thecontradictory theory ‘‘bin Laden was already dead’’ to theregression equation, however, explained no additional variance ( D R 2 ¼ .006), and this theory was not itself a significant predic- tor, b ¼ .086, t (96) ¼ 0.86, p ¼ .40. This indicates that the cor- relation in endorsement of the t wo contradictory theories is explainable entirely by their connection with belief in a decep- tive cover-up by authority (see Figure 1). The degree to which someone believes in a cover-up helps determine their endorse- ment of the official story, and of both conspiracy theories as well. This result is in line with our predictions and supports the idea that conspiracy theories are defined not by adherence to a particular alternative account but by opposition to the official story and a belief that deception is taking place. General Discussion While it has been known for some time that belief in one con- spiracy theory appears to be associated with belief in others, only now do we know that this can even apply to conspiracy theories that are mutually contradictory. This finding supports our contention that the monological nature of conspiracism (Goertzel, 1994; Swami et al., 2010, 2011) is driven not by con- spiracy theories directly supporting one another but by the coherence of each theory with higher-order beliefs that support the idea of conspiracy in general. As demonstrated in Study 2, perceived deception by authority is one such belief, and it is likely that there are many others as well. For those who hold such beliefs, the specifics of a conspiracy theory do not matter as much as the fact that it is a conspiracy theory at all. There are strong parallels between this conception of a mono- logicalbeliefsystemandAdornoetal.’s(1950)workonprejudice and authoritarianism. In an attempt to explain the strong positive correlations between contradictory antisemitic beliefs, Adorno suggested that incompatibilities between beliefs at a local level are dwarfed by coherence with broader beliefs about the world—‘‘nuclear ideas’’ which ‘‘tend to ‘pull in’ numerous other opinions and attitudes and thus to form a broad ideological sys- tem.’’(p.92).Suchasystem‘‘providesarationaleforanyspecific idea within it and a basis for meeting and assimilating new social conditions’’ (p. 93). Our findings support an equivalent explana- tion for beliefs in contradictory conspiracy theories, with a belief in deceptive officialdom as the nuclear idea in question. If Adorno’s explanation for contradictory antisemitic beliefs can indeed be applied to conspiracy theories, conspiracist beliefs might be most accurately viewed as not only monologi- cal but also ideological in nature. Just as an orthodox Marxist might interpret major world events as arising inevitably from the forces of history, a conspiracist would see the same events as carefully orchestrated steps in a plot for global domination. Conceptualizing conspiracism as a coherent ideology, rather than as a cluster of beliefs in individual theories, may be a fruit- ful approach in the future when examining its connection to ideologically relevant variables such as social dominance orientation and right-wing authoritarianism. Figure 1. Illustration of the observed correlations in endorsement of Study 2 items. The two conspiracy theories display a significant zero- order correlation (above) but have no significant direct relationship when belief in a cover-up is taken into account (below). Wood et al. 5
Although we have demonstrated the importance of a belief in deception by authority as an important antecedent of conspi- racy belief and a partial explanation for correlations between contradictory theories, there are certainly other broad beliefs which could make a similar contribution. For instance, conspi- racy theories would seem much more plausible to those with a belief in the effectiveness of intimidation and bribery. In a more abstract sense, a belief in the essential malevolence of officialdom—or in the specific malevolence of a certain pow- erful entity—would make many conspiracies seem more likely. The social element must not be neglected either; many conspi- racy theories are associated with specific groups or even orga- nized movements, such as the 9/11 Truth Movement. Clarke (2007) found a trend of increasing vagueness in these modern conspiracist communities, which he characterized as a reaction to the antagonistic atmosphere of Internet discourse. Our results suggest an alternative possibility: A genuine uncertainty within individuals regarding the true nature of the conspiracy behind a particular event (beyond the fact that there was one), and a willingness to consider and even endorse mutually con- tradictory accounts as long as they stand in opposition to the officially sanctioned narrative. There may also be an element of self-presentation and conflict avoidance in the vagueness observed by Clarke: If multiple contradictory theories are simultaneously believed by many in a conspiracist community, endorsing one in particular is tantamount to denying the others and may provoke a backlash. In any event, the development of conspiracy theories almost certainly owes a great deal to social engagement and discussion of alternative narratives, and the dynamics of conspiracist communities may be a fruitful avenue for future investigation with reference to previous work on opinion-based groups (e.g., Musgrove & McGarty, 2008). Conspiracist belief systems may also be well captured by con- nectionist models of social inference such as Thagard’s (1989) ECHO. ECHO has been shown to accurately predict the degree to which higher-order beliefs about social actors affect judge- ments of their actions as sinister or innocent, honest or deceptive (Read & Miller, 1993). However , there has been little or no investigation into the ability of ECHO to model the influence of broad worldviews. Based on the present research, one would expect that when broad beliefs are relevant to the interpretation of a particular situation, they serve as a constraint on the conclu- sions that are likely to be drawn from it in the same way as spe- cific beliefs about the actors and situations involved. A conspiracist belief system consisting of many such beliefs would inhibit the acceptance of official narratives but may not discrimi- nate among several different conspiracy theories. Some might be discarded, but even contradictory theories might be simultane- ously accepted. Almost any account of events which accords with the broader beliefs in question is likely to garner some endorse- ment by adherents of a conspiracist worldview. Modelling such a network might provide an instructive insight into the processes underlying the development of conspiracist beliefs, and of other beliefs influenced by superordinate ideological considerations. It must be noted that not all conspiracy theories fall under the ‘‘deceptive officialdom’’ umbrella. Antisemitic conspiracy theories are a notable and historically important exception;instead of alleging abuse of power by elites, historical theoriesof Jewish conspiracy usually detailed supposed attempts by aminority to seize power for themselves (Graumann, 1987). Itwould be instructive to examine whether beliefs in such conspiracies are correlated with belief in those that fit moreclosely into the ‘‘deceptive officialdom’’ template, and if suchrelationships are mediated to the same degree by endorsementof that central belief.In any case, the evidence we have gathered in the presentstudy supports the idea that conspiracism constitutes a monolo-gical belief system, drawing its coherence from central beliefssuch as the conviction that authorities and officials engage inmassive deception of the publicto achieve their malevolentgoals. Connectivity with this central idea lends support to any individual conspiracy theory, even to the point that mutuallycontradictory theories fail to show a negative correlation inbelief. Believing that Osama bin Laden is still alive is apparently no obstacle to believing that he has been dead for years.
Declaration of Conflict of Interest The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interests with respect to the authorship and/or publication of this article
Funding The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
If this is true, they must have funded it themselves. I wonder if they also paid to publish, (which is just wondering... not a criticism)
Are you trying to imply there is no connection between belief in a conspiracy and irrational behaviour?
How do you interpret the harrasment of Gene Rosen by believers in a false flag conspiracy following the Newtown massacre?
Clearly behaviour indicative of a psychopathic lack of empathy directly linked to a belief.
The abstract is completely unrepresentative and IMO shows gross professional misconduct/ineptitude/disinformation. Complete and utter FAIL... What it actually says is, People who believe OBL was dead before 2011 raid and people who believe he is still alive are both likely to believe there is a cover up
Conspiracy theories can form a monological belief system: A self-sustaining worldview comprised of a network of mutually supportive beliefs. The present research shows that even mutually incompatible conspiracy theories are positively correlated in endorsement. In Study 1 (n = 137), the more participants believed that Princess Diana faked her own death, the more they believed that she was murdered. In Study 2 (n = 102), the more participants believed that Osama Bin Laden was already dead when U.S. special forces raided his compound in Pakistan, the more they believed he is still alive. Hierarchical regression models showed that mutually incompatible conspiracy theories are positively associated because both are associated with the view that the authorities are engaged in a cover-up (Study 2). The monological nature of conspiracy belief appears to be driven not by conspiracy theories directly supporting one another but by broader beliefs supporting conspiracy theories in general.
The study shows that some conspiracy theorist's are likely to believe in mutually contradictory conspiracies. For instance one in which Osama is dead and another conspiracy in which he is alive. The study suggests that the conspiracies themselves are not as relevant or important as the world view they reinforce. In this case the world view being that the government is involved in a cover-up. It was shown that conspiracy theorists can simultaneously believe in two contradictory theories when both reinforce and support the conspiracist's belief that the government is covering something up.
In the present research, we seek to determine whether the coherence of the conspiracist belief system is driven not by direct relationships among individual theories, but by agreement between individual theories and higher-order beliefs about the world. For instance, the idea that authorities are engaged in motivated deception of the public would be a cornerstone of conspiracist thinking due to its centrality in consIn the present research, we seek to determine whether the coherence of the conspiracist belief system is driven not by direct relationships among individual theories, but by agreement between individual theories and higher-order beliefs about the world. For instance, the idea that authorities are engaged in motivated deception of the public would be a cornerstone of conspiracist thinking due to its centrality in conspiracy theories...
Would it be possible for their contradiction to be overruled by their coherence with a broader conspiracist worldview, such that they display a positive correlation in endorsement?
The article was published in a journal called "Social Psychological and Personality Science" which is described as a peer-reviewed academic journal that publishes papers in the field of Psychology. The journal is jointly owned by four scientific organizations.
I've been reading a little about the psychology of conspiracy theories. Particularly trying to understand the study mentioned in the OP; how is it that people can believe in contradictory theories? Just by chance I came across this post by CWC in another thread.
"I began to see that I was becoming so irrational that I believed opposing views of the same story. On the one hand I didn't believe that planes hit the towers or the Pentagon, nor did a plane crash in that PA field, and yet on the other hand I believed that the planes that hit the twin towers could not have caused the collapses. In other words, I had all angles covered with the belief that one of them was true. This is ludicrous. "