

AMERICANS, CREDULOUS

OR

THE ARROGANCE OF CONGENITAL LIARS & OTHER CHARACTER DEFECTS

Establishing the Truth Behind the Echo Flight UFO Incident of March 16, 1967

by James Carlson



"Such lights and clouds appear from time to time when a missile fails in the upper layers of the atmosphere and have been reported there," Russian defense analyst Pavel Felgenhauer was quoted as saying in a DefenseNews report.

"At least this failed test made some nice fireworks for the Norwegians," he quipped.

The Norwegian Meteorological Institute is said to have received a deluge of calls from confused and concerned members of the public.

This was the 12th test launch of the Bulava and the seventh time the firing proved far from a success.

The missile is a key part of Russia's designs to rebuild its aging arsenal. But persistent problems with the Bulava have become what analysts call an agonizing issue for Moscow.

"The Defense Ministry has ploughed a large proportion of its procurement budget into ensuring that the missile becomes the key element of its rocket forces," DefenseNews reported.

The previous failure, on July 16, precipitated the resignation of Yury Solomonov, director of Moscow's Institute of Thermal Technology, responsible for developing the missile.

The missile's repeated problems have also cast a pall on U.S.-Russian negotiations in which the two Cold War enemies are now trying to revise the parameters of a new arms reduction treaty to replace the 1991 START accord.

Should the missile fail to operate new Borei Submarines developed to launch Bulavas will prove useless.²

The main points to get out of this article are: (1) the test took place in Russia's preferred staging ground – they test missiles there all the time; (2) this incident wasn't isolated; such phenomena occur from time to time when a missile fails in the upper atmosphere; (3) this test was the twelfth test conducted for this missile type – it was the seventh time the test had failed; (4) the failed test provoked "hundreds" of UFO sighting reports – *hundreds*. This didn't happen because people in Scandinavia are stupid – it happened because they just didn't know better. Unfortunately, people who don't know better can often be taken advantage of by those who *do* know better.

And once again, the world turns awry ...

Any judicious selection of commentaries from the thousands of internet UFO forums available to anyone with a PC and the kind of patience that's left undiminished by waste and sloth even at the tail end of Congressional debate on whether or not to recognize the cultural value of Tim Burton or some other faceless individual who likes cartoons and corpses way too much for most Disney-weaned Americans will immediately give the hypothetical researcher a fairly accurate representation of the general folklore and level of belief surrounding just about any UFO-oriented event proposed since the 19th century – *at least*. A simple *Google* search of

² United Press International, <http://www.upi.com/>, "Russian missile test fails", Published Dec. 11, 2009 at 6:42 PM.

the subject, normally a well-validated research tool, suddenly morphs into a new nation of impossible demands on the normally seething, scattered, and relentless environment that best describes the irreverent sandstorm of human belief. It's a universe of uncommon eccentricity, a new city founded upon varying levels of irreconcilable statements only vaguely resembling issues of fact – baseless, often unconfirmed, bandied about without any mention of sources, verification, or oftentimes even the most loosely interpreted standards of proof; fiction becomes fact and a new race of idiots bounces off of school buses and into the halls of the American counterculture, well armed with a series of events that only barely match our definition of the word: Roswell, Exeter, Foo Fighters, Mothman, Rendlesham. Sometimes, when the event is particularly well-known, the desired information describing this new universe can be quickly located by simply entering the supposed *date*. Using this method, we learn very quickly that on March 16, 1967, the rock group *Pink Floyd* – while Syd Barrett was still the primary artistic focal point of the band – recorded their major opus in minor, *Interstellar Overdrive*;³ Dean A. Andrews, Jr. was giving testimony to the New Orleans Grand Jury that was preparing to indict Clay Shaw for conspiring to and achieving the murder of President John F. Kennedy a scant four years earlier;⁴ 110 NASA scientists had just proposed a series of experiments on the first lunar samples that would eventually be made available to them;⁵ and somewhere between a dozen and thirty or so Minuteman Missile ICBMs at Malmstrom AFB, outside of Great Falls, Montana, were shut down totally by one or more UFOs for no discernible reason whatsoever,⁶ although the theories explaining this little happenstance are both widespread and remarkably useless to consider.

At the first glance of this hypothetical *Google*-list of ours, there is little in it that might give one cause to worry – about *anything*. After all, *Pink Floyd* still wrote some of the best rock music in history, even *after* losing Syd Barrett, Clay Shaw was acquitted, but history is not his friend and has *not* judged him to be the American patriot he always insisted he was, NASA defended itself well against fringe elements asserting that nobody has ever been to the moon, let alone brought back samples of crushed and well-refined meteor dust, and everybody knows that UFO case-nuts are just that: *nut cases* – right?

3 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interstellar_Overdrive ; <http://www.blinkx.com/video/pink-floyd-interstellar-overdrive/MmnkzeGb1s1NnpN6J7xlcw>

4 <http://www.jfk-online.com/gjmenu.html> ; <http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/russ/testimony/andrewsshaw1.htm>

5 http://www.nasa.gov/centers/johnson/news/releases/1966_1968/index.html

6 <http://www.ufoevidence.org/cases/case1017.htm> ; <http://www.nicap.org/malmstrom67-2.htm>

Except that more people in America believe in UFOs than evolution, and they are by all accounts louder and more insistent than any possible coalition of the sane, regardless the counterculture these sane individuals may consider themselves to be an integral part of. More importantly, if UFOs were shutting down this nation's nuclear defense capabilities in 1967, they surely by now qualify as a threat to the security of the nation more direct and consequential than terrorist-pilots could ever hope to be; to paraphrase John Adams, "how could we even *hope* to defend ourselves against such an enemy?" So, terrorists in flying saucers are making our nuclear defense capabilities ineffectual and thereby meaningless as the mechanism of deterrence it was intended to be, and the fact that this was achieved in 1967 is ample proof that we Americans have been dangerously victimized by these *visitors* since before Woodstock – *oh my!* It is important, therefore, for us to understand how such a belief comes about, and *why* it continues to be held with such uncompromising strength and confidence even in the total absence of evidence, by which I mean evidence that doesn't amount to a witness statement that reads something like "I know it happened because this guy who's name I never actually asked for told me that it happened... and just like you, *I wonder where the hell is that guy is right now ...*'cause God knows we need this kind of enlightenment as a vehicle of our national defense." An examination of the event becomes necessary, and since the accounts detailing from one to three such incidents at Malmstrom AFB – each asserted by Robert L. Salas at one time or another for either Echo Flight, November Flight or Oscar Flight on March 16, 1967 – prove it to be by far the best known and most commonly believed among such incidents, having been the subject of numerous television documentaries, magazine articles, and at least one widely known book entitled *Faded Giant*, by the already mentioned Robert Salas and his pal, James Klotz,⁷ such an examination should weigh in heavily on that particular case, and how exactly an imaginary structure of any sort whatsoever could become, for many people, as existential a platform for truth as any other remembrance of our collective history. The Echo Flight Incident holds a sad place of pride in Robert Hastings' history of UFO interest in the marching forth of nuclear arms around the world, *UFOs and Nukes*, but as we shall see, his general disregard for anything approaching a generally accepted standard of proof ensures that his *magnum opus* will be forever classified as an interesting but ultimately useless example of modern folklore, dwelling somewhere amongst the many mansions of the Lord along with somewhat more

⁷ <http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/1419603418/ref=nosim/librarythin08-20>

charming and whimsical elements like the *chupacabra*, the modern resurgence of vampirism, snipe hunting, and the theory that Jack the Ripper was Lewis Carroll. The March 16 incident was even included in a documentary by Paul Kimball entitled *Best Evidence: Top Ten UFO Sightings*,⁸ which purports to chronicle what researchers consider to be the ten UFO incidents best supported by the strongest evidence. I believe that people should be more aware of what exactly constitutes “the strongest evidence”, because it’s become very plain that at this moment in time, millions of Americans are ignorant of this particular character typifying this particular case that has been otherwise so well defamed by so many individuals who have absolutely no conception of what best constitutes evidence, lies, and rebukes. Hell, the Echo Flight Incident has even been used to publicize extraterrestrial approval of President Obama’s agenda to seek a nuclear weapons-free world.⁹ In my humble opinion, once this “strongest evidence” has been properly examined, you should probably sit down, because the disorganized throngs crowding inside the theater of your head and seated in rows just beyond the orbits of your eyes will likely erupt in a sudden gasp, punctured only by a lone, low voice muttering, “*you gotta be shittin’ me* . . . THIS is what people actually believe? “

The strongest evidence in this case, i.e., the only *actual* evidence that’s ever been presented aside from Robert Salas’ personal word of honor dancing around the oral support of Robert Hastings, are the documents that led him to expose this supposedly intolerable interference by UFOs. These consist of a few pages from the *341st Strategic Missile Wing and 341st Combat Support Group HQ SAC DXIH 67-3922 Command History, Vol. 1*, and attached copies of supporting message traffic. For some reason, he never felt it necessary to publish the remainder of the document catalog that he claims he and the representatives of CUFON, the *Computer UFO Network*, collected over the course of their “investigation”, so we have to kind of guess at the context of it all, unless we’re willing to abandon self-judgment entirely and rely on the little supportive stories these guys bandy about in the course of another paranoia filled night at a strip club or something, swapping stories of how scary life was in 1967, allowing ourselves to just take in the atmosphere a bit and let that alone determine context; after all why bother thinking these things out for ourselves when we can just Google on over to just about any

⁸ <http://bestevidence.blogspot.com>

⁹ <http://www.examiner.com/x-2383-Honolulu-Exopolitics-Examiner~y2009m4d4-Obamas-nuclear-weapons-free-world--extraterrestrial-UFOs>

annoying little UFO blog, and let the proprietor of that establishment supply the ridicule and absence of thought that we normally apply without such assistance. Of course, in the long run, it's pretty interesting to figure out exactly how *little* documentation is actually needed to release the reigns of one's imagination in such a manner and turn them over entirely to the insane lizard with the martini and cocktail weenies bouncing off the walls of the mighty medulla oblongata. *Short answer?* Not a whole hell of a lot...

Overall, the UFO part of the March 16, 1967 incident at Malmstrom AFB has not proven to be well documented, and where that documentation *does* exist, it tends to avoid the few fact-checks most researchers are generally presumed by the public to have conducted. This is important, primarily because most of the individuals who *are* willing to go on the record regarding the presence and precipitating interaction of UFOs have proven to be less than reliable, even to the most discerning critics. Of course, *discerning critics* tend to be few and far between in 21st century America when the topic of conversation eventually rests on UFOs. As a nation, we tend to be far more interested in the *story* than the credibility of those *telling* the story. This is especially true in the case of the Echo Flight Incident, where the numerous discrepancies in witness accounts are forgiven as being a meaningless effect of poor memory, and the absence of both eye-witnesses and contemporary documentation in support of *anything* even remotely indicative of an extraordinary occurrence is completely ignored, even by the press. And I'd like to point out right now that the laziness of the press in this regard really pisses me off, because instead of taking ten minutes to look into the story and print a response that asserts the absolutely only sane conclusion to reach is that these people are obvious liars and shouldn't be getting away with this kind of irresponsible crap; the mass media attention they've attracted seems to accept that everything they say must be true, because, God knows, proponents of UFO theories lack entirely the ability to lie. My God, these clowns were invited onto Larry King, *twice*, to discuss their little bullshit story in more detail. It's a criminal kick in the face to all those men and women who have served their country well, never resorting to lies and exaggeration to make themselves seem somehow more important or more patriotic than the thousands of men and women they served with throughout the years. The fact that this little coterie of clowns does so on a regular basis, and are actually paid to do so is repugnant.

It should not be unexpected for any thorough examination of such a commonly known UFO incident to require a careful assessment of the historical record, including newspaper

reports, interviews with eyewitnesses, and an inspection of logs, military reports, past investigations and appraisals of all available records and evaluations, but with this case having been so *well-documented* already, any expectations of expanding that record to any significant extent must necessarily be somewhat low. We're fortunate, however, that when it comes to an assessment of the Echo Flight Incident, *the historical record and the numerous statements of witnesses contain all that is necessary to completely refute every association of this event with actual interference by UFOs*. None of the accounts that have been thus far asserted are credible, and I intend to explain exactly why throughout this narrative, confirming in the process that not only are there *no witnesses whatsoever* who will admit to actually *seeing* a UFO, but that *all* of the available records, written histories, and logs going back to the original incident itself very clearly affirm that *nothing* involving UFO interference occurred throughout the course of the entire event. More to the point, *all* of the military personnel who were actually present during the time UFOs purportedly interfered with the nation's highest security, tactical nuclear strike capabilities deny *in full* that UFOs were responsible in any way for the ICBM failures that occurred on March 16, 1967. In the face of such daunting testimony to the actual mediocrity of the incident, the fact that there is such a widespread belief that one or more UFOs *caused* it is somewhat alarming. It is remarkable indeed that this case is the source of such fantastic, confident belief at all, let alone being ranked among those UFO incidents thought to be supported by the *strongest evidence*. An intelligent examination of the incident, therefore, is not only recommended for clarity, it is *demanded* for accountable honesty – and it's surprising and annoying that Larry King and other representatives of the press and media have failed utterly to examine this event independently, even when available teams of researchers were immediately accessible.

At this point, in all fairness to those propagating the March 16, 1967 UFO fables, and in the interests of full transparency, it should be noted that the author of this narrative is the second son of Captain Eric D. Carlson, who on March 16, 1967 was the ranking commander at Echo Flight, the missile station attached to Malmstrom AFB's 10th Missile Squadron that suffered an equipment malfunction that resulted in the entire flight of ten Minuteman Missiles going offline and reporting a "No-Go" status. My father has *always* maintained that the missiles went offline due to an equipment malfunction that was thoroughly investigated by both civilian

and military representatives. Contrary to suggestions by a number of individuals that he has *confirmed* their insulting and ridiculous assertions, he firmly believes that one or more UFOs had *absolutely nothing* to do with the malfunctions that *did* occur on that date, a claim supported by the undeniable fact that UFOs were never reported by civilian or military observers on March 16, 1967 anywhere in the state of Montana. That deserves to be repeated: *there were no UFOs reported on March 16, 1967 by anybody*. The gall of these people is absolutely so insurmountable, that they consider themselves a better source of information than those individuals who were actually there; Robert Hastings, author and supposed expert on UFOs and their contribution to the field of nuclear munitions, has even gone so far as to suggest that my father doesn't remember these events very well, since he's getting a little old. Upon examining some of his more obnoxious claims regarding this matter in some detail, I expect his own reputation as a journalist and author professing to lay bare what the United States Air Force and other interested parties residing in Washington, D.C. have previously covered over to diminish somewhat as a result of the application of simple common sense, which his written statements in general tend to lack.

Robert Salas, however, would have the world believe that at least *three* UFOs (or *one* UFO from *three* different accounts) were reported by on-watch, military personnel on either March 16, March 24 or on *both* March 16 and March 24 – depending on which version of his fable you personally accept as factual – but was never actually written down or logged by military or police personnel, was not discussed with newspaper reporters or friends or neighbors of those who supposedly saw the UFOs, and was never the subject of any investigation that might have written anything down or kept records of any aspect of that investigation. If there *were* official reports, nobody actually knows anything about them, or is even willing to admit their existence, except Robert Salas, who was apparently the only person to take such reports seriously, but did so only at the tail end of thirty years.

It's also important to note that the name "Echo Flight Incident" is somewhat misleading. Military documents that refer to the "Echo Flight Incident" are referring to the failure of 10 nuclear missiles that occurred on March 16, 1967 at 0845 in the morning. UFOs were never seriously considered as a possible cause for the failures, but because UFOs were mentioned by one of the members of the enlisted security team that was on duty, the investigation team, in order to be as thorough as possible, was required take it into account. The Department of

Defense necessarily considers unidentified flying objects to be of unconfirmed national origin, so when they are mentioned in the course of an investigation of this sort on a base responsible for the targeting and firing of nuclear missiles, such rumors *have* to be accounted for. This was appropriately done in the course of the Echo Flight Incident investigation, and as the command history indicates, "Rumors of Unidentified Flying Objects (UFO) around the area of Echo Flight during the time of fault were disproven."¹⁰

This, of course, leads naturally to the follow-up question, "why does anyone believe UFOs were involved, when they were dismissed so casually and immediately by the investigation team?" The answer to *that* rests in the testimony of Mr. Robert L. Salas, who – thirty years after the incident – announced to the world that *he was present* when the missiles went offline, and asserted that UFOs caused the malfunction(s) at Echo Flight. Eventually, he was either informed by someone who knew better or was suddenly the target of a personal revelation that he couldn't possibly have been at Echo Flight as he had supposed. "I began to question if I was at Echo during the time of our incident since I knew I was assigned to the 490th Squadron, which did not have responsibility for Echo Flight."¹¹ The 10th Missile Squadron was responsible for manning Echo Flight. The 490th Missile Squadron was responsible only for the Kilo, Lima, Mike, November, and Oscar Flights. The command structure for all of the flights is not a difficult arrangement to understand. A quick glance at the map below, published in April, 2007 as "Figure 1.2-1" of the *Draft Environmental Assessment For Minuteman III Deactivation, Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana*, shows that the command structure is *entirely* alphabetical.

Should anybody feel it necessary to question the source, a few minutes of basic research – something apparently beyond the abilities of CUFON and other UFO proponent organizations who have accepted *everything* Salas has written without question, argument, or reproach – should satisfy anybody that the command structure hasn't changed significantly in the intervening years. Then, as in 2007, the 10th Missile Squadron manned A, B, C, D, and E-Flights (or Echo Flight, using the standard phonetic alphabet that our military has been using since 1957¹²); the 12th Missile Squadron mans F, G, H, I, and J-Flights (Juliett Flight); the 490th Missile Squadron mans K, L, M, N, and O-Flights (Oscar Flight); and the 564th Missile Squadron

¹⁰ 341st Strategic Missile Wing and 341st Combat Support Group HQ SAC DXIH 67-1865 (Command History, Vol. 1), p.32-34, & 38.

¹¹ Salas, Robert L., "Minuteman Missiles Shutdown", Mutual UFO Network UFO Journal, January, 1997, No. 345, pp. 15-17, cont. 22, 23.

¹² <http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq101-1.htm>

mans P, Q, R, S, and T-Flights (Tango Flight). The 564th Missile Squadron stands outside the other three, as it was designed for and originally outfitted with Minuteman II missiles, instead of the Minuteman I missiles the other squadrons were originally outfitted with. As a result, it didn't become fully operational until May, 1967, and even then it wasn't considered an actual part of Wing I, being called "the independent squadron."¹³ Other than that, the standard configuration for all of the squadrons hasn't changed since it was originally implemented. A squadron is comprised of five flights; each flight consists of one Missile Alert Facility (MAF) (also referred to as the *Launch Control Center* or the *Launch Control Facility*), and ten Launch Facilities (LFs), where the missile silos are located. Each LF is roughly 10 miles away from any other LF in order to isolate the damage should one of the missile silos be targeted by enemy missiles should hostilities between the nuclear powers become general. Each of the five LCCs also has the ability to command and monitor all 50 LFs in the squadron, in case any of the other LCCs in the squadron are also disabled in a military attack.¹⁴

This configuration did not mysteriously change between 1967 and now, so there's no reason whatsoever that Salas should have made a mistake regarding so fundamental an aspect of his *UFOs-Took-Out-The-Nuclear-Missiles-In-1967* plot-outline, unless his agenda gives him the moral *entitlement* to play fast and free with the truth and with the actual history of events in this country. This kind of an interpretation would explain why Salas never changed his story until the fallacies that are typical of it were made clear to him by others. I am personally convinced that this is closer to the truth, because I don't believe that someone with such a poor memory for the events that have had such a presupposed significant effect on his own life is the type of person who then writes and publishes a book that eventually details his thoughts and feelings during the course of those same events.

Are we expected to believe that Salas was *unaware* of the responsibilities of his command, that he genuinely believed he had manned a Missile Alert Facility that he would *never* have manned under ordinary circumstances? I have been insulted and have had my motives questioned on a number of UFO-oriented websites for doubting this "great" American's story, and publically referring to him as a ridiculous liar, and for believing my father when he told me there were no UFOs interfering with normal operations at Echo Flight during the entire span

¹³ Nalty, Bernard C., "USAF Ballistic Missile Programs 1967-1968", Office of Air Force History, September, 1969.

¹⁴ Minuteman Weapon System History and Description, July, 2001, Prepared by ICBM Prime Team, TRW Systems Prime, for ICBM System Program Office, Hill AFB, Ogden Air Logistics Center OO-ALC/LME.

of his military tour. Not only my own, but my father's credibility has repeatedly been called into question over this very issue by people who seem to forget that over the years, my father has *never* changed his story, while Salas, as we'll see, *has* done so, *repeatedly*, while losing little credibility with the true believers and other confused individuals who have decided that it is apparently more likely that UFOs completely shut down the nuclear missiles manned by members of our military forces forty years ago – an incident that was never even *hinted* at during the course of more than three of those four decades – then it is for Robert Salas to have *lied* about the matter, lies that eventually forced him to step back a bit from that precipice of his self-righteousness in order to declare that he was *mistaken* when he convinced himself that he was at Echo Flight on March 16, 1967, and assert instead that he was at *November Flight*, and that the missiles failed *there*, as well. No matter that his own resource, the command history already alluded to, specifically states that "No other Wing I configuration lost strategic alert at that time", or that this statement refers the reader to a classified SECRET message originating with SAC, "Subj: Loss of Strategic Alert Echo Flight, Malmstrom AFB, 17 Mar 67" stating the same.¹⁵ Robert L. Salas *knows* better – *and we can trust him*. So, gentleman of the press, or whoever the hell is supposed to fact-check the whack jobs in this world, rest assured that all of the November Flight missiles went off alert as well, and at around the same time. This new event was never investigated apparently, and was not worthy of being included in the command history, but he assures us that it occurred nonetheless. He recorded a short summary of the events with CUFON, the *Computer UFO Network*, some thirty years after the fact:

In central Montana, Thursday morning March 16 1967, the E-Flight Missile Combat Crew was below ground in the Echo-Flight Launch Control Center (LCC) or capsule. During the early morning hours, more than one report came in from security patrols and maintenance crews that they had seen UFOs. A UFO was reported directly above one of the E-Flight Launch Facilities (LF) or silos. It turned out that at least one security policeman was so frightened by this encounter that he never again returned to security duty.¹⁶


A short time later, the Deputy Crew Commander (DMCCC), a 1st Lieutenant, was briefing the Crew Commander (MCCC), a Captain, on the flight status when the alarm horn sounded. Over the next half-minute, all ten of their missiles reported a "No-Go" condition. One by one across the board, each missile had become inoperable.

¹⁵ 341st Strategic Missile Wing and 341st Combat Support Group HQ SAC DXIH 67-1865 (Command History, Vol. 1), p. 32-34, 38.

¹⁶ <http://www.nicap.org/malmstrom67-2.htm>

From there on, as an ex-Missileer describes it: "All Hell broke loose!" Among the many calls to and from the E-Flight LCC one was to the MCCC of November-Flight which links to the equally dramatic story of what happened in another LCC that same morning.

In this case we have a shutdown of strategic nuclear missiles coincident with UFO sighting over a missile silo! These were missiles lost to America's nuclear deterrent forces.¹⁷



¹⁷ <http://www.nicap.org/malmstrom67-2.htm>

Salas does a rare and somewhat amusing thing here, by describing in some detail an incident he wasn't present at to observe, but what's *most* interesting is his account of an event that almost goes unnoticed in the paragraphs above. He says here that among the many phone calls that went back and forth at Echo Flight was one from the E-Flight LCC to the MCCC of November Flight (which was later relocated to Oscar Flight, for reasons Salas has refused to discuss in any detail). This is a fairly important phone call, because as you shall see, it was this phone call, *and only this phone call*, that enables Salas to *date* the event he supposedly remembers so well. It is this phone call that lets him say, "I was at November-Oscar Flight when UFOs interfered with the nuclear strike capability of the United States of America on March 16, 1967." It's a shame that nobody at Echo Flight is willing to confirm that this phone call took place, but why would they? *November Flight was not even in the same chain of command as Echo Flight*, which, as we've seen, was manned by personnel attached to the 10th Missile Squadron. There is no reason for *anybody* at Echo Flight to communicate with November Flight, such a call being the responsibility of SAC. That's the only way a military chain of command has *ever* worked in this nation. As affirmed above, each Missile Alert Facility has the ability to command and monitor all 50 Launch Facilities in the *squadron*, just in case other MAFs are disabled. This level of Inter-flight connectivity *precludes* any need to communicate the failure of missiles at a single facility to another squadron. And yet, Salas insists that:

The Echo MCCC related to me that prior to the shutdown of all his missiles he had received more than one report from security patrols and maintenance crews that they had seen UFOs, one was directly above one of the LFs in Echo Flight. The Echo crew confirmed that they had spoken to my commander that day and told him of their incident.¹⁸

Technically, this may be feasible since no actual date or length of time is associated with "prior to the shutdown". More to the point, however, the Echo MCCC was my father, CAPT Eric D. Carlson, and he did not receive any such reports regarding UFOs hanging around Echo Flight on March 16. He also did not speak with Salas' commander regarding the Echo Flight Incident. SAC may well have called or sent off a message for INFO, and very probably did, but *Echo Flight most assuredly did not*. And yet, for *years*, Salas maintained that such a phone call was made, and this was why he was so confident that the date of the event he remembered so well – the event at November Flight, this time, not Echo Flight – was March 16, 1967, and not

¹⁸ Salas, Robert L., "Minuteman Missiles Shutdown", Mutual UFO Network UFO Journal, January, 1997, No. 345, pp. 15-17, cont. 22, 23.

some other date, such as a date he just *made up*, for instance. It is the presence of so many irreconcilable factors of this sort in Salas' story that detracts from his credibility; someone must have pointed this out to him at one time or another, because a few years later he changed this version of his story (more than once, I might add), and asserted instead a scenario in which the exchange happened during a phone call to SAC. The more examination that is applied to this folk tale, the more it crumbles into dust, and the less historically significant it becomes.

Upon receiving the FOIA materials requested by the *Computer UFO Network*, Robert Salas eventually published his account of the events at Echo Flight when the missiles were shut down on March 16. He said a UFO had been reported to him by guards on the surface and that was the cause of the missile site failures. *It's a nice little fantasy, as he relates it.* This version of events was originally published in January, 1997 in the *Mutual UFO Network UFO Journal*, and is something we will have to examine in stages, because it's *evolved* a bit over the years. This first version *is* kind of shocking, but not nearly shocking enough that readers should replace sense with stupidity – and yet many have done just that.

My recollection of the incident was that, while on duty as a Deputy Missile Combat Crew Commander (DMCCC) at a Minuteman Launch Control Facility (LCF) during the morning hours, I received a call from my NCO in charge of site security topside. He said that he and other guards had observed some unidentified flying objects in the vicinity. He said they had overflown the LCF a few times before he phoned. He could only distinguish them as "lights" at that time.

I did not take this report very seriously and simply told him to keep observing them and report back if he saw anything more significant. At the time, I believed the first call to be a joke. Five or ten minutes later, I received a second call from my security NCO. This time he was much more agitated and distraught. He stated that there was a UFO hovering just outside the front gate! He wanted to know what he should do. I don't recall what I said except to secure the fenced area. As we were talking, he said he had to go because one of the guards had been injured.¹⁹

I immediately woke my commander who had been taking his rest period and started to relate the phone conversations. Within seconds, our missiles began shutting down from "Alert" status to "No-Go" status. I recalled that most, if not all, of our missiles had shut down in rapid succession. Normally, if a missile went off alert status, it was due to a power outage at a particular site and the site power generator would come on line and pick up the power load and the LF would come back on line. It was extremely rare for more than one missile to go off line for any length of time. In this case, none of our missiles came back on line. The problem was not lack of power; some signal had been sent to the missiles which caused them to go off alert.

¹⁹ Salas, Robert L., "Minuteman Missiles Shutdown", *Mutual UFO Network UFO Journal*, January, 1997, No. 345, pp. 15-17, cont. 22, 23.

After we reported this incident to the command post, I phoned my security guard to determine what had transpired topside. He informed me that the guard who had approached the UFO had been injured — not seriously. The guard was being removed by helicopter to the base. I do not recall the nature of the injury or how it was incurred. We were relieved by our scheduled replacement crew later that morning. The missiles had still not been brought on line by on-site maintenance. Once topside, I spoke directly with the security guard about the UFOs. The only additional detail he added, that I recalled, was that the UFO had a red glow and appeared to be saucer-shaped. I do not recall any other details about its appearance. He repeated that it had been immediately outside the front gate, hovering silently.²⁰

There are some problems with Mr. Salas' first telling – this initial version of events. First, he *never* served at Echo Flight, as we've already discussed, and his squadron was *never* responsible for manning that particular station. He asserts that he *assumed* he was at Echo Flight, because *that* was the station discussed in the FOIA documents (!!!!!). I would *assume* an event like that would be remembered a little more clearly. To Salas' credit, he did *finally* take a position that, to date, nobody has felt the need to challenge to such an extent that he's forced to change a fundamental aspect of the story, much as he was forced to do with the previous three versions of his account. As a result, anybody introduced to this case via the Disclosure Project or his book *Faded Giant*, would have had a very different impression that doesn't detract so much from his credibility. And because I think that's a damn shame, we're going to examine a few parts of his story that late-comers to his theater for the absurd and the blind have not been given the opportunity to take into account. Right now, this audience knows only that

The UFO incident, happened on the morning of March 16, 1967. I was on duty along with my commander Fred Mywald [sic]. We were both on duty at Oscar Flight as part of the 490th strategic missile squad and there are five launch control facilities assigned to that particular squadron. We were at Oscar Flight.²¹

For six years prior to this, however, the story he told was completely different. He thought *at* first that he had served at Echo Flight, and that was the story he stuck to until he realized he was wrong – which is a common failing typical of the man. In fact, one of the more interesting, i.e., *entertaining*, exercises one can perform during the examination of his tale is to step outside of yourself for just a bit and examine the *evolution of the lie*. It's a remarkable thing to witness. Notice that this first version of his UFO story begins with the "first person witness to

²⁰ Salas, Robert L., "Minuteman Missiles Shutdown", *Mutual UFO Network UFO Journal*, January, 1997, No. 345, pp. 15-17, cont. 22, 23.

²¹ Greer, Steven M., M.D., Director, and Loder, Theodore C., III, Ph.D., "Disclosure Project Briefing Document Prepared for: Members of the Press, Members of United States Government, Members of the US Scientific Community", April, 2001. NOTE: Recently, Salas has again changed his story, insisting that the event he remembers occurred on March 24, not March 16, 1967.

a known, already confirmed event.” The Freedom of Information Act documents received by Mr. Salas (and these documents have been reproduced further in this narrative) are very clear that the *only* Malmstrom AFB missile failures accounted for in the command history occurred at Echo Flight on March 16, 1967. The failures occurred, they were reported, they were investigated, and they were forgotten for thirty years until Salas came along, rediscovered them via FOIA documents requested by the SYSOP and Information Director of the *Computer UFO Network*, and then claimed to be a witness to what must have been the most highly classified and invasive nuclear missile security breach in the nation’s history. Even better, he couldn’t be arrested for publishing classified materials, because the only *facts* his story contained were included in the FOIA documents.

The documents obtained by Mr. Salas & Co. are from the *Command History of the 341st Strategic Missile Wing and 341st Combat Support Group*, and they are very clear regarding the events archived. There was only *one* incident in March, 1967 in which an entire flight of missiles went offline and reported a “No-Go” status. It was on March 16, 1967, at Echo Flight. Not surprisingly, this represents the *already confirmed event* in his claim to being the “first person witness to a known, already confirmed event.” But then a strange thing happened. Somewhere between the original lie and securing the publication rights to the original lie, some *actual facts* intruded. As a direct result of this, Salas was forced to admit that his *assumption* that he was at Echo Flight was wrong, and that his “first person witness to a known, already confirmed event” was actually a “first person witness to an unknown, unconfirmed event” from thirty years ago that nobody else had ever mentioned before. And *that* meant that inside of two years, Salas had gone completely off the charts – *he no longer needed the FOIA documents at all*; in other words, he was in completely virgin territory, here – territory that should have been a warning to him, because *legally* (if he was an honest man and we actually had any reason to believe that he was telling the truth) he should have assumed that whatever true facts he was about to make public were *still highly classified*, and as far as the Department of Defense was concerned, it really didn’t matter what his reasons were for breaking the law, and it was totally *irrelevant* that the classification of the Echo Flight Incident had changed so much over the previous three decades, because Salas’ story had nothing at all to do with that event. He was the “first person witness to an unknown, unconfirmed event,” remember?. On the other hand, if he didn’t discuss any “true facts” at all, which would be the case if he was just making things up as he went

along, then he had *nothing* at all to worry about – nothing. *But if he was telling the truth...* well, someone representing either the Department of Defense or the U.S. Marshals Service would have visited him.

That isn't the only problem Salas had in 1996 and 1997, at least not if he wanted people to actually *believe* him. His biggest problem was the fact that most of his story sounds *ridiculous* to anybody with an actual background in the military. And the fact that the Air Force apparently decided *not* to prosecute him for what they usually consider to be a very serious crime doesn't really add much to his credibility. Any real examination and the story falls apart – as long as the examiner remembers to apply one simple rule: *is this really what would happen in a military nuclear weapons environment?* We're going to take a quick glance at some of these observations before getting into the really impossible shit this guy talks about ... little things first, *and then we'll expand*. Eventually, Robert L. Salas will prove to us, *by his own words*, that the entire story of UFO intervention with the nuclear missiles at Malmstrom AFB in March, 1967 did *not* happen, and that there were, in fact, no full-flight failures of missiles at all, with the exception of that at Echo Flight on March 16, 1967, and that *those* failures were the result of a comparably mediocre electrical malfunction that has proven to be very well documented, thank you very much.

Mr. Robert Salas asserts that in 1995 he requested Freedom of Information Act disclosures regarding the Malmstrom AFB missile shutdown incident in March, 1967. This was done through *Faded Giant* co-author Jim Klotz, SYSOP for CUFON, the *Computer UFO Network*, according to Mr. Robert Hastings, local cheerleader, author of *UFOs and Nukes*, and a well-known lecturer on the subject of things that can't otherwise be proven to the satisfaction of intelligent men and women everywhere.²² The response itself, however, is addressed to Mr. Dale Goudie, the Information Director of the *Computer UFO Network* (see reproduced documents below). There's nothing odd or suspicious about any of this, as the two men have been associates for many years. CUFON, based in Seattle, Washington, was originally set up by Dale Goudie as a Bulletin Board system run by the "UFO Reporting and Information Service."²³ An examination of the FOIA response that was addressed to Dale Goudie, however,

²² <http://www.theufochronicles.com/2009/01/ufos-did-shutdown-minuteman-missiles-at.html>

²³ <http://stason.org/TULARC/new-age/alien-visitors/11-10-Computer-UFO-Network-CUFON.html>

reveals immediately that Salas, Klotz and/or Goudie had specifically requested information "regarding an incident on or about 25 March 1967."²⁴ This suggests that they were *not* searching for information regarding the missile shutdown incident of March 16, as Salas has repeatedly claimed, but for information that could be associated with events that occurred around March 25. In an interview with UFOCOM, Robert Salas says:

It was not until I read an account of the Echo incident in a book that I decided to send an inquiry under FOIA for declassification of information regarding the incident. At that time I believed I was at Echo flight because I could not recall my location. I later learned that I was at November flight. I feel justified in going public with this story because of the declassification of the Echo incident.²⁵

If that's an honest account, then Salas must have known that the Echo Flight Incident occurred on March 16, 1967, because that was never in doubt. Why, then, would he request information from around March 25? In his article for the Mutual UFO Network UFO Journal, he states:

Jim Klotz, the investigator who had submitted the FOIA requests, and I had previously narrowed the time period by retrieving news reports from the Great Falls Tribune about UFO sightings during the early part of 1967. I had recalled reading such reports after my incident. In fact there were many news articles about UFO sightings a few weeks before and one week after the Echo incident. We requested USAF to release any information they had of such an incident that occurred during the spring of 1967. We made no reference to UFO sightings in our request.²⁶

It's obvious that he's referring to the March 24-25 UFO sightings in Belt, Montana and would like to associate the Echo Flight Incident with these sightings. He makes no reference to UFOs in the request, but asks for information specifically regarding March 25, a date he admits getting from newspaper reports of a specific UFO sighting, one that was investigated by Project Blue Book, and assigned a post-investigation "unidentified" status. In *this* commentary, he implies that neither he nor Klotz were aware of the original Echo Flight Incident, and were simply searching for a missile-failure scenario to match the one he "remembered" so well from his own past experiences. This is somewhat different from his later claims that "It was not until I read an account of the Echo incident in a book that I decided to send an inquiry under FOIA for

²⁴ Letter, 18 August, 1995; Curt E. Copeland, CAPT, USAF, Chief, Base Information Management, 341st Mission Support Squadron/IMQDF, Malmstrom AFB; Mr. Dale Goudie, Seattle, WA, 98118.

²⁵ <http://www.ufoevidence.org/Cases/CaseSubarticle.asp?ID=1019> - UFOCOM Correspondence, Interview conducted via mail with Mr. Robert L. Salas, maintained at <http://www.ufoevidence.org> since at least 01/2009.

²⁶ Salas, Robert L., "Minuteman Missiles Shutdown", Mutual UFO Network UFO Journal, January, 1997, No. 345, pp. 15-17, cont. 22, 23.

declassification of information regarding the incident.”²⁷ In his article, Salas states only that “We requested USAF to release any information they had of such an incident [the failure of an entire flight of nuclear missiles at Malmstrom AFB] that occurred during the spring of 1967.”²⁸ This would be appropriate only if he and Klotz were indeed unaware of the date reflected in his memories. This version of his story insists that Salas could not remember the date of the incident, and therefore requested FOIA materials applicable to spring, 1967. As the cover letter makes clear, however, Salas and Klotz were very specific, requesting materials “on or about 25 March 1967”, a date they admit getting from newspaper reports of UFO sightings.

Apparently the two had attempted to narrow down the time period, and used the dates of UFO sightings reported in area newspapers to that end. Unfortunately, that doesn’t explain why they didn’t simply use the date of the Echo Flight Incident in their request, since Salas believed at that time that he was on watch at Echo Flight when the incident occurred. It’s a minor misstep, but it suggests motivations and methods contrary to what Salas and Klotz have previously maintained. It suggests, in fact, that they were looking for information regarding a previously reported, well known UFO incident, *not* information regarding the Echo Flight Incident. Either they were fishing for information, or they didn’t know the date of the event they were hoping to find an explanation for – an odd mistake to make for someone who had “read an account of the Echo incident in a book.” And if he didn’t know the date of the incident, which seems pretty clear from the point of view of his Mutual UFO Network UFO Journal article, but *did* recall reading newspaper accounts of UFO sightings *after* the event, as previously stated, than why use the date of the UFO sightings? Why not give a date *before* the UFO sighting, since that’s how he remembered it? Personally, I find it hard to believe that an incident of such theatrical drama as described by Mr. Salas on many occasions occurred on a date that he conveniently *forgot*, particularly after he had recently *read* about the Echo Flight Incident of March 16 as he claimed in the interview with UFOCOM. It makes no sense for him to request information on or around March 25, if he was already aware that the incident he wanted to examine occurred on March 16. Even if he could only recall that the incident occurred “during the early part of 1967,”²⁹ it *still* makes no sense at all to request information “regarding an

²⁷ <http://www.ufoevidence.org/Cases/CaseSubarticle.asp?ID=1019> - UFOCOM Correspondence, Interview conducted via mail with Mr. Robert L. Salas, maintained at <http://www.ufoevidence.org> since at least 01/2009.

²⁸ <http://www.ufoevidence.org/Cases/CaseSubarticle.asp?ID=1019> - UFOCOM Correspondence, Interview conducted via mail with Mr. Robert L. Salas, maintained at <http://www.ufoevidence.org> since at least 01/2009.

²⁹ Salas, Robert L., “Minuteman Missiles Shutdown”, Mutual UFO Network UFO Journal, January, 1997, No. 345, pp. 15-17, cont. 22, 23.

incident on or about 25 March 1967,"³⁰ since that date was at the *end* of the UFO wave of sightings that had been reported in the Montana newspapers that Salas and Klotz had perused so carefully. To an observer, it looks increasingly like Salas and Klotz had no idea at all what date the missile failures may have occurred, because they were not interested in the failures of the ICBMs at Echo Flight on March 16, 1967. They were interested primarily in the Belt sightings of March 24-25, so that's exactly what they asked for.

On the other hand, perhaps Salas was simply careless. In his January, 1997 article, he mentions that "the FOIA requests were submitted to the Air Force in January 1995."³¹ The cover letter for the documents received, however, very clearly states that the original request was dated March 1, 1995. In other words, he manufactured or imagined a FOIA request date even though he was in possession of documents that showed otherwise. Possibly, dates aren't his strong suit, but they do remain important for the rest of us nonetheless. On the other hand, maybe he was referring to a *process*, and the letter he, Klotz, and Goudie published was only one of a *series* of letters written to ferret out and refine information of the time period in order to request additional, more specific, information from the U.S. Air Force in accordance with FOIA guidelines. Unfortunately, this would also indicate that the whole thing was primarily a fishing expedition to gather information on UFO sightings in Montana during the spring of 1967. If that were the case, it's far more likely that the FOIA queries were initiated by Klotz and Goudie alone, and that Salas was entirely incidental to any actual *research* that was going on, which is again contrary to everything he's published. Having requested FOIA documents myself, and being very well aware of how long such requests can sometimes take to process, my inclination is to doubt that the whole thing was procedural and that "the FOIA requests were submitted to the Air Force in January 1995"³² and "March 1, 1995."³³ After all, it took until August, 1995 to receive any response to the March 1, 1995 letter, which leaves a lot of room to doubt that another FOIA request was sent out and replied to sometime between an unknown date in

³⁰ Letter, 18 August, 1995; Curt E. Copeland, CAPT, USAF, Chief, Base Information Management, 341st Mission Support Squadron/IMQDF, Malmstrom AFB; Mr. Dale Goudie, Seattle, WA, 98118.

³¹ Salas, Robert L., "Minuteman Missiles Shutdown", Mutual UFO Network UFO Journal, January, 1997, No. 345, pp. 15-17, cont. 22, 23.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ Letter, 18 August, 1995; Curt E. Copeland, CAPT, USAF, Chief, Base Information Management, 341st Mission Support Squadron/IMQDF, Malmstrom AFB; Mr. Dale Goudie, Seattle, WA, 98118.

January and March 1, 1995. It seems to me to be far more likely that these guys are either idiots, or they're are trying to hide something.³⁴

If it's true that the FOIA queries were initiated by Klotz and Goudie alone, and that Salas *was* incidental to any of the research, then it's possible that Salas simply requested access to CUFON's database, and established his relationship with the two men in that manner, a relationship that would later result in the publication of *Faded Giant*. If that was true, however, he should have said so before providing the documents for public perusal; anything less implies that they're hiding something, which in turn authors a credibility issue. Regardless, it looks like he either made a stupid mistake, or is, once again, lying. Whatever the actual case, the information they received regarding Echo Flight was supplementary to what they apparently requested, but it *did* give them everything necessary to exploit the matter.

Or it might have if they had ever taken a little extra time to get their story straight. It's almost comedic, really, and we should examine some of that – *just for a laugh*.

If we examine Salas' first version of this historical little epic, the one he published in January, 1997 with the editorial assistance of the *Mutual UFO Network*, we notice immediately that the guards who first alerted Salas "had observed some unidentified flying objects in the vicinity" that had flown over the LCF a few times before they made the initial phone call to him while he was still 60 feet underground in the "bunker". The guard tells him that the UFOs could only be distinguished as "lights" at that time.³⁵ And that's about the same time that you wonder why a security guard attached to an Air Force Base would place such a call – one that corresponds to a basic security alert – *because he saw "lights" in the sky*. This borders on stupidity, pure and simple, and only a very gullible person – or someone with no military experience whatsoever – would actually believe it. An E-1 or E-2 enlisted airman – and they were the guys manning these billets – generally lacks the experience necessary to determine that the maneuvers being made by "lights" in the sky are not only strange, but could be differentiated enough from *other* lights in the sky to prove they were not aircraft; and even then, it wouldn't require the response of a security alert. Of course, it sounds good, when judged from

³⁴ I am satisfied that they are trying to hide some important information that proves the extent of their lie. I discuss this further in the narrative, because I prefer to lay the groundwork for the theory first. Please have patience, and read to the end, and I promise to eventually discuss everything.

³⁵ Salas, Robert L., "Minuteman Missiles Shutdown", *Mutual UFO Network UFO Journal*, January, 1997, No. 345, pp. 15-17, cont. 22, 23.

a literary angle, because it gives the scene a sense of continuity, even though it comes across as silly when you imagine it actually occurring. Anybody who has ever lived near an Air Force base or a civilian airport can easily give an example in which an aircraft at night will seem to make maneuvers that one would not normally believe an aircraft could make. This is because aircraft fly in three dimensions, while an observer of aircraft – particularly at night when there isn't much to see – references the visible spectrum in only *two* dimensions. It's all a matter of looking at something you've not seen before from the right angle at night, and things suddenly don't look like what they really *are* anymore. So when an E-1 or E-2 enlisted airman looks at lights in the sky and determines that they're making such odd maneuvers over the facility that they need to be reported, his security supervisor, the Flight Security Controller, will generally respond with "you're supposed to be watching the fence, so do your job, and quit looking at lights in the sky." In Salas' story, however, the Flight Security Controller apparently thinks this warrants a security alert, since these lights in the sky "had overflowed the LCF a few times," something that would never happen with all of the air traffic in the region, at a facility attached to an Air Force Base that has already confirmed the testing of Mark 5 re-entry vehicles during that very same quarter! *Hell, no! We report every strange light in the sky! Hell, we report every light in the sky that an airman thinks is strange. And we're going to report it to a guy sitting 60 feet underground who not only can't see the light in the sky that we're reporting, he can't even come up and see it for himself until his watch is over, because he's required to maintain 2-man integrity in an LCF that normally takes a good forty minutes to get out of with the security protocols that were in place! Does anybody else not see that this is a really stupid, stupid story?*

In a later version of this same incident, dated from around 1999-2000,³⁶ Salas states:

Outside, above the subterranean LCC capsule, it was a typical clear, cold Montana night sky; there were a few inches of snow on the ground. Where we were, there were no city lights to detract from the spectacular array of stars, and it was not uncommon to see shooting stars. Montana isn't called "Big Sky Country" for no reason, and Airmen on duty topside probably spent some of their time outside looking up at the stars. It was one of those airmen who first saw what at first appeared to be a star begin to zig-zag across the sky. Then he saw another light do the same thing, and this time it was larger and closer. He asked his Flight Security Controller, (FSC, the Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) in charge of Launch Control Center site security), to come and take a look. They both stood there watching the lights streak directly above them, stop, change directions at high speed and return overhead. The NCO ran into the building and phoned me at my station in the underground capsule. He reported to me that they had been seeing lights

³⁶ Salas, Robert and Klotz, Jim, "The Malmstrom AFB UFO/Missile Incident" <http://www.cufon.org/> Special Reports, updated 15-May-2000.

making strange maneuvers over the facility, and that they weren't aircraft. I replied: "Great. You just keep watching them and let me know if they get any closer."

I did not take this report seriously and directed him to report back if anything more significant happened. At the time, I believed this first call to be a joke. Still, that sort of behavior was definitely out of character for air security policemen whose communications with us were usually very professional.³⁷

The first fault that we find with this narrative is the weather report: "it was a typical clear, cold Montana night sky; there were a few inches of snow on the ground. Where we were, there were no city lights to detract from the spectacular array of stars, and it was not uncommon to see shooting stars." While this statement seems to support the proposition that the security detachment would not immediately contact the personnel manning the Missile Alert Facility to discuss some "lights" in the sky, shooting stars being common and all, a more pointed observation would also note that the description applies to the *night* – "a typical clear, cold Montana night".

On March 28, 1967, the Billings Gazette ran the following article:

You're Just Seeing Stars³⁸

The blinking light which people have been mistaking for a UFO (Unidentified Flying Object) was sighted again Monday evening over Billings northwestern skies.

"It is just a star as far as I know," said a Weather Bureau official.

The Weather Bureau spokesman said he was not an astronomer but suspected the light to be Venus.

"We have had calls every night on this," he said. "Most of the nights have been cloudy for the past few weeks and now all the clouds are gone and people are seeing stars for the first time in quite awhile," he added.

So, apparently there hadn't actually been a clear night in *weeks*, as of March 28. But that's not the only problem that's really notable here.

In Salas' first telling of this tale, he implies that the Echo Flight Incident occurred *before* or about the same time as this hypothetical UFO incident at November Flight (which a few years

³⁷ Salas, Robert and Klotz, Jim, "The Malmstrom AFB UFO/Missile Incident" <http://www.cufon.org/> Special Reports, updated 15-May-2000.

³⁸ Billings Gazette, Evening Edition, "You're Just Seeing Stars", Tuesday, March 28, 1967, page 9.

later magically turned into Oscar Flight). According to Salas, shortly after the missiles at November Flight failed (*an event that was never documented in any way by the Air Force, and remained so for thirty years until Robert Salas documented it*) and during the period that his commander was first reporting the incident to SAC, he was notified that the Echo Flight missiles had also apparently failed.

I recalled something my commander had said during our incident. After we reported the incident to the command post, he had received a call from another LCC. After that call he turned to me and said, "The same thing happened at another flight."³⁹

In the version of these events that Salas and Klotz wrote for the CUFON website, which bears a copyright date of 1999, but which was updated on May 15, 2000 when the two men decided that Salas was at Oscar Flight instead of November Flight, the story is rephrased a bit.

Among the many calls to and from the E-Flight LCC one was to the MCCC of Oscar-Flight which links to the equally dramatic story of what happened in another LCC that same morning.⁴⁰

Both of these versions state pretty plainly that they found out about the incident at Echo Flight because one of the personnel at another LCC called to tell them. The first version states that they received the call about Echo Flight after reporting their own incident to the command post; they don't actually name the LCC in this version, stating simply that it was "from another LCC", which, by the way, should not be confused at *all* with the actual command post. "Another LCC" meant another command center for another flight of missiles, one that isn't necessarily part of the same squadron. In the second version, however, which was written about three to four years after Salas first broke the story on a radio show that ordinarily discusses such important historical conundrums wrapped in mysteries wrapped in greasy butcher's paper, he states outright that they learned of the event after being notified of it by the personnel on duty at Echo Flight, adding that it was one "Among the many calls" between November-Oscar Flight and Echo Flight at that time.

His interview with the Disclosure Project in 2001 states:

³⁹ Salas, Robert L., "Minuteman Missiles Shutdown", *Mutual UFO Network UFO Journal*, January, 1997, No. 345, pp. 15-17, cont. 22, 23.

⁴⁰ Salas, Robert and Klotz, Jim, "The Malmstrom AFB UFO/Missile Incident" <http://www.cufon.org/> Special Reports, updated 15-May-2000.

After I talked to my guard upstairs, my commander talked to the command post. When he finished talking to the command post he turned to me and said, "The same thing occurred at ECHO Flight."⁴¹

In the book Robert Salas and James Klotz wrote, *Faded Giant*, published in 2005, Salas seems to be equally certain regarding these events and the order in which they occurred.

When we had completed our checklist procedure, we discovered that each of the missiles had gone off alert due to a Guidance and Control (G&C) System fault. Power had not been lost to the sites, the missiles simply were not operational due to some inexplicable reason, each of their G&C systems had malfunctioned. After reporting to the Command Post, Fred turned to me and stated that the same kind of Missile shutdowns had happened at Echo-Flight!⁴²

All of these versions basically agree that Salas learned about the Echo Flight missile failures shortly after CAPT Frederick Meiwald notified the command post – or was told by someone at Echo Flight, depending on which version strikes your fancy – about the failures that supposedly occurred at November-Oscar Flight, which would have immediately followed querying the system for the initial cause. It was by querying the system that they determined the failures that supposedly occurred at November-Oscar Flight were the result of a guidance and control systems failure. In *Faded Giant*, Salas mentions going through a checklist, and I have no doubt that one of the items on that checklist was "notify the command post". It's kind of a *requirement* in the military that when something odd happens, you're supposed to immediately notify your chain of command if at all possible. I have no doubt that's exactly what would have happened if this event had occurred. They notified the command post, and supposedly they were told that their failures were the same as those that happened at Echo Flight. And this is where I have to step back a bit and review *the evolution of the lie*.

You see, we *know* that the Echo Flight Incident occurred around 0845⁴³. So *why would this November-Oscar Flight incident occur while it was still dark outside?* Sunrise on March 16, 1967 was at 0638.⁴⁴ That's over *two hours* before the Echo Flight failures actually occurred – an incident that we can *prove* because, unlike pretty much *everything* Salas has suggested as a second tail to the tale, it was all documented. Are we to believe that CAPT Meiwald was on the

⁴¹ Greer, Steven M., M.D., Director, and Loder, Theodore C., III, Ph.D., "Disclosure Project Briefing Document Prepared for: Members of the Press, Members of United States Government, Members of the US Scientific Community", April, 2001.

⁴² Salas, Robert and Klotz, James, *Faded Giant*, BookSurge, LLC, 2005, ISBN 1-4196-0341-8.

⁴³ 341st Strategic Missile Wing and 341st Combat Support Group HQ SAC DXIH 67-1865 (Command History, Vol. 1), p. 32-34, 38.

⁴⁴ <http://www.sunrisesunset.com/usa/Montana.asp>

phone for over *two hours* before being told about the incident at Echo Flight? Or did he wait over two hours before reporting the incident? In the earlier versions of his story, Salas claims that the Echo Flight commander, CAPT Eric D. Carlson, my father, called CAPT Meiwald and notified him personally that E-Flight went down as documented. I know for a fact that not only did my father not call Meiwald to explain to him personally what had occurred, but the command relationship between squadrons *precludes* any such communication, as we've already established. This is just one more anomaly that indicates the extent of this worthless and *careless* lie, a pathetic indication that Salas didn't even bother to put much thought into it. And there's a whole lot more carelessness to come.

In the previously mentioned interview with UFOCOM, Salas *did* make some statements regarding this perceived disparity:

Was it day or night?

It was early morning during our incident, I don't recall the exact time, but it was probably dark outside.⁴⁵

It's difficult to determine exactly *when* this interview was conducted, but he was still insisting that he was at November Flight, so it was sometime between 1997 and 2000. And as we've seen, whether his recollection is of "a typical clear, cold Montana night sky" or simply "it was probably dark outside", it still sounds like a careless error, and a careless error that keeps being repeated over a 4-5 year stretch of time is nothing short of another lie, an opinion I've reached primarily because Salas took the time to *publish* everything.

Although Salas admits that communications originating with the air security policemen "were usually very professional," he is unable to give any realistic answer to explain why a Flight Security Controller supervising a security squad in the U.S. Air Force would initiate a standard security alert on the basis of what could only be distinguished as "lights" in the night sky, when the sun should have been up for *at least* an hour. Remember when I stated that any real examination of this story causes it to fall apart as long as we remember to ask if this would really happen in a military environment? *This is the reason*. To date, not even *one* of the security policemen has ever come forward to confirm Salas' assertions. *Not one person* – military *or* civilian – has ever come forward throughout the intervening *four decades* to affirm

⁴⁵<http://www.ufoevidence.org/Cases/CaseSubarticle.asp?ID=1019> - UFOCOM Correspondence, Interview conducted via mail with Mr. Robert L. Salas, maintained at <http://www.ufoevidence.org> since at least 01/2009.

that there was a UFO flying around Great Falls, Montana (or anywhere else in Montana) on March 16, 1967, two hours (at least) after the sun came up ...

Damnation, though – his description? *Utterly convincing!*

Outside, above the subterranean LCC capsule, it was a typical clear, cold Montana night sky; there were a few inches of snow on the ground. Where we were, there were no city lights to detract from the spectacular array of stars, and it was not uncommon to see shooting stars. Montana isn't called "Big Sky Country" for no reason, and Airmen on duty topside probably spent some of their time outside looking up at the stars. It was one of those airmen who first saw what at first appeared to be a star begin to zig-zag across the sky. Then he saw another light do the same thing, and this time it was larger and closer.⁴⁶

We've got to keep a cool head, though, and never forget that this may be simply another example of Salas' infamously poor memory – after all, he's forgotten and then had to remember so many details. My God, it would be nothing short of a *miracle* if this seemingly learning-disabled individual could remember enough of those details to hold the interest of a neighbor's kid on a Cub Scout Jamboree campout five minutes after the fire's put out and a minute-and-a-half after the ghost stories begin, but to remember enough of them to actually *write a book* – well, *damn*, I'm impressed! On a personal, more critical note, he sure does a lot of embellishment regarding the night and its effects for someone who was 60-feet underground the entire time.

In his more recent testimony for the Disclosure Project in 2001, Salas again insists that it was dark outside:

It was still dark out and we're sixty feet underground [at the ICBM launch control facility]. It was early in the morning and I received a call from my topside security guard who's the flight security controller and he said that he and some of the guards had been observing some strange lights flying around the site around the launch control facility.⁴⁷

In the November Flight Internet version, which was the story posted to the CUFON website *prior* to the May 15, 2000 update when Salas changed the location from November Flight to Oscar Flight, the same UFOs that the NCO in his original version "could only distinguish ... as 'lights'" suddenly take on a much more *defined* appearance. "Over-flying the LCF" is now "making strange maneuvers over the facility" that are of such odd character that the

⁴⁶ Salas, Robert and Klotz, Jim, "The Malmstrom AFB UFO/Missile Incident" <http://www.cufon.org/> Special Reports, updated 15-May-2000.

⁴⁷ Greer, Steven M., M.D., Director, and Loder, Theodore C., III, Ph.D., "Disclosure Project Briefing Document Prepared for: Members of the Press, Members of United States Government, Members of the US Scientific Community", April, 2001.

Flight Security Controller can now assert “that they weren't aircraft.” It appears that Salas’ “recollection” has improved significantly, almost as if his memory was strengthened by a conversation with one of the guards that he’s mentioned thus far in his narrative. That’s impossible, of course. *He has no idea who was actually on duty that night and has offered no names at all that might be verified in any way, even if just to determine whether or not such an individual ever served in the U.S. Air Force.* He’s submitted no duty logs for verification, has interviewed none of the eye-witnesses that he’s proposed, and admits that he himself never actually *saw* anything. These guards are the only eye-witnesses that he’s ever discussed, and they cannot be interviewed, have no photographs of what they supposedly saw, and there is no record *anywhere* that anybody saw anything at all out of the ordinary on March 16, 1967. *Nothing.* We can be equally certain that nobody has ever mentioned missile failures at November or Oscar Flights, and that there are no Air Force documents *anywhere* to suggest that such failures may have taken place, even though SAC would *require* such documentation be completed, if only as an INFO message. And we would be downright *negligent*, if we forgot to mention the Echo Flight discussion in the command history that tells us: “All LFs in E-Flight lost strategic alert nearly simultaneously. No other Wing I configuration lost strategic alert at that time”,⁴⁸ which would, of course, mean that nothing happened at either November or Oscar Flight.

Of course, if Salas *did* have names and statements, he would never have been able to get away with that twisted little two-step he’s performed that goes “we were at Echo Flight; *no!* November Flight; *no!* Oscar Flight; uuhhh... *probably!*” It’s the *anonymity* of all of his supposed witnesses that protects him from being reproached as a ridiculous liar. And the only comment of his that *might* help to explain the absence of any security detachment witnesses over the course of 40 years was a half-hearted and silly attempt suggesting that *maybe* they were sent to Vietnam.⁴⁹

Salas must have been aware that the unknown identities of his only witnesses is the weakest part of story, because throughout its evolution, he keeps adding details, as if he wants to cover up the fact that he’s not identified any witnesses who can be examined for integrity, credibility, and accuracy. By April 2001, when he retold his tale through the Disclosure Project, it

⁴⁸ 341st Strategic Missile Wing and 341st Combat Support Group HQ SAC DXIH 67-1865 (Command History, Vol. 1), p. 32-34, 38.

⁴⁹ Greer, Steven M., M.D., Director, and Loder, Theodore C., III, Ph.D., “Disclosure Project Briefing Document Prepared for: Members of the Press, Members of United States Government, Members of the US Scientific Community”, April, 2001.

had definitely become more *literary* in tone. I love how his memory improved so significantly for each year that passed by since he first read those few pages from the command history that he got in the mail. Between 1995 and 2000, he polished his story up so much, that he was actually able to discover a little more *conversation* underneath that old tarnish.

It was still dark out and we're sixty feet underground [at the ICBM launch control facility]. It was early in the morning and I received a call from my topside security guard who's the flight security controller and he said that he and some of the guards had been observing some strange lights flying around the site around the launch control facility. He said they were acting very unusual just flying around, and I said, "You mean UFO?" He said, well, he didn't know what they were but they were lights and were flying around. They were not airplanes; they weren't making any noise. They were not helicopters; they were making some very strange maneuvers and he couldn't explain it. Well, I just kind of shook my head and said, "Call me if anything more important happens."

Basically we just ended the conversation. It wasn't more than a few minutes – maybe a half hour later – and he calls back and this time he's very frightened; I can tell by the tone of his voice he's very shook up. He says, "Sir, there's a glowing red object hovering right outside the front gate – I'm looking at it right now. I've got all the men out here with their weapons drawn". Of course he was very disturbed while he was telling me this; he was very excited.

I didn't know what to make of it but he wanted me to give him instructions or orders, tell him what to do. And I think I said something like, "Make sure the perimeter fence is secure." Then right away he said, "I've got to go sir, one of these guards has been injured", and he hung up.

I immediately went over to my commander who was taking a nap – we have a little cot down there for rest periods – and I was telling him about the telephone call we just received. As I was relating this to him our missiles started shutting down one by one. By shutting down, I mean they went into a "No-Go" condition meaning they could not be launched. So we get bells and whistles – a red light No-Go condition. As I recalled at the time, it seemed like every one of them shut down but later in recalling this incident with my commander Mywald [sic], he said he felt we only lost maybe seven or eight of these weapons.⁵⁰

By 2000, Salas had the entire security detachment out with weapons drawn! Of course, none of this was ever logged down, included in an official report of any kind, or even *mentioned* again; none of the members of that detachment have *ever* come forward to confirm the story. It just happened and was apparently forgotten by everybody until Salas revealed all these events to the world a few decades later. I find it particularly fascinating how each version of the story that he tells actually shows some significant development and description applied to the responses of the security guards to the situation that Salas claims they were reacting to, even to

⁵⁰ Greer, Steven M., M.D., Director, and Loder, Theodore C., III, Ph.D., "Disclosure Project Briefing Document Prepared for: Members of the Press, Members of United States Government, Members of the US Scientific Community", April, 2001.

the point where the actual conversation between them is *enhanced*; and yet, when we compare Robert Salas' responses to what the security guards are supposedly saying to *him*, there's very *little* information at all. From around 1997, when he was still claiming that the incident had occurred at November Flight, his responses are equal in ambiguity to that of the security policeman:

I did not take this report very seriously and simply told him to keep observing them and report back if he saw anything more significant. At the time, I believed the first call to be a joke. Five or ten minutes later, I received a second call from my security NCO. This time he was much more agitated and distraught. He stated that there was a UFO hovering just outside the front gate! He wanted to know what he should do. I don't recall what I said except to secure the fenced area.⁵¹

A couple years later, around the middle of 1999, he was saying:⁵²

It was one of those airmen who first saw what at first appeared to be a star begin to zig-zag across the sky. Then he saw another light do the same thing, and this time it was larger and closer. He asked his Flight Security Controller, (FSC, the Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) in charge of Launch Control Center site security), to come and take a look. They both stood there watching the lights streak directly above them, stop, change directions at high speed and return overhead. The NCO ran into the building and phoned me at my station in the underground capsule. He reported to me that they had been seeing lights making strange maneuvers over the facility, and that they weren't aircraft. I replied: "Great. You just keep watching them and let me know if they get any closer."

I did not take this report seriously and directed him to report back if anything more significant happened. At the time, I believed this first call to be a joke. Still, that sort of behavior was definitely out of character for air security policemen whose communications with us were usually very professional.

A few minutes later, the security NCO called again. This time he was clearly frightened and was shouting his words: "Sir, there's one hovering outside the front gate!"

"One what?"

"A UFO! It's just sitting there. We're all just looking at it. What do you want us to do?"

"What? What does it look like?"

"I can't really describe it. It's glowing red. What are we supposed to do?"

"Make sure the site is secure and I'll phone the Command Post."

⁵¹ Salas, Robert L., "Minuteman Missiles Shutdown", *Mutual UFO Network UFO Journal*, January, 1997, No. 345, pp. 15-17, cont. 22, 23.

⁵² Salas, Robert and Klotz, Jim, "The Malmstrom AFB UFO/Missile Incident" <http://www.cufon.org/> Special Reports, updated 15-May-2000.

"Sir, I have to go now, one of the guys just got injured."

Before I could ask about the injury, he was off the line. ⁵³

It's decidedly odd that the NCO's witty banter becomes far more detailed the further in time from the original event we go – which is the absolute *opposite* of what common sense tells us we should normally expect from someone who's telling the truth. He enhances the communications originating with the security detachment significantly, while his own role has barely developed; he asks a couple of leading questions to enable the security guard to give a better description of the UFO, but his own role is noticeably detached, as if *he's* the skeptic, and the security guard has to convince *him*. In his first version, he gets what's basically a report of *lights in the sky*. His response is to instruct the guard to keep watching them. In the second call, the guard is "more agitated and distraught"⁵⁴ and wants to know what he's supposed to do. Interestingly, in the first version he claims "I don't recall what I said except to secure the fenced area", while the later version neglects to mention his faulty, on-again-off-again memory at *all*. In fact, Salas' second version is far more definitive in both tone and content. The only definitive element in the first version is Salas' poor memory regarding his own statements, while his memory regarding the commentary of the security detachment actually *improves*. In the first version the only aspect he does recall is his instruction "to secure the fenced area," a tasking the entire security detachment must have been aware of as a matter of course. After all, that's why they were *there*; securing the fenced area was pretty much their primary function. In the second version, the one from 1999 on CUFON's website, even more details and conversation are elicited.

The point is, the story evolves – *but only those parts that Salas has no control over*. When he describes his *own* actions, the change is barely significant. But when he describes another person's actions, a person who has never come forward, and has offered no version of his own to correct the obviously evolving story line, well ... *that's another thing entirely*. That's the sort of change you would see from someone who's either working on a piece of *fiction*, or is only concerned about his own side of the conversation. And the only reason someone might be concerned about what he said on the phone and not about what was being said *to* him, would

⁵³ Salas, Robert and Klotz, Jim, "The Malmstrom AFB UFO/Missile Incident" <http://www.cufon.org/> Special Reports, updated 15-May-2000.

⁵⁴ Salas, Robert L., "Minuteman Missiles Shutdown", Mutual UFO Network UFO Journal, January, 1997, No. 345, pp. 15-17, cont. 22, 23.

be the presence of another witness who could only hear the instructions Salas was *giving* to the security policeman, and not the responses he was *receiving in turn*. And in a launch control facility where the strongest security protocol in place was the enforcement of two-man integrity, that other witness could only be the Missile Combat Crew Commander Salas was serving under at the time: CAPT Frederick C. Meiwald, a man who was never mentioned in Salas' accounts until 1999-2000. It would be somewhat embarrassing if Salas were to make claims that Mr. Meiwald might later dispute, so it would be best to first gauge the extent of his MCCC's recollections before expounding on his own role a bit, something he managed to do just prior to announcing that he was *not* serving at November Flight the morning of March 16, 1967, but at *Oscar Flight*. The repercussions to this new change of location weren't very extensive, because, let's face it, the whole world wasn't exactly tuning in to listen to his shifting storyline, at least nowhere near as much as he would have liked.

Once the whole world was listening, however – and by April, 2001, when the Disclosure Project released its “Briefing Document Prepared for: Members of the Press, Members of United States Government, Members of the US Scientific Community”, the whole world was listening – Salas felt free to expand his own role a bit. His responses, originally recorded in December 2000, were now very significant, because by then, he had been in touch with Mr. Frederick C. Meiwald, and he knew exactly what Mr. Meiwald remembered, and he had a pretty good idea of what he did *not* remember. As a direct result of this, his December 2000 version of these events noticeably enhances his own role in the conversation at the expense of his “non-witness” witness' role. In other words, the security guard was no longer telling Salas; *Salas was now telling the security guard*:

It was still dark out and we're sixty feet underground [at the ICBM launch control facility]. It was early in the morning and I received a call from my topside security guard who's the flight security controller and he said that he and some of the guards had been observing some strange lights flying around the site around the launch control facility. He said they were acting very unusual just flying around, and I said, “You mean UFO? He said, well, he didn't know what they were but they were lights and were flying around. They were not airplanes; they weren't making any noise. They were not helicopters; they were making some very strange maneuvers and he couldn't explain it. Well, I just kind of shook my head and said, “Call me if anything more important happens.”⁵⁵

⁵⁵ Greer, Steven M., M.D., Director, and Loder, Theodore C., III, Ph.D., “Disclosure Project Briefing Document Prepared for: Members of the Press, Members of United States Government, Members of the US Scientific Community”, April, 2001.

This is the sort of thing you don't normally see when an individual references true memories. And this is actually significant, because in *this* version, *Salas* is the first one to say, "UFO", and he does so as soon as the guard calls and describes "lights in the sky." He jumps *immediately* to UFO. In the Disclosure Project version, Mr. Salas has become not only a more commanding presence, he's become downright prescient! And yet, his last, dismissive comment, "Call me if anything more important happens", likely delivered with an air of sarcasm, allows him to take on the persona of a skeptic, giving the impression thereby that he is a sane, practical, and calculating individual who must be *persuaded* that UFOs even exist. This evolving story-line is mighty impressive for a man who didn't even know what command he was stationed at for the first 2-3 years that he was actively publicizing his story. Our memories simply don't work this way; when we see an incident like this, it generally reflects a false memory reached by the continual reinforcement and embellishment of a self-created event.

That first phone call from the security detachment has never been confirmed (let's face it, only *one man* ever heard it), but even if it *could* be confirmed, that first phone call would *still* be irrelevant to the events that may or may not have later occurred, because Salas "believed the first call to be a joke." Even if the UFO were an *actual flying saucer*, as he has repeatedly proposed, he would not have done *anything* differently. "I just kind of shook my head and said, 'Call me if anything more important happens.'"⁵⁶ Yes, he *is* flippant, and yes, he *is* dismissive. But with this kind of storyline, *he has to be*. This hypothetical Security NCO who was paying so much attention to those impertinent lights in the sky was unable to realize the implied seriousness of the matter that he was communicating in order to enable the skeptic in the room to voice his concern that this well-travelled road should be carefully surveyed before leaping into some ridiculous fray of munchkins and monkeys at the turn in the universe where the wreckage goes awry. It's not *brilliant* storytelling, but it does make you wonder what's going to happen next.

Ironically, this is the only convincing facet of Salas' entire story. There's nothing abnormal about reaching a conclusion based on *fact*. It *is* abnormal, however, to tell the same story over and over and over, and have it become more and more unlikely with each retelling. His first version of the story insists that "I did not take this report very seriously", and that he

⁵⁶ Greer, Steven M., M.D., Director, and Loder, Theodore C., III, Ph.D., "Disclosure Project Briefing Document Prepared for: Members of the Press, Members of United States Government, Members of the US Scientific Community", April, 2001.

"believed the first call to be a joke."⁵⁷ *Any other response would be a fool's pipedream!* It's easy to believe that this phone call was a joke, because such "jokes" were and are common. The fact that *everybody* who has ever come forward to discuss these silly claims have all said the same thing – "I thought it was a joke", or "there were rumors of UFOs" – is absolute proof that such a response is the normal, expected comeback to any communication of this caliber. *I thought it was a joke ...*

There are, and have been since World War Two, a large number of UFO *jokes* familiar to anybody who's ever lived on any air force base in the country. And 1967 was a banner year for jokes and hoaxes, *yes, sir!* There were also a lot of false identifications of said jokes by airmen, base residents, and a whole coterie of other civilian and military sources, so a whole *lot* of fake UFOs were noted by *everybody*. Malmstrom AFB was no different than any other part of the country, as far as this goes. People need to remember that to a great extent, these guys serving on the security details were kids, 18-19 years old, in many cases, and there was a national *draft* in effect. Life was a little different in 1967 than in 1997; it was a weird period of paranoia and pop science fiction that was heightened and hyped by possibly the coldest stretch of the Cold War, and possibly the worst, most hazardous period of fighting in Vietnam. College campuses across the nation were politicized as they had *never* been prior to this period, and a lot of people thought the country was coming apart at those poorly defined seams between generations. In addition to these socially stressful symptoms, UFOs had become a national news and entertainment *phenomenon*. UFOs were a big deal in 1967 and every kid watching Saturday morning cartoons of Aquaman and Thor facing off against flying saucers and aliens or reading Big-Little Books with the Fantastic Four taking on both Dr. Doom *and* UFOs knew all about it as no previous generation of American kids ever had. We saw them in advertising, on TV shows, and carved into desks at every public school in the country. This was a generation indoctrinated to believe in flying saucers and goofball threats as no other generation ever had, and when you paint that kind of fiction in colors reflecting Vietnam, the space race, the threat of nuclear annihilation, "The Electric Kool-Aid Acid Test", and acute radiation sickness, you very often end up much the way we end up today, with grass fires all across southern California – except in 1967, people were claiming the fires were set by aliens landing their UFOs on grass that was just a little too dry. *This doesn't mean UFOs were setting grass fires.* It means we

⁵⁷ Salas, Robert L., "Minuteman Missiles Shutdown", Mutual UFO Network UFO Journal, January, 1997, No. 345, pp. 15-17, cont. 22, 23.

couldn't get UFOs out of our little heads, and when things that really bothered us actually happened, we went in the same direction that the flying saucers were coming from in the first place: *our national, nuclear imagination*. They came up in our comic books. We saw them at the Saturday matinee, on the 1230 show at the base theater. We bought little paperbacks about them from *The Weekly Reader* at 45 cents a pop. We put lonely old, kung-fu grip G. I. Joe and Beach Buggy Barbie in our own homemade flying saucers, and when we played marbles, the ring we drew in the sand was the latest TV spaceship. We built flying saucers from toilet tissue tubes, way too much tape and popsicle sticks, and when we were done playing with them, they reverted back into garbage and trash piles and we tripped over them constantly in the playground, thinking of that *Give a Hoot, Don't Pollute* Indian with that hanging tear in his eye, and the well-understood warning that we were all killing everybody, the entire planet. Where U.F.O. in the 1950s meant "Unidentified Flying Object", UFO in the 1960s was a brand new word, like *astronaut*. This is nothing *new*. Carl Jung was talking about the phenomenon a long time before Robert Salas ever decided a UFO that he never actually saw must have been *real*, simply because some kid told him it was there, but Carl Jung also didn't fall into the deep end of the swimming pool and insist that the show he was enjoying on the inside of his eyelids at night and on his TV set during the day should be used to fixate on like little children playing with national policy fetish dolls. *UFOs were common in 1967* ... and they didn't come from outer space – they came from *The Outer Limits*, *The Invaders*, *Night Gallery*, a whole book full of other TV shows, cheers and jeers, comic books, movies, and cartoons, all hanging out with *The Prisoner* and running around with Lucy and Linus Van Pelt, spinning round and around a whole new national counterculture full of other resources, like sad men with their ears to the ground, and ad men with their eyes to the skies. 1967 was the UFO *season*, and anybody who lived through it should have been able to tell the difference between what was real, and what was fantasy.

The Invaders, a television show about UFOs disrupting the life of an American architect who is forced to spend his days trying to persuade a skeptical world that our planet is being invaded by aliens had premiered nationwide on January 10, 1967, two months and one week prior to Salas' supposed UFO "event" at Malmstrom AFB. *Star Trek* was still on TV, and had aired episode number 21, "Tomorrow Is Yesterday", on January 26, 1967, less than two months prior to the events at Echo Flight; in this episode, the USS Enterprise under Captain James

Tiberius Kirk is thrown back in time to Earth, *circa* 1969 by the effects of a high-gravity neutron star, and is picked up as a UFO on military radar. In response, Offutt Air Force Base in Omaha, Nebraska, scrambles an F-104 Starfighter jet interceptor to identify the craft, but a tractor beams from the Enterprise accidentally tears the plane apart. And although the pilot is rescued, the Enterprise crew *still* has to figure out how to return the pilot to Earth minus his memories of the wondrous things he's witnessed on board the starship. This episode is also a thinly disguised variation of another supposed UFO encounter, the Mantell incident of 1948, in which pilot Thomas F. Mantell, Jr., flying an F-51 that had not been preflighted with oxygen, lost consciousness after climbing past 25,000 feet, and was killed in the ensuing crash. He had been asked to identify an "unusual aircraft or object" seen over Mansfield, Kentucky, that was apparently moving very slowly south, just like a weather balloon would have done in those southerly breezes.⁵⁸ The *Star Trek* episode based on this incident was repeated on July 13, 1967, proving once again that UFOs were culturally relevant as damn fine, if ubiquitous, entertainment.⁵⁹

On March 10, *six days* before Salas' UFO "event", *The Green Hornet* aired the episode "Invasion From Outer Space: Part 1", featuring another flying saucer. Of course, everybody naturally believes that it's from outer space and is piloted by aliens. Ironically, it turns out to be just one component of a decidedly Earth-centered plot to rob an Air Force convoy transporting top secret electronics equipment and a nuclear missile warhead, just like the ones that young Mr. Salas was prepared to launch. No aliens here, just one more bad, criminal idea dreamed up by another run-of-the-mill, power-hungry scientist who wants to launch his own private Nuclear Age with a bang. "Invasion From Outer Space: Part 2", the finale of this reckless, restless and wreckless little crime opera debuted on March 17, *one day* after Echo Flight proved that an equipment malfunction could be easily managed by the U.S. Air Force, but after thirty years, *Watch the Skies!*, because there's no telling what God and Evolution may have twisted into shape in the dummy mind and eyes of a retired Mussulman on the edge of tomorrow; you just never know who's going to be possessed by the morbidly ridiculous strings of a violin playing wee-wee all over the original soundtrack of *Psycho*.

⁵⁸ Peebles, Curtis, *Watch the Skies! A Chronicle of the Flying Saucer Myth*, Smithsonian Institution Press, 1994, pp. 21-25.

⁵⁹ All such examples of the aforementioned "damn fine entertainment" can be verified at <http://www.imdb.com> or <http://en.wikipedia.org/>.

On March 12, *four days* prior to the Echo Flight Incident, *Voyage to the Bottom of the Sea* aired "The Deadly Cloud", about a giant UFO disguised as a cloud and full of alien invaders seeking to destroy the Earth for its mineral wealth. On March 14, two days later, *The Invaders* TV show aired "The Innocent", in which the aliens take architect David Vincent up into their spaceship and try to prove to him that they have nothing but peaceful intentions for the planet Earth by showing him all of the groovy things they've done to one little valley in the desert. Can anybody say "Death Valley"? On March 15, *the day before* Salas' "event", *Green Acres* aired "The Saucer Season", one of the Eb-centered episodes, few and far between, but all classics. Remember Eb? Between Arnold the pig and Eb, Arnold was the smart one. In "The Saucer Season", Eb makes headlines and becomes the center of attention for the entire valley and beyond when he sees a flying saucer and has a nice chat with the aliens inside. In *this* TV farce, the UFO was just a hoax engineered by hicks, but the Air Force hears about it, and dispatches a Lieutenant, played by Bob Hastings of *McHale's Navy*, to investigate the sighting, this edition being a sad reminder of another Robert Hastings thirty years in advance of the main event, so our forefathers got to enjoy a little spoonful of irony with their tea, ignorant entirely of the synchronicity they were slowly forging in the tamped fires of the human imagination. And, yes, comedy ensues. *Also* on March 15, *Lost in Space* aired "The Colonists", another little TV drama about a tightly-seamed giant UFO, this one full of Amazons and their slaves flying in to colonize Planet X, where they discover the Robinson clan, their pilot, Major Don West, their stump-bodied robot babysitter, and Dr. Zachary (*Doomed! We're all doomed!*) Smith, all comfortably ensconced in their *own* flying saucer, the *Jupiter II*. All of these fun times happened in the one week prior to the Echo Flight Incident. *And in those days, we didn't even have cable TV...*

The point should be obvious: in 1967, UFOs were a *cultural* phenomenon, not a *scientific* one. It's not surprising that there were jokes – especially among a bunch of young airmen. *Everyone* in the nation was aware of such jokes, and for the most part they enjoyed them. UFO stories, hoaxes, jokes – whatever, were a means to an end then, and a they're a means to an end now, and that end is always the same: *look at me!! I'm king of the world, ma!*

This environment was well-primed for both hoax reports and for the simple, daily, and ordinary mistakes based on poor observations and ignorance of astronomy and things that go bump in the night. This was, and continues to be, true even amongst those now ultra-famous "trained observers", although in my experience, there's no such thing as a "trained observer",

'cause being assigned to a security detail, whether civilian or military, just doesn't come coupled with any requisite "training" of that sort, pal – you're either good at it or you're not, *period*. Case in point: on February 16, a dozen or more UFOs were sighted by police and civilians in Michigan; most witness descriptions were similar: "a bright orange object ... intermittently ejecting a stream of fire", "orange in color. Light seemed to be very bright. Object's life duration was approximately 10 minutes. When it reached this peak it would eject a stream of fire from underneath and then the main portion would snuff out."⁶⁰ An amazing space oddity – a truly conspicuous craft! Within a day, "a telephone caller told police that a friend of his was launching weather balloons with flares attached",⁶¹ and police closed out the case investigation.

March 6, 1967, a week and three days before the *Salas incident*, several witnesses reported UFOs along the shores of Lake Michigan. Holland police and Ottawa County sheriff's deputies investigated numerous such sightings, and were on hand with several other persons to watch one of the "yellow-lighted" UFOs touchdown in a field near Tunnel Park. This occurred around 9:00 p.m. One of the policemen, Constable Norman Fyneweever, went forward to study the situation a little better, and discovered that the UFO taking up so much of everybody's time was "an inflated clear plastic cleaning bag rigged with a candle underneath."

On March 12, 1967, two brothers in Bountiful, Iowa announced that they were responsible for "dozens" of UFO sightings around their community. Lynn Porter, 23, and his brother Robin, 19, stated that they had "released six balloons constructed from plastic dry-cleaning bags and powered by candles."⁶² Their act inspired a number of copycat hoaxers across the nation almost *immediately*. One of the youths noted that after lighting the candle, "it rises immediately and bounces, hovers, and streaks through the sky just like the reports on flying saucers."⁶³ Strange maneuvers in the sky that no conventional aircraft could imitate were mighty popular that winter and the following spring.

On March 13, 1967, in Galesburg, Illinois, several reports of UFOs started coming into the local police stations and were subsequently investigated. They turned out to be a couple of red plastic kites with battery-powered light bulbs. Whenever wind jarred the kites, the bulbs would flicker, creating a reddish glow that, according to police, "fit the description of numerous

⁶⁰ United Press International, *The Columbus Daily Telegram*, Columbus, Nebraska, "Two police report seeing UFO", February 17, 1967.

⁶¹ Associated Press, *Northwest Arkansas Times*, Fayetteville, Arkansas, "When Little Men Wave...", February 18, 1967.

⁶² Green, Gabriel & Smith, Warren, *Let's Face the Facts About Flying Saucers*, Popular Library - New York, Script Associates, 1967, p. 106.

⁶³ *Ibid.*

UFO sightings last week in the Galesburg area." The sightings they were referring to were reported nation-wide and were investigated by Project Blue Book. Blue Book identified one that was photographed as a weather balloon, and the rest of the sightings (those between March 6-11, 1967) were determined to be "unidentified" as a result of insufficient information available to investigators, and please note that "unidentified" does not mean "flying saucer". The point here is, they sure looked a lot like the "electric kites" discovered on March 13, at least to area police, who were supposedly "trained observers".

There were a number of UFO sightings in a number of communities in Montana *after* March 16, including Great Falls, Billings, Fort Benton, Roy and others, as previously mentioned in this narrative. *Civilian* Weather Bureau officials repeatedly stated that the reports were of stars, although one official stated that he suspected the sightings were of Venus. We've already mentioned this one: "We have had calls every night on this," he said. "Most of the nights have been cloudy for the past few weeks and now all the clouds are gone and people are seeing stars for the first time in quite awhile." As previously mentioned, one of these sightings was also investigated by Blue Book, and also determined to be "unidentified". This series of UFO sightings was also the only one that Blue Book recorded for the *entire* state of Montana in March 1967. It's unfortunate, but "true believers" tend to focus on "We have had calls every night on this," and neglect to mention anything else.

On March 28, 1967, a number of residents in Billings, Montana called police and local newspapers reporting UFOs flying over the city. Many of the calls from various individuals included qualifiers such as, "It couldn't have been a star ... it was too close." Some descriptions stated it was cylindrical in shape, which is fairly common among UFO reports, or said it was "standing up and down like a tin can, and it had amber colored lights on the top and bottom." One witness stated that "The light on the bottom was brighter and it moved through the air making a sound, like a balloon." Another stated that she witnessed one UFO "disappear" over Logan Field airport. When asked about "little green men" and "flying saucers," she responded "I don't believe in those things," but adding that "I did see SOMETHING!" A spokesman at Logan Field control tower, when asked about the UFOs on the 28th and those of the previous week stated "I've been looking out those windows [of the control tower] for years ... and I haven't seen a thing yet. It just seems everyone is seeing them – but you and me." Police identified the UFO that was so widely reported as "a device constructed by pranksters, consisting of a small

plastic bag (probably from a cleaning shop) with drinking straws crossed at the bottom and 'powered' by a birthday candle." *Sound familiar?* This was evidently the same hoax UFO that was used about three weeks earlier in Ottawa County, and about two weeks earlier in Bountiful, Iowa.

All of the above examples were Associated Press and United Press International stories that were filed for release all over the world, and were printed in local newspapers in Montana during this same period. *Hoaxing is common.* Joking around about UFOs was nothing new in 1967, and it was done regularly. *Everybody* had their own tale to tell about UFOs, and all were distinguished, for the most part, by the same mysterious qualifier: *the guy telling the story didn't personally see anything, but he heard about another guy who did.* And much like the UFOs that supposedly took out the missiles at Echo-November-Oscar Flight, they were, for the most part, simply *rumors*.

Being "rumors", they were perfectly tuned for exploitation. The natural leading question here is, "exploit the matter to what ends?" What are their ultimate goals? For the answer to that question, we need only explore the commentary of Salas and Klotz, *circa* 1999-2000:

For many years, the Air Force has maintained that no reported UFO incident has ever affected national security. It is established fact that a large number of Air Force personnel reported sighting UFOs at the time many of our strategic missiles became unlaunchable. The incidents described above clearly had national security implications. In one previously classified message, SAC Headquarters described the E-Flight incident as: loss of strategic alert of all ten missiles within ten seconds of each other for no apparent reason and a "...cause for grave concern...(to SAC headquarters)." (emphasis ours)

There is a great discrepancy between the United States Air Force's public position relative to UFOs and national security, and the established facts of this case.

We hope that the Secretary of the Air Force will search for, declassify, and release all information on this case.

Our hope is that public knowledge of this now declassified incident will induce those who were among the security policemen and directly witnessed the UFOs over the Minuteman facilities, and others with any pertinent information, to come forward and add their stories to those of the Missile Combat Crew officers. We maintain that the American people have the right to know the truth about this and other UFO incidents which affected national security.

We welcome information about this or any other military/UFO incident from anyone.⁶⁴

In the long run, Salas and pals want one thing: *the declassification and disclosure of all information having to do with UFOs*. And if they get that little wish granted, and the information received doesn't answer all of their meaningless, irrelevant questions, or if they get an answer something like "here's everything we've got, and it indicates there's nothing special about this crap – it's all in your head," all that means is the government still has secrets, they haven't answered the questions asked, and UFOs are still very real and still very much unexplained. The big answer is *exactly* what Steven Greer of the Disclosure Project wants as well, according to him and the group of maniacs he's gathered together, which is why the Disclosure Project represents our Place Two to look for Salas' agenda goals. It's not surprising that Salas and Greer eventually came together – they want exactly the same thing, but in different colors. Salas wanted publicity, because he was working on a retirement plan, while Greer wants full disclosure, and is not averse to doing anything he can, ethical or not, to force the government to give him that.

Most people who are aware of the Echo Flight Incident were introduced to it via the Disclosure Project; these were the guys who managed to recite institutional nonsense into the Congressional Record (although, in their defense, they certainly weren't the first). As a result, most of the people who don't understand the evolution of "Salasian" thought are unaware of the ridiculous lengths he has gone to make a point. Nobody ever questions these guys, even to the extent of asking them "where do you dig these witnesses of yours up, and why do you believe them?" Well, when you include on your website statements like, "We welcome information about this or any other military/UFO incident from anyone"⁶⁵, you've got to assume you're going to get a lot of crap from a lot of folks who served three years in the military before getting the bum's rush out, because, frankly, they just weren't the type of Alpha-Dog personality that the USAF is looking for; more to the point, when your normal practice is to believe *every single word* that *every one of these guys* tells you, it will eventually become obvious that their accounts cannot stand up to any in-depth examination. I happen to really *enjoy* pointing those obvious things out, because the undeserved yet unmitigated *arrogance* of these guys is stipulated on the assumption that those people most critical of their alternative take on history are *blind*, unable to perceive and therefore counter what they believe are the obvious manipulations of government to hide extraterrestrial interference on a massive scale within all aspects of our society.

⁶⁵ Salas, Robert and Klotz, Jim, "The Malmstrom AFB UFO/Missile Incident" <http://www.cufon.org/> Special Reports, updated 15-May-2000.

And that's offensive on a number of levels.

The goal of “full disclosure” has been asserted for *years* by these core groups of UFO enthusiasts. They believe that only *full disclosure* by the American government and the military can truly give them what they really want most: *confirmation* that all of the conspiracies, alternative histories, and paranoid babbling that they’ve been collecting since before World War Two are “really, really real,” and they have not been wasting their time and minds for nearly the length of a man’s lifetime – they’ve been doing really important *stuff*, stuff that has an inherent worth to the whole planet. Now, does that mean I believe Robert Salas is a fool who really believes the garbage he’s been writing about since 1996 or so? Not at all – he’s a smart man, so he’s obviously doing it for the fame, and the travel. He lectures all over the country and writes regularly on the only subject he happens to be famous for – the supposed UFO interference that occurred in 1967 – and he didn’t start doing it until he retired from his day job. The UFO incident he “created” is one never previously hinted at, so he’s now *the accepted expert*. He created an amusing retirement for himself, wrote a book, and is now milking the fruits of that labor by wetting the pants of UFO groupies in tank tops and shorts, standing next to fools, who are standing next to spendthrifts who want to be part of the thrill-ride that’s screaming through their own private little Robert Ludlum novel that Salas has set the stage for. I happen to think it’s immoral on a societal level, but he’s got a lot of people who are probably patting him on the back for figuring out how to retire in comfort by pandering to idiots and fools. He’s simply attached himself to a group of people screaming “full disclosure!” who will literally believe anything you tell them except UFOs are in your head and have very little inclination to verify any of it. A lot of these guys have been doing it for *years*, without much success, at least not the type of success that they’re looking for, and they are now willing *to go any length at all* to score a point. They have been doing this dog and pony show unsuccessfully for so long, that they don’t care so much anymore about telling lies or reporting events that never occurred as long as they get what they want. *The ends fully justify the means*. And it is *these* people who latched onto Robert Salas and his retirement party at a very, very early point in his story. They are *not* honest, they *do* tell lies, and they think they’re justified in doing so. And since this is the motivating factor that drives Salas and the group he locked his story onto, we should examine that aspect of this little party they’ve invited the rest of the world to.

I believe that, given the history of CUFON, the *Computer UFO Network*, it is perfectly acceptable to assume that these gentlemen, who, more than anybody else, have pressed forward with Salas' insane little tale, even to the point of helping him to write and publish his book, are perfectly willing to *lie* if it contributes to getting them what they want most – *full disclosure and the validation of their choice to become the experts regarding what they think of as the most important event in human history*. But they don't yet have that, nor the respect that they think should go along with it. As a result, these people are so bitter, that *lies are now integral to strategy*.

On January 1, 1986 Jim Speiser, working out of Wheat Ridge, Colorado, founded *ParaNet*, as part of a bulletin-board system (similar to CUFON) called "The Other Side". It was one of the first BBS set up to collect and maintain information "for the purpose of research on the paranormal."⁶⁶ Jim Speiser wanted to bring together the three factions of paranormal debate – the skeptics, the believers, and the undecided – for public discussion of paranormal events, and created ParaNet as a means of doing so, a "neutral ground for the exchange of information on the paranormal."⁶⁷ ParaNet offers investigator's of such phenomenon the *raw materials*, in the form of sighting reports submitted by the public. In this aspect of its database foundation, it is similar to CUFON, the Computer UFO Network, which is also dependent on publically submitted information, the *raw materials*, as it were, that allows them to "grow" their database and continue to function as the recipient of these materials. Of course, they can't check out or investigate all of these submitted stories to determine their veracity – there are simply too many; this is publically submitted information, not information that the government refuses to disclose, so presumably it's far more worthy of trust and belief. It's not necessary to investigate every little sighting that's collected; these people don't really have a good enough reason to *lie*, do they? *Of course not!* Let's just give them the benefit of the doubt they would ordinarily be accorded as a consumer-available organization providing a *service*. If there's anything you're provided with that you think may not be true, then you can get in touch with those providing the raw materials for yourself, and investigate it all you want. *This is just a service, not a Biblical revelation.*⁶⁸ Of course, the fact that it's being published at all, regardless of the medium in use, is the only thing

⁶⁶ <http://stason.org/TULARC/new-age/alien-visitors/11-41-ParaNet-Paranormal-Network-Information-Service.html>

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

that a lot of Americans need to give it that *just washed and rinsed* glow of authority. There really are a lot of people out there who tend to believe whatever they read, and to these people a *revelation* is a *revelation*, and it doesn't really matter whether you capitalize the word or not – it's still the word of God.

To a number of individuals directly involved or hanging about the periphery of the various UFO movements that have arisen in the past century or so, Jim Speiser is a hero for going up against the U.S. government's military disinformation machine, and for defending in print the necessity for the thorough and *public* investigation of the UFO phenomenon. He's a very good communicator, a fine writer, and has no qualms about the use of over-enthusiasm in defense of UFO crusaders for belief at all levels. In addition, he exhibits an unmitigated disgust for those who are unwilling to credit the UFO phenomenon with even the barest sliver of rational meaning or importance in their lives, often to an extent where even skeptical investigation must be considered a waste of everybody's time. Primarily, though, *he's really annoyed by people who just don't care about UFOs because the UFO debate is intrinsically unimportant, and a waste of intellectual capacity except as a form of entertainment*. There's a brand new circle in Speiser's Hell reserved for those who are simply *dismissive* of UFOs. I'm proud to say that I've been living there for more than just a few years, and people like me are an effect of what Speiser calls the *New Negativism*. Just check out the arrogance that oozes from this guy [bracketed comments are all mine].⁶⁹

Explaining UFO sightings is one thing. Excessive, obsessive debunking is quite another. The rise of organized skepticism has raised negativism to a new art form. I call it "The Discount Muffler Theory of UFOlogy," because I am reminded of the TV commercial where two chimpanzees are banging on a muffler to get it to fit a car it was obviously not designed for. The debunkers constantly try to hammer the facts into place, in order to get them to fit a given situation [something true believers in UFOs would *never* do].

The message of this New Negativism is clear: those of us interested in UFO research are nothing but childish, uneducated, anti-intellectual twits, who should probably go home and watch reruns of Star Trek. To be truly intellectually chic, these days, one must NOT let one's mind entertain such silly notions.

While a few skeptics grudgingly acknowledge the scientific competence of some UFOlogists, the majority are characterized as unworthy of their letters [not necessarily "unworthy"; more like "unable to provide evidence that can be examined"; well, at least in the midst of his whining, he

⁶⁹ Speiser, Jim, "UFOlogy: After 40 Years, Still No Respect", <http://www.book-of-thoth.com/archives-article-5258.html>.

hasn't likened himself to victims of the Holocaust or witch hunts like so many other over-burdened souls tend to do]. And those of us below the doctorate level are made to feel sympathy with the witches of Salem [damn. Never mind]. I envision in the near future bumper stickers that say, "Kill a Believer for CSICOP."

Given that UFOlogy and "Mainstream Science" share a common ancestor, namely Curiosity, the question must be asked, Is all this abject negativism truly in the best interest of science? Perhaps the debunkers are right, and there really is nothing new under the sun. How has it harmed anyone to wonder, to look further, to investigate? [It doesn't hurt anybody, but True Believers rarely leave it at that; when someone points out the fallacies inherent to the subject, they are attacked, viciously and personally, because few people on the "Believer" side are willing to admit that the fallacies can't be overcome, and should not, for that reason, be used to create a valid interpretation of our universe.] One gets the impression that the skeptics would prefer us all to pack up our Geiger counters, our VCRs, and our autographed copies of "Communion" and go home, never again to whisper the phrase, "UFOs are real".⁷⁰ [That would be nice, but it isn't necessary – the only thing that's necessary is to keep the discussion grounded in fact, something a lot of True Believers find rather difficult to do. A case in point follows.]

In February, 1986, Jim Speiser, perhaps in a moment of petulant weakness brought on by the despair one suffers at the realization that his status as an American citizen and self-serving icon of the "New Foolishness" is simply not sufficient qualification to make him privy to all of the hidden information stashed away by the various U.S. military and intelligence organizations that may or may not have them stashed away, conceived of the following plan to get some of the answers to some of the questions he has (complete and replete with all of the whining the topic invariably demands):

The basic idea is to prove (or disprove) once and for all the extent of the government's involvement in investigating the UFO phenomenon. The folks at CAUS will tell you that it's already a foregone conclusion that the government has been involved in the field; witness the volume of documents they have produced under FOIA. But to whom have they proven it? Readers of Just Cause? A few die-hard UFOnuts? Big deal! The skeptics aren't impressed and frankly, neither am I. They really haven't uncovered anything we didn't know or suspect in the past. [Yeah, and we're all shocked – the government actually has secrets!]

What is needed is to catch the government with their pants down, and to do it in full view of the public eye. We need to observe firsthand what role the government takes in the investigation of an actual UFO event. The problem is that actual UFO events don't take place when you want them to, and it would be only by providence that we would be in position at the time of a sighting.

My proposal is to do the next best thing: CREATE a UFO event, and watch the Men In Black or whoever, come out of the woodwork.⁷¹

⁷⁰ Speiser, Jim, "UFOlogy: After 40 Years, Still No Respect", <http://www.book-of-thoth.com/archives-article-5258.html>.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

I'm not talking about your run-of-the-mill hoax. I'm talking about a well-financed, stringently planned, professionally executed Sting operation. [It's interesting that he characterizes "hoax" as "run-of-the-mill", because I've *a/ways* felt that way.]

Step one is to get a commitment [sic] from some press or media organization (20/20 would love this stuff, but Geraldo Rivera's credibility factor gives me pause) [This just kills me; I love this guy! He's harping on Geraldo Rivera's credibility when he lacks entirely the ability or focus to examine his own! Even better, he's doing it while in the process of destroying what little credibility he has left!] They would be in on it from the beginning, perhaps even helping with the financing, with the guarantee of an exclusive. [And he even expects the press to pay for it? *How adorable!* This guy's a friggin' riot.]

Step two is a trip to Hollywood, where we obtain the services of the very finest makeup artist (Rick Baker?) who will create for us the corpse of an alien. It doesn't have to be a million-dollar ET job, just good enough to be convincing at first glance.

Step three is to somehow create a rash of unexplained sightings of the nocturnal lights variety – daytime disks I think would be just too difficult. I'm leaning towards high intensity flares ejected from aircraft, perhaps over a body of water where there's no chance of recovery. [Finally, someone in this community is willing to admit how easy a hoax is to carry out...]

Step Four – and here we risk disclosure [only here?] – a rancher or farmer reports to the authorities that he has shot and killed "something" on his property. The authorities discover the alien corpse and call in The Authorities who call in THE AUTHORITIES. [Self-destruction is a beautiful thing to watch, isn't it folks?]

This is the point at which we begin our observations. If there's anything to the MIB [Men In Black] theory, the government will swoop down like vultures and secure the area, taking witnesses into custody for debriefing sessions. And this will be the most difficult and most important part: at least one of the debriefings must be recorded. According to reports, [And God knows, *those* are all true...] these sessions are designed to "brainwash" the witness into thinking he didn't see that what he saw, or to scare him into keeping his mouth shut or both. To this point, such reports have been met with understandable skepticism, being branded paranoid ravings. A success at this juncture would strongly indicate that the government has something to hide. If tapes of the sessions were to be aired nationally, the UFO community would no longer be the only ones wondering what's going on.⁷² [Nor would they be the focus of those wondering what's going on with them...]

And all this comes from the guy who wrote "Explaining UFO sightings is one thing. Excessive, obsessive debunking is quite another. The rise of organized skepticism has raised negativism to a new art form."⁷³ It isn't Negativism to point it out when someone else is lying or wrong – *it's just better acuity.*

⁷² <http://www.cufon.org/cufon/mask/projmask.htm>

⁷³ Speiser, Jim, "UFOlogy: After 40 Years, Still No Respect", <http://www.book-of-thoth.com/archives-article-5258.html>.

Jim Speiser shopped his plan around some of the better known people involved in the UFO movement, those who have been pressing for nothing less than *complete disclosure*. From someone of the supposed integrity of Jim Speiser, this evinces an environment of extreme paranoia well beyond what many people would be led to expect. The main point to get from this weird event is the fact that a lot of people were very much aware of this plan, supported it, at least in principle, and *kept it a secret for years*. In 1986, *Dale Goudie* of our very own *CUFON*, the founder of the *UFO Reporting and Information Service* in Seattle, Washington, received this letter, along with extensive notes and explanations, mailed directly to him by Jim Speiser. They discussed the plan in some detail, Dale Goudie raising points that he thought might be problematic should any actual attempt be made. That was in 1986. It wasn't until September 06, 1997 that CUFON published any details of this plan, which was appropriately labeled *Project Mask*.

We've decided to bring this information to public attention at this time because enough time has elapsed and because, more than ever before, unverifiable UFO-related information and claims are coming out. The material presented ... raises important questions which should stimulate thought and debate about unverified information and peoples' claims and motives.⁷⁴

This was nine months after the publication of Robert Salas' first article for the *Mutual UFO Network UFO Journal*. Why they didn't publish this discussion of fake aliens immediately is a good question in light of their self-serving opinion that releasing the plan over ten years later "should stimulate thought and debate about unverified information" when the same unverified information amounted to a near *plague* in 1986. This incident just *hints* at the lengths these people will go in order to reach their goal of "full disclosure." They are apparently willing to at least discuss creating a false UFO incident in order to force the government's hand, at which point they can say "see? We were right! Look at all the Men in Black."

It's difficult to know whether a hoax at this level was ever actually carried out in support of "full disclosure", but we do know that not long after these plans were discussed, Dale Goudie was involved, at least on the periphery, with some of the machinations that resulted in the now famous Majestic-12 disclosure. This involved the *proven* forgery of classified military documents that many of those involved in some manner or other with the UFO movement to bring about disclosure have since explained away as a government disinformation campaign to discredit the

⁷⁴ <http://www.cufon.org/cufon/mask/projmask.htm>

UFOlogists involved, neglecting to answer why, if it was a government plot, the forgery and every other instant of supposed government interference was done so poorly.⁷⁵ They also fail to explain why the government would go to such lengths to discredit these UFOlogists when they're doing such damn professional job of it *themselves*. In any case, all of the involved individuals have been repeatedly paid off at various UFO junkets, conferences, and MUFON conventions to simply repeat their tales of high intelligence intrigue and ABOVE TOP SECRET manipulations, so it's impossible to know exactly *when* a lot of these folks did *what*. The only thing we can say with any confidence is that the whole mess involved a very complicated hoax that members of the UFOlogy movement have been arguing about ever since, each one trying to spin it in a direction involving government lies and the covering up of their own. If, as these folks assert, the government were involved, it's unlikely that many of the blatantly obvious errors that were made would ever have been made, because anyone with a military background who has (or had) access to classified materials *at any level* would have instantly judged it a fake.

Dale Goudie was at the forefront of this as it relates to *Project Aquarius*, which is mentioned in the forged classified military documents referred to above. He's been trying ever since to prove that *Project Aquarius* is actually a highly classified USAF project governing the investigation of UFOs, which the Air Force claims it does not do.⁷⁶ The story as told by Goudie is very obviously the result of a mix up between one Project Aquarius by the NSA that was active, highly classified, and had nothing at all to do with UFOs, and *another* Project Aquarius that is either nonexistent, being a terminated Air Force project from many years ago that may or may not have involved UFOs, but has no bearing on *anything* at all today, or is an active Air Force project that continues the USAF investigation into UFOs where Project Blue Book left off. Considering that Dale Goudie latched onto the name *Project Aquarius* as a result of it being mentioned in an obviously forged document, one must be forgiven for doubting its veracity as an active, living investigation of UFOs. The document in question was examined by Major Kilikauskas, of AFSAC, and he agreed that it was fake, noting *several* reasons for reaching this conclusion, including the following: (1) there never has been an office within AFSAC (or 7602nd) with the symbol INS, INSR, or IT, which the message insistently refers to; (2) there has never been a "Captain Grace" (or anyone with the surname "Grace") assigned to AFSAC, which

⁷⁵ <http://www.ufoevidence.org/documents/doc1538.htm>

⁷⁶ <http://www.spacepub.com/users/data/mj12/mj12b.htm>

the message insistently refers to; (3) imagery interpretation the message refers to is completely outside the command mission for both AFSAC and AFOSI; (4) individuals referred to in the message as AFSAC photo interpreters do not exist, and photo interpreters are not used at AFSAC for anything; (5) the classification term WNINTEL is spelled phonetically on each occurrence in the message, a practice never adopted by the military, representing a mistake that *nobody* in the military, once familiarized with the caveat, would ever make, and one that would never find itself in use on official Department of Defense message traffic; (6) the message is embarrassingly replete with grammatical errors and typing errors, thereby making little sense to anybody with military classification experience; and (7) the document is not in the standard, accepted format for classified messages in use anywhere in the U.S. government or military. In addition, neither Major Kilikauskas, who examined the message, nor Mr. Nehlig, who had worked in AFSAC for many years, could ever recall hearing anything at all about a "Project Aquarius."⁷⁷

And it is *this* information, carefully subnoted and asterixed, that CUFON uses as an indication that the Air Force is lying to Americans when it claims that it doesn't investigate UFOs. The level of understanding assumed by these people is not exactly imposing. They seem to think the Air Force is lying when it says it doesn't investigate UFOs, simply because the Air Force admits that any UFO landing or otherwise interfering with the proper running of an Air Force Command, particularly one in which nuclear materials are used, would nonetheless find itself under immediate investigation. *And these guys still want their ideas to be taken seriously.* Just imagine: military protocol requires that an immediate investigation be undertaken should there be any outside interference whatsoever with the operations on any military command, therefore it follows that the USAF is consciously lying to Americans when it claims "we don't investigate UFOs", since a UFO might conceivably qualify as "outside interference". Trying to wade through the reams of crap these guys release is a chore I would *never* recommend others undertake. Would any of these critics actually prefer that *no* investigation be undertaken, or do they simply want the Air Force to admit that should a hypothetical incident of this type occur, the Air Force would *of course* be forced into the position where the investigation of UFOs – on an incidental level, mind you, not as a general rule – would definitely be undertaken? A comment

⁷⁷ http://www.cufon.org/cufon/foia_004.htm

by Bertrand Russell comes to mind: "Most people would sooner die than think ... *in fact, they do so.*"

CUFON attaches itself to stories calculated to entrap government witnesses in an effort to prove that the government lies all the time about UFOs; although CUFON seems to have no problem acting in the same manner if it helps them to ultimately reach their goals. And in order to "prove" that the Air Force lied to Americans when it stated that "no reported UFO incident has ever affected national security,"⁷⁸ it is apparently more than willing to assist Robert Salas to press his ridiculous claims.

I admit that I find it difficult to believe *anything* asserted by groups like CUFON who consistently impart useless information or information that comes equipped with its own background story that tends to be easily refuted. For instance, Robert Salas has claimed that he read of the Echo Flight Incident in a book, which originally induced him to initiate the FOIA request that eventually resulted in his status as a star on the UFO circuit. While I have no opinion regarding the existence of this hypothetical book, it would nonetheless come as no surprise to discover that Salas lied about this as well, although I am perfectly willing to admit such an error in judgment if someone were to tell me precisely what book Robert Salas read that refers to the Echo Flight Incident under that name, but does not give a date for that event. After all, his FOIA requests seem to indicate, as previously discussed, that he was unaware of the actual date on which the incident occurred.

This is a question of particular interest to me, because the declassification of the Echo Flight Incident, as evidenced by the FOIA documents he received, is Salas' primary reason for "going public with this story", and ignoring the standard classified materials debrief he would have received upon leaving the Air Force. In any *normal* situation, Salas might have good reason to suspect upon reading the FOIA documents that the Echo Flight Incident had been declassified, and he could therefore discuss the matter freely. The story that he's related, however, does not reflect a *normal* situation. By January, 1997, when he first published his article "Minuteman Missiles Shutdown" in the Mutual UFO Network UFO Journal, he had already reached the conclusion that he was *not* involved in the Echo Flight Incident at all. In

⁷⁸ Salas, Robert L., "Minuteman Missiles Shutdown", Mutual UFO Network UFO Journal, January, 1997, No. 345, pp. 15-17, cont. 22, 23.

fact, he couldn't even have been positive regarding the date of March 16, 1967 as the date for the incident that he claims to remember. In his article, he states:

To summarize the events of that morning: UFOs were sighted by security personnel at our LCC (probably November Flight), at one of our LFs, and by other security personnel at Echo LFs and these were reported separately to the capsule crews at both LCCs. These reports were made at or about the time Minuteman Strategic missiles shutdown at both sites. USAF has confirmed that all of Echo flights missiles shutdown within seconds of each other. There was no apparent reason for these shutdowns.⁷⁹

If Salas believed that the event he was involved with had occurred at November Flight, and not Echo Flight, as he presumably thought prior to this ridiculous revelation he claims to have had, then he has no justification whatsoever for betraying the end-of-service non-disclosure agreement he entered into upon separation from the Air Force. Any reasonable inference would have concluded that a discussion of events that were once highly classified would have remained so over the years, unless he could produce documents indicating otherwise. His FOIA request failed to result in *any* documents detailing a missile systems failure at November Flight, classified *or* unclassified. Salas *should* have concluded that in the absence of information indicating November Flight missile failures, any associated, official message traffic discussing such failures, and any indication *at all* that an investigation into the cause of these hypothetical, unconfirmed November Flight missile failures was conducted, any *discussion* of the matter, let alone the publication of details related to the event, would still be prohibited under legal guidelines. Of course, this would hardly apply if there were *no missile failures* at November Flight for the period of time covered by the original FOIA request, or if Salas had simply published a *fictional* account of a November Flight incident that occurred in conjunction with the incident at Echo Flight. One cannot help but wonder why it is that no other witnesses have ever come forward to support this hypothetical account of missile failures occurring at November Flight at the same time as the failures that occurred at Echo Flight. Is it because such individuals were aware, as Mr. Salas apparently was not, that divulging the details of such an event might very well be a violation with legal ramifications of any non-disclosure agreements that would have applied to such an exposé, or is it because there *were* no witnesses, such an incident being entirely *fictional*? This is a valid question, because over

⁷⁹ Salas, Robert L., "Minuteman Missiles Shutdown", Mutual UFO Network UFO Journal, January, 1997, No. 345, pp. 15-17, cont. 22, 23.

the course of the four decades (as of 2007) that have transpired since the incident itself, and the *fifteen years* since Robert Salas originally broke the story, *not one witness has ever come forward who will admit to having seen a UFO anywhere near Malmstrom AFB on March 16, 1967*. That is a remarkable characteristic for such a widely accepted, well-known incident that, to all accounts, this neat little story represents.

I admit, at this stage, it's a moot point. It's difficult to tie down exactly *when* he decided that his story was no longer believable, but within two to three years or so after Robert Salas came forth from the wilderness with this undocumented tale of missiles failing at November Flight as a result of UFO interference that nobody else has been willing to confirm, he once again changed the fundamental aspect of his story that separates it so dramatically from the normal mish-mash of UFO sightings recorded across the breadth of America: *the location*. He never really published a reason for this, stating only:

Please note that in previous versions of this presentation, we stated that Robert Salas was on duty in the November-Flight LCC. Later research and witness testimony has revealed that it was actually Oscar-Flight.⁸⁰

And so, with barely a pause in the universe of information management, and with absolutely no change at all in the copyright dates included on the websites where a new version of his story was posted without any notification that another change had been made to the fundamental character of the tale itself, Robert Salas notified the world that on March 16, 1967, UFOs interfered with the nuclear strike capabilities of the United States by causing the missiles to fail – in the same way and on the same date as the Echo Flight Incident – at Malmstrom AFB's Wing I configuration *Oscar Flight*. This is problematic for Salas. After all, he claimed to have been at Echo Flight during the missiles failure incident, even when he wasn't. And when faced with that embarrassing disclosure, he said that he was mistaken, and that he had actually been on duty at November Flight, because November Flight was the only other Wing I configuration that was even *mentioned* in the FOIA documents he obtained. This is the point of view his January 1997 article assumes. Now, however, Salas and Klotz were asserting a different event entirely. After claiming outright that the missiles failed at November Flight due to UFOs, and did so without any documentation whatsoever to support the occurrence of such an

⁸⁰ Salas, Robert and Klotz, Jim, "The Malmstrom AFB UFO/Missile Incident" <http://www.cufon.org/> Special Reports, updated 15-May-2000.

important national security failure, Salas and Klotz were *now* asserting that they had it all wrong, and that the incident occurred at another Wing I Flight altogether. *It absolutely boggles the mind.*

To advance credit where due, it's conceivable that Salas may have been attempting to confirm everything he had already published in the many, *many* months between the November and Oscar Flight scene of the crime relocation. When considering the time scale, however, it's more likely that he and Klotz were simply hanging around, waiting for someone to come forward and explain exactly why the story they had described could not have occurred exactly as they had described. After all, he had already asserted a professional association to a flight configuration that would not normally occur in his own chain of command. Even so, the case that's been made for an Oscar Flight incident is weaker still than the one made for November Flight, since the Oscar incident isn't even *mentioned* in the FOIA documents representing Salas' primary resource materials.

I think that what happened here is the result of an interview that Salas had with his one-time watch commander, Frederick Meiwald. After all, he told his story for somewhere just less than three years, asserting that he was at November Flight when the crap hit the blowhard, and not mentioning by name his commander the entire time. Then, in a document published by Salas and Klotz sourced out of CUFON, they mention Meiwald by name for the first time. A short few months later, Salas claims he was at Oscar Flight, not November Flight, and that "research" indicated the change was necessary. Of course, they still maintained that the event occurred on March 16, 1967, and they still claimed that they know the date is correct, because the incident at Echo Flight earlier in the watch was referred to by an unnamed individual at the Command Post (or by the MCCC of Echo Flight, depending upon which version of this claim you're using) while speaking on the phone with Frederick Meiwald. Rather than rest on the conclusion that these guys are absolute idiots, I'll give them the benefit of the doubt and assume that the changes in the story this time were all the result of new information coming in, the ultimate source being Frederick Meiwald, a man Salas apparently felt no need to hunt down for the first three years that he was actively publicizing his story of anti-nuclear critics from another galaxy (or possibly another star system, another time period, or a brand new, presumably hidden, technocratic nation – you pick your own fiction; either way, it's an idiot's version of 52-card pickup).

The natural follow-up question in the face of this new disclosure should be obvious: if the incident he claims to have been witness to occurred at *Oscar Flight*, than what use are the FOIA documents? And if the FOIA documents are thereby rendered useless, why would Salas and Klotz still insist that the incident Salas recollects occurred on March 16, 1967, as he was still reporting by at least May, 2000?⁸¹ The answer to *that* question resides with his previous claim that the UFO incident he remembers so well happened *before* area UFO sightings that were reported in local newspapers: "I had recalled reading such reports after my incident."⁸² The only UFO sightings that would qualify are the Belt sightings of 24-25 March 1967. Salas and Klotz *had* to affix their Oscar Flight event to March 16, because if they didn't, they would be forced to admit that even those very few memories Salas *could* recall – those few instances that therefore didn't require confirmation of any sort whatsoever – were just as error-prone as the rest of his narrative. They would be forced to admit that Salas' *remembrance of things past* was entirely faulty as to both location *and* date. Under the heavy weight of an injured recollection of such extent, the first parallel characteristic to break would be his credibility – and, frankly, Salas desperately needs that crutch.

The March 24-25 series of UFO sightings around Belt, Montana was reported in area newspapers, and is included among a number of sightings recorded by Project Blue Book personnel. Of the 204 sightings listed by Blue Book for the month of March, 1967, It is the *only* series of UFO sightings recorded for the entire state of Montana, and although Blue Book eventually conceded that *one* of these sightings was indeed "unidentified" (as opposed to a planet sighting, meteor, or confirmed aircraft), it is somewhat telling as well that military representatives looking into the matter found *nothing* that would indicate an extraordinary event had occurred. In any case, Blue Book never investigated other Montana UFO sightings for March, 1967. There's no evidence at all that an investigation concerning UFOs over Malmstrom AFB, or any of the Wing I configurations attached to Malmstrom, was ever conducted for any purpose other than to dispel their mention as rumors, nor is there any evidence whatsoever to suggest that an investigation of Wing I configuration missile failures on the level of the Echo Flight Incident was ever conducted.

⁸¹ Salas, Robert and Klotz, Jim, "The Malmstrom AFB UFO/Missile Incident" <http://www.cufon.org/> Special Reports, updated 15-May-2000.

⁸² Salas, Robert L., "Minuteman Missiles Shutdown", Mutual UFO Network UFO Journal, January, 1997, No. 345, pp. 15-17, cont. 22, 23.

It's been suggested that there was no Blue Book investigation of UFOs over the Wing I configurations attached to Malmstrom AFB because incidents considered a threat to U.S. national security were reported in accordance with JANAP 146 or Air Force Manual 55-11, neither of which were part of the Blue Book system. This supposition, however, is incorrect. There were standing orders that any UFOs reported to any Air Force command were required to be reported to Project Blue Book,⁸³ and this was very obviously *not* done in any of the cases sworn to by Salas, et al. That alone leads me to question whether any UFOs were reported, because Blue Book would have been notified *immediately*, and this clearly wasn't done. The fact that JANAP 146 and Air Force Manual 55-11 are not part of the Blue Book system does not excuse personnel from reporting UFOs in accordance with procedures already established for UFO reporting; it just means that additional reporting requirements need to be adopted as well. It's been suggested that Blue Book wasn't notified because the incident occurred at a nuclear missile command, but that excuse also doesn't hold up very well to examination when we consider that in August, 1965, Project Blue Book was notified by the USAF command post at Cheyenne, Wyoming that UFOs in the area had been reported. Later that night, the base commander of nearby Francis E. Warren Air Force Base reported UFOs to Blue Book, as did the commanding officer at Sioux Army Depot; an area SAC post also reported UFOs, presumably the same ones.⁸⁴ The proximity to nuclear missiles certainly didn't prevent these sightings from being properly reported to Blue Book, and standing orders are generally required to be adhered to, regardless of the command. But in March 1967, Blue Book wasn't called in to investigate *any* sightings in the entire state of Montana excepting the series occurring on March 24-25.

It would be odd in any investigation, but it's absolutely *impossible* that an unidentified vehicle sighting over a nuclear missile facility by military personnel would *not* be reported to Project Blue Book, nor as required by the additional instructions referred to above. And yet, according to Salas and CUFON, this is *exactly* what happened. The only contemporary reports or evidence of an investigation that anybody has ever produced in regard to any of the UFOs that have thus far been proposed for March 1967 is the Blue Book investigation for one of the

⁸³ Editors, United Press International and Cowles Communications, Inc., Flying Saucers, Look Book Division, United Press International, 1967, excerpted The Progress, Clearfield, Curwensville, Philipsburg, Moshannon Valley, PA, "Twenty Years of Flying Saucers . . . Trips in Strange Discs, Talks With Space People Are Reported", March 3, 1967.

⁸⁴ Hynek, J. Allen, The UFO Experience A Scientific Enquiry, First Ballantine Books Edition, May, 1974.

March 24-25 Belt, Montana sightings. There were a number of sightings outside of Montana, many of which have been confirmed as fakes and hoaxes, but only the Belt sightings would fit the sort of criteria one would generally expect from CUFON. And since the missile failures event that Salas remembers supposedly occurred *before* the sightings reported in area newspapers, March 16, 1967, was – at least through December 2000 – the date that he was sticking with.

This insistence – up to the year 2000 or so – that the events Salas supposedly experienced occurred on March 16, 1967 was due entirely to the fact of the Echo Flight missile failures, because there is no documentation or confirmation that *anything* he's described may have occurred at November Flight, or, for that matter, any of the other flights. *There is no evidence; there is absolutely nothing to support his story.* And the only reason, as of 1999 or so, that he asserted the missile failures he witnessed must have occurred at November Flight instead of Echo Flight, is the presence of a Mobile Strike Team “which had checked all November Flight's LFs on the morning of 16 March 67”.⁸⁵ Salas basically cherry picks what information should be trusted, claiming that A2C Gamble's statement in that same command history announcing that all members of this Mobile Strike Team “were questioned and stated that no unusual activity or sightings were observed”⁸⁶ is a *lie*, but this doesn't necessarily apply to the entire document, although he apparently reserves the right to change his mind, something he has done frequently, and has apparently settled into a suspicious, cautious, and critical attitude in reference to any of the conclusions associated with these very few pages. Actually, none of the events reported by Gamble are suspicious in any way, because they are completely accounted for within the parameters of the investigation detailed in that same command history.

Echo Flight Incident was approached in four ways in the investigations:

- a. Review of events on or near 16 March 1967 and of flight configuration.
- b. Investigation, and where possible elimination, of circumstances which may have been responsible for the incident.
- c. Investigation of means of causing the results which were noted at the time of shutdown.
- d. Investigation of similar events.⁸⁷

⁸⁵ 341st Strategic Missile Wing and 341st Combat Support Group HQ SAC DXIH 67-1865 (Command History, Vol. 1), p.32-34, 38.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

This was a thorough investigation, and *that's all*. Some may be tempted to believe that the fourth method for investigating the Echo Flight Incident – Investigation of similar events – indicates that another event must have occurred, possibly at November Flight or Oscar Flight. Frankly, this is a leap of faith that doesn't come equipped with a trampoline. It makes a lot more sense to believe what's written in the command history: Page 32 – “No other Wing I configuration lost strategic alert at that time.” That means that *nothing happened* at any of the flights manned by missile squadrons attached to Malmstrom AFB. A2C Gamble's source for this is another classified message, one originating at SAC on March 17. The reference indicates a DM caveat, which is for *Data Management*. Taking into account this caveat and the date-time group, the message referenced is most likely a confirmation of a prior message from Malmstrom AFB.

It was under “Review of events on or near 16 March 1967” that the investigation team refuted questions of UFO “rumors”. There isn't anything at all suspicious about this line of questioning and investigation, and the amount of emphasis Salas and others put on this part of the investigation is irrelevant to the actual importance it assumes – which isn't much. Because of “rumors” of UFOs, the investigation *had* to take them into account. This does not mean that UFOs were present, only that *rumors* were investigated and found to be groundless. It doesn't make much sense that people would reach the conclusion that UFOs were present simply because the command history acknowledges that there were “rumors” of UFOs, but very little of Salas' story makes any sense at all. The paranoia of those who support such a point of view is present at such a high level *all the time* that throughout this whole discussion, evidence for the absence of UFOs is regularly interpreted as evidence for UFO inclusion into the paradigm we've come to accept as the Echo Flight Incident. I've never come across such a ridiculous series of deductions as those asserted by CUFON and other such groups. If they can show that a Mobile Strike Team at November Flight was *outside*, they suggest that this team also encountered UFOs, but there's nothing at all to support this line of reason – no reports, no members of security teams coming forward to make such claims, *nothing*. Salas claims that he sent out a security team, and they also encountered a UFO, but there's no confirmation for any of this, not even the fact that a security team was indeed sent out. It's very likely that *if* such a team was outside during the time that Salas claims his UFOs were knocking out the missiles, they were probably checking on a proximity alarm that went off at one of the launch facilities. This sort of

event was very common, but the rigors of the job insisted that each one be checked out nonetheless. Sometimes it was bears, or foxes, or even birds flying low over the fence line, and sometimes it was just civilians in the area, but each alarm going off had to be investigated. *This was normal.*

The May 6, 1969 issue of the Billings Gazette, a daily newspaper for Billings, Great Falls, and other communities outside of Malmstrom AFB reported on this and other aspects of the security presence in a New York Times wire story written by reporter Winthrop Griffith entitled “Skeptical Buddies of ICBM”.⁸⁸ For our purposes, it’s enlightening on a great many levels.

Just before ascending from the capsule (for eight hours of watching television, eating and sleeping before returning again), Wall and Hood heard the shrill alarm which sounds off for any new situation and saw the red “OUTER SECURITY” light flash on in a panel representing Alpha Four, a launch facility 12 miles to the southeast of their capsule. [This is a Launch Facility attached to Alpha Flight, one of five Flights – including Echo Flight – that was commanded under the 10th Missile Squadron, Malmstrom AFB].

BY THE TIME they were replaced by another combat missile crew and had reached the surface, a security alert team stationed above had loaded into a pickup truck and was ready to drive to the isolated missile site.

Airman First Class Donald West drove the pickup and checked in by radio with the security headquarters at Alpha One every few minutes. As the pickup moved along the highway, Sgt. Peter Gerber silently watched the moonlit hills and snowbanks, clutching an M-2 rifle with both hands. West and Gerber are both 21 years old.

Twenty minutes later, the pickup stopped at the gate in front of Alpha Four. West unlocked a small box at one side and switched on four brilliant lights mounted on top of the banjo antennas over the silo. He returned to man the radio in the pickup, while Gerber trudged through snowbanks and brush to inspect the outer perimeter of the launch facility.

He completed the circle and took over the radio while West opened the gate and — rifle held ready — searched every square foot inside the fence and above the missile silo. Gerber watched West’s long shadows move over nearby snowbanks and the cement blast cover over the silo, and commented in a timid whisper: “Sort of eerie here, isn’t it? Sometimes it really gets hairy out at these sites, when it’s 40 below zero and you think there might really be someone here and you have to crawl through snow or woods.”

West completed his search, used a phone in a small room just below the surface to report that everything appeared to be satisfactory and returned to the pickup.

⁸⁸ Griffith, Winthrop, “Skeptical Buddies of ICBM”, The Billings Gazette, May 6, 1969, p. 2.

"NOTHING WRONG," he said to Gerber. "Probably just a squirrel or a low-flying bird broke the alarm circuit."

But the two young men had to wait ("sometimes we have to wait all night") for the Launch Control Center to radio word that the outer security alarm system had been "reset" and was clear.

Less tense now, they eyed the now dark silo site casually and talked amiably while they sat in the pickup's cab.

"It's just a job," West said. "It's not so hard now. When they had the fence and gate hooked up to an alarm system, we used to be a lot busier. Sometimes the local farm kids, when it was real cold, would jangle the gate so a team would come out and they could get a ride home. So someone decided to unhook the alarm from the gate and fence."

Gerber was more thoughtful:

"You know, I've been doing this for a year, and I've never even seen a Minuteman missile. I'd like to see one. It's all sort of hard to understand when you've never seen the real thing.

"But I like the work. I guess it's interesting. The good thing about this duty is that no one is on your back all the time, telling you what to do. I get the feeling the Air Force trusts me.

"AND YOU have a lot of time to think out here. (About what?) Well, you can think about anything – about this whole missile business and what it means to the country and world. I try to figure that out.

"Mostly I like to think about the future. I wonder what I'll do when I get out of the Air Force. Yes, I think about that most of the time, about my future."

The radio in the pickup squawked the message that the "reset" had been completed and was clear of any security alarm. The Minuteman missile a few feet away in the depths of Alpha Four's silo again was ready to fulfill its purpose.

West turned the key to start the pickup and said quietly, "Let's get out of here."⁸⁹

Some details to remember that bear on the events as described by Salas, Klotz, and other supposed "witnesses" include the following: (1) the security personnel that make up the Mobile Strike Teams were E-1 to E-3 personnel with little experience and not much authority; for the most part, however, they are nonetheless *independent*, and carry out their responsibilities *without* being in constant contact with the launch personnel; they are a security detachment, so it is the command post that they answer to. (2) The outer security alarms went off all the time; it was a very *common* incident, and each time it happened, one of the security detachment's

⁸⁹ Griffith, Winthrop, "Skeptical Buddies of ICBM", The Billings Gazette, May 6, 1969, p. 2.

Mobile Strike Teams was sent out to investigate. This particular article, published in May, 1969, refers to a period *before* “someone decided to unhook the alarm from the gate and fence” that is treated as a personal memory of Airman First Class Donald West. Taking into account the average length of a military station tour for an airman in 1969, it’s easily possible that the period he refers to includes the Echo incident on March 16, 1967, or a short few months later. It would be a serious security failure at *any* military command “to unhook the alarm from the gate and fence” after a UFO incident in which a member of the security detachment was injured and had to be evacuated by helicopter as Salas and crew expect the rest of the world to believe, but to do so at a facility intended to be the primary nuclear defense of the United States in 1967, the same year during which we were escalating our role in the Vietnam War, *would be criminal*. It would also be impossible ... *It would not happen*. The only time that events such as the one described above could occur is during a period of relative mediocrity. When tremendous events occur, such as the one Salas wants us to believe, security becomes a paramount concern, and *everything* happens by the book. Clearly, this wasn’t the case at Alpha Flight in early May, 1969, because by that time the fence and gate wasn’t even hooked up to the alarm system.

At the time of the Echo Flight Incident, as referenced above, one of the November Flight Mobile Strike Teams was out on a security call, much like that described above, with one exception: they were checking *all* of the November Flight LFs. Since this was done in the morning, it was most likely a regularly scheduled inspection or a security drill. The command history simply doesn’t explain why they were inspecting *all* of the LFs. *This doesn’t mean that they were doing it as a result of UFOs in the area*. That would be an absolutely insane reason to jump to, simply because a command history written by an E-2 military member with little supervisory support doesn’t state the exact reason that they were outside at the time. The only thing we “*need-to-know*”, as far as A2C Gamble was concerned, was that they *were* outside, and as a result of this, they were questioned as part of the overall investigation of the incident. Rumors of UFOs were checked out and found to be groundless, but any UFO sighting implies a *pilot*, which implies *nationality*, equally unknown, so in an investigation, you talk to *everybody* – the November Flight Mobile Strike Team was *outside* at the time, so they were questioned, and they responded that they saw *nothing* out of the ordinary. This is testimony that nobody has

ever had cause to doubt until Salas and the CUFON crew came together thirty years later, and Salas announced that:

This statement was informative in that there would be no reason to query the November Flight strike team (security) about rumors of UFOs in the area of Echo Flight. This is the only reference to UFOs regarding this incident in any of the documents received from USAF and the statement is simply untrue. None of the reports we received from guards or maintenance personnel were ever retracted.⁹⁰

It's funny that he can say with such force that no reports were ever retracted when he can't even say with any confidence what was in the reports that were actually made, since he had neither the clearance nor the right to examine what was in those reports made by members of the security detachment. Under investigative protocol, he would have been the last person allowed to examine such testimony, because the Department of Defense necessarily examines multiple points of view, and any possibility of shared testimony has to be cut to a minimum; this procedure allows investigators to compare different versions of the same event in order to ferret out any objective truth to the testimony. Of course, at this time, Salas believed – so he says – that he was working at November Flight, so it's difficult to know exactly what he's talking about in relation to these retracted accounts of a security detachment's report, particularly since he *now* claims that he was working at Oscar Flight at the time. In my opinion, he's been caught in far too many outright lies. Every time that he's changed his story, it wasn't due to all of the extra research that he and CUFON were supposedly conducting at the time – *it was because somebody read his statement and told him that he was wrong, or that he was lying*. Since when is this the kind of story you trust? More importantly, and to the point as outlined by standards of proof accepted by any system of logic for many centuries now, since when is this the kind of *evidence* that is so definitive and remarkable as to be accepted without examination?

The Mobile Strike Team wasn't questioned because UFOs were seen at Echo Flight or November Flight, or even Oscar Flight. They were questioned because they were *outside* at the time of the Echo Flight Incident, and could therefore be questioned regarding the *rumors* of UFOs. The same questioning was very likely conducted with the LCC crews and the security teams that were involved with the incident itself. These interviews may well have been required at *all* of the Wing I flights for reasons included on page 33 of the command history: "OOAMA

⁹⁰ Salas, Robert L., "Minuteman Missiles Shutdown", Mutual UFO Network UFO Journal, January, 1997, No. 345, pp. 15-17, cont. 22, 23.

decided to send a task group to Malmstrom for study of the incident because the problem pertained peculiarly to Wing I."⁹¹

How then, does Robert Salas substantiate this supposed fact that he carelessly tosses off, that "UFOs were sighted by security personnel at our LCC ... and by other security personnel at Echo LFs and these were reported separately to the capsule crews at both LCCs"?⁹² Part of this, I'm sure, was the result of Robert Hastings' interview with Mr. Walt Figel.

LT Walt Figel was the Deputy Missile Commander on board Echo Flight on March 16, 1967. His statement indicates that during a check-in call with the maintenance and security personnel attached to E-Flight, someone mentioned that a UFO had been observed – an act that wasn't technically true.

... several of the missiles were open ... for some routine maintenance. I don't remember why. But, uh, at least two of them were running on diesel power so they were not connected to the power grid. I don't remember if it was three open or four open [but] it was just routine maintenance. Nothing had happened [to the missiles]. It was just the time of the year for routine maintenance. Um, and the day before, there were maintenance teams out there. They had stayed overnight.⁹³

It's well-documented that the entire Minuteman missile force had serious problems at that time, and replacements, particularly of the standby power system components, were pretty continuous from 1966 and into 1968 due to numerous failures. Force modernization was also an issue for this entire period.

The refurbishment or replacement of standby power system components began in 1966 with emergency modifications – principally to the mechanism for switching automatically to internal power – in Minuteman Wings I through V. The first series of alterations was scarcely under way when it was discovered that the new switching mechanism was overly sensitive to fluctuations in commercial current. The solution arrived at was to arrange a two-second delay between sensing a change in voltage and shutting off outside power. If the weather or some defect in the commercial system caused a minor variation in current, normal power was expected to return within that time; if the fluctuation persisted, the system would shift to standby power before any damage could be done. ...

The repeated failure of the launch site generators also imposed a severe strain on the storage batteries – 32-volt for Minuteman I and 160-volt for Minuteman II – which were used as emergency sources of power. The revisions in plans and delays in overhauling the unreliable

⁹¹ 341st Strategic Missile Wing and 341st Combat Support Group HQ SAC DXIH 67-1865 (Command History, Vol. 1).

⁹² Salas, Robert L., "Minuteman Missiles Shutdown", Mutual UFO Network UFO Journal, January, 1997, No. 345, pp. 15-17, cont. 22, 23.

⁹³ <http://www.theufochronicles.com/2008/12/did-ufos-cause-shutdown-of-icbms-at.html>

diesel system resulted in a continued reliance on emergency power to do what had been planned for the standby diesels and expected a heavy toll in expended batteries. The Air Force soon found it necessary to purchase more batteries in order to replenish a dwindling supply of spares.⁹⁴

This was not an example of “routine maintenance”; systems were being refurbished or replaced across the board *system-wide* for a number of reasons, and all of this is very well documented. It may have *looked* routine, especially from the outside looking in, which would be the case for anybody who wasn’t part of the maintenance system, such as those manning the launch control centers, but there was nothing routine about it at all. It was just another symptom of the severe mechanical and electrical problems faced by the entire system. Problems with the Minuteman force is one of the reasons the Department of Defense decided not to disable the entire Titan force as previously scheduled. In February, it was decided to eliminate only half, and by October, it was decided to keep *all* of the Titan missiles in service through fiscal year 1973.

In any case, Figel was well aware that there were maintenance teams and security personnel already out at some of the silos when the whole flight of missiles went offline, so there would have been no need to send crews out to authenticate the status of the missiles if crews were already out, so he needed to find out exactly where those teams were. He described the rest of what happened to Robert Hastings, author of *UFOs and Nukes*.

... the missiles dropped off alert, I started calling the maintenance people out there on the radio to talk to them. I had the security guard authenticate so I know I’m talking to a security guard and, you know, “What’s going on? Is maintenance trying to get into the silo?” [The guard said] “No, they’re still in the camper.” [So, I said,] “Get ‘em up, I want to talk to them.” Then I tried to tell them what I had was a Channel 9 No-Go. ... we did that with the sites that were there, that [had maintenance teams and their guards on site] and I sent Strike Teams to two other sites.

... somewhere along the way, um, one of the maintenance people—cause he didn’t know what was going on any place else either, they have no capability of talking to each other, in other words, they can talk to the capsule but they can’t talk to each other—unless they were on the radio and no one was using the radio except the security police. And the guy says, “We got a Channel 9 No-Go. It must be a UFO hovering over the site. I think I see one here.”

[I said,] “Yeah, right, whatever. What were you drinking?” And he tried to convince me of something and I said, well, I basically, you know, didn’t believe him. [Laughs] I said, you know, we have to get somebody to look at this [No-Go]. [A short time later] one of the Strike Teams that went out, one of the two, claimed that they saw something over the site.

⁹⁴ Nalty, Bernard C., USAF Ballistic Missile Programs 1967-1968, Office of Air Force History, September, 1969.

How did they describe that?

Oh, on radio, “There’s this large object hovering over the site!” I’ve always been a non-believer so I said, “Right, sure you do.” [They responded,] “Yeah! Yeah, we do!” So, [I said,] “There’s two of you there, saying so, so write it down in your report.” [The Strike Team leader] said, “What do you want us to do?” [I said,] “Follow your checklist. Go to the site, open it up, and call me.”

What was the demeanor of the guard you were talking to?

Um, you know, I wouldn’t say panicked, or anything. I was thinking he was yanking my chain more than anything else.⁹⁵

According to Hastings, Figel then described hearing from the maintenance man about his opening up the silo, going down into it, and reporting that even though the missile was offline, nothing was visually damaged or otherwise amiss at the site. Figel then told the maintenance teams to remain on-site until they were relieved. It’s very apparent, throughout the entire interview, that Hastings repeatedly tries to interpret a bit of amusing banter on the radio as an honest-to-God, validated UFO report, which it certainly is not. If a real UFO had been seen and was thought to be responsible for the Channel 9 “No-Go”, why the hell would Figel order everybody to remain on station until they were relieved? Why would the security personnel, obviously witnessing a high-level security breach, do absolutely *nothing*?

Everything that Figel asserts in this bit of interview with Hastings is proof of nothing more than amusing banter on the radio. One of the maintenance crews that was already out says they’ve got a “Channel 9 No-Go”, and *ha-ha*, “must have been ‘cause of a UFO – in fact, I think I see one right now.” Figel responds with “yeah, right, what are you drinking.” A member of the strike team comes on with “hey, I see one too!” *Ha-ha!* Figel tells them “well, there’s two of you so log it down,” and nobody mentions UFOs again, and apparently nobody logged down that UFOs were present. In fact, nobody ever mentioned it again for thirty years except to establish for the Echo Flight Incident investigation that UFOs were mentioned, but it was all just a big joke – a rumor that had nothing to do with the event itself. As Figel so definitively put it: “*I was thinking he was yanking my chain more than anything else.*”⁹⁶

If we’re to believe, as Hastings does, that this is an actual UFO report and not a couple of guys screwing around, then we’re saying this *daytime* event was never noticed by anybody

⁹⁵ <http://www.theufochronicles.com/2008/12/did-ufos-cause-shutdown-of-icbms-at.html>

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

else, even though, as Figel has asserted, there were four other maintenance teams that had been sent out the night before who spent the night in the field, as well as the security personnel who were with them, *and* the two strike teams that he had sent out due to the system dropping offline, all of which happened before anybody even *mentioned* the word “UFO.” And although the only reason the security personnel were with the maintenance crews was to look after them and ensure that open and continuous communications were maintained via the 2-way radios that only security personnel carried, it wasn’t a security guard who first mentioned a UFO – it was a member of the maintenance team, and that means he had to use the same communication system used by the airmen in Winthrop Griffith’s article about Alpha Flight, “Skeptical Buddies of ICBM”, which was a landline phone at the silo maintained in a small room just below the surface. So, although he was *inside with the equipment* where he could determine what the status of the missile was, and the security guard was *outside with a 2-way radio*, it was the maintenance crew member who called in to Figel to say that, *yes, we have Channel 9 No-Go, my God, it must have been a UFO that did it.* And he did so before the security guard mentioned anything at all, except at the very beginning of the conversation when he authenticated his own status to Figel sitting 60-feet underground at the LCC. It’s an absolute *joke* that we have to look at an open and shut case of two guys screwing around this closely simply because Robert Hastings is not bright enough to tell the difference between an “oh, wow, I’m just kidding” incident and an invasive attack on the nation’s most powerful means of waging war.

As for the Echo Flight Incident investigation, it *had* to look into the matter of UFOs, but not because they were actually present; they had to be looked into, because they were mentioned in the course of questioning Figel and my father. It’s also telling that Figel admits that upon mentioning the banter during the questioning after they were relieved, no one made any comments or further inquiries – which is exactly how we would expect someone to react upon such “banter” being mentioned during the course of an investigation of an equipment malfunction. There were certainly *not* two UFO reports – there were two guys joking around with Walt Figel: “hey, I see a UFO! – yeah, me, too!” Unfortunately, it’s also obvious that Hastings is primed to accept anything at all as a statement of fact, when all that’s here is a couple of guys goofing off in the course of doing their job. We can say this with some confidence because none

of them ever came forward to explain it any further, and no documents mentioning the incident ever turned up either. Figel said he thought they were yanking his chain, and he was right – and that's exactly what all of Hastings' further questioning shows – except he sees it as proof of a valid UFO report that was never made of a UFO that nobody ever saw.

The following pages include photocopies of all the military documents discussing the Echo Flight Incident that are available at *The Black Vault*. The only pages published by Salas and Klotz at the CUFON website from 1999 through February 2010 are pages 32-34 and page 38 of the 341st Strategic Missile Wing and 341st Combat Support Group HQ SAC DXIH 67-1865 (Command History, Vol. 1), none of which can be considered conclusive in any way. In addition, the cover page CUFON associates with the documents reproduced by Salas and Klotz is actually the cover page for the *following* quarter, 1 April through 30 June, 1967, and cannot be associated with the event itself nor the initial round of testing completed at Malmstrom AFB. Additionally, thanks should be appropriately noted here to *The Black Vault* at <http://community.theblackvault.com/> ; these guys are *extremely* thorough, and very professional. They made a concerted effort to obtain all possible documents regarding the Echo Flight Incident, and should be congratulated heartily for having done so. Thanks also to Mr. Tim Printy, publisher of SUNlite, <http://home.comcast.net/~tprinty/UFO/SUNlite.htm>, for bringing them to my attention.

THIS EXCERPT IS:

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R-WG-341-141
100-1000000
100-1000000

341st STRATEGIC MISSILE WING

AND 341st COMBAT SUPPORT GROUP

HQ SAC DXIH 67-1865

(Unclassified Title)

PRC

1 Jan 1967

GROUP 3

Downgrade

Assigned to the

FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE, STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND

Permanently Stationed at

MALMSTROM AIR FORCE BASE, GREAT FALLS, MONTANA

PRC

DOCUMENT DECLASSIFIED PER
HQ AFSPC/DOXN 27 Apr 95 and
OO-ALC/LME 27 Jul 95.

This document was prepared by A2C David B. Gamble, Wing Historian under the supervision of the Wing Information Officer. It is prepared in compliance with SACR 210-1, 29 June 1964, and is classified SECRET under the provision of AFR 205-1 as amended. The classification is required for the protection of information that reveals the military capability and operational status of the Wing. (U)

APPROVED:

Herman T. DeHaas
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Chief, Information Division

John W. Carroll
JOHN W. CARROLL, Col, USAF
Wing Commander

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22 AUG 1978

ATCH 1

SECURITY STATEMENT PAGE

This volume is classified SECRET to conform to the classification of the information in the source documents. It will be handled in accordance with the provisions of AFR 205-1, as amended.

This volume contains information effecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws (Title 18, U.S.C. sections 793 and 794), the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to any unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

This volume has been placed in downgrading Group 3, which is the highest downgrading group assigned to the information in the source documents. The historian's analysis and consolidation of information from many sources, which individually may have lower downgrade provisions, results in a synthesis which may have wider implications than the material on which it is based. Therefore, individual downgrade instructions for each paragraph are not indicated, and all portions of this volume will be handled under the overall downgrading group.

Project How Now (Service Star), the testing of Mark 5 re-entry vehicles by higher headquarters for effectiveness. Malmstrom sent the last vehicle in the program for the base during the quarter.
 This ended the program at Malmstrom. ⁵⁸ (U)

A walk-thru inspection of the HF Hardened Antennas at Malmstrom was conducted during February by Boeing and SATAF personnel. The antennas were already equipped in the LFs but were not in working order. The walk-thru inspection had an average of 40 discrepancies per site. Boeing Company has not set any official date for an operational antenna to be demonstrated. The estimated date for the operational antennas was set for early July 67. At that time, maintenance will begin on correcting the discrepancies at the sites. ⁵⁹ (U)

The following is the investigation of Echo Flight incident and the results. (U)

On 16 March 1967 at 0845, all sites in Echo (E) Flight, Malmstrom AFB, shutdown with No-Go indication of Channels 9 and 12 on Voice Reporting Signal Assemble (VRSA). All LF's in E Flight lost strategic alert nearly simultaneously. No other Wing I configuration lost strategic alert at that time. ⁶⁰ (U)

Guidance & Control channel 50 dump data was collected from E-7 facility and E-8 Facility and all 10 sites were then returned to strategic alert without any LF equipment replacement. All 10

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58. Taken from Messages on file at Job Control, by A2C David B. Gamble, Wing Historian, on 23 Apr 67.
59. Rpt, "Monthly Report HF/SSB Hardened Antenna," by SATAF (DCA), 28 Feb 67, Ex 42. ~~REDACTED~~
60. Msg, (S) DM 02752, SAC to 341 SMW, Subj: Loss of Strategic Alert Echo Flight, Malmstrom AFB, 17 Mar 67, Ex 43.

[REDACTED]

sites were reported to have been subject to a normal controlled shutdown. ⁶¹ (U)

The only unusual LF events noted were the failure of the secondary door actuator motor at LF, E-2 and the intermittent operation of the diesel generator at LF, E-8. ⁶² (U)

Technical Analysis Division (TAD) personnel inspected LCC, E-1 for loose cable connections and the Electric Surge Arrester (ESA) room for any faults and noted no unusual discrepancies. ⁶³ (U)

LCF, E-1 experienced commercial power problems in the early afternoon of 16 Mar 67 which resulted in a burn out of the 10 Hp Envirmental Control System (ECS) chiller compressor motor. ⁶⁴ (U)

At approximately 1400 hrs on 16 Mar 67, the 341st SMW was advised that SAC Headquarters had called in OOAMA support for a complete engineering analysis of this problem. ⁶⁵ (U)

OOAMA decided to send a task group to Malmstrom for study of the incident at Echo Flight because the problem pertained peculiarly to Wing I. It was also decided to make the studies and tests there because OOAMA was not equiped with Wing I equipment. The task group included personnel from OOAMA, Boeing Company, Autonetics, and 15th AF ; they were to arrive on 17 or 18

61. Rpt, (S) "Report of Engineering Investigation of Echo Flight Incident, Malmstrom AFB, Mont. - 16 Mar 67," by Engineering Investigation Team, 23 Mar 67, p 1.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid.

65. Ibid. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

March 67. ⁶⁶ (P)

A preliminary analysis was made of the Fault Isolator Test Tape (FITT) from LF, D-7 and E-8. Targeting support was scheduled for a G&C Channel 50 data dump at LF's E-2 and E-9 which, although returned to alert, were still felt to possess useful data. The investigation was held in suspense until the arrival of the OOAMA team on 18 March 67. ⁶⁷ (P)

Echo Flight incident was approached in four ways in the investigation: ⁶⁸ (P)

- a. Review of events on or near 16 March 67 and of flight configuration.
- b. Investigation, and where possible elimination, of circumstances which may have been responsible for the incident.
- c. Investigation of means of causing the results which were noted at the time of shutdown.
- d. Investigation of similar events.

In reviewing the events of the incident, the LCC crew was questioned by Wing Maintenance Evaluation Team (DCMET), OOAMA, and Boeing Company personnel on 16 March 67. ⁶⁹ (P)

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66. Msg, (C) OONE 01012, OOAMA to SAC, Subj: Wing I, E Flight Incident, 3 Mar 67, Ex 44.
 67. Rpt, (S) "Report of Engineering Investigation of Echo Flight Incident, Malmstrom AFB, Mont. - 16 Mar 67," by Engineering Investigation Team, 23 Mar 67, p 1.
 68. Ibid., p 3.
 69. Ibid., p 6.
- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

In screening the crew it was determined that loss of strategic alert and fault indication occurred in an extremely short period of time. The exact time estimates could not be obtained but the time interval was estimated to be between 10 to 40 seconds. ⁷⁰ (S)

The standby light was not observed to illuminate for any of the ten launch facilities. None of the command and status line monitor fault lights were illuminated. There was no pattern or sequence noted as to the illumination of fault and loss of strategic alert. No flickering or ripple was noted on any of the other status displays. The emergency lights were on (all other lights off) and these lights did not appear to dim. ⁷¹ (S)

The initial time of the incident, decided by the crew, could be no more than two or three minutes earlier than the official log time of 0845 hours (local). ⁷² (S)

The crew also stated; the LF, E-8 had a channel 26 which indicated it was operating on diesel at the time of fault. The 465L (SAC Communications & Control System) and communications equipment was not processing traffic at the time of the incident. ⁷³ (S)

Neither of the crew members were using any electrical equipment. Such as electric razor...etc. At the time of fault

70. Rpt, (S) "Report of Engineering Investigation of Echo Flight Incident, Malmstrom AFB, Mont. - 16 Mar 67," by Engineering Investigation Team, 23 Mar 67, p 6.

71. Ibid.

72. Ibid. [REDACTED]

73. Ibid., p 7.

36

[REDACTED]

the deputy commander was turned away from the console to brief the commander who had just been awakened from sleep. The commander was the first to see the faults. ⁷⁴ (U)

Channel 50 data was extracted from sites E-7 and E-8 immediately after the shutdown of the entire flight. Analysis of this data determined that both sites were shutdown as a result of external influence to the G&C, no No-Go's were detected by the G&C. Although E-8 had indications of a previous Monitor check No-Go it was not the cause of shutdown at this time. This was determined by information contained in sector 54 which said that subsequent to the last No-Go the G&C had completed an iteration routine which is performed approximately 2 hours and 30 minutes into a restart. Had a G&C No-Go caused this shutdown, the Discrete Input "A" (DIA) word would have been placed in this sector. ⁷⁵ (U)

On Sunday, 19 March 67, a team was dispatched to sites E-2 and E-9 to dump channel 50 data. These two sites were in strategic alert at this time but were selected because they had never experienced a restart since the last time that a maintenance tape had been used. Information from the No-Go sectors of channel 50 indicated that these G&C's had never entered a No-Go loop at any time. This hardens the case against a No-Go causing a shutdown of the flight. If a No-Go had shutdown the flight, it would have

74. Rpt, (S) "Report of Engineering Investigation of Echo Flight Incident, Malmstrom AFB, Mont. - 16 Mar 67," by Engineering Investigation Team, 23 Mar 67, p 7.

75. Ibid., p 8. [REDACTED]

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been recorded in channel 50 data. ⁷⁶ (U)

The only non-detectable fault from the G&C section which could have caused a No-Go would have been loss of confirm codes. This type of fault would not have produced a VRSA channel 9 and 12, but only a channel 9. This information eliminated the No-Go ⁷⁷ theory as the cause of the incident. (U)

As stated earlier, all 10 launch facilities shutdown with a VRSA channel 9 and 12 (G&C No-Go and Logic Coupler No-Go) recordings. Because of this consistency considerable investigation was expended in the Logic Coupler area. In the channel 50 analysis it was shown that the guidance section did not experience a No-Go and therefore, it was felt that the VRSA channel 9 report was not valid. It is possible, however, for the Logic Coupler to generate both of these No-Go indications. ⁷⁸ (U)

The logic of the coupler was studied by the investigating team in an effort to identify a method by which both VRSA 9 and 12 could be activated. The opinion of the team was that external generated signals caused the generation of these two channels and shutdown of the launch facilities. The possibility of this is very remote due to the fact that all 10 couplers would have to fail in the flight within a few seconds of each other. ⁷⁹ (U)

76. Rpt, (S) "Report of Engineering Investigation of Echo Flight Incident, Malmstrom AFB, Mont. - 16 Mar 67, by Engineering Investigation Team, 23 Mar 67, p 8.

77. Ibid., p 30.

78. Ibid., p 30.

79. Ibid., p 30.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The only possible means that could be identified by the team involved a situation in which a coupler self test command occurred along with a partial reset within the coupler. This could feasible cause a VRSA 9 and 12 indication. This was also quite remote for all 10 couplers would have to have been partially reset in the same manner. ⁸⁰ (U)

Further studies of this problem will be accomplished at the contractors facility since a full engineering investigation is not feasible at this level. (U)

In the researching of other possibilities, weather was ruled out as a contributing factor in the incident. ⁸¹ (U)

A check with Communication maintenance verified that there was no unusual activity with EWO-1 or EWO-2 at the time of the incident. ⁸² (U)

Rumors of Unidentified Flying Objects (UFO) around the area of Echo Flight during the time of fault were disproven. A Mobile Strike Team, which had checked all November Flight's LF's on the morning of 16 March 67, were questioned and stated that no unusual activity or sightings were observed. ⁸³ (U)

The 801st Radar Squadron, Malmstrom AFB, gave a negative report on any radar or atmospheric interference problems related to Echo Flight. ⁸⁴ (U)

80. Rpt, (S) "Report of Engineering Investigation of Echo Flight Incident, Malmstrom AFB, Mont - 16 Mar 67," by Engineering Investigation Team, 23 Mar 67, p 30.


81. Ibid., p 28.

82. Ibid., p 25.

83. Ibid., p 27.

84. Ibid., p 26.

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Capt. Bradshaw in the command post at the time of Echo Flight incident, verified that there was no activity on the Primary Alerting System (PAS) at Echo Flight. (U)⁸⁵


During the investigation it was discovered that Boeing modification teams were at sites B-1, K-1 and G-1 on 16 March 67; but this could not have affected anything in relationship to E Flight because they arrived at the sites after the incident occurred.⁸⁶ (U)

As mentioned before, a power problem affected E-1 at 1453 on 16 March 67 according to LCC log. The Brine Chiller (CH-1) shutdown due to power fluctuation. This was not considered unusual for power failures or fluctuations often cause CH shutdowns. Between 1510 and 1600 hours, E-1 experienced another power fluctuation. The capsule crew heard the Motor Generator brushes chatter. At this time the site manager indicated that one phase had low voltage, but LCF power was not appreciably affected since capsule florescent lights were still on. The diesel generator started but could not be put on the line due to broken lead. Commercial power was restored at 1921 hours on 16 March 67.⁸⁷ (U)

In reviewing the maintenance history of the Wing, it was discovered a similar incident occurred at Alpha Flight in

85. Rpt, (S) "Report of Engineering Investigation of Echo Flight Incident, Malmstrom AFB, Mont - 16 Mar 67," by Engineering Investigation Team, 23 Mar 67, p 26.

86. Ibid., p 23.

87. Ibid., p 12. 

[REDACTED]

December 1966. On 19 December 66, A Flight had some of its
LFs shutdown (A-6, A-7, and A-10). The similarity between the
two flights was: The same Capsule crew, adverse weather con-
ditions, and commercial power failure after the facilities
shutdown. ⁸⁸ (U)

Since weather condition and Capsule crew have been eliminated
as causes of the incident, investigation of electrical failure
was started. (U)

The power outage that affected E-1 at 1453 on 16 March 67,
occurred on the 7.2/12.5 kilo volts (KV) transmission line from
the Winifred Substation. Fergus Electric Co. (Mr. D. Young,
Lewistown) advised Mr. H. Jackson that a transformer shorted one
phase of the three south of Winifred. ⁸⁹ (U)

Sites Echo 1-6 and E-9, E-10, and E-11 are supplied by 7.2
KV line from the Winifred substation. No sites in other flights
are supplied power from Winifred. Sites E-7, E-8, D-6, D-7, M-2,
M-3, and M-8 are supplied power by 7.2 KV lines from the Hilger
substation. ⁹⁰ (U) (SEE DIAGRAMS)

The source of power comes from the Rainbow generating plant
in Great Falls and is fed through the Rainbow switchboard on
100 KV power lines to the Stanford substation. The 100 KV lines
continue to Benchland where it feeds two 50 KV lines. One goes

88. Rpt, (S) "Report of Engineering Investigation of Echo Flight
Incident, Malmstrom AFB, Mont. - 16 Mar 67," by Engineering
Investigation Team, 23 Mar 67, p 9.

89. Ibid., p 12.

90; Ibid., p 14. [REDACTED]





FIGURE 1.


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Continued Power Distribution

FIGURE 2.

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A FLIGHT POWER DISTRIBUTION
FIGURE 3.

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to the Glengarry substation at Lewistown and the other to the Harlowton substation. The Glengarry substation feeds the Hilger substation with 50 KV lines and Hilger feeds the Winifred substation with 50 KV lines. The sites are fed by 7.2 KV lines. ⁹¹ (U)

A 7.2 KV transformer shorted in the line to site E-3 at 1450, 16 March 67. This transformer is located on a farm two miles south of the Winifred substation. Automatic reclosure switches at Winifred substation opened, and were reclosed manually after transformer replacement later in the day. This caused the Brine Chiller problem at E-1. The transformer was in the West phase. It was not determined which phase this corresponds to at the sites. Sites E-3, E-5, E-6, E-9, and E-10 transferred to Standby Power. Sites E-1 transferred to Direct Current (DC) ⁹² operation. (U)

On 28 March 67, the 341st SMW in conjunction with the Montana Power Company conducted a switching test on the 50 KV high voltage line between the Harlowton and Glengarry substations. The test was performed at the request of OOAMA/OONE as a part of the initial Echo Flight incident investigation performed at Malmstrom. The intent of the test was to verify correlation, if possible, between high voltage switching and launch facility shutdown or other launch facility faults. ⁹³ (U)

91. Rpt, (S) "Report Engineering Investigation of Echo Flight Incident, Malmstrom AFB, Mont. - 16 Mar 67," by Engineering Investigation Team, 23 Mar 67, p 14.

92. Ibid., p 15. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

93. Msg, (C) DM7 02998, SAC to OOAMA, Subj: Proposed Power Switching Test for Echo Flight, 24 Mar 67, Ex 45.

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After performing the tests, it was decided that commercial power switching operations were not the cause of the E Flight shutdown. This was based on the following reasons. Other flights fed by the Hilger substation were not affected. Similar shutdowns occurred in A Flight LFs which were supplied by power not only from separated substations, but also, from separate feed lines from the generation station. Shutdown in 1965 or 1966 of missiles do not correlate to any power line switching in the Montana Power System. ⁹⁴ (U)

Since the only common item determined in this investigation was the LCC. The LCC power fault transmitted to the LFs on the hardened cable was considered the only power fault capable of causing the Echo Flight incident. ⁹⁵ (U)

The investigation teams at Malmstrom, were unable to determine a logical cause for the incident. Further investigation in the area of shutdown results will be conducted in an effort to determine a possible cause of this incident. These studies will be conducted at the contractors facility and will be included in the next history. ⁹⁶ (U)

On 12 January 1967, at 0905 hours, a potential disaster

94. Rpt, (S) "Report of Engineering Investigation of Echo Flight Incident, Malmstrom AFB, Mont. - 16 Mar 67," by Engineering Investigation Team, 23 Mar 67, p 17.

95. Ibid., p 17.

96. Ibid., p 3.

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situation occurred while the 341st MIMS Re-entry Vehicle Branch team was being evaluated by the 3901st SMES in performance of a Dash 1 A maintenance on a W-56-Mod 1 warhead.⁹⁷ (U)

During the operation a T-290A (instrument to register gaseous air contamination) gave an alarm. The area was immediately evacuated and those present were sent to the Hospital, Decontamination station, for observation of possible contamination.⁹⁸ (U)

A Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) team entered the area wearing protective clothing and equipped with a T-290A, plastic bags, and cotton swabs. The warhead was checked with swipe tests for radiation with all results showing negative.⁹⁹ (U)

A check was made on the T-290A which gave the alarm and was determined to be faulty. The area was again checked by the team for radiation with no results. The alert was then ended at 1150 hours on 12 January 67.¹⁰⁰ (U)

97. Rpt, (U) "Disaster Control Team Action Report," by Team Chief Explosive Ordinance Disposal, 12 Jan 67, Ex 46.

98. Ibid.

99. Ibid.

100. Ibid.

DCA

28 February 1967

From: Lt Wilson/3680

Monthly Report HF/SSB Hardened Antenna

Subject: Monthly Narrative Report Input (Hard HF Antenna Acceptance Team)

15AF (DM4C)

This monthly report for February is submitted through your headquarters for Hq SAC (DM7B) in accordance with paragraph 41, Chapter 7, SACM 66-8. The following paragraphs where applicable correspond to subparagraphs of paragraph 41, SACM 66-8.

a. Known Problem Areas: All known problem areas have been thoroughly identified as a result of the Walk-Thru Inspections conducted at Wing I facilities during period 1 February 1967 through 24 February 1967. A message report on each walk-thru has been sent to Hq SAC, 15AF and 18 SAD.

b. Formal Demonstration Schedule: No forecast of formal demonstrations can be made until the discrepancies identified during current walk-thru inspections are corrected.

d. Summary of Technical Orders: No change from those previously reported on the status of Technical Orders and SAC CEM's.

f. Significant Matters: HF/Walk-Thru Inspections have been conducted on 564th SMS flights P, Q and R. Tentative walk-thru of flights S and T HF/SSB facilities have been set for period 6 - 10 March 1967. Copies of these inspections will be forwarded in the same manner as Wing I facility inspections.

JOHN W CARROLL, Colonel, USAF
Commander

Cy to:
18SAD, WC, COMS, DCO, DCMQ, BCE,
SAFZ, DCGS, SATAF(ESG-29), 10SMS,
12SMS, 400SMS

HL
Laid

(2) No support teams were utilized.

(3) There are no recommendations for improvement of local or higher headquarters procedures or directives.

Ross E. Mershan

ROSS E. MERSHAN, TSgt, USAF
Team Chief Explosive Ordnance Disposal

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PAGE 2 RUWMBAG934 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO RESOLVE THIS PROBLEM, OR TO DEFINITIZE ADEQUATE ENGINEERING ANALYSIS TASKS WITHOUT ADDITIONAL TESTING. A REVIEW OF AVAILABLE DATA STRONGLY SUGGESTS THIS TO BE A WING X PECULIAR PROBLEM. THE COAMA ETF IS NOT A WING X FACILITY. IT IS, THEREFORE, NECESSARY TO RUN THE PROPOSED TESTS AT WALSTROM, PREFERABLY AT ECHO 8. IT IS CURRENTLY BELIEVED THAT FRUITFUL DATA WILL NOT EXIST UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THE NO-GO MODE CAN BE REPRODUCED AT LEAST AT THE LF LEVEL.

3. THE FOLLOWING PLAN OF ACTION WAS AGREED UPON BY ALL REPRESENTATIVES. DEVELOP A TEST PLAN WHICH, AFTER ISOLATING AN LF FROM THE SYSTEM, ALLOWS FOR THE APPLICATION OF STIMULI WHICH WILL REPRODUCE THE NO-GO AT THE LF LEVEL. AFTER ANALYSIS OF SUCH TEST DATA, PROCEEDING AS REQUIRED TO TEST, OR ANALYZE AT THE LOF LEVEL. THE TASK GROUP WILL CONVENE AT BOEING, SEATTLE ON 4 APRIL TO DEVELOP A TEST PLAN AND PROCEDURES. SUCH PLAN WILL INCLUDE EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS, LF ISOLATION PROCEDURES, DEFINE TESTS TO BE PERFORMED, AND BE REVIEWED FOR SAFETY. THE PLAN WILL RECEIVE SAFETY CLEARANCE THROUGH OONE, AND WILL BE COORDINATED WITH SAC AS REQUIRED. COMPLETION DATE FOR THE PLAN IS AIMED AT 5 MAY 1967. THE PLAN WILL BE DEVELOPED AND PROTOTYPED, AT THE NRA FACILITY AT BOEING.

4. ADDITIONAL INVESTIGATIVE ENGINEERING STUDIES ARE IN PROCESS, AND WILL CONTINUE. BOEING IS ATTEMPTING TO OBTAIN AN EXHIBIT 7KVA TRANS-

PAGE 3 RUWMBAG934 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FORMER WHICH WAS REPORTED TO HAVE SHORTED A FEW HOURS AFTER THE INCIDENT. A TRANSFORMER REPORT ON THE TRANSFORMER WILL BE DEVELOPED BY BOEING ENGINEERING. DEPENDENT UPON THE ANALYSIS OF THIS TRANSFORMER, AND ITS FAILURE MODE, ADDITIONAL TESTS MAY BE REQUESTED SIMILAR TO THE POWER TESTS RUN ON 23 MARCH 1967, AT WALSTROM WITH THE ADDED TRANSFORMER FAILURE MODE SIMULATION. YOU WILL BE FURTHER ADVISED WITH RESPECT TO THIS ACTIVITY.

5. CONCURRENCE IN THE USE OF ECHO 8 FOR TESTING OUTLINED IN PARA THREE (3) IS REQUESTED. PLANNING FACTORS AT THIS TIME ARE FOR A PERIOD OF SIX WEEKS BEGINNING 15 MAY 1967. YOU WILL BE ADVISED OF ANY SHIFT IN THESE TARGET DATES. GP-4.

BT Page 2 of 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DISASTER CONTROL TEAM ACTION REPORT
Malmstrom AFB, Montana

1. Reference: SAC Form 696, para U.
2. Date of Disaster: 12 January 1967
3. Time of Disaster: Approximately 0910 local
4. Location of Disaster: 341st MHS Munitions Storage Area, building 1840, MK-11 Bay.
5. OPR Submitting Report: 341st MHS Explosive Ordnance Disposal Section
6. Report is complete.
7. Report as follows: Explosive Ordnance Disposal Team Chief -
Ross E. Hersman, TSgt, AF 19433161, MCOIC Explosive Ordnance Disposal Section.

(1) On 12 January 1967 at approximately 0910 local, the 341st MHSRV Evaluation Team consisting of TSgt Roy E. Aldridge, AF 19453530 - Team Chief, SSgt William R. Shoemaker, AF 13533767 - Team Member, and SSgt Frank A. Martin, AF 28718138 - Team Member, was being evaluated by the 3901st while performing Dash 1A maintenance on a W56, Mod 1 Warhead IAW T.O. 11N-561A. During removal of MC1508, the T-290A, serial No. PF-2450-B9, gave an audible alarm, indicating the presence of a hazardous environment.

This maintenance was being performed in the 341st MHS Munitions Storage Area, building 1840, MK-11 Maintenance Bay. The RV maintenance team chief TSgt Aldridge sounded the alarm and the entire area was evacuated. The E.O.D. team consisting of TSgt Hersman, ALC Jackie L. Shreves, AF19681063 and TSgt Robert A. Steele AF11193215 (3901st EOD) re-entered the area with full protective clothing, a second T-290A, serial No. PF-2132-K8, plastic bags and cotton swabs. The W56, Mod 1 Warhead and the MC1508 was monitored with negative results. Swipe tests were taken from the W56, Mod 1 Warhead and MC1508 IAW T.O. 11A17-1-100-29, para 3-1.1, dtd 18 Feb 65, Chg 10 Oct 66. This information was given to the Wing Command Post. At approximately 1105 local TSgt Hersman, ALC Coyle W. Turner, AF19724121 and Capt. Robert J. Huntsman, PV3112241 (3901st EOD - Observer) re-entered the area with both T-290A's and two PAC-15's serial No. 4612 and 5518 and remonitored the area. The T290A, serial No. PF-2450-B9 which had been used by the RV maintenance team would not setup IAW T.O. 11N-35-15 and was determined to be inoperative. TSgt Hersman and Capt. Huntsman monitored the MK-11 maintenance bay for alpha contamination with negative results. The second T-290A, serial No PF-2132-K8 was again used, and again a negative indication was received. These actions were reported to the Wing Command Post. All protective clothing was checked for contamination with negative results. The swipe test samples were given to the Bio-environmental Engineer Section to be forwarded to Wright-Patterson AFB for complete evaluation & analysis. Information received from Wright-Patterson indicated that these swipe tests were also negative.

Atch 4^o

VZCZ CNIA278

FTTS JAW RUCSAAAG196 0762315-SSSS--RUWMB0A.

ZNY ~~SSSS~~

P 17225Z MAR 67

FM SAC

TO RUWMB0A/00AMA HILL AFB UTAH

INFO RUWBNNA/15AF

RUWMB0A/341SMW MALMSTROM AFB MONT

RUWMBAA/AFFRO BOEING CO SEATTLE WASH

RUWJABA/BSO NORTON AFB CALIF

BT

~~SECRET~~ DM 02752 MAR 67.

ACTION: 00AMA (CONCT/00NE-COL DAVENPORT). INFO: 15AF (DM4C), 341SMW (DCM), BOEING AFFRO (D.J. DOWNEY, MINUTEMAN ENGINEERING) BSD (BSS, BSQR)

SUBJECT: LOSS OF STRATEGIC ALERT, ECHO FLIGHT, MALSTROM AFB. (U)

REF: MY SECRET MESSAGE DM7B 02751, 17 MAR 67, SAME SUBJECT.

ALL TEN MISSILES IN ECHO FLIGHT AT MALMSTROM LOST STRAT ALERT WITHIN TEN SECONDS OF EACH OTHER. THIS INCIDENT OCCURRED AT 0845L ON 16 MARCH 67. AS OF THIS DATE, ASS MISSILES HAVE BEEN RETURNED TO STRAT

PAGE 2 RUCSAAAG196 ~~SECRET~~

ALERT WITH NO APPARENT DIFFICULTY. INVESTIGATION AS TO THE CAUSE OF THE INCIDENT IS BEING CONDUCTED BY MALMSTROM TEST. TWO FTTS HAVE BEEN RUN THROUGH TWO MISSILES THIS FAR. NO CONCLUSIONS HAVE BEEN DRAWN. THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT BOTH COMPUTERS IN BOTH G&C'S WERE UPSET MOMENTARILY. CAUSE OF THE UPSET IS NOT KNOWN AT THIS TIME. ALL OTHER SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION AT THIS TIME IS CONTAINED IN ABOVE REFERENCED MESSAGE.

FOR 00AMA. THE FACT THAT NO APPARENT REASON FOR THE LOSS OF TEN MISSILES CAN BE READILY IDENTIFIED IS CAUSE FOR GRAVE CONCERN TO THIS HEADQUARTERS. WE MUST HAVE AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS TO DETERMINE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION AND WE MUST KNOW AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE WHAT THE IMPACT IS TO THE FLEET, IF ANY. REQUEST YOUR RESPONSE BE IN KEEPING WITH THE URGENCY OF THE PROBLEM. WE IN TURN WILL PROVIDE OUR FULL COOPERATION AND SUPPORT.

FOR 00AMA AND 15AF WE HAVE CONCURRED IN A BOEING REQUEST TO SEND TWO ENGINEERS, MR. R.E. RIGERT AND MR. W. M. DUTTON TO MALMSTROM TO COLLECT FIRST HAND KNOWLEDGE OF THE PROBLEM FOR POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE IN LATER ANALYSIS. REQUEST COOPERATION OF ALL CONCERNED TO PROVIDE THEM ACCESS TO AVAILABLE INFORMATION, I.E., CREW COMMANDERS LOG ENTRIES, MAINTENANCE FORMS, INTERROGATION OF KNOWLEDGEABLE PEOPLE, ETC.

PAGE 3 RUCSAAAG196 ~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLEARANCES AND DATE AND TIME OF ARRIVAL WILL BE SENT FROM THE AFFRO BY SEPARATE MESSAGE.

FOR 15AF. 00AMA HAS INDICATED BY TELECON THAT THEY ARE SENDING ADDITIONAL ENGINEERING SUPPORT. REQUEST YOUR COOPERATION TO INSURE MAXIMUM RESULTS ARE OBTAINED FROM THIS EFFORT. GP74, BCASMC-67-437

BT

JS 12342
17/C-208

DCM-1
WC-1
DCO-1
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
DECLASSIFIED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AT 30 YEARS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

17
C-344
87522
Jul

VZCZCNIA760

PTTC JAZ RUMNBA0034 030 210Y-CCCC--RUMNBA.
ZNY ~~CCCC~~

P 30005Z MAR 67

FM OQAMA/HILL AFB UTAH

TO RUCSAAA/SAC

RUMBKNA/15TH AF MARCH AFB CALIF

RUMNBA0/341SW WALNSTON AFB NCNT

RUMNBA0/APPRO THE BOEING CO SEATTLE WASH

RUMNBA0/NORTH AMERICAN AVIATION AUTONETICS DIV ANAHEIM CALIF

INFO RUEDFIA/HQRS AFLC WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB OHIO

RUMJABA/BSO MORTON AFB CALIF

BT

C ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ GONE 01012 MAR 67

FOR: SAC/DM7B, DE; 15AF/DMAC, DE; 341 SWW/DCM; BOEING (D.J.

DOWING-MINUTEMAN ENGINEERING); AUTONETICS/MR H.R. HEATH.

INFO: HQRS AFLC WRIGHT PATTERSON AFB OHIO (COL MORRISON); BSD/BSS,

BSQR, BSQM

SUBJECT: WING I, E FLIGHT INCIDENT

1. A TASK GROUP MEETING CONVENED AT OQAMA ON 28 MARCH 1967, TO REVIEW THE RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION TO DATE. REPRESENTATIVES FROM BOEING COMPANY, AUTONETICS, OQAMA, AND 15TH AF WERE REPRESENTED.
2. IT IS THE POSITION OF THE TASK GROUP THAT INSUFFICIENT DATA EXISTS

Page 1 of 2

DCM-1
WC-1
DCO-1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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THIS EXCERPT IS:

~~SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
341st STRATEGIC MISSILE WING

AND 341st COMBAT SUPPORT GROUP

HQ SAC DXI., 67-3922

P.R.C.

(Unclassified Title)

Apr Thru 30 Jun 1967

VOL I

Assigned to the ~~15th Air Force~~

FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE, STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND

28 AUG 1978

Permanently Stationed at

MALMSTROM AIR FORCE BASE, GREAT FALLS, MONTANA

P.R.C.

This document was prepared by A2C David B. Gamble, Wing Historian under the supervision of the Wing Information Officer. It is prepared in compliance with SACR 210-1, 29 June 1964, and is classified SECRET under the provision of AFR 205-1 as amended. The classification is required for the protection of information that reveals the military capability and operational status of the Wing (U)

APPROVED:

David B. Gamble
DAVID B. GAMBLE, A2C, USAF
Historian

John W. Carroll
JOHN W. CARROLL, Col, USAF
Wing Commander

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COPY (1) OF FOUR COPIES

AS1-67-5-449

ATCH 2

SECURITY STATEMENT PAGE

This volume is ~~SECRET~~ to conform to the classification of the information in the source documents. It will be handled in accordance with the provisions of AFR 205-1, as amended.

This volume contains information effecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws (Title 18, U.S.C., sections 793 and 794), the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to any unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

This volume has been placed in downgrading Group 3, which is the highest downgrading group assigned to the information in the source documents. The historian's analysis and consolidation of information from many sources, which individually may have lower downgrade provisions, results in a synthesis which may have wider implications than the material on which it is based. Therefore, individual downgrade instructions for each paragraph are not indicated, and all portions of this volume will be handled under the overall downgrading group.

~~TOP SECRET~~

P29

two different types have been introduced into the Squadron. The only major difference between the vehicles is the weight. This causes a problem in the operational data on the targeting tapes fed into the G&Cs. The present tapes have operational data for a lighter weighing G&C vehicle, therefore, they can not compensate for the additional weight of the heavier G&C vehicle in navigation. This means that the tapes now in use would not be able to correctly guide the missile equipped with a heavy G&C vehicle. Theoretically, a missile equipped with a heavier G&C and with the wrong type of computer tape would fall short of its target and therefore, be useless. SAC has started a schedule to replace the tapes of the heavy G&Cs with a corrected tape (MOTP-607) which would compensate for the weight difference. The SAC schedule for replacement is as follows: Papa flight, 18 Jul 67, Quebec flight, 21 July 67; Romeo flight, 25 July 67, and Tango flight, 31 July 67.^{41,42} (U)

As stated in the last history, studies of the Echo flight incident were to be conducted at the contractors plant. (U)

A task group meeting convened at ODAMA, Hill AFB, Utah on 28 March 67, to review the results of the investigation to date.

41. Interview, A2C David B. Gamble, Wing Historian, with Lt. Thomas R. Filiatreau, Wing Maintenance Technical Analysis Division, 11 Jul 67.

42. Msg, (C) DIRM 07160, SAC to Norton AFB, 6 Jul 67, Ex 44.

~~TOP SECRET~~

P30

[REDACTED]

Representatives from the Boeing Company, Autonetics, COAMA, and
15th AF attended. ⁴³ (U)

The group decided that insufficient data on the incident existed to resolve the problem or for adequate engineering analysis without additional testing. The present data suggested that the problem was a Wing I peculiar problem. Since the COAMA Experimental Test Facility (ETF) was not a Wing I type, it was necessary for the experiments to be conducted at Malmstrom. Further analysis of the problem showed that experiments would be of no real value until a No-Go Mode could be reproduced at least at a LF level. ⁴⁴ (U)

It was decided by the group to first develop a way to reproduce a No-Go Mode at the LF level then at the Launch Control Facility (LCF) level before a test could be made at Malmstrom. The group was to reconvene at Boeings' Seattle plant on 4 April 67 for development of a way to safely reproduce a No-Go effect. The plan was to be developed at the Network Resolution Area (NRA) at Boeing, with a completion date for the plan set at 5 May 67. ⁴⁵ (U)

During testing at Boeing, a 30 micro sec Pulse (-10 to 0 volt square wave) was placed on the Self Test Command (STC) line at the C-53P Coupler Logic Drawer interface (STC). Seven out of

43. Msg, (C) OONE 01012, COAMA to SAC, "Wing I, E Flight Incident," 30 May 67, Ex 45.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid.

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

P 31

10 separate applications of a single Pulse, would cause the system to shut down with a Channel 9 & 12 No-Go. ⁴⁶ (U)

Subsequent testing at Autonetics has resulted in the following explanation of what probably happens in the Coupler Logic Drawer. The Pulse inserted is long enough to initiate the Coupler Self test sequence within the C-53P. However, it is not of long enough duration to enable control lines to the computer to place the computer in a Coupler test loop Mode. This causes the Coupler to issue a sequence error due to lack of coincidence between G&C and Coupler Modes. This sequence error, together with the action of two other flip flop outputs (M-17 & M-20), is sufficient to initiate the Coupler and G&C No-Go shut down. ⁴⁷ (U)

The effort at Boeing NRA was to determine the source and most likely path of noise Pulse to the Logic Coupler. The results to the Electro Magnetic Pulse (EMP) testing at the LF and Wing IV indicated that the Sensitive Information Network (SIN) were susceptible to noise of the type that could have caused the problem. ⁴⁸ (U)

The SIN lines go only from the ICC to all of the LF's in the flight, which could explain the flight peculiar aspect of the problem. ⁴⁹ (U)

46. Msg, (S) OONE 01204, OOAMA to SAC, "Malmstrom E Flight Problem Weekly Status," 17 Apr 67, Ex 46.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid.

~~SECRET~~

P32

~~SECRET~~

The best possible source of the noise Pulse, so far in the analysis, was the transformer failure which occurred at a stock watering through the Echo flight area. The shorting to ground of the single phase transformer may have unbalanced the three phase "Y" connected system enough to cause ground currents to flow back to the generator. The Hardened Intersite Cable (HIC) shields would provide a path for the ground current thus inducing voltage Pulses on the SIN lines to all LF's. ⁵⁰ (U)

Testing at NRA has proven that there is significant coupling between the shields of the SIN lines and the Self Test Command (STC) line into the C-53P Logic Coupler. ⁵¹ (U)

A conference was held at Boeing on 18 April 67 for the task team to review the preliminary test plan for LF, E-78, at Malmstrom. Also, a test plan was reviewed to accomplish the transformer failure simulation tests at Malmstrom. Boeing had co-ordinated with the power company, and received their approval for the tests. ⁵² (U)

It was the consensus of the task group that the transformer tests should be run as soon as possible so that the data would be available for the E-78 test plan development. The plan was to instrumentally connect the HIC lines and power line into both one

50. Msg, (S) OOME 0120h, OQAMA to SAC, "Malmstrom E Flight Problem Weekly Status," 17 Apr 67, Ex 46.

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid.

~~SECRET~~

P 33

53

E flight LF and LCC. (U)

The power tests were accomplished at Malmstrom AFB during the week of 15 May 67. The tests were in accordance with Test Plan D2-18446-1. No sites were shut down for the test. (U)

Instrumentation on the Sensitive Information Network lines and on the commercial primary power lines showed no significant noise propagation as a result of simulating the transformer failure. (U)

As part of the tests, one of the primary power lines at the LCC was opened and then shorted to neutral. The test plan called for three operations of this sequence; however, the back-up Environmental Control System (ECS) failed to sequence properly and rather than jeopardize the equipment, only one sequence was performed. (U)

During the transformer tests, a one volt peak to peak 60 cycle signal appeared on the SIN receiving line at E-3. Also, a high current spike was seen on the primary power neutral line to launch facility ground point. The 60 cycle signal on the SIN line was insignificant because tests have indicated that frequencies in the area of 100 Kilo Cycle (KC) propagated most readily

53. Msg, (S) OONE 01204, OOCMA to SAC, "Malmstrom E Flight Problem Weekly Status," 17 Apr 67, Ex 46.

54. Msg, (S) OONE 01787, OOCMA to ESD Norton AFB, "Malmstrom E Flight Problem Interim Report," 2 Jun 67, Ex 47.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid.

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

P34

within the LF. Also, known was that the C-53P Logic Coupler will cause Channel 9 & 12 No-GO shut down with Pulse width in the area of 10 to 100 micro sec (a 60 Cycle Per Second signal has a pulse width of approximately 16.7 milli sec). The current spike on the neutral power line did not appear to extend to the Logic Coupler interface therefore, it was not felt to be significant.⁵⁷ (U)

Each time a power Pulse was initiated, by shorting the transformer or opening one phase at the LCC, E-1 and E-3 were observed to switch to emergency power momentarily. The capsule area did not report any change in status from the 10 LF's in Echo Flight as a result of power tests.⁵⁸ (U)

The tests run at Boeing in the NRA have proved that the C-53P Logic Coupler was the receiver to the noise Pulse irregularly. The normal signal on the STC in the C-53P is (-10 to 0 volt Pulse of duration between two and 200 micro sec) was applied at this point. When the Pulse width was set at 30 micro sec, 12 Channel 9 & 12 No-Go's, one Channel 9 No-Go, and four Coupler Self Tests (CST), were experienced out of 20 separate applications of the Pulse.⁵⁹ (U)

In other words, 60 percent of the time the responses were the same as experienced at Echo Flight and 85 percent of the

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57. Msg, (S) OONE 01787, ODAHA to BSD Norton AFB, "Malmstrom E Flight Problem Interim Report," 2 Jun 67, Ex 47.

58. Ibid.

59. Ibid.

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

time the response would have placed the system in a non EWO
status. ⁶⁰ (U)

P35

A 30 micro sec Pulse is equivalent to a frequency of 3 KC_u and previous testing at the LF and NRA have indicated the Pulse coupling within the LF is present at frequencies in this general area. OONE has conducted tests at the Hill Experimental Launch Facility on the Wing II-V Logic Coupler to determine if it could be a receiver to this same type Pulse. This testing will indicate if the Wing II-V, Logic Coupler will respond to a random Pulse similar to the response observed on the C-53P Logic Coupler during test at the Boeing NRA. ⁶¹ (U)

The results of these tests will be included in the next history. (U)

Due to the fact that the power tests were essentially negative, it appears that the cause of the Echo Flight problem was of the EMP or electrostatic nature. ⁶² (U)


A Channel 9 & 12 No-Go shut down has never been reported at Wings II thru V. This fact is probably due to the significant difference between the Wing I and the Wing II thru V, Logic Couplers as well as differences in the inter site cable and LF

60. Msg, (S) OONE 01787, OOAMA to BSD Norton AFB, "Malmstrom E Flight Problem Interim Report," 2 Jun 67, Ex 47.

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid.

[REDACTED]



cabling. Therefore, Echo Flight problem still appears to be
a Wing I peculiar problem. ⁶³ (1)

P 36

OONE recommended Ballistic System Division (BSD) accomplish additional testing of the EMP and electrostatic nature at a Wing I facility at the time of Force Modernization to determine the extent of vulnerability. After the testing has isolated all problems with the Wing I Force Modernization configuration, BSD could evaluate the need for testing of Wing II-V Force Mod silos. ⁶⁴ (1)

Air Force Systems Command (AFSC) has the primary responsibility for EMP testing, and has an active test program at the present time. Therefore, OQAMA recommended that BSD and Air Force Weapons Laboratory (AFWL) accomplish these tests at Malmstrom at the earliest possible date. ⁶⁵ (1)


The results of these tests will appear in the next history. (U)

In a previous history a problem of Movement Security Alarm System on the Wings' re-entry vehicles G&C Vans was described. The problem was the alarm system under the vans, was inoperative during winter weather conditions, due to the collection of mud, snow, and ice under the van. Because of the great deal of maintenance required to keep the alarm operational; the Wing suggested

63. Msg, (S) OONE 01787, OQAMA to BSD Norton AFB, "Malmstrom E Flight Problem Interim Report," 2 Jun 67, Ex 47.

64. Ibid.

65. Ibid.



~~67-8886-44~~

9

TO RUCSAB/SAC

RIENBQ42341SMW MALMSTROM AFB MONT

ERIP/304/NORTH AMERICAN AVIATION AUTONETICS DIV ANAHEIM CALIF

FROM JABA/BSO NORTON AFB CALIF

莊

Dem-
we-
Dco

DOWNING-MINUTEMAN ENGINEERING; AUTOMETICS/M H. R. HEATH.

BSCE, BSCE

1. A TASK GROUP MEETING CONVENED AT OOSAMA ON 28 MARCH 1967. TO

BOEING COMPANY, AUTONETICS, OGDEN, AND 15TH AF WERE REPRESENTED

2. IT IS THE POSITION OF THE TASK GROUP THAT INSUFFICIENT DATA EXISTS

Page 122

DECLASSIFIED BY SP-6 BTJ/STW
DECLASSIFIED ON 09-28-2013

PAGE 2 RUNMMBA9834

TO RESOLVE THIS PROBLEM, OR TO DEFINITELY ADEQUATE ENGINEERING ANALYSIS TASKS WITHOUT ADDITIONAL TESTING. A REVIEW OF AVAILABLE DATA STRONGLY SUGGESTS THIS TO BE A WING 1 PECULIAR PROBLEM. THE OAMA ETF IS NOT A WING 1 FACILITY. IT IS, THEREFORE, NECESSARY TO RUN THE PROPOSED TESTS AT MALSTROM, PREFERABLY AT ECHO 8. IT IS CURRENTLY BELIEVED THAT FRUITFUL DATA WILL NOT EXIST UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THE NO-GO MODE CAN BE REPRODUCED AT LEAST AT THE LF LEVEL.

3. THE FOLLOWING PLAN OF ACTION WAS AGREED UPON BY ALL REPRESENTATIVES DEVELOP A TEST PLAN WHICH, AFTER ISOLATING AN LF FROM THE SYSTEM, ALLOW FOR THE APPLICATION OF STIMULI WHICH WILL REPRODUCE THE NO-GO AT THE LF LEVEL. AFTER ANALYSIS OF SUCH TEST DATA, PROCEEDING AS REQUIRED TO TEST OR ANALYZE AT THE LCF LEVEL. THE TASK GROUP WILL CONVENE AT BOEING, SEATTLE ON 4 APRIL TO DEVELOP A TEST PLAN AND PROCEDURES. SUCH PLAN WILL INCLUDE EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS, LF ISOLATION PROCEDURES, DEFINE TESTS TO BE PERFORMED, AND BE REVIEWED FOR SAFETY. THE PLAN WILL RECEIVE SAFETY CLEARANCE THROUGH CONE, AND WILL BE COORDINATED WITH SAC AS REQUIRED. COMPLETION DATE FOR THE PLAN IS AIMED AT 5 MAY 1967. THE PLAN WILL BE DEVELOPED AND PROTOTYPED, AT THE INRA FACILITY AT BOEING.

4. ADDITIONAL INVESTIGATIVE ENGINEERING STUDIES ARE IN PROCESS, AND WILL CONTINUE. BOEING IS ATTEMPTING TO OBTAIN AN EXHIBIT 7KVA TRANS-

PAGE 3 RUNMMBA9834

FORMER WHICH WAS REPORTED TO HAVE SHORTED A FEW HOURS AFTER THE INCIDENT. A TEARDOWN REPORT ON THE TRANSFORMER WILL BE DEVELOPED BY BOEING ENGINEERING. DEPENDENT UPON THE ANALYSIS OF THIS TRANSFORMER AND ITS FAIL MODE, ADDITIONAL TESTS MAY BE REQUESTED SIMILAR TO THE POWER TESTS RUN ON 28 MARCH 1967, AT MALSTROM WITH THE ADDED TRANSFORMER FAILURE MODE SIMULATION. YOU WILL BE FURTHER ADVISED WITH RESPECT TO THIS ACTIVITY.

5. CONCURRENCE IN THE USE OF ECHO 8 FOR TESTING OUTLINED IN PARAGRAPH THREE (3) IS REQUESTED. PLANNING FACTORS AT THIS TIME ARE FOR A PERIOD OF SIX WEEKS BEGINNING 15 MARCH 1967. YOU WILL BE ADVISED OF ANY SHIFT IN THESE TARGET DATES. GP-4.

END PAGE 2 of 2

VZCZCNIA354

PTTS JAZZ RUWMB00143 167215Z ~~SECRET~~ RUWMB00A.

ZNY SSSSS

P 171300Z APR 67

FM OODANA HILL AFB UTAH

TO RUCSAAA/SAC

RUWBNNA/15AF MARCH AFB CALIF

RUWMB00A/341STRATNSLVG MALMSTROM AFB MONT

RUWMB00A/AFPRO THE BOEING CO SEATTLE WASH

RUWJBQA/4MAHEIM CALIF

RUWMB00A/SATF MALMSTROM AFB MONT

~~SECRET~~ OONE 01234 APR 67

FOR SAC/DN7B 15AF/DMAC BSD/BSS BSGH BSGM 41 SMW/DCM

BOEING CO. J. DOWNING MINUTEMAN ENGINEERING AUTONETICS/MR H. R.

HEATH AFLC/MCMC (COL MORRISON).

INFO HQ AFLC WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB OHIO BSD NORTON AFB CALIF.

SUBJECT: MALMSTROM E FLIGHT PROBLEM WEEKLY STATUS

1. DURING TESTING AT BOEING, SEATTLE, A 30 MICRO SECOND PULSE

(-10 TO 10 VOLT SQUARE WAVE) WAS PLACED ON THE SELF TEST COMMAND LINE

AT THE C-53P COUPLER LOGIC DRAWER INTERFACE (SELF TEST COMMAND LINE).

FOR 7 OUT OF 10 SEPARATE APPLICATIONS OF A SINGLE PULSE THE SYSTEM

PAGE 2 RUWMB00143 ~~SECRET~~

SHUT DOWN WITH CHANNEL 9 & 12. SUBSEQUENT TESTING AT AUTONETICS

AS RESULTED IN THE FOLLOWING EXPLANATION OF WHAT PROBABLY HAPPENS IN

THE COUPLER LOGIC DRAWER. THE PULSE INSERTED IS LONG ENOUGH TO

INITIATE THE COUPLER SELF TEST SEQUENCE WITHIN THE C53. HOWEVER, IF

IS NOT OF LONG ENOUGH DURATION TO ENABLE CONTROL LINES TO THE COMPUTER

TO PLACE THE COMPUTER IN A COUPLER TEST LOOP MODE. THIS CAUSES THE

COUPLER TO ISSUE A SEQUENCE ERROR DUE TO LACK OF COINCIDENCE BETWEEN

82C AND COUPLER MODES. THIS SEQUENCE ERROR, TOGETHER WITH THE

ACTION OF TWO OTHER FLIP FLOP OUTPUTS (N-17 & N-20), IS SUFFICIENT TO

INITIATE THE COUPLER AND 82C NO 60 SHUT DOWN. THE EFFORT NOW AT

BOEING NRA IS TO DETERMINE THE SOURCE AND MOST LIKELY PATCH OF THE

NOISE PULSE TO THE LOGIC COUPLER. THE RESULTS OF EMP TESTING AT

HEATH AND USING IV, INDICATE THAT THE SEN LINES ARE SUSCEPTIBLE TO NOISE

OF THE TYPE THAT COULD HAVE CAUSED THE PROBLEM. THE SEN LINES GO

ONLY FROM THE LCC TO ALL OF THE LF'S IN THE FLIGHT WHICH WOULD EXPLAIN

THE FLIGHT PERCUKULAR ASPECT OF THE PROBLEM. THE BEST POSSIBLE SOURCE

OF THE NOISE PULSE, SO FAR IN OUR ANALYSIS, IS THE TRANSFORMER FAILURE

WHICH OCCURRED AT A STUCK WATERING THROUGH IN THE E FLIGHT AREA. THE

SHORTING TO GROUND OF THE SINGLE PHASE TRANSFORMER MAY HAVE UNBALANCED

THE 3 PHASE "Y" CONNECTED SYSTEM ENOUGH TO CAUSE GROUND CURRENTS TO

2 Page 1 of 2

GROUP 1 SCASMC-67-580

DECLASSIFIED BY 6032

ON 08-11-2010

FLOW BACK TO THE GENERATOR. THE 1 RDENED INTERSITE CABLE (HIC) SHIELDS WOULD PROVIDE A PATH FOR THE GROUND CURRENT THUS INDUCING VOLTAGE PULSES ON THE SIN LINES TO ALL LF'S. TESTING AT NRA HAS PROVEN THAT THERE IS SIGNIFICANT COUPLING BETWEEN THE SHIELDS OF THE SIN LINES AND THE STC LINE INTO THE CTSSP LOGIC COUPLER.

2. A CONFERENCE IS SCHEDULED AT BOEING ON 15 APRIL FOR THE TASK TEAM TO REVIEW THE PRELIMINARY TEST PLAN FOR LF E78 AT MALMSTROM. ALSO, A TEST PLAN WILL BE REVIEWED TO ACCOMPLISH THE TRANSFORMER FAILURE SIMULATION TESTS AT MALMSTROM. BOEING HAS COORDINATED WITH THE POWER COMPANY, AND HAS THEIR APPROVAL FOR THE TESTS. THE FINAL TRANSFORMER TEST PLAN WILL BE SUBMITTED TO OAMA, AND SUBSEQUENTLY SAC AND SATAF COORDINATION WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED.

IT IS THE CONSENSUS OF THE TASK GROUP THAT THE TRANSFORMER TESTS SHOULD BE RUN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE SO THAT THE DATA ARE AVAILABLE FOR THE E-8 TEST PLAN DEVELOPMENT. THE PLAN IS AT THIS TIME TO INTRUMENT TO HIC LINES AND POWER LINE INTO BOTH ONE E FLIGHT

LF AND LCC. GP-4.

BT

BCASMC-62-580

2 of 2

FIRM NAME AND ADDRESS THE BOEING COMPANY P.O. BOX 350 - SEATTLE, WASH. 98124 (BOE 720)		ENGINEERING CHANGE PROPOSAL FACILITY			DATE 27 December 1966		
1	WGL NO ATTACHMENT AT 2827	WFG CODE	SYSTEM DESIGNATION WS113A	PLCP NO. 528	TYPE F	REV.	CORREP.
2	CONTRACTOR'S RECOMMENDED PRIORITY <input type="checkbox"/> EMERGENCY <input type="checkbox"/> URGENT <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ROUTINE <input type="checkbox"/> COMPATIBILITY						
3	CONTRACT AND ITEM NOMENCLATURE Launch Facility						
4	NAME OF PART OR LOWEST ASSEMBLY AFFECTED Launch Facility Support Building						
5	TITLE OF CHANGE DC Supply for Isolation Relays - VRSA Channels 26 and 27 (LF)						
6	DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE Provide DC supply for the isolation relays being installed in VRSA channels 26 and 27 per ECP 1141. A typical DC supply circuit for these relays is shown on Attachment A Sketch 1. <u>ADDITIONAL DESCRIPTION:</u> Instructions for retest of VRSA Channels 26 and 27 and for personnel and weapon system safety will be required.						
7	JUSTIFICATION FOR CHANGE The isolation relays are being installed in VRSA channels 26 and 27 per ECP 1141. The DC power required for these relays is to be supplied from the RP1E power System. This FCIR initiates the required RP1E change.			REQUESTED BY PROCURING ACTIVITY PER REF: FWG Meeting 90 DATE: 29 November 66 ATTACHMENT B PAGE 6			
8	DEVELOPMENTAL REQUIREMENTS N/A			ARE DESIGN REQ'D Yes DATE TBD			
9	ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS No alternate solutions are considered feasible						
10	RECOMMENDED PRODUCTION EFFECTIVITY N/A						
11	ESTIMATED COST FOR CHANGE IN PRODUCTION N/A						
12	RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RETROFIT Retrofit required to provide wiring changes for isolation relays to be installed by ECP 1141						
13	RECOMMENDED RETROFIT EFFECTIVITY VAFB, LF's 02 - 09; MAFB, EAFB, MTAFB, WAFB, FEWAFB - All Flights HETF, LFSB					MOCKUP AFFECTED <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	

THE INFORMATION IN THIS EXCERPT IS.

1. Air Force--Anniversary Celebrations.

HISTORY
of

Director Aerospace Studies Inst AFM: Archives Branch Maxwell AFB, Alabama	RETURN TO:	K-UG-341-H1 JUL-Sep 1967
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341st STRATEGIC MISSILE WING
AND 341st COMBAT SUPPORT GROUP
HQ SAC DXIH 67E 5/22

(Unclassified Title)
1 Jul thru 30 Sep 1967
P.R.C.

DOCUMENT DECLASSIFIED PER
HQ AFSPC/DOXN 27 Apr 95 and
OO-AIC/LME 27 Jul 95.

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FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE, STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND
Permanently Stationed at
MALMSTROM AIR FORCE BASE, GREAT FALLS, MONTANA

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P.R.C.

APPROVED:

David B. Gamble
DAVID B. GAMBLE, AIC, USAF
Historian

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JOHN W. CARROLL, Col, USAF

William D. Napton
WILLIAM D. NAPTON, Sgt, USAF
Historian

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23 AUG 1978

RESTRICTED DOCUMENT

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Arch 3

This volume is classified ~~TOP SECRET~~
to conform to the classification of the information in the source
documents. It will be handled in accordance with the provisions
of AFR 205-1, as amended. (U)

This volume contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage
Laws (Title 18, U.S.C., sections 793 and 794), the transmission or
revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is
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Reproduction of this document in whole or in part is pro-
hibited except with the permission of the office of origin. (U)

This volume has been placed in downgrading Group 1, because
it contains Formerly Restricted Data material. The historian's
analysis and consolidation of information from many sources,
which individually may have lower downgrade provisions, results
in a synthesis which may have wider implications than the material
on which it is based. Therefore, paragraphs have been individually
classified, but have not been marked with individual downgrade
instructions, and all portions of this volume will be excluded
from automatic regrading. (U)

[REDACTED]

but usually if the G&C is off power for any period of time, it will not restart when power is returned by a maintenance team. ¹³³ (U)

The dash 9 and dash 20 missile problem in the 564th SMS had been alleviated this quarter. Since almost all the dash 9 and dash 20 missiles were removed prior to this quarter. ¹³⁴ (U)

PS62

MISSILE ACCIDENTS/INCIDENTS

There were no missile accidents or incidents during this quarter, but testing on the Echo Flight Incident was accomplished during this time interval. Testing on Echo Flight, because of it's relationship to this section will be included in this section. (U)

MISSILE INCIDENTS-Echo Flight Testing

Testing on the problems associated with Echo Flight are still be conducted by higher headquarters and the contractors. The results of all these tests are not known as yet. Next will be the presentation of test results that are known and their affects. (U)

As stated in the last history, a No-Go Mode effect had to be reproduced inorder to study the problem. This was achieved by the use of a 30 micro sec Pulse (-10 to 0 volt square wave) placed on Self Test Command (STC) line at the C-53P Coupler

133. Interview, ALC David B. Gamble, Wing Historian, with Capt. Daune W. Hollis, DO Code Vault, on 27 Oct 67.

134. History, 341st SMW, Apr - Jun 67, p 28.

[REDACTED]

Logic Drawer interface STC. This caused the system to shut down with a Channel 9 & 12 No-Go. ¹³⁵ (U)

Boeing studied the source and path of the noise Pulse to the Logic Coupler and suspected that the Sensitive Information Network (SIN) lines would cause the noise Pulse. Further studies at Malmstrom AFB by Boeing proved this analysis wrong. ¹³⁶ (U)

Tests at Boeing's Network Resolution Area (NRA) have proven that the C-53P Logic Coupler is the receiver of the noise Pulse irregularities. These tests had 60 percent of the time, the responses were the same as experienced at Echo Flight, and 85 percent of the time placing the system in a non EWD status. ¹³⁷ (U)

OOAMA thought that the cause of the incident was of the Electro Magnetic Pulse (EMP) noise or electrostatic nature. OOAMA, also thought that the problem was a Wing I peculiar problem; because Channel 9 & 12 No-Go shut downs have never been reported at Wing II thru V. This fact was due to the significant difference between the Logic Couplers, inter site cabling, and LF cabling of the Minuteman I and Minuteman II systems. ¹³⁸ (U)

COME conducted tests at the Hill Experimental Test Facility (HETF) on the Wing II-V Logic Coupler to determine if it could

135. History, 341st SMW, Apr - Jun 67, p 31.

136. Ibid., p 31 - 34.

137. Ibid., p 34 - 35.

138. Ibid., p 35 - 36

~~SECRET~~

be a receiver to this same type of noise Pulse. ¹³⁹ (U)

Results of these tests were directly determining C-53D Logic Coupler (Minuteman II system) to EMP type noise. The C-53D Logic Coupler was found to be susceptible to input noise injection which resulted in an non EWO system condition. ¹⁴⁰ (U)

This test was made in two phases; however the results of Phase II is not yet available to this office. (U)

Phase I consisted of a correlation of noise inputs on the C-53D Coupler interface to system noise response. Preliminary conclusions of Phase I testing indicated that Minuteman II system was vulnerable to noise on the C-53D Logic Coupler input interface lines. Four input lines in the C-53D Logic Coupler were found to be susceptible to input noise injection which results in a non EWO status. ¹⁴¹ (U)

Phase II test objectives were to determine the percentage of coupling from the input of the Electrical Surge Arresstor (ESA) panel to the interface of the Logic Coupler. ¹⁴² (U)

The probability of a non EWO accuracy due to a EMP noise pulse can not be defined until OOAMA's Phase I and II test

139. History, 341st SMW, Apr - Jun 67, p 35 - 36.

140. Msg, (S) OONC 02525, OOAMA to SAC, "Malmstrom Echo Flight Incident," 7 Aug 67, Ex 34.

141. Ibid., Ex 34.

142. Ibid., Ex 34.

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

programs analysis has been finalized and correlated with
SAMSO's EMP tests results in a joint conference. ¹⁴³ (U)

On 27 - 28 July 1967, OOAMA conducted an engineering inspection at Malmstrom AFB of the interconnecting box, ESA panel, and missile away drawers at LCFs, Alpha 01 and Echo 01. The inspection found approximately 200 were checked. There were no set pattern of loose connections noted on SIN lines or Command lines. The interconnecting box was inspected for loose connections, arcing, burned areas, and tampering, with none discovered. Missiles away drawers involved in the incident were checked and found operation as designed. Thus ¹⁴⁴ no major problems were uncovered. (U)

P565

MISSILE INCIDENTS-Echo Flight Testing (EMP)

The direct relationship of EMP testing and Echo Flight Incident are intermixed, these EMP tests will be included in this section. (U)

SAMSO has been conducting EMP tests at Warren AFB, Wyo., but the results are unknown to this office. The tests made on Delta Flight were completed on all test objectives. SAMSO, with the completion of these tests, began EMP testing at the 564th

143. Msg, (S) OONC 02525, OOAMA to SAC, "Malmstrom Echo Flight Incident," 7 Aug 67, Ex 34.

144. Ibid., Ex 34.

[REDACTED]

145
SMS in October. (U)

These EMP tests by SAMS and Boeing are to discover the weak spots in the different types of Minuteman configurations along the EMP field. When weak or faulty areas are found, ECPs are initiated to correct these discrepancies. 146 (U)

On 28 September 1967, Sierra 39, 56th SMS, was depostured and turned over to Boeing for EMP tests. These tests will be conducted until about mid-January 1968. The primary reason for Boeing's EMP testing is to determine the effectiveness of the lightning protection equipment of the Real Property Installed Equipment (RP/IE) at 56th SMS's IEs. Various voltages will be inserted into the site equipment from a test tie-in to simulate the effects of lightning strikes on the outside cable communications, ground electronics system and associated IE equipment. 147 (U)

Later, on 22 October, SAMS joined Boeing on these EMP tests at Sierra 39. (U)

A primary cause always associated with Echo Flight Incident has been connected with some type of adverse power affect. Tests have been conducted time and time again to determine this, but have always lead to a negative result. Boeing's testing at

145. Msg, (S) OONG 02525, OOAMA to SAC, "Malmstrom Echo Flight Incident," 7 Aug 67, Ex 34.

146. Interview, AIC David B. Gamble, Wing Historian, with Lt. Col. Elliott Coldwater, Deputy Commander for Engineering, SAMS, Det 29, on 7 Nov 67.

147. Ibid.

~~REDACTED~~

Sierra 39 is just another test to assure that the Wing VI configuration will not be affected by adverse electrical effects. (U) ¹⁴⁸

A conference was held at Whiteman AFB, Kan., to review test data for a Force Mod EMP modification. The members of the conference agreed that the data indicated the proposed modification would be effective. A decision was made that additional testing would be required by Boeing to verify that specific frequencies were safe in Force Mod systems. These tests were completed in August 1967. ¹⁴⁹ (U)

Three major changes have resulted from EMP testing. Boeing has submitted ECPs, numbers 1221, 1141-1 and 1141-2, for the modification of EMP for Force Mod. Another change was a Facility Change Initiation Request (FCIR) Maintenance Change Letter (MCL) number 2827, not yet incorporated into the Force Mod systems. ¹⁵⁰ (U)

Presented next will be the changes to the EMP for Force Mod. Because of the complicated engineering terminology, a detailed explanation given by the Boeing Engineers will not be presented of the changes to the EMP. Changes will be presented in brief explanation given by the ECP. (U)

Boeing ECP 1221 will modify the interconnecting box by adding a major sub-assembly containing zener diodes, isolation

148. Interview, ALC David B. Gamble, Wing Historian, with Lt. Col. Elliott Coldwater, Deputy Commander for Engineering, SAMSO, Det 29, on 7 Nov 67. ~~REDACTED~~

149. Msg, (S) OONC 02525, OOAMA to SAC, "Malmstrom Echo Flight Incident," 7 Aug 67, Ex 34.

150. Interview, ALC David B. Gamble, Wing Historian, with Lt. Col. Elliott Coldwater, Deputy Commander for Engineering, SAMSO, Det 29, on 7 Nov 67.

transformers, and common mode suppression transformers for each Sensitive Command Network (SCN)/ Sensitive Information Network (SIN) circuit pair. ¹⁵¹ (U)

Boeing ECP 1141 dash 1 modifies the cable assembly set (launcher) by revising wiring to provide protection to Voice Reporting Signal Assemble (VRSA) Channels 26 and 27. ¹⁵² (U)

Boeing ECP 1141 dash 2 made another modification to the interconnecting box, by adding two isolation relays and reroutes wiring to connect relays into VRSA monitoring circuits. ¹⁵³ (U)

The FCIR, MCL will provide for alteration of sensing at RPIE and of monitor circuits to re-establish correlation of sensing and monitor reporting. ¹⁵⁴ (U)

SUPPORT-Security

Last quarter, the Wing's proposal for the removal of the Movement Security Alarm System of Re-entry vehicles G&C vans was agreed with by OOAMA engineers. This proposal was sent to Headquarters, SAC for concurrence. ¹⁵⁵ (U)

Headquarters, SAC in a message to OOAMA concurred with the Wing's proposal. It stated that the Movement Security System on

151. Engineering Change Proposal, "ECP No. 1221," submitted by Boeing Company, Ex 35.

152. Engineering Change Proposal, "ECP No. 1141-1," submitted by Boeing Company, Ex 36.

153. Engineering Change Proposal, "ECP No. 1141-2," submitted by Boeing Company, Ex 36.

154. Facilities Change Initiation Request, "FCIR, MCL No. 2827," submitted by Boeing Company, Ex 37.

155. History, 341st SMW, Apr - Jun 67, p 37.

VZCZCNIA761

PITTSBURGH RUWMBB 0011 219153Z ~~RUWMBB~~ RUWMBB 00A.

ZNY ~~RUWMBB~~

P 071507Z AUG 67

FM OAMA HILL AFB UTAH

TO RUCSAAA/SAC

INFO RUWBKNA/15AF MARCH AFB CALIF

RUWMBB 00A/34 STRATISLWG MALMSTROM AFB MONT

RUWMBB 00A/STATAF MALMSTROM AFB MONT

RUWTKIA/AFWL KIRTLAND AFB NMEX

R

~~S-1-1-1~~ OONC 02525 AUG 67

FOR DM7B. INFO: SAMSO (SMQB/SMQW/SMQY/SMQA/SMTGT D); 15AF (DM7B);

341SMW (DCM); SATAF (SAFETY) AND AFWL (WLRPE/CAIT CIKOTOS).

SUBJECT: MALMSTROM ECHO FLIGHT INCIDENT (U). REFERENCE: SAC

DM7B 077999, 25 JULY 1967, SAME SUBJECT.

TESTS ARE BEING CONDUCTED AT HILL ENGINEERING TEST FACILITY (HETF)

TO DETERMINE C-53D LOGIC COUPLER VULNERABILITY TO EMP TYPE NOISE.

PHASE I TESTS AT HETF HAVE BEEN COMPLETED. PHASE I TESTING CON-

SISTED OF A CORRELATION OF NOISE INPUTS ON THE C-53D COUPLER

INTERFACE TO SYSTEM NOISE RESPONSE. THE PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS

OF PHASE I TESTING INDICATES THAT MINUTEMAN II - V SYSTEM IS

VULNERABLE TO NOISE ON THE C-53D COUPLER INPUT INTERFACE LINES. FOUR

INPUT LINES IN THE C-53D WERE FOUND TO BE SUSCEPTIBLE TO INPUT NOISE

INJECTION WHICH RESULTED IN A NON EVO SYSTEM CONDITION. DETAILED

ANALYSIS HAS NOT BEEN FINALIZED TO DATE. COMPLETION EXPECTED WITHIN

PAGE 2 RUWMBB 0011 ~~RUWMBB~~

30 DAYS.

PHASE II TESTING AT THE HETF IS PRESENTLY BEING SCHEDULED TO BEGIN WITHIN 10 DAYS. THE PHASE II TESTING OBJECTIVE IS TO DETERMINE THE PERCENTAGE OF COUPLING FROM THE INPUT OF THE ESA PANEL TO THE INTERFACE OF THE LOGIC COUPLER.

THE PROBABILITY OF REOCCURRENCE OF THIS TYPE CANNOT BE DEFINED UNTIL SUCH TIME AS OAMA PHASE I AND PHASE II TEST PROGRAM ANALYSIS HAVE BEEN FINALIZED AND CORRELATE WITH THE SAMSO EMP TEST RESULTS IN A JOINT CONFERENCE. REFERENCE PARAGRAPH 2. CONFEREES AT THE WHITEMAN CONFERENCE REVIEWED THE TEST DATA FOR FORCE MOD EMP FIX. THE DATA INDICATED THAT THE PROPOSED FIX WAS EFFECTIVE. A DECISION WAS MADE THAT ADDITIONAL TESTING WOULD BE REQUIRED BY BOEING (1 - 1 WEEKS) TO VERIFY THAT SPECIFIC FREQUENCIES WERE SAFE IN FORCE MOD SYSTEMS. THIS TEST SHOULD BE COMPLETED BY 11 AUG 67. OAMA ENGINEERING INSPECTION AT MALMSTROM AFB OF THE INTERCONNECTING BOX AND ESA PANEL, MISSILE AWAY DRAWERS AT LCFS A701 AND E-01 ON 27-28 JULY 1967, ARE AS FOLLOWS: (1) INSPECTION INDICATED APPROXIMATELY 5 PERCENT OF THE ESA TERMINALS CHECKED HAD LOOSE CONNECTIONS (A QUALITY CONTROL PROBLEM) APPROXIMATELY 200 WERE CHECKED. NO SET PATTERN OF LOOSE CONNECTIONS NOTED ON SIN LINES OR COMMAND LINES. (2) INSPECTION OF INTERCONNECTING BOX FOR LOOSE CONNECTIONS, ARCING, BURNED AREAS

PAGE 1 OF 2

825/10-67-1069

AND TAMPERING. NO ABNORMALITIES WERE NOTED. () MISSILE AWAY
DRAWERS INVOLVED IN THE INCIDENT WERE CHECKED AND FOUND OPERATING AS
DESIGNED. OQAMA ENGINEERING PERSONNEL ARE PARTICIPATING WITH SAMSO
PERSONNEL DURING THE EMP TEST PROGRAM PROVIDING TECHNICAL DIRECTION ON
WEAPON SYSTEM TYPE PROBLEMS AS REQUIRED.

EMP TESTS AT WARREN AFB ARE CONTINUING. TESTS AT "D" FLIGHT HAVE BEEN
COMPLETED AND THE TEST OBJECTIVES HAVE BEEN MET. ADDITIONAL TESTS
ARE TO BE CONDUCTED AT A710 AND ARE SCHEDULED TO BE COMPLETED APPROXI-
MATELY 15 OCT 1967. SQUADRON 20 TESTS ARE SCHEDULED TO BEGIN APPROXI-
MATELY 15 OCT 1967 DEPENDING ON END DATE OF M74 TESTING.

THIS HEADQUARTERS WILL CONTINUE TO ADVISE YOU OF OQAMA'S TEST PROGRAM
AS TEST RESULTS AND FINDINGS ARE IDENTIFIED. GP74.
BT

~~SECRET~~
~~DOWNGRAD AT 2 YEAR INTERVALS~~
~~DECLASSIFY AFTER 12 YEARS~~

1		ENGINEERING CHANGE PROPOSAL			
2		CONTRACTOR'S RECOMMENDED PRIORITY			
3		CONTRACT NO.		CONTRACT ITEM NOMENCLATURE	
4		NAME OF PART OR SUBASSEMBLY AFFECTED		PART NO. (IF DIFFERENT) AFFECTED	
5		TITLE OF CHANGE		DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE	
6		This effort will include the following specific objectives:			
7		A. Formalize Form B's, Form C's, and Figure A Technical Requirements based on the preliminary SPA and Design Requirements for HIC EM Pulse Suppressor.			
8		DEVELOPMENTAL REQUIREMENTS			
9		ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS			
10		PRODUCTION EFFECTIVITY			
11		ESTIMATED COST FOR CHANGE IN PRODUCTION			
12		RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RETROFIT			
13		RETROACTIVE EFFECTIVITY		RECOMMENDED RECD.	

THE BOEING COMPANY
P.O. BOX 1700
SEATTLE 74, WASHINGTON

ENGINEERING CHANGE PROPOSAL

1 MODEL OR TYPE DESIGNATION: Figure A 1377 & 1377M
2 NO. DATE: 81205
3 SYSTEM DESIGNATION: WS-133A-M
4 PART NO.: 12217
5 REV: 2
6 CONTROL: R

2 CONTRACTOR'S RECOMMENDED PRIORITY: ☐ EMERGENCY ☐ URGENT ☒ NORMAL ☐ LOW PRIORITY

3 CONTRACT NO.:
CONTRACT ITEM NOMENCLATURE: Interconnecting Box
CONTRACT SPECIFICATION: See Page 3
APPLIED: ☒ YES ☐ NO

4 NAME OF PART OR SUBASSEMBLY AFFECTED: See Line 6
PART NO. (IF DIFFERENT) AFFECTED: See Page 3
IN REQD.: ☒ YES ☐ NO

5 TITLE OF CHANGE: HIC EM Pulse Suppressor

6 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:
This ECP will provide for Weapon System Implementation of a cost-effective HIC EMP Fix, a study of which was accomplished under CCP H972, the preliminary design of which was developed under CCP B1238, and which will be tested at an operational site under CCP B1185.

7 This effort will include the following specific objectives:

A. Formalize Form B's, Form C's, and Figure A Technical Requirements based on the preliminary SPA and Design Requirements for HIC EM Pulse Suppressor.

Continued on Page 10

7 JUSTIFICATION FOR CHANGE:
A. Extensive Electro-Magnetic Pulse (EMP) tests have shown that system anomalies occur in the WS-133A-M System as a result of noise generated from electrical discharge type pulses on the Hardened Intersite Cable (HIC). Modification of the Weapon System is required to eliminate these anomalies.

Continued on Page 11

8 DEVELOPMENTAL REQUIREMENTS:
See Line 6

9 ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS:
None

10 PRODUCTION EFFECTIVITY:

11 ESTIMATED COST FOR CHANGE IN PRODUCTION:

12 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RETROFIT:
To update delivered hardware.

Continued on Page 11

13 RETROACTIVE EFFECTIVITY: ☒ YES ☐ NO

ANALYSIS REVISION NOTICE		CONTRACTOR:	ARN NO:
		The Boeing Company	MA-338
ORIGINATOR:	SUBMITTAL DATE:	EFFECTIVITY:	
L. Proffitt	October 24, 1967	IM-VM, I-V	
CONTRACTOR APPROVAL:	BSO, STL APPROVAL:	ECP REF. NO:	
E. A. Melick, Jr. 10/20/67		ECP 1221	
VOLUME TITLE: Operational Ground Equipment Modernized Wing IV DZ-15800-1		SECT:	PAGE:
FORM, DWG. TITLE: Interconnecting Boxes, Fig. A 1377M Rev. C dated 8-9-67		NO:	SHT NO:
		1377M	1, 3
ACTION AND REASON			
Approval of this ARN will not result in a change to the revision code letter.			
<u>ACTION</u>			
1. Revise the second sentence of paragraph I.F. to read:			
"Requirements shall be met when the input is a 0 to 2200 volt pulse with a rise time of from 1 to 225 microseconds and the volt-time integral is the integral of the pulse shape described in DZ-18148 -4(S) dated 22 August, 1967."			
2. Revise paragraph II.H to read:			
"H.1, To limit voltage pulses at the output of the I-Box to values described in paragraphs I.F.1 and I.F.2, a suppression assembly containing an isolation type transformer, zener diodes and common mode rejection coil will be connected in each Command, HVC, and 494L circuit. For each SIN circuit, a suppression assembly similar to the Command line assembly will be provided that contains an inductor wired between the primary and secondary winding center taps of the isolation transformer for the Missile Away signal path."			
"H.2, Degradation of operational message reliability on lines noted resulting from functioning of the noise suppression assembly will be prevented by selection of components to limit the additional circuit inductance to be compatible with existing communication specifications."			
"H3, Introduction of unacceptable noise and signal degradation on other lines in the I-Box during functioning of the suppression assembly will be prevented by design of the input bundle assembly which assures that its shields are tied as closely as practicable to the outer shield of the input cable."			
"H4, Components shall be selected to accept the energy specified in paragraph I.F.5 without degradation."			
3. Revise Identification Spec. notation, sheet 3, to read:			
"See Identification Spec: S-133-111-1-100 (Wings I-V) S-133-111-1-145 (Wings IM-VM)"			
<u>REASON</u>			
To add revisions reviewed at ECP 1221/1141 In-Process Review dated 10/13/67. (See ARN MA-339 for ECP 1141 revisions).			

ANALYSIS REVISION NOTICE		INT-A TO:	ARN NO:
		The Boeing Company	VMA-133
ORIGINATOR:	SUBMITTAL DATE:	EFFECTIVITY:	
J. J. Wikert 10/27/57	10-24-57	VAFB LF's 02, 03, 06, 07 & 09	
CONTRACTOR APPROVAL:	BSD STL APPROVAL:	EIP REF. NO:	
W. A. Shook		1221	
VOLUME TITLE: Operational Ground Equipment:		SECT:	PAGE:
Unmodernized VAFB Supplement D2-12130 Vol. II			
FORM DWG. TITLE:	NO:	SHT NO:	
Figure A 1377.1 Rev. D 4-7-66 Interconnecting Boxes (Various)	1377.1	1 & 2	
ACTION AND REASON			
- Approval of this change will result in a change to the Figure A revision code.			
<u>ACTION</u>			
1. Revise first sentence I. B. to read as follows:			
"I. B. A method of connecting signals transmitted between the Launcher Support Building and the launcher equipments via the Cable Assembly Set, Launcher (Figure A 1248.1)"			
2. Revise Technical Requirement I. D. to read as follows:			
"I. D. A method of mating the site unique signals of the Cable System Pressurized, Hardened, SCN (Figure A 1339 or Figure A 9032M) to the site common signals of the Cable Assembly Set, Launcher (Figure A 1248.1)"			
3. Add Technical Requirement I. E. as follows:			
"I. E. Means shall be provided which shall meet the requirements listed below. Requirements shall be met when the input is a 0 to 2200 volt pulse with a rise time of from 1 to 225 microseconds and the volt-time integral is the integral of the pulse shape described in D2-18148-4(S) dated 22 August, 1967."			
The following HICS lines are referred to:			
Command			
SIN			
HVC (where applicable)			
Requirements:			
1. The Common mode (line to equipment chassis) voltage envelope on any line (listed above) at the output of the Interconnecting Box shall have a peak value of 600 volts if no sharp discharge occurs at the input. If a sharp discharge occurs at the input the voltage output shall not have a sharp discharge which is greater than 80 volts amplitude, nor shall the voltage output exceed the envelope defined by:			
$V(t) = \pm 100 e^{-.7ft} \text{ volts}$			
f = frequency (Hz)			
t = time (sec.)			

ANALYSIS REVISION NOTICE		CONTRACT NO.	FIG. NO.
ORIGINATOR: J. J. Wikert		SUBMITTAL DATE: 10-24-67	EFFECTIVITY: VAFB LF's 02, 03, 06, 07&09
CONTRACTOR APPROVAL: W. A. Shook		DSD, STL APPROVAL	ECP REF. NO: 1221
VOLUME TITLE: Operational Ground Equipment Unmodernized VAFB Supplement D2-12130, Vol. II		SECT:	PAGE:
FORM/DWG. TITLE: Figure A 1377.1 Rev. D, 4-7-66 Interconnecting Boxes (Various)		NO.: 1377.1	SHT NO.: 1 & 2
ACTION AND REASON			
<p>3. Add Technical Requirement I. E. as follows: (Cont'd)</p> <p>2. The signal mode (line to line) voltage envelope on any line pair (listed above) at the output of the Interconnecting Box shall have a peak value of 600 v maximum, and shall not exceed the limits defined by:</p> $V(t) = \pm 600 e^{-.7ft} \text{ volts}$ <p>3. Degradation of operational message reliability on the lines noted resulting from functioning of the noise suppression means shall not exceed allowable tolerances in existing communication system specifications.</p> <p>4. Functioning of the noise suppression means on the lines listed above shall not introduce unacceptable noise nor degrade signals on other lines through the I-Box that do not have noise suppression means.</p> <p>5. The means shall be capable of accepting at least .25 watt-second of energy in from 1 to 1000 microseconds without degradation.</p> <p>4. Add Recommended Solution II. G, as follows:</p> <p>"G. 1, To limit voltage pulses at the output of the I-Box to values described in paragraphs I. E. 1 and I. E. 2, a suppression assembly containing an isolation type transformer, zener diodes and common mode rejection coil will be connected in each command and HVC circuit. For each SIN circuit, a suppression assembly similar to the command line assembly will be provided that contains an inductor wired between the primary and secondary winding center taps of the isolation transformer for the Missile Away signal path."</p> <p>"G. 2, Degradation of operational message reliability on lines noted resulting from functioning of the noise suppression assembly will be prevented by selection of components to limit the additional circuit inductance to be compatible with existing communication specifications."</p> <p>"G. 3, Introduction of unacceptable noise and signal degradation on other lines in the I-Box during functioning of the suppression assembly will be prevented by design of the input bundle assembly which assures that its shields are tied as closely as practicable to the outer shield of the input cable."</p> <p>"G. 4, Components shall be selected to accept the energy specified in paragraph I.E. 5 without degradation."</p>			
REASON			
To add revisions reviewed at ECP 1221/1141 In-Process Review dated 10/13/67.			

ANALYSIS REVISION NOTICE		FORM NO. 1	REV. NO. 1
ORIGINATOR: J. Wilkert	SUBMITTAL DATE: October 24, 1967	EFFECTIVITY: VAFB LF's 04, 05 and 06	ARN NO.: VMA-137
CONTRACTOR APPROVAL: W. A. Shook	BSO, STL APPROVAL	ECP REF. NO.: ECP 1221	
VOLUME TITLE: Operational Ground Equipment Modernized VAFB Supplement D2-16119-	SECT:	PAGE:	
FORM, DWG. TITLE: Interconnecting Boxes, Figure A 1377MV, Rev. E dated 8-16-67	NO.: 1377MV	INT NO.: 1, 2	
ACTION AND REASON			
Approval of this ARN will result in a change to the revision code letter.			
<u>ACTION</u>			
1. Revise the second sentence of paragraph I. F. to read: "Requirements shall be met when the input is a 0 to 2200 volt pulse with a rise time of from 1 to 225 microseconds and the volt-time integral is the integral of the pulse shape described in D2-18148-4(S) dated 22 August, 1967."			
2. Revise paragraph II. H to read: "H. 1, To limit voltage pulses at the output of the I-Box to values described in paragraphs I. F. 1 and I. F. 2, a suppression assembly containing an isolation type transformer, zener diodes and common mode rejection coil will be connected in each command, HVC, and 494L circuit. For each SIN circuit, a suppression assembly similar to the command line assembly will be provided that contains an inductor wired between the primary and secondary winding center taps of the isolation transformer for the Missile Away signal path." "H. 2, Degradation of operational message reliability on lines noted resulting from functioning of the noise suppression assembly will be prevented by selection of components to limit the additional circuit inductance to be compatible with existing communication specifications." "H3, Introduction of unacceptable noise and signal degradation on other lines in the I-Box during functioning of the suppression assembly will be prevented by design of the input bundle assembly which assures that its shields are tied as closely as practicable to the outer shield of the input cable." "H4, Components shall be selected to accept the energy specified in paragraph I. F. 5 without degradation."			
<u>REASON</u>			
To add revisions reviewed at ECP 1221/1141 In-Process Review dated 10/13/67.			

Line 6 - DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE: (Continued from Page 1)

- B. Provide detail engineering design, specifications and documentation for modifying Figure A's 1377 and 1377M - Interconnecting (I) Box. This modification will consist of the addition of sub-assemblies within the existing I-Box. One sub-assembly will contain zener diodes, isolation transformers and common mode rejection coils for each SCN/SDN, 494L and Status line CIRCUIT PAIRS mounted on a sheet metal bracket and electrically connected by means of a separate wire bundle. The existing wire bundle in the I-Box will also be modified. When a site has operational Hardened Voice Channel (HVC) circuits connected for use, a second sub-assembly using zener diodes, isolation transformer and common mode rejection coils will be added.

Note: This change for Figure A 1377 and 1377M is as follows:

Figure A 1377 (Wings III, V, VAFB, METF and CAFB) for inclusion of accommodation of EMP protection for SCN/SDN, Hardened Voice Channel (HVC) and Status lines.

Figure A 1377M (Wings I, II, IV, VAFB, STP III, NRA and EDL) for SCN/SDN, HVC and 494L.

- C. Provide special tools required for Figure A's 1377 and 1377M kit installation and checkout in the field.
- D. This ECP will provide a Wing IV Type Figure A 1377M Interconnecting Box for STP III.
- E. Fabricate production prototypes and provide kits and engineering for EDL and NRA/STP III evaluation. Additional Qualification Tests are not recommended.
- F. Identify weight change to the Figure A's 1377 and 1377M Interconnecting Box.
- G. Revise ACO 6359 and ACO 8302 documentation to allow physical and electrical connection with the revised Figure A's 1377 and 1377M Interconnecting Box.
- H. This ECP 1221 change shall be incorporated concurrently with ECP 1141.
- I. Analysis Revision Notices for Figure A's 1377M, 1377.1 and 1377MV are submitted herewith for approval.

Line 7 - JUSTIFICATION FOR CHANGE: (Continued from Page 1)

- B. If this change is not incorporated, operational status of WS-133A-M is jeopardized under electrical disturbance environments.
- C. Program Priority - Expedited handling to provide earliest possible incorporation at Wing I F/M.
- D. Failure data is not applicable.
- E. End Item Reliability:
There are no Contractual Requirements for the Figure A's 1377 & 1377M; a reliability estimate will be prepared as part of the In-Process Review. R

Line 12 - RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RETROFIT: (Continued from Page 1)

This ECP does not require Contractor installation of this change. Notwithstanding this fact, it is recommended that Contractor accomplish the installation effort.

Kit validation for the Wing I version and the Wings II through V modernized version to be accomplished at STP III. TCOT Verification and Kit Proofing is not recommended. R

Line 13 - TCOT REQUIRED: (Continued from Page 1)

Prepare Form 118B and coordinate with affected Air Force Organisation. R
Prepare Record Type Time Compliance Technical Order No. 24X-LW30-885 R
for Figure A's 1377 and 1377M under contract AF4(824)-885 in accordance with MIL-T-9835A, dated 31 December 1963.

Lines 16, 17, 18, 19, 20:

All items that are not checked (x) are not affected.

Line 17 - TARGETING PARAMETERS: (Continued from Page 2)

Targeting Parameters are not affected.

Line 18 - MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES: (Continued from Page 2)

In accordance with the requirements of ESD 52-62 Maintenance Analysis Form C/C₁'s will be revised for Figure A's 137M, 1377.1 and 1377V. Revision will be for organizational and field level and depot Form C/C₁'s.

R

'Zero' Indenture Form C's will be revised to support in Process Design Review in lieu of CDR and PDR.

The revised Maintenance Analysis for Figure A 137M, will be reviewed and Air Force Specialty Codes, Team Codes and Task Proficiency Level Codes will be established or revised as required for the Personnel Data and Personnel Information section's.

Develop maintainability criteria for the revised Figure A's 137M, 1377.1 and 1377V.

R

R

Prepare a maintainability presentation for in Process Design Review.

Line 18 - OVERHAUL/REWORK METHODS: (Continued from Page 2)

Depot tooling is not affected.

Line 18 - NOMENCLATURE: (Continued from Page 2)

Revised Nomenclature will be requested for the Figure A's 1377 and 1377M.

R

Line 18 - SPARE PARTS EXHIBIT: (Continued from Page 2)

The priced Spare Parts Exhibit will be affected by this change.

Line 18 - INTERCHANGEABILITY: (Continued from Page 2)

Interchangeability is affected by this change.

Line 19 - TRAINERS: (Continued from Page 2)

R

|

For the T-11 Trainer see the attached Training Equipment Supplement.

R

Line 19 - DATA/PUBLICATIONS: (Continued from Page 2)

T.O.'s Affected:

Contract TED:

21M-LGM30A-2-21	LAUNCH FACILITY & LAUNCH CONTROL FACILITY INTRASITE CABLING - WING I	
21M-LGM30A-2-21-1	LAUNCH FACILITY & LAUNCH CONTROL FACILITY INTRASITE CABLING - WAFB	
21M-LGM30B-2-21-2	LAUNCH FACILITY & LAUNCH CONTROL FACILITY INTRASITE CABLING - WING III	
21M-LGM30B-2-21-1	LAUNCH FACILITY & LAUNCH CONTROL FACILITY INTRASITE CABLING - WING II	
21M-LGM30B-2-21-3	LAUNCH FACILITY & LAUNCH CONTROL FACILITY INTRASITE CABLING - WING IV	
21M-LGM30B-2-21-4	LAUNCH FACILITY & LAUNCH CONTROL FACILITY INTRASITE CABLING - WING V	
21M-LGM30A-4-1	LGM30A/B WEAPON SYSTEM ILLUSTRATED PARTS BREAKDOWN	
21M-LGM30A-4-1-1	LGM30A/B/F W.S. - CTL ILLUSTRATED PARTS BREAKDOWN	R

Line 20 - INTERFACE: (Continued from Page 2)

ICMGA 8420 records the interface effect on Boeing and Bendix equipment and interface documents.

R
R

Line 22 - DEVELOPMENT STATUS: (Continued from Page 2)

Conduct of In-Process Review in lieu of FTR, CDR or Data package submittal is recommended. Technical approval at the In-Process Review shall constitute approval for the contractor to proceed with subsequent effort.

First Article Configuration Inspection (FACI) and Team Acceptance Review (TAR) are not recommended.

THE BOEING COMPANY
3800 BOEING
TACOMA, WASHINGTON

ENGINEERING CHANGE PROPOSAL

1	MODEL OF THE DESIGNATION See Dash No's	NO. 81205	DATE OF PROPOSAL 7-17-56	1141	TYPE R	FOR ALL
2	CONTRACTS RESPONSIBILITY <input type="checkbox"/> CONTRACT <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DESIGN <input type="checkbox"/> FABRIC <input type="checkbox"/> COMPLETION					
3	CONTRACT NO. See Dash No's	CONTRACT SPECIFICATION SPEC NO. S-153-111-1-100		AFFECTED <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO		
4	NAME OF PARTY REQUESTING CHANGE See Dash No's	DATE OF REQUEST 10	DATE OF PROPOSAL See Dash No's	IN PROGRESS <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO		
5	BRIEF SUMMARY OF CHANGE Provide Protection for Magistor Lines for VSC Channels 26 and 27.					
6	<p>A. Background:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> In response to OMA direction Contractor conducted studies of Launch Facility vulnerability from the Soft Support Building (OSSE Project Control Number 22-1-10-100, WIP 0005-1000). These studies led to OMA direction, via letter OMAEC dated 11 February 1956, that an ECP be submitted. Contractor's response, letter 2-1102-26-070, was submitted 19 May 1956. <p>(Continued on Page 3)</p>					
	<p>DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE To prevent equipment damage and/or failure from overvoltages below 2000 volts. If this change is not incorporated the resistor lines for VSC channels 26 and 27 will not be protected against overvoltages below 2000 volts.</p>		<p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> APPROVED BY CONTRACTOR AND OMA/CONED by letter dated 11 Feb. 1956</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> APPROVED BY CONTRACTOR</p> <p>1. CONTRACTOR'S RESPONSE TO OMA/CONED 2. BY THE CONTRACTOR'S RESPONSE 3. BY THE CONTRACTOR'S RESPONSE</p>			
8	RECOMMENDATION FOR APPROVAL See Dash No's					
9	RECOMMENDATION FOR APPROVAL See Dash No's					
10	RECOMMENDATION FOR APPROVAL See Dash No's					
11	RECOMMENDATION FOR APPROVAL See Page					
12	RECOMMENDATION FOR APPROVAL See Dash No's					
13	APPROVED BY CONTRACTOR				<p>11/11/56 10:00 AM</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO</p>	

ANALYSIS REVISION NOTICE		CONTRACTOR: The Boeing Company	ACFNO: VMA-33
ORIGINATOR: <i>C. Wenger</i> C. Wenger	SUBMITTAL DATE: 4-7-66	EFFECTIVITY: VAFB-LF-05 & LF-08	
CONTRACTOR APPROVAL: W. A. Shook	350 SHL APPROVAL:	ECP REF. NO: 1141	
VERSION TITLE: OGE System Specification S-133-11 Modernized VAFB Supp. D2-16119-1		SECT:	PAGE: 150
FORM / DWG TITLE: Fig. A 1377MV, Rev. B dated 8-3-65 Interconnecting Boxes		NO: 1377MV	SHT NO: 1
ACTION AND REASON			
<p>Approval of this change will result in a change to the Figure A revision code.</p> <p><u>ACTION</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Add the following technical requirement to paragraph I. B. "VRSA monitor lines for equipment in the Launcher Support Building require a means to prevent equipment damage to the Programmer Group (Figure A 1201) from overvoltages up to 2000 volts." Add the following recommended solution to Part II: "Isolation relays will be provided in the monitor lines for VRSA channels 26 and 27 to prevent equipment damage to the Programmer Group (Figure A 1201) due to overvoltages below 2000 volts." <p><u>REASON</u></p> <p>OOAMA/OONEO letter dated Feb. 11, 1966, directed that an ECP be submitted. The ECP is to prevent Launch Facility vulnerability from the support building. VRSA channels 26 and 27 are used to monitor equipment in the support building and overvoltage protection is not presently provided for overvoltages under 2000 volts.</p>			
Sht. 1 of 1			

27
20

Line 6 DESTRUCTION of CH WIP: (Continued from Page 3)

I. Publication Affected by this Change: (Continued)

T.O. Numbers:

Contract -740:

21M-LGM30B-2-21-3	LF & LCF INTRASITE CABLING (WING VI ONLY)
21M-LGM30B-2-21-4	LF & LCF INTRASITE CABLING (WING V ONLY)
21M-LGM30A-4-1	LGM30A/B WEAPON SYSTEM ILLUSTRATED PARTS BREAKDOWN.

R

Pursuant to Part I, Item 813 of Contract AF04(094)-740, changes and/or revisions to the above Technical Orders to incorporate the effects of this ECP will be accomplished within the scope of basic Contract -740. Issuance of a CCB Directive for this ECP shall constitute authority for incorporation of effects of this change in the affected Technical Manuals.

- J. This change can be implemented with no interface effect on Associate Contractor equipment, drawings or documentation.
- K. Items in lines 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 which are not checked (x) are not affected.
- L. Neither hardware reliability nor the reliability contractual statement is affected by this change.
- M. Contractor proposes to conduct a kit verification at STP III. This will avoid a delay in the delivery of operational kits expected to result from a kit proofing.

5

SIGNATURE AND ADDRESS THE BOEING COMPANY P.O. BOX 360 SEATTLE 24, WASHINGTON		ENGINEERING CHANGE PROPOSAL		DATE	
1	MODEL OR TYPE DESIGNATION Figure A 1248	VERSION 81205	SYSTEM DESIGNATION WS-133A	ECP NO. 1141-1	REV R
2	LIMITATIONS RECOMMENDED PART-TO- <input type="checkbox"/> INTERCHANGE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SWAP <input type="checkbox"/> ROUTINE <input type="checkbox"/> COMPATIBILITY				
3	CONTRACT NO.	CONTRACT END ITEM SIGNATURE Cable Assembly Set, Launcher	CONTRACT SPECIFICATION SPEC NO. --- DRAWING --- AFFECTED <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO		
4	NAME OF PARTS ELEMENT TO BE AFFECTED Cable Assembly Set, Launcher	PARTS AFFECTED ITEM AFFECTED NO	No Change IN PROG. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO		
5	TITLE OF CHANGE Provide Protection for Monitor Lines for VRSA Channels 26 and 27				
6	DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE A. This change will require the revision of the following schematic drawings to change the nomenclature on cabling affected: 21-52047 21-53557 21-54327 21-52987 21-53527 21-53407 21-54320 B. Figure A 1248 hardware will not be affected. C. Interchangeability: The functional interchangeability of the Figure A 1248 cables will not be affected by this change. D. Items in lines 10, 12, 13, 19 and 20 which are not checked (x) are not affected.				
7	DISTRIBUTION FOR CHANGE See ECP 11412 <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; width: fit-content;"> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> APPROVED BY PROCESSING OFFICE FOR OF ... See ECP 11412 <input type="checkbox"/> INITIATED BY CONTRACTOR FOR 1 COMPLIANCE WITH NEW OR REVISED SPEC 2 FOR TECHNICAL/QUALITY REPORTING 3 OTHER </div>				
8	DEVELOPMENTAL REQUIREMENTS None, the development of Figure A 1248 has been completed.				
9	ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS None				
10	PRODUCTION EFFECTIVITY				
11	ESTIMATED COST FOR CHANGE (REF. 2) \$ --- See ECP 11412 page				
12	RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RETURN N/A				
13	RETROACTIVE EFFECTIVITY N/A <div style="float: right;"> SCFM WS/TCIO RECD. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO 8 </div>				

PREPARED BY AND ADDRESS THE BOEING COMPANY P.O. BOX 350 SEATTLE 24, WASHINGTON		ENGINEERING CHANGE PROPOSAL		PART	
1	MODEL OR TYPE DESIGNATION Figure A 1377	WDG CODE 81205	SYSTEM DESIGNATION WS-133A	LIT NO. 1141-2	REV R
2	CONTRACTOR'S DESIGNATED PRIORITY <input type="checkbox"/> LOW <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> MEDIUM <input type="checkbox"/> HIGH <input type="checkbox"/> CRITICAL <input type="checkbox"/> COMPATIBILITY				
3	CONTRACT NO. Interconnecting Box	CONTRACT END ITEM NUMBER AND REL Interconnecting Box	CONTRACT SPECIFICATION SPEC NO. See page 3 EWG NO. See page 3		
4	NAME OF PART OR ITEM ASSEMBLY AFFECTED Interconnecting Box	PART NO. OR IDENTIFIER AFFECTED See page 3	IN PROD. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO		
5	TITLE OF CHANGE Provide Protection for Monitor Lines for VRSA Channels 26 and 27				
6	DEVELOPER'S COMMENTS A. This change will add (2) two isolation relays to the Interconnecting Box and reroute the wiring so as to connect these relays into the VRSA monitoring circuits. B. The MCL for the "Phase Two" power fix will alter the sensing at the RPDE end of the monitor circuits to re-establish the correlation of sensing and monitor reporting as defined under ECP 857 R2. C. Interchangeability: The configuration of the Figure A 1377 Interconnecting Box resulting from this change will not be interchangeable with prior configurations of the item. D. Items in lines 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 which are not checked (x) are not affected.				
7	DISPOSITION OF CHANGE See ECP 1141 R				
8	DEVELOPMENTAL REQUIREMENTS None, the development of Figure A 1377 has been completed.				
9	ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS None				
10	PRODUCTION EFFECTIVITY See ECP 1141, Page				
11	ESTIMATED COST FOR CHANGE IN PRODUCTION See ECP 1141, Page				
12	RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REPORT See ECP 1141, Page				
13	RECOMMENDATION FOR ACTION <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO				

FIRM NAME AND ADDRESS THE BOEING COMPANY P.O. BOX 3583 SEATTLE, WASH. 98124 (BOE 720)		ENGINEERING CHANGE PROPOSAL FACILITY		DATE 27 December 1966	
1	ML NO ATTACHMENT A1 2827	WFC CODE	SYSTEM DESIGNATION WS113A	ECP NO. 528	TYPE F
2	CONTRACTOR'S RECOMMENDED PRIORITY <input type="checkbox"/> EMERGENCY <input type="checkbox"/> URGENT <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ROUTINE <input type="checkbox"/> COMPATIBILITY				
3	CONTRACT END ITEM NOMENCLATURE Launch Facility				
4	NAME OF PART OR LOWEST ASSEMBLY AFFECTED Launch Facility Support Building				
5	TITLE OF CHANGE DC Supply for Isolation Relays - VRSA Channels 26 and 27 (LF)				
6	DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE Provide DC supply for the isolation relays being installed in VRSA channels 26 and 27 per ECP 1141. A typical DC supply circuit for these relays is shown on Attachment A Sketch 1. ADDITIONAL DESCRIPTION: Instructions for retest of VRSA Channels 26 and 27 and for personnel and weapon-system safety will be required.				
7	JUSTIFICATION FOR CHANGE The isolation relays are being installed in VRSA channels 26 and 27 per ECP 1141. The DC power required for these relays is to be supplied from the RPIE power System. This FCIR initiates the required RPIE change.				
8	DEVELOPMENTAL REQUIREMENTS N/A REQUESTED BY PROCURING ACTIVITY PER REF: <u>FWG Meeting 90</u> DATE: <u>29 November 66</u> ATTACHMENT B PAGE <u>6</u>				
9	ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS No alternate solutions are considered feasible A/E DESIGN REQ'D <u>Yes</u> DATE <u>TBD</u>				
10	RECOMMENDED PRODUCTION EFFECTIVITY N/A				
11	ESTIMATED COST FOR CHANGE IN PRODUCTION N/A				
12	RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RETROFIT Retrofit required to provide wiring changes for isolation relays to be installed by ECP 1141				
13	RECOMMENDED PRODUCTION EFFECTIVITY VAFB, LFs 02 - 09; MAFB, EAFB, MTAFB, WAFB, FEWAFB - All Flights HETFB, -LFSB MOCKUP AFFECTED <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO				

Item 16 - EFFECT ON OPERATIONAL EMPLOYMENT

Service Life

This change, together with the associated ECP 1141, will improve service life of the VRSA channels 26 and 27 by protecting them from damage by overvoltages below 2000 volts.

Item 19 - EFFECT ON LOGISTIC SUPPORT MATERIALS

Data/Publications

<u>SAC-CEM</u>	<u>VAFB</u> <u>(WG. I,II)</u>	<u>VAFB</u> <u>(WG III,V)</u>	<u>MAFB</u>	<u>EAFB</u>	<u>MTAFB</u>	<u>WAFB</u>	<u>FEWAFB</u>
21-SM80A-2-21 Power Generation and Distribution	-1		-2				
21-SM80B-2-21 Power Generation and Distribution		-5		-1	-2	-3	-4

Item 20 - OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

Interface

This is a companion facility change to Boeing ECP 1141. ICWGA 8026 records required action steps.

MINUTEMAN FACILITY CHANGE INITIATION REQUEST			
MCL NO. <u>2827</u>	DATE _____	FECP NO. <u>528</u>	
(FOR 8150 USE ONLY)			
ORIGINATOR AND SERIAL NO. ① Boeing 720	DATE PREPARED ② 31 Oct. 1966	NEED DATE ③ 15 Aug. 1967	INTERFACE AFFECTED ④ YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/>
SUBJECT ⑤ DC Supply for Isolation Relays - VRSA Channels 26 and 27 (LF)			
DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE (USE ADDITIONAL SHEETS IF REQUIRED) ⑥ (ATTACH DWG'S AND SKETCHES) Provide DC supply for the isolation relays being installed in VRSA channels 26 and 27 per ECP 1141. A typical DC supply circuit for these relays is shown on Sketch 1.			
JUSTIFICATION (USE ADDITIONAL SHEETS IF REQUIRED) ⑦ The isolation relays are being installed in VRSA channels 26 and 27 per ECP 1141. The DC power required for these relays is to be supplied from the RPIE power system. This FCIR initiates the required RPIE change.			
ESTIMATED COST ⑧ <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between; align-items: center;"> <div>4 MH at \$11 = \$44</div> <div>Mat'l = 1</div> </div> <div style="text-align: right;">TOTAL = \$45</div>			
DOCUMENTS AFFECTED ⑨		RECOMMENDED EFFECTIVITY: ⑩	
DRAWINGS _____	BASE	CONSTR. PHASE	A & CO PHASE
SPECIFICATIONS _____	Wing I		All LFs
MASTER EQUIPMENT LIST _____	Wing II		All LFs
MANUALS _____	Wing III		All LFs
FIG. A AND FORM C <u>Fig. A 1377 and 1329</u>	Wing V		All LFs
OTHER <u>ICWGA 8026</u>	VAFB		All W133A LFs
	HETF		W133A LF
	Wing IV		All LFs

11/23
 11/23
 11/23

1. MCL NO. 2827	MINUTEMAN WEAPON SYSTEM FACILITIES WORKING GROUP ACTION SHEET	2. DAY MONTH YEAR DATE: 29 November 1966 SUPERSEDES ISSUE OF:
------------------------	---	---

3. THE PROPOSED FACILITY CHANGE AS DESIGNATED BY THE MCL NUMBER IN BLOCK 1. ABOVE WAS REVIEWED AT FWG MEETING NO. 90

ACTION TAKEN ON THIS CHANGE WAS:

☐ 1. APPROVED AS WRITTEN

☒ 2. APPROVED WITH FOLLOWING CHANGES OR COMMENTS

☐ 3. RETURNED TO ORIGINATOR: ☐ AS NOT JUSTIFIED: ☐ FOR ADDITIONAL JUSTIFICATION FOR FOLLOWING REASON:

The FWG classified this FCIR for design action. A Routine priority FECF 528 will be submitted to the CCB for final determination. Work with ECP 1141 and if approved accomplish concurrently.

☐ SKETCHES ATTACHED TO CHANGE ARE ADEQUATE

☒ SKETCHES WILL BE PROVIDED BY THE A/E ON TBD

4. CLASSIFICATION OF CHANGE: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CLASS I <input type="checkbox"/> CLASS II	6. PRIORITY FOR CHANGE: <input type="checkbox"/> EMERGENCY <input type="checkbox"/> URGENT <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ROUTINE	8. FACILITY AREA AFFECTED: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> LF <input type="checkbox"/> LCF <input type="checkbox"/> SMSB <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER
5. INTERFACE AFFECTED: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO ECP ACTION REQUIRED: <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO	7. ESTIMATED COST FOR CHANGE: Labor 4 MH at \$11 = \$44 Mat'l = 1 \$45/Fac	9. FACILITY AFFECTED: LFSB

EFFECTIVITY FOR CHANGE			
BASE	TO BE ACCOMPLISHED BY CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTOR	BASE	TO BE ACCOMPLISHED BY ASSEMBLY AND CHECKOUT CONTRACTOR
VAFB		VAFB	LF's 02-09
WING I MAFB		WING I MAFB	All Flights
WING II EAFB		WING II EAFB	All Flights
WING III MTAFB		WING III MTAFB	All Flights
WING IV WAFB		WING IV WAFB	All Flights
WING V FEWAFB		WING V FEWAFB	All Flights
WING VI GFAFB		WING VI GFAFB	
SQDN 20 MAFB		SQDN 20 MAFB	
ETF HAFB		ETF HAFB	LFSB

7.3 INFORMATION IN THIS ICERT IS:

[REDACTED]

DOCUMENT DECLASSIFIED PER
HQ AFSPC/DOXN 27 Apr 95 and
OO-ALC/LME 27 Jul 95.

HISTORY

OF

DXIH 68,0356

341ST STRATEGIC MISSILE WING
AND 341ST COMBAT SUPPORT GROUP

1 October to 31 December 1967

P.R.C.
(Unclassified Title)

Assigned to the [REDACTED]

FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE, STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND

Permanently Stationed at

MALMSTROM AIR FORCE BASE, GREAT FALLS, MONTANA

William D. Napton
WILLIAM D. NAPTON, Sgt, USAF
Historian

John W. Carroll
for JOHN W. CARROLL, Col, USAF
Wing Commander

COPY (1) OF FOUR COPIES

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

6-4643-11
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atc 24

CABLE OF CONTENTS FOREWORD CHRONOLOGY CHAPTER I CHAPTER II CHAPTER III

This volume is classified ~~TOP SECRET~~ to conform to the classification of the information in the source documents. It will be handled in accordance with the provisions of AFR 205-1, as amended.

This volume contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws (Title 18, U.S.C., sections 793 and 794), the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

This volume has been placed in downgrading group 3, which is the highest downgrade group assigned to the information in the source documents. The historians analysis and consolidation of information from many sources, which individually may have a lower downgrade provisions, results in a synthesis which may have a wider implication than the material on which it is based. Therefore, individual downgrade instructions for each paragraph are not included, and all portions of this volume will be handled under the overall downgrading group.

The remaining bank of batteries were removed from the LCF on 10 October and replaced with new batteries on 14 October. The LCF was examined and found to be in operational status and was brought back to alert status on 15 October. The investigation of the incident could not discover the cause of the incident, but it was believed to be a freak incident.⁹¹ (U)

MISSILE INCIDENTS - Echo Flight Testing

In direct relation to the Echo Flight incident as covered in the April - June 1967 History of the 341st SMW was the Electro Magnetic Pulse (EMP) testing conducted throughout the quarter. The EMP tests were conducted by SAMSO, later joined in the testing by the Boeing Company. The EMP tests by SAMSO and Boeing were to discover the weak spots in the different type of Minuteman configurations within the EMP field. Whenever a weak or faulty area was found, an ECP was to be initiated to correct the discrepancy, or eliminate it.⁹² (U)

The EMP tests were conducted at LF Sierra-39 of the 564th SMS. The tests were scheduled to last until mid-January 1968, but could be extended if there were still apparent problem areas to investigate. The primary reason for the Boeing tests were to determine EMP affects on the Real Property Installed Equipment (RPIE) of the Minuteman sites. During the tests, various voltages of electricity were inserted into the equipment on the site to

91. Taken from the files of TAD, 24 Oct 67, by Sgt William D. Napton, Wing Historian.

92. Interview, Sgt William D. Napton, Wing Historian, with Lt. Col E. Coldwater, SATAE Engineer, 6 Feb 68.

simulate a lightning strike, and observe the effect of this situation on the various equipment.⁹³ (P)

One of the primary theoris of the Echo Flight incident was connected with some type of adverse power effect. All test conducted toward this end proved negative results. The EMP tests at Sierra-39 were considered to be the final series of tests in this area.⁹⁴ (P)

Personnel of the Air Force Special Weapons Command, Kirkland AFB, New Mexico, joined SAMSO and Boeing personnel in observing the EMP tests from 14 November through 15 December. The Sylvania Electronic Company also sent representative's to the site to discuss the field of lightening effects and EMP. Due to the interest generated by the EMP tests it was estimated they would be carried on into mid-1968.⁹⁵ (P)

SUPPORT - TRANSPORTATION

Malmstrom had 696 vehicles authorized and 918 vehicles assigned during the quarter. Support of Force Modernization caused the overage in assigned vehicles. The average monthly millage of the 341st TRAns alone was approximately 580,000 miles. Combined with the other units that were involved in vehicle transportation, the

93. Interview, Sgt William D. Napton, Wing Historian, with Lt. Col. E. Coldwater, SATAF Engineer, 6 Feb 68.

94. Ibid.

95. Ibid.

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3K2A/15TH AF MARCH AFB CALIF

RIP H B O Z / 641 S M W MALMSTROM AFB MONT

RUHMDAA/AFPRO THE BOEING CO SEATTLE WASH

FRID / 64 / NORTH AMERICAN AVIATION AUTONETICS DIV ANAHEIM CALIF

INFO RUEFIA/HDQRS AFLC WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB OHIO

FROM JABA/BSO NORTON AFB CALIF

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CONFIDENTIAL MAR 67

FOR: SAC/DW7B, DE: 15AF/DN4C, DE: 341 SWH/DCH; BOEING (D.J.)

DOWNING-MINUTEMAN ENGINEERING; AUTOMETICS/H. H. R. HEATH.

INFO: HDRQS AFLC WRIGHT PATTERSON AFB MCNC (COL MORRISON); BSD/BSS

ESCR, BScG

SUBJECT: WING I, E FLIGHT, INCIDENT

1. A TASK GROUP MEETING CONVENED AT OAKA ON 28 MARCH 1957 TO

REVIEW THE RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION TO DATE. REPRESENTATIVES FROM

BOEING COMPANY, AUTONETICS, OGCMA, AND 15TH AF WERE REPRESENTED.

2. IT IS THE POSITION OF THE TASK GROUP THAT INSUFFICIENT DATA EXISTS

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PAGE 2 RUWMB20034

TO RESOLVE THIS PROBLEM, OR TO DEFINITELY ADEQUATE ENGINEERING ANALYSIS TASKS WITHOUT ADDITIONAL TESTING. A REVIEW OF AVAILABLE DATA STRONGLY SUGGESTS THIS TO BE A WING I PECULIAR PROBLEM. THE OOMAA ETF IS NOT A WING I FACILITY. IT IS, THEREFORE, NECESSARY TO RUN THE PROPOSED TESTS AT MALSTROM, PREFERABLY AT ECHO B. IT IS CURRENTLY BELIEVED THAT FRUITFUL DATA WILL NOT EXIST UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THE NO-GO MODE CAN BE REPRODUCED AT LEAST AT THE LF LEVEL.

3. THE FOLLOWING PLAN OF ACTION WAS AGREED UPON BY ALL REPRESENTATIVES. DEVELOP A TEST PLAN WHICH, AFTER ISOLATING AN LF FROM THE SYSTEM, ALLOW FOR THE APPLICATION OF STIMULI WHICH WILL REPRODUCE THE NO-GO AT THE LF LEVEL. AFTER ANALYSIS OF SUCH TEST DATA, PROCEEDING AS REQUIRED TO TEST OR ANALYZE AT THE LCF LEVEL. THE TASK GROUP WILL CONVENE AT BOEING, SEATTLE ON 4 APRIL TO DEVELOP A TEST PLAN AND PROCEDURES. SUCH PLAN WILL INCLUDE EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS, LF ISOLATION PROCEDURES, DEFINE TESTS TO BE PERFORMED, AND BE REVIEWED FOR SAFETY. THE PLAN WILL RECEIVE SAFETY CLEARANCE THROUGH CONE, AND WILL BE COORDINATED WITH SAC AS REQUIRED. COMPLETION DATE FOR THE PLAN IS AIMED AT 5 MAY 1967. THE PLAN WILL BE DEVELOPED AND PROTOTYPED, AT THE INRA FACILITY AT BOEING. 4. ADDITIONAL INVESTIGATIVE ENGINEERING STUDIES ARE IN PROCESS, AND WILL CONTINUE. BOEING IS ATTEMPTING TO OBTAIN AN EXHIBIT 7KVA TRANS-

PAGE 3 RUWMB20034

FORMER WHICH WAS REPORTED TO HAVE SHORTED A FEW HOURS AFTER THE INCIDENT. A WEAR/DOWN REPORT ON THE TRANSFORMER WILL BE DEVELOPED BY BOEING ENGINEERING. DEPENDENT UPON THE ANALYSIS OF THIS TRANSFORMER, AND ITS FAILURE MODE, ADDITIONAL TESTS MAY BE REQUESTED SIMILAR TO THE POWER TESTS RUN ON 28 MARCH 1967, AT MALSTROM WITH THE ADDED TRANSFORMER FAILURE MODE SIMULATION. YOU WILL BE FURTHER ADVISED WITH RESPECT TO THIS ACTIVITY.

5. CONCURRENCE IN THE USE OF ECHO B FOR TESTING OUTLINED IN PARAGRAPH (3) IS REQUESTED. PLANNING FACTORS AT THIS TIME ARE FOR A PERIOD OF SIX WEEKS BEGINNING 15 MAY 1967. YOU WILL BE ADVISED OF ANY SHIFT IN THESE TARGET DATES. GP-4.

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FM OQAMA/HILL AFB UTAH

TO RUCSAAA/SAC

RUWBNKA/15TH AF WARCH AFB CALIF

RUWNBAA/341SNW WALNSTROM AFB MONT

RUWNBAA/APPRO THE BOEING CO SEATTLE WASH

RUWNBQA/NORTH AMERICAN AVIATION AUTONETICS DIV ANAHEIM CALIF

INFO RUEDFIA/HDRS AFLO WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB OHIO

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ GONE 01012 MAR 67

FOR: SAC/DW7B, DE; 15AF/DWAC, DE; 341 SNW/DCM; BOEING (D.J.

DOWING-MINUTEMAN ENGINEERING); AUTONETICS/MR H.R. HEATH.

INFO: HDRQS AFLO WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB MONT (COL MORRISON); BSO/BSS,

BSQR, BSQM

SUBJECT: WING I, E FLIGHT INCIDENT

1. A TASK GROUP MEETING CONVENED AT OQAMA ON 28 MARCH 1967, TO REVIEW THE RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION TO DATE. REPRESENTATIVES FROM BOEING COMPANY, AUTONETICS, OQAMA, AND 15TH AF WERE REPRESENTED.

2. IT IS THE POSITION OF THE TASK GROUP THAT INSUFFICIENT DATA EXISTS

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PAGE 2 RUHNBAG0934 8-6-78
TO RESOLVE THIS PROBLEM, OR TO DEFINITIZE ADEQUATE ENGINEERING ANALYSIS TASKS WITHOUT ADDITIONAL TESTING. A REVIEW OF AVAILABLE DATA STRONGLY SUGGESTS THIS TO BE A WING I PARTICULAR PROBLEM. THE OQAMA ETF IS NOT A WING I FACILITY. IT IS, THEREFORE, NECESSARY TO RUN THE PROPOSED TESTS AT MALMSTROM, PREFERABLY AT ROOM 8. IT IS CURRENTLY BELIEVED THAT FRUITFUL DATA WILL NOT EXIST UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THE NO-GO MODE CAN BE REPRODUCED AT LEAST AT THE LF LEVEL.

PAGE 3 RUMMBB9864
FORMER WHICH WAS REPORTED TO HAVE SHORTED A FEW HOURS AFTER THE INCIDENT. A TRANSFORMER REPORT ON THE TRANSFORMER WILL BE DEVELOPED BY BOEING ENGINEERING. DEPENDENT UPON THE ANALYSIS OF THIS TRANSFORMER, AND ITS FAILURE MODE, ADDITIONAL TESTS MAY BE REQUESTED SIMILAR TO THE POWER TESTS RUN ON 23 MARCH 1967, AT WALSTROM WITH THE ADDED TRANSFORMER FAILURE GDE SIMULATION. YOU WILL BE FURTHER ADVISED WITH RESPECT TO THIS ACTIVITY.

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HISTORY
of

341st STRATEGIC MISSILE WING
AND 341st COMBAT SUPPORT GROUP

1 January - 31 March 1968

(Unclassified Title)

CXIH-68-7

ASSIGNED TO
18th Strategic Aerospace Division, 15th Air Force, Strategic Air Command

STATIONED AT
Balmstrom Air Force Base, Great Falls, Montana

William D. Napton
WILLIAM D. NAPTON
Sgt, USAF
Wing Historian

Carl A. Lilley Col
for L. J. CRANON
Colonel, USAF
Wing Commander

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OO-ALC/LMS 27 Jul 95.

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SECURITY STATEMENT

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there was a power transfer. Headquarters, 15th AF ordered a test to determine if the channel 20 was being caused by noise or a phase sequence problem. If phase relation was the problem, it could possibly damage both the motor generator and the GAC cooler compressor unit. The test was to cover such items as current draw, voltage drop and the phase relation between the primary power and the 208 volt, 60 hertz (cycles per second) motor generator output at the time of the power transfer.⁸⁶

(U) A meeting on the VMSA channel 20 alarm and direct current to alternating current problem was held at SASSO Headquarters, Norton AFB, California, on 27 February. Field tests were required before any corrective action could be planned however. The 341st DCH and the Boeing Company conducted a joint study to determine the frequency of the channel 20 alarms by site, and by date, with all related material. The tests were begun in late February and continued through to the end of the quarter.⁸⁷

MODIFICATION - EMP TESTING

(U) In direct relation to an incident covered in the April-June 1967 history of the 341st SSW was the Electro-Magnetic Pulse

86. Msg, dtg 221500Z, 15AF(DM75) to 341SSW(DCH), subj: Channel 20, 22 Jan 68.

87. Msg, dtg 282326Z, SASSO to 341SSW(DCH), subj: VMSA channel 20 and DC to AC Power Transfer Problem, 28 Feb 68.

(EMP) testing conducted by SAMSC, the Boeing Company and the 341st SMW at site Sierra-39 of the 564th SMS. The original tests were terminated on 9 January, and the site was returned to the Wing. Due to a G&C change, the site did not resume alert posture until 14 January.⁸⁸

(U) Two Time Compliance Technical Orders (T.C.T.O.) came from the EMP testing. One was for the addition of EMP pulse suppression to LF interconnecting boxes to eliminate the effect of noise generated by electrical discharge type pulses in the Hardened Intersite Cables. The second was the addition of VRSA monitor line protection relays to the interconnecting boxes to prevent equipment damage and/or failure from overvoltages below 2000 volts. The two T.C.T.O.s were to be accomplished concurrently. The second of the T.C.T.O.s was not released until 27 March, and work was not started by the end of the quarter.⁸⁹

(U) A Summer-68 EMP program was scheduled to begin 1 April at site India-6 of the 12th SMS. However, due to contractual problems associated with the test program, the date for the start of the program slipped to 1 June 1968. The program was to last for one year.⁹⁰

88. Ltr, 341SMW(DCRK) to 15AF(DCR), subj: Unit Progress, 31 Jan 68. Ex 38.

89. Publication, "Minuteman Service News", Issue 36, Jan-Feb 68.

90. Msg, dtg 162323Z, SAC(DFLD) to 341SMW(DCR), subj: Summer EMP Program, 16 Feb 68.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
Headquarters 341st Strategic Missile Wing (SAC)
Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana, 59402

TO: BCRM

31 January 1968

FROM: Unit Progress Report (RCS: SAC-U89)
SAC Programming Plan 12-66, LGM 30F (Minuteman) Force Modernization
Program, Malmstrom AFB
Month Ending 31 January 1968

TO: 15AF (DCR)

1. Commander's Comments: The LGM 30F (Minuteman) Force Modernization Program is on schedule in the 341st Strategic Missile Wing.

2. Status Summaries:

- a. Personnel: All tasks will be accomplished on schedule.
- b. Operations and Training: All tasks will be accomplished on schedule.
- c. Communications: All tasks will be accomplished on schedule.
- d. Maintenance:

(1) Training:

(a) The programmed ATC formal technical retraining of twenty officers and two hundred and seventy-eight technicians in Force Modernization (WS133A-M System) is on schedule. During January, two ATC Travel Team Courses were completed. Forty members completed Course ADF 44370G-4 (Missile Maint. Technician/A-M) and forty officers and key noncommissioned officers completed Course ODF 3124G-2 (WS133A-M Supervisors' and Planners familiarization course). The completions of Travel Team Courses included thirty personnel who were not originally scheduled in the program. During this report period, the inputs into ATC technical courses at Chanute AFB were resumed, after a scheduled "break" for Christmas and New Year holidays. Eight members departed for Course AZR 31670G-3, Msl analyst, (Targeting) A-M; three to Course AZR 31672G, Electronics Technician; four to Course AZR 31670G-4, Msl Analyst (TEAT) A-M and one officer entered training in Course OZR 2825-4, TEAT Officer, A-M. As of 31 Jan 68, 248 members of the 341SMW had completed their technical retraining for maintenance support of the Force Modernized flight.

(b) The program to provide the initial Force Modernization retrained mobile teams has been completed, as previously reported. As of 31 January 1968, the 341SMW expects to have fifteen electro-mechanical teams, eight missile maintenance teams and eight combat targeting teams Force Modernization retrained. The on-base launch facility trainer has continued to be used effectively for training of missile maintenance teams and combat targeting teams. Site India - 10 was approved as the 341SMW off-base Electro-Mechanical Team trainer during January. It will be utilized to the maximum possible extent to assure an optimum capability in the EMT support area. The on-base LF trainer was converted to the WS133-B configuration on 5 Jan 68, to fulfill the immediate training needs for Wing VI mobile teams.

(c) The T-20 Control Monitor Trainer has been removed from the On-Base LF Trainer for necessary modifications. It is at the Autonetics Company, McAlester, Okla. The training tasks which would normally require the equipment are being accomplished at the Classroom Control Monitor Trainer, T-19, located in the 341MIMS Hangar. No problems are anticipated in fulfilling our training requirements.

(d) The T-15 Control Monitor Trainer, applicable to WS133B (Wing VI) training, is at the Autonetics Company, Anaheim, California, being modified. It is scheduled for return to Malmstrom AFB by 27 Jun 68.

(e) The WS133A (Wing I) off-base launch facility trainer, Alpha - 11, will be continued as a proficiency trainer and team evaluation facility, until Mar 68. After that date, training and evaluations for WS133A mobile maintenance teams will be accomplished in conjunction with EWO dispatches.

(2) Program:

(a) Golf Flight at 341SMW is scheduled to be repostured on 26 Jan 68.

(b) Juliet Flight is scheduled to be depostured on 30 and 31 Jan 68.

(c) The Electro-Magnetic Pulse (EMP) Lightning Test on Site Sierra - 39 was completed and the site returned to SAC on 9 Jan 68. Posturing of the site began on 10 Jan 68; however, due to a Guidance and Control Package problem, posturing was not completed until 14 Jan 68.

(d) The Flight Command, Interrogation and Status Test Demonstration M2-1, Security System, Power System, SIN and VRSA Tests Demonstration M2-2 and Launch and Launch Enable System Test Demonstration M2-3 were scheduled for accomplishment at Site Golf - 1 on 20 and 22 Jan 68.

e. Facilities:

(1) "In-House" work on removal of obstacles for helicopter landing pads has been discontinued because of snow and cold weather. Resumption of this work at C-7 is tentatively scheduled for 7 February 1968. Work also remains to be accomplished at C-3 and N-4. Obstacle removal has been completed at G-9, D-3, N-1, C-1 and N-10.

(2) Drafting of the helicopter landing approach plates for Launch Facilities has been temporarily discontinued at the suggestion of Headquarters 15th Air Force, with 75% completion, until they determine standard criteria for these plates for all missile bases. Currently available approach plates are adequate for interim operational use.

3. Soft Spots: None

4. Problems/Deficiencies Requiring Higher Headquarters Action: None

John W. Carroll
JOHN W. CARROLL, Colonel, USAF
Commander

Copies to: 18AD(DEXO)-3, C-2, DCO-6
DCM-4, DS-1, MS-1, BC-2,
BP-2, BCE-2, CSUP-2, BSV-1,
BO-2, BCR-1, TSC-1, CXI-4,
DCA-1

Not surprisingly, the people who were actually at Echo Flight on March 16, 1967 do not recall UFOs shutting down the missiles, and this is supported by all of the evidence as long as that evidence isn't being repeatedly retooled and manipulated by individuals with a prior investment in the results who were not present at the time – people like Robert L. Salas and James Klotz and Robert Hastings and all of the nameless faces and personalities behind CUFON and NICAP. But if Salas was not there, and by 1997 he had *finally* admitted that he was not, how could he be so certain that UFOs were reported there? He actually does have an answer for that.

I recalled something my commander had said during our incident. After we reported the incident to the command post, he had received a call from another LCC. After that call he turned to me and said, "The same thing happened at another flight." With this "new" recollection, I began to question if I was at Echo during the time of our incident since I knew I was assigned to the 490th Squadron, which did not have responsibility for Echo Flight.⁹⁷

Wow. He is actually willing to admit that during the entire time he was asserting that he had been at Echo Flight, he was still aware that he had been attached to the 490th Missile Squadron. And yet, he was unable to recall that not only was Echo Flight *never* under the responsibility of the 490th SMS, but more than one flight had lost the ability to strike on command. That is stunning. Personal failings like that are oftentimes difficult for a man to admit, so it must have been an ordeal for him. The "commander" he's referring to would be LT Fred Meiwald, whom Salas was unable or unwilling to name for some years after he first started telling his story. By the time of his interview with UFOCOM, LT Meiwald had become CAPT Meiwald, although nothing as far as access to this supposed witness ever changed. We only have Salas' word that any conversation with Meiwald ever took place. So, his insistence that these UFOs that nobody actually saw nonetheless managed to take down the missiles at both Echo Flight and November Flight on March 16, 1967 – something nobody else in the world has ever claimed, even after forty years and the declassification of the E-Flight event itself – is based entirely on this "new" recollection of his that an unnamed commander was told during a phone call nobody can substantiate that a similar event that he otherwise fails to describe also occurred at another Flight, one that he fails to name, and was never recorded by anybody. *Well,*

⁹⁷ Salas, Robert L., "Minuteman Missiles Shutdown", Mutual UFO Network UFO Journal, January, 1997, No. 345, pp. 15-17, cont. 22, 23.

that's pretty damn definitive, isn't it? We have to take his word for it that such a phone call was ever made, but we don't even have his word that "The same thing happened at another flight", because he wasn't the one listening to the phone call! And we have to believe his memories are correct, when he couldn't even remember accurately where he was at the time all of this happened. By 1997, all he could say was he was "probably" at November Flight when this occurred. Well, at least he admits he was no longer at Echo Flight!⁹⁸

When my commander and I returned to the base, we discussed the incident with our squadron commander and an Air Force investigator from Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI). The Colonel was just as shocked about the incident as we were. Neither he, nor anyone else we talked to that day about the incident could explain it or indicated that it was some sort of readiness exercise. After that day, and through the time of my transfer from the base in June 1969, none of the crews, including ours, ever received any additional information on the incident. There was never a report of investigation that was released to the missile crews or any other explanation given of the incident. This was also unusual because we were given regular briefings about any technical areas of concern regarding the readiness of our weapons. These were my recollections at the time the FOIA requests were submitted to the Air Force in January 1995. After nearly a year of submitting these requests and waiting for responses, USAF declassified an incident which appeared to be the one in which I was involved. I will refer to that as the Echo Flight Incident.

Jim Klotz, the investigator who had submitted the FOIA requests, and I had previously narrowed the time period by retrieving news reports from the Great Falls Tribune about UFO sightings during the early part of 1967. I had recalled reading such reports after my incident. In fact there were many news articles about UFO sightings a few weeks before and one week after the Echo incident. We requested USAF to release any information they had of such an incident that occurred during the spring of 1967. We made no reference to UFO sightings in our request. As a result of these FOIA requests USAF sent us copies of the unit histories for the 341st Strategic Missile Wing, Great Falls, Montana for 1967. The histories, which included the Echo incident, had been classified. In addition, USAF sent copies of some previously classified messages regarding the incident. One message was sent from SAC headquarters. The Echo incident, as related in one of those messages, is described as loss of strategic alert of all ten missiles within ten seconds of each other for no apparent reason and a "...cause for grave concern ... [to SAC headquarters]". The date of the Echo incident is March 16, 1967. When we received this information, I assumed that I was in the Echo capsule during this incident because the events of the incident were very similar to my recollection.

In other words, I don't really remember what actually happened, and I don't really remember where I was at that time, but I also *don't* remember that I *wasn't* there, so I must have been there. *Damn ...* I'm convinced.

⁹⁸ Salas, Robert L., "Minuteman Missiles Shutdown", Mutual UFO Network UFO Journal, January, 1997, No. 345, pp. 15-17, cont. 22, 23. [full page]

Once Salas adopted the November Flight version of the story, the possibility that a confirmation could be obtained dropped to almost zero. Robert Salas, Jim Klotz, and Robert Hastings all insist, however, that there *is* confirmation for the tale they're trying to sell. We should, therefore, examine this confirmation to illustrate how deep the bunk actually is in this connected series of suppositions and leaps of the imagination. It's natural for us to start with the FOIA documents that first set these gentlemen on the road to infamy. Originally, Salas and Klotz confirmed the event using the contents of the documents they received. We shall see, however, that these documents actually prove the opposite, and that they are, in fact, still very relevant to the history Salas, Klotz, and Hastings have repeatedly proposed – with all of their stupid errors intact.

The FOIA documents requested by Salas are definitive military documents that anyone with knowledge of military classification protocol should be able to examine and interpret handily. Unfortunately, the people who first received these documents, and then proceeded to interpret them for the benefit of the rest of the world – Robert Salas and that little group of newshounds at the *Computer UFO Network* – are either ignorant of such military procedures (in the case of *CUFON*), or they are lying (in the case of Robert Salas, who most likely will claim to have forgotten those details as he forgot so many other relevant matters involving this ridiculous case). Before examining the obvious errors inherent to their interpretation, some background information is necessary to provide some context for those readers who are genuinely ignorant of such matters, having never served in the military or, due to their profession, been exposed to and expected to learn something about classified materials and the protocols under which they are handled.

It's important for us to recognize first that the FOIA documents under examination are not a guaranteed sequence of events dictated after a few years have gone by and the authors have had time to reflect on the importance of each event, and how it best fits into the time frame under consideration. These documents represent a series of events that were important only to the originating culture represented by the chain of command and the time period during which they were drafted, and attesting to events that may or may not be reflected upon at a later date. Although, with the exception of the military messages brought to light by Salas, the documents

were originally intended to be historically relevant, a short discussion detailing the preparation of command, unit, and squadron histories is necessary to show why they probably are *not*, and how this affects their subsequent interpretation.

The Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA), first established in 1942, is the primary repository for Air Force historical documents.⁹⁹ Its current holdings exceed 100 million pages and represent the world's largest organized collection of historical documents on U.S. military aviation. The majority of documents included in this massive archive consist of USAF organizational histories from every echelon of the service from major command to squadron level. The classified or otherwise restricted documents included make up about 25 percent of the overall holdings. In addition to unit histories, the agency houses several special collections, some dating back to the early 1900s. Among these are historical monographs and studies; over 2,000 oral history interviews; numerous end-of-tour reports of notable overseas commanders; complete course materials of the Air Corps Tactical School from the 1930s; and the actual working papers of key Army Air Forces staff offices, the British Air Ministry, and the German Luftwaffe during World War II. It includes as well an extensive 2-million page Gulf War collection and an electronic database of nearly 85 gigabytes of information on the Air War over Serbia that have been added in just the past decade. The Gulf War holdings alone include chronologies, working papers, message traffic, oral history transcripts, unit histories, and contingency historical reports. It also holds the personal paper collections of over 500 Air Force civilian and military figures of varied levels of importance, including former Secretaries of the Air Force John L. McLucas, Robert C. Seamans, Jr., and Eugene M. Zuckert, as well as Generals George S. Brown, George C. Kenney, Curtis E. LeMay, John D. Ryan, and Thomas D. White.

The agency is still cataloguing historical reports and information from Operations Noble Eagle, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom, as well as information about recent tsunami and hurricane relief operations that have been undertaken. The agency's historical collection is readily available to qualified students, faculty, and staff, and answers as well requests for historical information from Congress, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Air Staff, the major commands, and the general public, this last under very specific guidelines involving cost and security access. The Air Force's oral history program is included among agency tasks, as is the

⁹⁹ http://www.au.af.mil/au/cf/au_catalog/tus.pdf (includes all associated AFHRA information). Also see: <http://www.airforcehistory.hq.af.mil>

maintenance of records showing the status of aircraft, and updating and preserving the official lists of aerial victory credits earned during wartime.

For AFHRA staff members, *busy* is *routine*. They are *always* expected to play a major, organizational role in the training of new Air Force historians, and conduct biennial archival and oral history training courses for professional members of the Air Force History and Museums program. The emphasis placed on archival tasking by the USAF requires the agency to deploy contingency historical teams consisting of IMA reservists during wartime and other operations simply to capture and archive documentation of Air Force activities. What is desired, and what is actually achieved, however, are often very different.

Their goal is very simple: “preserving the current record that will be of greatest use and value in the future without flooding repositories with an unmanageable volume of paper.”¹⁰⁰ The methods used to reach this goal have, however, varied greatly over the years. Between 1946 and 1969, when Albert F. Simpson served as the Air Force’s chief historian, the methods used to account for the histories of the various commands, units, and squadrons were *significantly* different from the methods that were enacted in January of 1969. It wasn’t until 1969, for instance, that the Air Force required major commands and numbered air forces to maintain a separate historical office staffed by *professional* historians. Command historians before then were subordinate to public information officers; after 1969, they reported *directly* to their commanders. Command historians were not required to supervise a program of historical retention anywhere *near* the level that was expected of them after January, 1969.

This was due entirely to America’s increased role in Vietnam during this period, and the greater emphasis placed on the need for accurate unit and squadron histories. The lessons learned by U.S. Army historians during the early and middle sixties period of the Vietnam War demanded changes that were put into effect in *all* of the military services at about the same time. This was primarily because the Office of the Secretary of Defense was required, at the time, to prepare a full annual report to the President and Congress, a report that required the coordination of all historical projects within the Department of Defense. This all changed, in a series of stages, beginning in 1968 when the annual report to the President and Congress was discontinued and the Air Force initiated on its own a “major reorganization and a fundamental

¹⁰⁰ http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/jessup/jessup_ch19_21.pdf

change in the objectives of the historical program,”¹⁰¹ a program that would no longer be subjected to the vagaries resulting from poorly understood objectives and the institutionalized destruction of records and documents that would only be considered historically important after January, 1969. Before then, records management *across the board* was a mess, and it was a problem that everybody from the President on down was very well aware of.

When the Office of the Secretary of Defense coordinated the Department of Defense historical programs, there were some attempts to introduce to incoming military members the historical importance of military records through Department of Defense schools and training programs. This introduction was, however, short and fleeting. Partly, this was the result of each Secretary of Defense reinterpreting for himself the need for and the use of military historical records whenever that cabinet position changed. For the most part, however, it was because records managers rarely acquired the historical sense necessary to determine which documents should be saved and which could be destroyed. They simply were not taught the lessons needed for the proper retention of records of historical import. Deciding which records should be retained and which records should be destroyed requires some appreciation of a command's place in history. Before the changes established throughout 1968-69, most officers lacked the specialized training, orientation, and experiences necessary to recognize the historical benefit or potential uses of the documents created or received under their command. Often, public information officers simply delegated many of their responsibilities to enlisted records managers or unit historians who frequently possessed no appreciation at all for the historical value of the many records and files that they routinely shredded, burned, or decided, for whatever reason, to retain.

An initial examination of the FOIA documents requested by Robert Salas and Jim Klotz make this very evident. In March, 1967 the Wing Historian for the 341st Strategic Missile Wing at Malmstrom AFB was Airman Second Class David B. Gamble. In the rank structure of 1967, *Airman Second Class* was an E-2 military member – a rank Air Force personnel were expected to earn within about eight months after basic training (boot camp). *It's the second-to-lowest rank there is*, one that lacks *any authority whatsoever* and should never, for that reason, be granted responsibilities surpassing pay grade. They gave an E-2 military member the full responsibilities of the Wing Historian, answerable only to one of the public information officers, a member who,

¹⁰¹ http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/jessup/jessup_ch19_21.pdf

ordinarily for 1967, would have lacked the historical sense necessary to determine which documents should be saved and which could be destroyed. This E-2 would have made many of the decisions regarding the destruction or retention of documents without advisement, and would very likely have had to decide both the structure and the content of the command histories, one of which eventually made it to Robert Salas and Jim Klotz, leading them to announce that UFOs interfered with the Minuteman missiles under the command of Malmstrom AFB. We can be sure of this, because one of the references on page 32 of the command history they use as their primary resource states "Taken from Messages on file at Job Control, by A2C David B. Gamble, Wing Historian, on 23 Apr 67."¹⁰²

This reference is important to the assertions that would be made thirty years later for *another* reason, as well, in that it provides a source for the following statement included in the history: "Project How Now (Service Star), the testing of Mark 5 re-entry vehicles by higher headquarters for effectiveness. Malmstrom sent the last vehicle in the program for the base during the quarter. This ended the program at Malmstrom."¹⁰³ This is particularly important because it provides a very good source for many of the UFO sightings throughout February and March that Salas, Klotz, and Robert Hastings continue to place so much emphasis on. There may have been UFOs reported, but those UFOs could very easily have been Mark 5 re-entry vehicles that were being tested throughout the quarter at Malmstrom Air Force Base. Apparently, this didn't even deserve mention in any of Salas' numerous articles; and when I asked Robert Hastings what his thoughts were regarding "Project How Now (Service Star), the testing of Mark 5 re-entry vehicles by higher headquarters for effectiveness," he ended the conversation the same way he frequently ends things that don't go the way he expects or wants them to go: *he pretended it didn't happen*. When the *prosaic* enters his world view, he prefers to ignore it entirely, so he can continue fighting the dragons of adversity for the benefit of all mankind. One can't help wondering whether or not this is just another little story of little men who, like Peter Pan on a whiskey bender somewhere in New Jersey, decided not to grow up.

Other indications that the command history was drafted without modern guidelines of historical relevancy or training are also very evident. For instance, the ordered details of topics scripted by engineers that are referred to in the command history have been reproduced out of

¹⁰² 341st Strategic Missile Wing and 341st Combat Support Group HQ SAC DXIH 67-1865 (Command History, Vol. 1), p. 32-34, 38.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*

order, a unique characteristic that can be proven by simply looking over the footnotes. This is a *sloppy* history, possessing only one factor obvious from start to end: *it is neither professional nor reliable as source of history*. The details might be interesting, and the security classification is *very revealing*, but there's not much here that would serve well for someone interested in anything beyond the basic facts included. Someone wanting to make inferences of reason, such as Salas and Klotz do when they make statements such as "This statement was informative in that there would be no reason to query the November Flight strike team (security) about rumors of UFOs in the area of Echo Flight"¹⁰⁴, or "There was no apparent reason for these shutdowns"¹⁰⁵, both of which Salas uses to infer "facts" from statements in the command histories, simply cannot do it with these poorly compiled documents. It would be laughable if so many people didn't believe every word that these guys put out. *You cannot infer facts from these documents*. They are a series of statements that are often not in chronological order, nor the order in which they were originally written. One has to wonder whether or not this is the reason that Salas and Klotz have not released the entire command history that they, by all accounts, were sent as a result of their request.

Judging the factual worth of statements included in this history is also a waste of time, so when Salas concludes that "This is the only reference to UFOs regarding this incident in any of the documents received from USAF and the statement is simply untrue", he's being critical of events that were recorded by an E-2 Wing Historian, signed off by one of the public affairs officers who may or may not have actually supervised him, and eventually approved and signed by the Commanding Officer at SAC, all of which happened *within three months* of the original event. There is *nothing* in those documents that is untrue. It is just a list of facts without the proper, historical context necessary to infer thoughts, motivations, or worth. They may not reflect good *history*, but they are certainly not *untrue*. The military simply does not give E-2 personnel the right to record lies on official documents, and there's not a single Commanding Officer in any United States force today *or forty years ago* that would knowingly sign off on a statement in a Command History that was *false*. Making a statement like Salas has that the command history contains lies is absolutely ridiculous, and serves no purpose at all except to aggrandize his own worth as a critic of the military he served in for only *seven* years, barely

¹⁰⁴ Salas, Robert L., "Minuteman Missiles Shutdown", Mutual UFO Network UFO Journal, January, 1997, No. 345, pp. 15-17, cont. 22, 23.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

enough time to gain professional perspective, let alone the knowledge and acuity to actually *criticize* with any real declarations of worth. And as he himself proved at a later date, he could not possibly judge the worth of such statements in the command history as they applied to Echo Flight or November Flight, because *he was not present at either launch control facility*. It just took him a couple more years than it takes most people to realize that. I wonder, once he decided that he was actually at *Oscar Flight* on March 16, 1967, whether he still believed that A2C Gamble *lied* in these military documents. Possibly he now believes, as Hastings and Klotz apparently do, that Gamble's summary of historical events is technically inaccurate regarding all the details of supposed UFO interference, because of a conspiracy throughout the entire Malmstrom AFB chain of command – which is exactly what it would take, and why most intelligent observers discount the idea immediately – to collect and edit for children's eyes only every mention of UFOs in reference to March 1967 and the Minuteman Missile Force then active throughout wide plains of America. This is sadly the only reason they've been able to come up with to explain why this particular command history – as well as every other document gathered and collated by man – is *worthless* to those historians who insist UFOs were somehow involved in this little *brouhaha*. It's just a criminal shame that nobody introduced to his testimony through the Disclosure Project or the book *Faded Giant* was made aware of the many problems he's suffered from due to the poor memory that, more than anything else, has made his own accounts of this period worthless to historians. *Hell, what am I saying?* His accounts are worthless not just to historians, *but pretty much anybody who might be interested in non-fiction as a viable form of memory retention*.

Problems providing for the accurate and meaningful retention of historically important military records were universally recognized throughout *all* of the United States military services during the entire period that we're interested in. Before 1969, particularly susceptible to destruction by records managers and historians were "informal files of working papers, background files, and personal working files that rarely enter the records retirement system."¹⁰⁶ This means that the personal notations, and command discussions justifying acts and decisions made were more often than not destroyed and left out of the permanent records and archives. In addition, a lot of supporting records and files that might give a clearer indication of motive or

¹⁰⁶ http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/jessup/jessup_ch19_21.pdf

reasoning were left out of the permanent record. “Decentralized records keeping, which in essence makes every action officer ... his or her own records clerk, continues to encourage highly individual approaches to the job without assuring that important records will be retained for historical reference.”¹⁰⁷

Records personnel assigned to units during the Vietnam War made this problem so evident that changes *had* to be made. Records personnel often completed their tasks without even the most basic of training in records management, were uncertain about the functional systems in use, entertained only vague ideas regarding what constituted historical records, and with shorter tours limiting what little experience they actually acquired, records clerks and administrators often found their tasks “complicated, unrewarding, and occasionally overwhelming.”¹⁰⁸ As a result, many records were never created while others were prematurely destroyed. Many units simply did without any professional guidance whatsoever regarding records retention. Sadly, the fact that in 1967 the USAF Historian assigned to the 341st Strategic Missile Wing and the 341st Combat Support Group was an Airman of E-2 pay grade proves that this was also the case at Malmstrom AFB. The problems involving records keeping and the sad state of military archiving had such a widespread impact, that in 1968, the Adjutant General *suspended completely* all authority to destroy any and all records created by units in Vietnam. Starting then, records from the combat zone were retired as *permanent* regardless of their functional filing designation. While this did not apply to Air Force major commands, such as Malmstrom AFB, nor to the units assigned under that command, it does give an indication of the emphasis that the military was beginning to apply to the importance of historical records in any functional organization. It’s a sign that the lessons learned in Vietnam were going to eventually be applied to all other military units over the next two years. As indicated above, the Air Force instituted the major part of their reforms beginning in January, 1969. The fact that such extreme measures were taken with the disposition of combat zone records does not mean similar problems were not faced by larger, more stable commands and units elsewhere. Records at every level of every command, including Department headquarters were susceptible at all times to unnecessary and unwanted destruction. Pressures of economy, space, and time *continuously* jeopardized historically valuable staff documents, because the temptation and the

¹⁰⁷ http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/jessup/jessup_ch19_21.pdf

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

need to destroy records is normally *very high* in any organization that produces so many documents possessing such a high security classification.

It's difficult at times not to find fault with "investigators" who expect every question they have will be answered in full by archived military records, particularly when they are told that the records have been declassified, so they finally have federal "permission" to examine them. This is, after all, the entire impetus behind the "full disclosure" movement, which might as well be called the "Let's Declassify UFOs" movement. I can just imagine the ensuing hilarity should "full disclosure" actually occur and those who have been demanding it the longest and the loudest discover that *none* of their questions have been answered, because most of the classified materials that they finally get access to are little more than a record of their *own* whereabouts and activities, the military having decided decades ago that the only *real threat* here is that represented by the groups and individuals demanding "full disclosure". From what I've been able to tell, that couldn't possibly happen, not because these hypothetical classified records wouldn't be more concerned with UFO investigators than with UFOs, but because those same UFO investigators couldn't possibly understand and properly interpret such classified records and files. They would see a record of their own movements and activities over the course of a decade, and wonder why it was that the UFOs were paying so much attention to *them*, as opposed to the more pedestrian military targets of interest. *Ego*, more than anything else, makes their interpretation of life in America useless for the rest of the world. At least they've managed to validate their own existence.

Ideally, any individual with a background in classified military protocols would interpret such documents the most accurately, so it's confusing to some people when they note that the FOIA documents Mr. Salas relies on were so *sloppily* interpreted, especially in light of his own ever-evolving tale that falls apart of its own accord wherever it's examined at any length. Mr. Robert Salas, having been in the U.S. Air Force, should be very aware of the character assumed by this fantastic story. Instead, he and the *Computer UFO Network* took a comparatively mundane electrical incident from 1967 and turned it into one of the most ill-conceived, poorly researched, and embarrassingly irresponsible conspiracy theories sane Americans have *ever* been subjected to. Their interpretation of a few pages culled from the *Command History of the 341st Strategic Missile Wing and 341st Combat Support Group* betrays

little knowledge of military administration, and no knowledge whatsoever of military classification procedures. Even worse, they've managed to gain the attention of an odd conglomerate of fools and fantasists large enough that the total absence of *any evidence whatsoever* has gone by unnoticed. They've managed to prove only one thing: a substantial portion of the general public is willing to believe just about *anything*, as long as you crowd their heads first with a busload of irrelevant details and nonsense mixed in with meaningless facts and unreasonable suppositions – all floating around like so many pieces of otherwise unexciting *fluff*. We should, therefore, take a closer look at those documents, because *it is the documents that initially indicate the developing lie*.

Salas and others make much out of the SECRET classification of his FOIA documents, but it's misleading to ignore the *character* of the classification assigned, as they have done. These documents were not declassified as a result of the 1995 FOIA request that CUFON sent out, as Salas and Klotz have insistently implied or stated outright. In fact, the documents they have relied upon from the very beginning make it clear that the entire command history was declassified at least *once* in 1978, most likely to CONFIDENTIAL, although this is hard to make out.¹⁰⁹ The page and paragraph markings in conjunction with declass statements on the cover make that very evident. In addition, further examination shows undeniably that *every mention of both UFOs and November Flight* were UNCLASSIFIED when it was originally drafted, which would have been sometime between April and July, 1967. It's true that the entire document was classified SECRET at one time, but *this does not apply to all of the information contained therein*. Full document classification, marked on the cover, the end page and in all references to the document itself, discloses only one thing: the highest classification of anything that's in the document. In accordance with security classification protocols in use by the Department of Defense in 1967, each *paragraph* of the document is also classified: (U) indicates UNCLASSIFIED, (C) is for CONFIDENTIAL, (S) indicates SECRET, and (TS) is TOP SECRET. Commanders originating the security protocols in use wanted a quick and easy method that would enable commanders in the field to very quickly declassify documents under their control should it be necessary. In addition, the classification of all documents at a paragraph level enabled users to determine exactly what information they were restricted from discussing. In

¹⁰⁹ 341st Strategic Missile Wing and 341st Combat Support Group HQ SAC DXIH 67-1865 (Command History, Vol. 1).

the case of the command history that was eventually delivered into the hands of Salas and CUFON, on that day in 1967 when A2C Gamble first drafted that history, he could have walked into the Gulf station in the center of Great Falls and talked about there being rumors of UFOs over Echo Flight during a system fault there, and the fact, as well, that a Mobile Strike Team was checking out all of the LFs at November Flight on the morning of March 16, 1967, and he would have been well within his legal rights to do so, because it was *all unclassified information*. There's little doubt, especially in 1967, that his actions would have been frowned upon by the chain of command, but there would have been no legal action taken as a result, and no official strikes to his record excepting possible rebukes for undisciplined behavior that would have been mentioned only on enlisted evaluations as part of how he could personally improve his lot in life and his associated worth to the Air Force.

This is absolute proof that UFOs did *not* take down the missiles at Echo Flight, November Flight, or any other flight on March 16, 1967. If *anybody* in the Malmstrom AFB chain of command had thought *at any time* that UFOs represented a threat *at any level* to the security of the United States as a result of, reflection of, or even the barest of incidental connections to what had happened at Echo Flight in March, 1967, that information and any reference to it would have had a *minimum* classification of TOP SECRET as an unknown threat to national security representing a vulnerability to a highly classified nuclear weapons system. And yet, as we've seen, *all* of this information was UNCLASSIFIED from the very beginning – not SECRET, as Salas and Klotz have told everybody in all of the articles they've written and in their book *Faded Giant*, not TOP SECRET, as it would have been if *anybody* really thought a UFO was involved or represented any kind of a national security threat, but UNCLASSIFIED. And it was UNCLASSIFIED from the very day it was first typed up by A2C Gamble. This is a character of the documents themselves that cannot be denied, and cannot be explained away as part of the big, evil cover-up to hide UFOs, because this is a command history document, classified for use by individuals who are *required* to know the full story surrounding the events that took place. The United States government classifies material in order to allow those individuals requiring necessary access to complete an assigned task the means to examine those materials, while preventing examination by any individuals who do *not* require necessary access to fulfill their duties. Access is granted on the basis of two conditions being met: (1) the individual concerned must possess the necessary security clearance such as SECRET or TOP SECRET;

without the appropriate clearance, you see *nothing*; this is a quality normally determined on a national level, granted only after a full background investigation; and (2) the individual concerned must possess the “need-to-know”, a quality normally determined on a local level, and granted only if the classified materials custodian is satisfied that the applicant requires access to properly fulfill the duties of his or her office or position. *Simple curiosity is not a good enough reason to be allowed access.* Applicants must establish “need-to-know”. If you don’t “need-to-know” the information, you don’t get to see the information.

To understand best this aspect of classified materials protocol, and to provide as well an excellent example of the extreme lengths some individuals who do *not* understand such protocols will go in order to break and mold and refit a world they do not understand into a world that doesn’t exist, we need to take a temporary sidestep; rest assured we will return to this point after a short digression.

Robert Salas, Jim Klotz, and (at least part of the time) Robert Hastings are not the only individuals wanting some measure of credit for disclosing the character of an event they apparently know very little about; there are enough commentaries and discussions available to anyone with a PC, patience, and a little common sense to widen the field significantly for an award of this nature. For instance, Brad Sparks of NICAP (National Investigations Committee on Aerial Phenomena), the group founded in October 1956 to promote the study of UFOs, and to report on their conclusions to both Congress and the American public, made the following statement regarding the Echo Flight Incident on the NICAP website’s Nuclear Connection Project (NCP):

In the 1967 Malmstrom incident 10 Minutemans DID get knocked out, but the investigation was conducted not by NSA but by the missile contractor Boeing, which issued a SECRET classified "Report of Engineering Investigation of Echo Flight Incident, Malmstrom, Mont - 16 Mar 1967." The trick was that the UFO "rumors" were denied so that the missile disabling could be investigated and reported as if unrelated to the UFOs (which WERE sighted, contrary to the flimsy denials). No satisfactory explanation for the missile disabling was found. (See below) Presumably whenever these kinds of national security UFO incidents occurred that affected military equipment there were investigations by contractors who built or maintained the equipment, and the UFO aspects were compartmented off. At a higher level these reports could be read by someone cleared to know about the UFO details, and they could ignore the perfunctory denials of UFO activity written into the contractor studies.¹¹⁰

¹¹⁰ <http://www.nicap.org/malmstrom67dir.htm>.

This arrogant posturing by a man who obviously is not familiar *in any way* with the case he is attempting to discuss has so many easily provable errors in it, that I wanted to deal with it in some detail. My primary reason for this is the fact that NICAP was at one time a repository of some importance for those wanting information that could be confirmed, information that was, for the most part, pretty dependable, and skewed neither to the true believers nor to the affirmed skeptics. They were interested in information that could be *confirmed*, and were, to some extent, admired by men and women associated with both groups. At the time of the Echo Flight Incident, NICAP was even acting in collaboration with Dr. Edward Condon and the University of Colorado UFO Project, conducted from 1966 to 1968 for the Office of Scientific Research of the U.S. Air Force's Office of Aerospace Research. They broke off from that group, distancing themselves from the UFO Project, in 1968, alleging that Dr. Condon's negative and skeptical commentaries and public statements indicated a growing prejudice against UFOs and witnesses who come forward to report UFOs, characteristics which NICAP claims resulted in the hasty dismissal of many otherwise important sightings. These opinions would appear to have been confirmed, at least to some extent, by information made public after Dr. Condon's death in 1974, but have also been attributed by some of Condon's defenders to his abrasive and oftentimes argumentative personality, and have little to do with his actual assimilation and subsequent administration of facts.¹¹¹ Dr. Condon is on the record as saying that he considered most UFO sightings reported in the past as historical dead ends, useful only as curiosities; such reports can't really be of any scientific use, because the witness had already been questioned, and there was no useful forensic evidence that could possibly add to what had already been reported. They were basically closed cases with nothing to recommend them to a scientific investigation, an opinion that seems perfectly reasonable, except to those individuals who insist upon an additional swing after three strikes: *but Mommy, I want a do-over ...*

That's wandering a bit off topic, however, since the only point that really needs to be made here, is that at one time, NICAP was an organization with a fairly admirable reputation for confirming most of the statements and records that they made available to others outside of the organization. They had a reputation for being a very careful and honest source of opinion,

¹¹¹ Story, Ronald D. (Ed.), The Encyclopedia of UFOs, Doubleday and Company, Inc., Garden City, New York, 1980 (various entries; reference for the entire paragraph).

evidence, and strong belief, all of which was carefully defined from the very beginning of the process, so recipients of such data were aware that the information they were receiving was evidence that was usually carefully measured, the opinion of someone collating such evidence, or an administrative belief based on the experience of discussing and measuring what other witnesses may have declared. The care that was taken was due entirely to self-proclaimed *values*; NICAP didn't make careless, off-the-cuff statements, because they didn't think they could afford to, not if they wanted to preserve their reputation in the process of trying to convince civilian individuals without inherent investment in the debate, or the representatives of both government and corporation who would have had such additional concerns. Apparently, something in that equation, that *balance*, has changed, because Sparks' commentary regarding the Echo Flight Incident is nothing short of the most paranoia-driven, and yet complacent, acceptance of truth behind a fictional account since Southern politicians started circulating the theory that the Civil War was all about *States' Rights*.

By all accounts, Mr. Brad Sparks is considered someone who can speak with some level of authority within the constraints of the UFO investigative community. He is, according to some sources, a UFOlogical researcher of fairly high standing, as such individuals go, being a leading expert in regards to the "CIA Robertson Panel" and the history of CIA investigations of UFO phenomena, not a small credit in light of the high level of secrecy surrounding CIA memoranda and reports that even *pretend* to express an official opinion. He was the first researcher to discover that the Director of the CIA had actually been *briefed* on UFOs at one time, something most people were not exactly shocked to discover, as well as the first to obtain release of the CIA Director's UFO briefing memos, something most people *were* shocked to discover. He also obtained release of the complete, uncensored and declassified "CIA Robertson Panel Report and Minutes", as well as many other CIA documents considered important primarily for revealing an environment of suspicion and self-defeatism long suspected, but rarely discussed as a point of fact.¹¹²

Sparks cofounded *Citizens Against UFO Secrecy* (CAUS) and served as the assistant research director for the *Aerial Phenomena Research Organization* (APRO), until 1988. Unfortunately, CAUS is an anti-military crank outfit, while APRO rarely confines itself to research. Sparks is also a Research Associate for the *National Aviation Reporting Center on*

¹¹² http://redpill.dailygrail.com/wiki/Brad_Sparks.

Anomalous Phenomena (NARCAP), a member of MUFON (Mutual UFO Network), and a consultant to the MUFON director. Clearly he has the chops for the job, but he also seems – at least after a cursory glance at his biography – to possess at least *some* measure of skepticism appropriate to those who investigate anomalies, including a long standing rejection of the Roswell incident and the Extraterrestrial Hypothesis for UFOs, while maintaining as well a willing openness to reconsider any further evidence that might be brought forward. It's a bit odd, taking into consideration the above qualities, that he would summarily accept everything that Robert Salas has proposed without *some* examination, but apparently he has. Not that he's alone in this; he, like Salas, CUFON and Robert Hastings, is also an advocate of "full disclosure".¹¹³

As for his statement referred to above, it's easiest simply to adopt a point-counterpoint examination to refute this weird little declaration. He insists that "the investigation was conducted not by NSA but by the missile contractor Boeing, which issued a SECRET classified "Report of Engineering Investigation of Echo Flight Incident, Malmstrom, Mont - 16 Mar 1967."¹¹⁴ This is demonstrably false, considering that the FOIA documents originally requested by CUFON state that the task group conducting the investigation included personnel from OOAMA, Boeing Company, Autonetics Division of North American Aviation, 15th AF, the Wing Maintenance Evaluation Team (DCMET), and the 801st Radar Squadron.¹¹⁵ Other documents state that representatives of Ogden Air Materiel Area were included as well.¹¹⁶ We also know that Major James H. Schraff *headed* the investigating team.¹¹⁷ Furthermore, in 1967 the NSA was all about collecting intelligence. They would *never* have been called in to investigate *any* type of equipment failure, whether related to nuclear missiles or not; that has *always* been in the purview of civil contractors, technicians, and military operators, and that is why the NSA was not involved in this particular investigation. The NSA managed COMINT, SIGINT, spy ships, and information collection via satellite or other means,¹¹⁸ and had been doing so from day one.¹¹⁹ The Joint Chiefs would have *never* assigned this case to the NSA, and there's nothing at all suspicious about this – it's simply another example of work being assigned to

¹¹³ http://redpill.dailygrail.com/wiki/Brad_Sparks.

¹¹⁴ <http://www.nicap.org/malmstrom67dir.htm>.

¹¹⁵ 341st Strategic Missile Wing and 341st Combat Support Group HQ SAC DXIH 67-1865 (Command History, Vol. 1).

¹¹⁶ Nalty, Bernard C., "USAF Ballistic Missile Programs 1967-1968", Office of Air Force History, September, 1969.

¹¹⁷ Craig, Roy, *UFOs: An Insider's View of the Official Quest for Evidence*, 1995, p.171.

¹¹⁸ <http://history.sandiego.edu/gen/20th/nsa.html>.

¹¹⁹ <http://history.sandiego.edu/gen/text/coldwar/nsa-charter.html>.

those most capable and best trained to see it through. And in any case, Boeing did *not* release the report summarizing the findings that the investigation made, *the U.S. Air Force did*. They *ran* the investigation, they *managed* the assets, they *reached* the conclusions, and they *issued* the report, assigning it a classification of SECRET because it included information of a sensitive nature, a quality best determined in this case by someone with a military background, not some Saturn V design op fresh out of the depths of the Boeing Corporation.

Most people who discover that a military investigation of any sort whatsoever that is *not*, on the surface, treated like a UFO investigation, must not *be* a UFO investigation, and that is exactly the case here. The fact that this investigation was *not* conducted like other UFO investigations does not indicate that a new *tactic* has been adopted by the U.S. Air Force; it indicates only that this investigation had *nothing* at all to do with UFOs – *period*. If the investigation conducted was able to show that the entire flight of ten missiles was taken out of useful commission by a UFO that did nothing more than what Robert Salas claims, i.e., it floated next to the front gate for a few minutes and then left, it would be admitting that an entire flight of ten missiles could be taken out of useful commission by remote means requiring no more than peripheral access to the launch control center for a few minutes. That information *alone*, would require, by law, a classification of TOP SECRET, since only a classification that high is applicable not only for information representing a previously unknown vulnerability to a highly classified nuclear weapons system, but to protect as well information which, if disclosed, “could result in exceptionally grave damage to the Nation, such as: ... The compromise of ... scientific or technological developments vital to the national defense.”¹²⁰ Assuredly, the knowledge that an entire flight of nuclear missiles could be plunged into a No-Go status does not warrant a TOP SECRET assignment alone, but the knowledge that it could be done from the front gate without affecting the adjacent power grid would indeed be sufficient. Knowledge like that would have been *more* than enough to direct the research impetus of the Soviet Union for at least a few months, and *that* would be more than enough to require a classification of TOP SECRET. The fact that just about *everything* attached to this investigation excepting the *one* document that actually explains what *happened* on March 16, 1967 with anything even remotely resembling contextual qualities (and will, for that reason, be examined later in this narrative) is only classified SECRET should be enough to prove that UFOs were not involved.

¹²⁰ Air Force Regulation 205-1 (15 Dec 1953), section 2, paragraph 22.

But since most of the people paying attention are (1) ignorant of general military operations, behavior, and culture, and (2) lack the ability, desire, or need to correct (1), *it apparently isn't*.

The people that are trying their hardest to convince the world that UFOs were involved with this little matter don't care one twig whether it is true or not. The agenda they have set swirls around in the darkness like black oil going down a drain, and *facts* in such an environment are irrelevant. They want "full disclosure", and telling a few lies about matters they have no real clearance to examine and no chance at all that they will eventually be awarded such clearance is their selfish little way of complaining in the face of a government bureaucracy that is not allowed to have an official opinion about the one thing in their lives that makes them feel worthy. *Recognizing that is easy* – any kid who's taken Psychology 101 and has read some of the crap these guys publish that they consider to be *persuasive arguments* can do that. Convincing others that these maniacs who don't feel validated unless they can dictate the faults in their own government's recognition of anomalies – creatures which by definition cannot be recognized in the first place – is *not*.

Brad Sparks claims "The trick was that the UFO 'rumors' were denied so that the missile disabling could be investigated and reported as if unrelated to the UFOs (which WERE sighted, contrary to the flimsy denials)." ¹²¹ This is too ridiculous to even consider (but I will, not because I *like* to, but because idiots like Sparks do). UFO rumors were denied because there were no eye-witnesses willing to claim that they actually *saw* a UFO – that's why they were called "*rumors*". As for the naïve, paranoid rhetoric that "UFO 'rumors' were denied so that the missile disabling could be investigated and reported as if unrelated to the UFOs", I can't help but wonder what his source is for such a theory. If it's not just a paranoid fantasy, I suppose he should get some credit just for coming up with such an outlandish and absurd proposition without any evidence at all to recommend it. There are no documents *anywhere* that give the slightest indication that the presence of UFOs could be confirmed or that they had any association at all with the Echo Flight Incident. There are also no "flimsy denials" of UFO sightings at Echo Flight, just flimsy *sightings* based entirely on supposition in the total absence of any real witnesses. What we *do* have are documented assertions that UFO rumors were examined and found to be baseless. In light of this, who exactly is relying on "flimsy" evidence to support an assumption? Let us be perfectly clear: *nobody ever reported a UFO on March 16*

¹²¹ <http://www.nicap.org/malmstrom67dir.htm>.

anywhere near Malmstrom AFB until Salas did so in 1995-96. And then, he changed his story so much and so often over the next few years that people finally quit arguing with him; and at *that* point, when his story had finally reached the pinnacle of inconclusive mystery and doubt in which no one came forward with unarguable fact to prove that his lie was indeed a lie, he rested, like God after seven days, and wrote a *book*, a book that we know is fiction, because there are no classified or unclassified documents *anywhere* in the world that can possibly put a UFO in Montana on March 16, 1967. In fact, as we'll discuss further in this narrative when we get around to pointing out the egregious errors in Robert Salas' most recently published collection of fool's gold, the "rumors" under consideration may well have originated with an investigator for NICAP. But we'll discuss that possibility further in this narrative. Suffice for the moment to assert that no witness ever came forward with any report of a UFO on March 16, 1967 before Robert Salas did. If such a report *does* exist, it was never published or discussed by *anybody*.

Assuming that this hypothetical UFO that nobody reported would also necessitate an investigation, one that, according to Sparks, would have to have been separated or compartmented from the investigation of the equipment failure, it should be noted that the Department of Defense does not divide one classified incident into two simply to preserve plausible deniability. They just give it a higher classification under the appropriate handling caveat, and then *shut-up about it*. In this case, there was absolutely no need for a denial *of any sort*, because the incident was already classified SECRET. Why would they need to deny part of an issue that they won't even discuss? Sparks' theory is an absolutely insane conclusion to reach given the classification character that we're familiar with and that the Air Force does not deviate from. Remember, the incident itself was classified SECRET. It was the UFO angle that was UNCLASSIFIED; and even that's a superfluous argument, because *they have no intention of discussing the matter at all*. "UFO 'rumors' were denied so that the missile disabling could be investigated and reported as if unrelated to the UFOs"??¹²² They have absolutely *no intention* of reporting the results of their investigation to *anybody* who doesn't already have a "need-to-know". *It's classified*. That's why we have classification protocols. *This theory Sparks has come up with only makes sense if the incident under investigation is UNCLASSIFIED*, and even then

¹²² <http://www.nicap.org/malmstrom67dir.htm>.

it only makes sense if you're a paranoid idiot with delusions of inappropriate *nut-hood* and no knowledge of military administration.

If we were to take all the people that the original drafters of the investigative report were aware of who also had the security clearance to examine that investigative report, as well as the “need-to-know”, which of these men and women should have been denied the knowledge, if it were true and not a fantasy like we're proposing here, that UFOs were involved? Broken down to these terms, Sparks' hypothesis represents a ridiculous and silly idea, because if you have both the clearance and the “need-to-know”, then you have been given *all* of the information, not just part of it. *That's the whole point behind the acquisition of both facets of information clearance.* And if you don't have both the security clearance *and* the “need-to-know”, you're not going to be given access – *period*. And if there *was* somebody, and this is just hypothetical, mind you, because such a person simply *does not exist*, why would any mention of UFOs be UNCLASSIFIED? If you have a secret, and you don't want people to talk about it, generally you classify the matter. Plausible deniability assumes a point of view from which a person can discuss one incident separate from another *without lying about either one*. That type of cynical paranoia just doesn't apply here, because Sparks is assuming that we're in a position to freely discuss the matter, and we're *not*. We've already decided, in fact, that we're *not* going to discuss it. *Nobody* outside of the chain of command or the investigating team is going to be allowed access to the results of that investigation unless they have already established *clearance* and “*need-to-know*”, and if that aspect of Department of Defense security protocol has already been established, then they are going to have to know about the UFO connection as well, if it actually exists. In this case, however, it *doesn't* exist, so attempting to use baseless suppositions to show that evidence for the absence of UFOs is actually evidence for their *inclusion* into the case file is simply an act of *ignorance* masquerading as *stupidity*, and does nothing to satisfy Brad Sparks' desire to associate UFOs with historical incidents of nuclear missile failures. It *does*, however, detract from his reputation as a man willing to consider all sides of an issue fairly before reaching any sort of conclusion. Sparks' suppositions and suspicions do nothing at all except prove that such a man – at least in the context of the new NICAP – also does not exist.

There are defining characteristics of this case that we already know are *absolutely true*. We know, for instance, that the Echo Flight Incident was classified SECRET, and the UFO

“rumors” were UNCLASSIFIED. This tells us that raising any issue at all in relation to the missile failures was illegal from the get-go. The USAF or any individual in the world could deny or affirm both the existence of and the interference by UFOs in March 1967 as much as they want, even to the point of associating it with the possible failure of missiles out of Malmstrom AFB, because it’s all UNCLASSIFIED information, which means anybody can look into it, offer their opinion, discuss the facts involved as they’re aware of them, answer any questions proposed by the press, or simply estimate the likelihood of an associated conclusion. On the other hand, they wouldn’t even *discuss* the incident of the Echo Flight missile failures on March 16, 1967. Any connection with UFOs is thereby rendered *totally irrelevant* in the context of a secured environment. That’s the *intention* behind classifying information: *once classification has been assigned, security is assumed*. The extent of that security is defined by the level of classification, while the access to that information is defined by the “need-to-know”. There’s simply no need for Sparks’ paranoid little games when all you have to do is change a paragraph (U) to (S) – and the Malmstrom chain of command had every authority to do so as the originator of all the documents. If you aren’t aware of *that*, you’re going to sound like a paranoid idiot real fast once you start talking about it. Why is this such a difficult concept for any of these people to grasp? At one time, even Salas, awash in such dreadful arrogance that even unnecessary lies come easy and unbidden, was aware of this natural characteristic of classification theory and protocol. Of course, he now prefers not to discuss such matters, except to claim that it was his own efforts that resulted in the declassification of the associated documents. In any case, Sparks’ assertion that there was any need at all to hide any aspect of the investigation out of some weird fear the USAF may have had that someone would find out about this non-existent association with UFOs is the obvious conclusion of a brainless twit who seems to think that the classification of a document is insufficient protection; if that were the case, they would simply raise the quality of the protection for that document by raising the security classification. And as we’ve repeatedly explained to the fools who generally accept these ridiculous arguments that NICAP has put out in lieu of any actual explanation, if UFOs were actually involved, it would be *illegal* to classify any of the documents discussing the matter lower than TOP SECRET. These little games that these *oh so obvious* idiots want to play by claiming that they know UFOs were involved because the UFOs were dismissed so immediately by the investigation is just childish twiddling and posturing that means nothing and has no basis in fact at all. The only thing

they've made more apparent, and obvious is the actual extent they will go to make a meaningless, inappropriate point.

Sparks also claims that "No satisfactory explanation for the missile disabling was found."¹²³ *This too is totally incorrect.* The investigative team determined *exactly* what the problem was, *how* it happened, and how to *correct* it so it didn't happen again. The problem itself was even reported nationally through Associated Press wire reports. I can and will prove all of that in this narrative, but the only point of fact necessary to assert for the moment is that Brad Sparks is one-hundred percent *wrong*, which he could have countered had he done a little open-minded research. Basically, he's rushed from a position of ignorance to an error in judgment that wouldn't have occurred if he'd only slowed down a little bit, and not been in such a hurry to accept everything Robert Salas had to say as gospel.

Sparks asserts that "whenever these kinds of national security UFO incidents occurred that affected military equipment there were investigations by contractors who built or maintained the equipment, and the UFO aspects were compartmented off."¹²⁴ *This is just idiotic.* Why would anybody compartment off a key aspect of an already classified investigation in order to raise the security clearance of the compartmented information, when all they have to do is raise the classification of the original document? Or is he actually suggesting that all of those – or, indeed, *any* – contractor reports that do *not* mention UFOs but did affect military equipment need to be re-examined because they may have actually involved UFOs, but the military was just hiding that aspect of it? And what happens when equipment fails, but God forbid we can't figure out what exactly happened that brought about the failure? If UFOs were involved, do you just ignore that aspect of it, and let an investigation continue from a position of ignorance? Maybe Sparks is not aware that civilian contractors for the Department of Defense are bound by security protocols equal in every way to the security protocols applied to military personnel, so there's no reason to compartment off any part of the investigation in order to hide anything, particularly since the investigation is already classified. It might be a surprise to some folks, but Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) rules *still* apply, whether those involved are civilian contractors or military personnel. There's absolutely no reason imaginable to compartment *anything*, whether it's to prevent contractor access to such information or simply to prevent

¹²³ <http://www.nicap.org/malmstrom67dir.htm>.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*

those who are already cleared for SECRET materials from accessing information that, for one reason or another, the chain of command has decided to deny. All the command has to do to achieve *any* of these ends is to simply deny access based on “need-to-know”. It's easy enough to restrict access to already classified materials as a matter of discretionary control, and it's extremely difficult for the recipient of such discretion to counter such an argument when it's supported by any type of professional authority, such as that possessed by any Air Force chain of command. Frankly, it's more efficient and a whole lot easier to implement than arranging for separate investigations by separate teams presumably competing for personnel and resources, or maybe just one investigation with important aspects of it hidden from those individuals conducting the investigation – it's a little hard to figure out exactly what Sparks has in mind to describe here, because it's just so obviously a waste of human thought. If a member of the United States military with the authority to produce classified materials were to even *attempt* to draft a document that not only leaves out essential information necessary for a full understanding of that document, but also attempts to justify *access* to that document on the basis of information that isn't actually *in* the document – and let's face it, this is *exactly* what Sparks is proposing here – that authority would be taken away, because the Department of Defense does not want *fools and idiots* producing and distributing classified information. *This is a ridiculous idea with absolutely nothing to recommend it, and there's no evidence anywhere to support such a paranoid and idiotic suspicion.*

In any case, just because there are civilian contractors involved is no reason to assume they aren't liable for their actions with the same restrictions military personnel are. In addition to ensuring at the very *minimum* an application of punitive measures for gross negligence should any classified information be compromised, it also means that the classification of previously associated, peripheral information – such as that represented by the investigative team looking into the Echo Flight Incident *apart* from this hypothetical, higher security UFO investigation – *still* has to be classified under a caveat limiting access as Sensitive Compartmented Information, which *clearly* was not done. This is a suspicion based *entirely* on *nothing*. The only thing of any value at all hiding within Brad Sparks' assertions at this point is the extent he is apparently willing to go in order link his imaginary UFOs to an incident that only barely qualifies as rumor. What possible reason would there be to split up one highly classified investigation into *two* highly classified investigations in order to hide some aspect of one? Anybody

concerned with security at any level whatsoever would *immediately* see that this is a fool's errand, one that doubles the risk of someone compromising the classified data under examination. *It wouldn't even be considered as an option.* If UFOs were involved, then UFOs were a threat, and if UFOs were a threat, then UFOs needed to be investigated; if UFOs needed to be investigated, then the investigators had to know that the UFOs were actually there. Compartmenting off *anything* invalidates that investigation.

There's a possibility that I'm interpreting his intention poorly. Maybe Sparks is suggesting here that there was only *one* investigation, but *two* reports – one SECRET that states UFO rumors were checked out and found to have no bearing on the Echo Flight Incident, and the other TOP SECRET that discusses the UFOs as the *cause* of the incident; because if UFOs were involved in any way, *there would have to be a document somewhere that discusses it.* Unfortunately, this theory is also foolish, primarily because only one TOP SECRET report would have been necessary. With *two* reports being drafted, the odds of compromising some of the materials in question increases significantly, so once again, *this interpretation wouldn't even be considered as an option.* I can't believe that anybody more concerned with revealing the *truth* than establishing a theory based on what's personally *preferred*, would ever come up with an idea like this that is so steeped in ignorance and thoroughly absent of any sense or sign of deep thought or consideration. You do not protect classified information from being disclosed by lying about its contents or hiding certain aspects of it; if you don't want people to access your documents because of content, you just give it a higher classification and don't let them look at it. Hell, you don't even have to raise the classification – you just don't give them access to the materials based on "need-to-know". Do the folks at NICAP even know how to *think* anymore? 'Cause if they do, they sure hide it well.

Sparks also seems to prefer the idea that the blame for all of this can be confidently laid at the door of the civilian defense contractor, the Boeing Company, since, according to Sparks, they were the ones who wrote the report. *Except they didn't.* As we've already pointed out, the investigation into the missile failures at Echo Flight was *not* the sole responsibility of the contractor as Sparks seems to be suggesting; it was in every way a *joint* effort involving both contractors *and* military personnel, with the contractors *subordinate* to military authority. *That's the only way the military does anything.* In fact, Major James H. Schraff, an officer in the Air

Force, *headed* the investigating team.¹²⁵ Furthermore, there was more than one contractor involved with the investigation, implying that the military was at first uncertain of the direct cause of the missile failures or the ultimate direction the investigation would take. The Boeing Company may have built the missiles, but the Autonetics Division of North American Aviation built the guidance and control modules that told those missiles where to go, and they were part of the investigation for that very reason. While it's true that Autonetics is now owned by Boeing, this didn't occur until 1996. So if a contractor was running the investigation, as Sparks is proposing here, which one was in charge, and how would that have been determined? As a general rule, you rarely, if ever, see the production of materials as complex and technologically superior as Department of Defense munitions of this sort generally are, being the product of a *single* contractor. So, if the contractor is running the show, who decides which one and how? And if the cause of the equipment malfunction is determined to be in a subsystem that was developed by a contractor *different* from the one running the show, is the head of the investigation swapped out to someone representing *that* corporation? Once again, the proposition is idiotic. The Department of Defense runs the show – *always*.

The motivation applied to these hypothetical geniuses Sparks has conjured up is pure comedy: "At a higher level these reports could be read by someone cleared to know about the UFO details, and they could ignore the perfunctory denials of UFO activity written into the contractor studies" – studies that were already classified SECRET.¹²⁶ In other words, these *yahoos* need a higher level security clearance (as in "someone cleared to know about the UFO details") to review information that has already been assigned a clearance that's UNCLASSIFIED (this being every mention of UFOs in the area), in relation to an incident and investigation that was classified SECRET (the Echo Flight Incident). *What would be the point of this?* Is Sparks actually asserting that UNCLASSIFIED details involving UFOs have been removed from a SECRET investigation and its associated report so it could be included in a hypothetical TOP SECRET report *simply* to prevent disclosure of UFO information by anyone lacking a clearance beyond SECRET? *Really??* Why not simply raise the access or clearance of the whole report? The more these people try to mold and fit the known events into their own little fantasy UFO conspiracy dream, the more ridiculous and foolish they sound. If people like

¹²⁵ Craig, Roy, *UFOs: An Insider's View of the Official Quest for Evidence*, 1995, p.171.

¹²⁶ <http://www.nicap.org/malmstrom67dir.htm>.

Brad Sparks would simply review their own efforts to justify the affirmations of others, their opinions *might* be given a little bit more regard, and maybe their feelings wouldn't get hurt quite so much when anybody with a military background that includes classified materials protocol reviews their little house of theories and says "*you're a fuckin' idiot...*"

It's become very apparent that many of the theories expounded upon by men and women, like Brad Sparks, who accept without any real evidence the assumption of UFO interference with USAF missile defense systems seem to be oftentimes based upon a very fundamental ignorance of military administration and culture. This is common, especially in those cases which rely on classified materials that the military simply will not discuss in any context whatsoever, usually with good and sufficient cause. This criticism applies particularly well to those who so easily accept the interpretation of military message traffic affirmed by Salas and Klotz, particularly their constant emphasis on the phrase "the fact that no apparent reason for the loss of ten missiles can be readily identified is cause for grave concern to this headquarters".¹²⁷ What they've *neglected* to mention is that "grave concern" is nothing more than a *flagging phrase* used by the Department of Defense for determination of classification, and *nothing else*. All it does is justify the classification already assigned. Civil ignorance of military administration necessitates some explanation here.

Air Force Regulation 205-1 on Safeguarding Classified Information assigns authority for classifying documents with the originator or drafter of the document:

The assignment of information to a defense classification is a responsibility of command. Subject to all of the provisions of this Regulation and such other instructions as are issued by the Secretary of the Air Force or the Chief of Staff, USAF, concerning the classifying of specific information, commanders who originate information or who otherwise have primary interest therein ... are responsible for determining whether such information requires protection as classified information and the defense classification to be assigned, if protection is required. Within a headquarters, unless otherwise directed by the commander, the head of the office which has the primary interest in any information will determine the classification required therefore, coordinating with other interested offices whenever necessary. Commanders will prescribe specific procedures and control measures within their respective headquarters to insure that

¹²⁷ Msg, (S) P 172250Z Mar 67, SAC to Info 15AF, Malmstrom AFB, Boeing Seattle, Subj. Loss of Strategic Alert, Echo Flight, Malmstrom AFB.

information is accorded timely review and that, if protection is required, the information is assigned to or marked with the proper classification.¹²⁸

It's also a requirement for drafters of highly classified documents to assign classification relative to guidelines published by the Department of Defense. Regulation 205-1 assigns this authority for the U.S. Air Force:

AFR-205-1 names the persons in the Air Force, by position, who are authorized to classify information originally as TOP SECRET and as SECRET. These persons are authorized to designate in writing additional individuals within their respective offices or headquarters to classify information.¹²⁹

In other words, the ultimate authority to assign classification resides with the Commanding Officer of the originating command, and although he can designate other individuals in writing, the primary responsibility still rests with him, with such authority going no further up the chain of command. This allows for punitive measures to be taken against those who, for one reason or another, *under-classify* materials, especially if such an act results in the unauthorized release or disclosure of classified information or materials.

AFR-205-1, however, also qualifies the assigned classification further:

It is essential that information be assigned the lowest classification consistent with its proper protection in order to avoid depreciation of the importance of correctly classified information, to avoid unnecessary expense and delay in the handling and transmission of documents and other matter, and to preserve the integrity of the individual classification.¹³⁰

This is an important facet of basic security classification protocol. Paragraph 2 of the Air Force Regulation 205-1 Attachment to AFR205-1, NOTAL defines TOP SECRET as "Classification for defense information, the defense aspect of which is paramount, and the unauthorized disclosure of which could result in exceptionally grave damage to the Nation." Due to this, whenever the phrase "grave concern" or something similar that uses the word "grave" to describe the originating command environment, without use of the word "exceptionally" – as in "exceptionally grave concern" – the drafter is simply giving his reasons for the assigned classification – a practice some people refer to as CYA, or "cover your ass". It's included in case someone questions the assigned classification, which could later result in a

¹²⁸ Air Force Regulation 205-1 (15 Dec 1953), section 2, paragraph 20-a.

¹²⁹ Air Force Regulation 205-1 (15 Dec 1953), [Attachment to AFR 205-1], NOTAL, paragraph 8-b.

¹³⁰ Air Force Regulation 205-1 (15 Dec 1953), [Attachment to AFR 205-1], NOTAL, paragraph 8-f.

punitive judgment. And because classified materials "must be assigned the lowest classification consistent with its proper protection", those matters that represent a "cause for grave concern" but *not* a "cause for exceptionally grave concern" are generally assigned a classification of SECRET. Use of the phrase does *not* carry the exceptional implication of threat that Robert Salas, James Klotz, and Robert Hastings have constantly associated it with. *None* of their discussions of the FOIA documents have mentioned this aspect of protocol use of a flagging phrase to establish classification; most of the time they simply state the matter, using it as an indication of an *exceptional threat* that does not exist, as Salas originally did in his January 1997 article:

The Echo incident, as related in one of those messages, is described as loss of strategic alert of all ten missiles within ten seconds of each other for no apparent reason and a "...cause for grave concern ... [to SAC headquarters]".¹³¹

Even worse, Salas and Klotz have determined to use the phrase, *and the public's ignorance of classification protocol* to declare their true motives, and those of the *Computer UFO Network* who originally requested the FOIA documents (the words "emphasis ours" in the statement below was added by Salas and Klotz, not the author of this narrative).

For many years, the Air Force has maintained that no reported UFO incident has ever affected national security. It is established fact that a large number of Air Force personnel reported sighting UFOs at the time many of our strategic missiles became unlaunchable. The incidents described above clearly had national security implications. In one previously classified message, SAC Headquarters described the E-Flight incident as: loss of strategic alert of all ten missiles within ten seconds of each other for no apparent reason and a "...cause for grave concern...(to SAC headquarters)." (emphasis ours)¹³²

By the time of the Disclosure Project, however, Salas is no longer relying on this classification flagging phrase to imply a non-existent threat. By this time, Salas has determined to reject the phrase, yet *maintain the implication of threat*, a cynical act that suggests he is very well aware of this communications aspect, and has chosen to ignore it, an unethical use of language to raise a point and publicize an official level of concern *that doesn't really exist*

I've got a copy of a telex which we received under FOIA coming from SAC headquarters and coming to Malmstrom and other bases right after the morning that happened saying that this

¹³¹ Salas, Robert L., "Minuteman Missiles Shutdown", Mutual UFO Network UFO Journal, January, 1997, No. 345, pp. 15-17, cont. 22, 23.

¹³² Salas, Robert and Klotz, Jim, "The Malmstrom AFB UFO/Missile Incident" <http://www.cufon.org/> Special Reports, updated 15-May-2000.

incident was of extreme concern [my emphasis] to SAC headquarters because they couldn't explain it.¹³³

The result is an emphasis on concern that was not intended to be interpreted as exceeding the original classification. I could understand an error of this sort being made by Jim Klotz, Dale Goudie, or Robert Hastings, but Robert Salas should know better. He was, after all, *required* by the United States Department of Defense to know better at one time. Maybe he forgot. He does seem to have forgotten an awful lot of details at one time or another since 1995, when he supposedly received the documents via CUFON.

The security classification of these documents is incredibly important, because they were originally drafted and classified under a military system with rules and requirements of its own, protocols involving national security threats that are now, as well as in 1967, already well-defined and established. These need to be taken into account, because a word or phrase – like “grave concern”, for instance – can, under such protocols, reflect a *significance* that is separate from its commonly accepted definition. For instance, the United States Air Force can claim that it does not investigate UFOs, and it would be telling the truth, regardless of what CUFON or other UFO investigative groups might insist. *However*, because UFOs can apparently *fly*, in the event that there is actually reason to expect that a given UFO-related incident is nonetheless real, as long as that UFO remains *unidentified*, the United States Air Force is *required* to recognize the possibility that the UFO in question may have originated with the armed forces of another country. *And you're damn right they should investigate that.* But does the USAF investigate UFOs anywhere near the level they did when Project Blue Book was still active? Of course not. That would be *stupid*. Have you ever read any of those reports? Most of them are *crap*, and the USAF doesn't have the high opinion of people who report seeing UFOs that Robert Hastings or CUFON has, so they aren't going to believe every statement they receive until some reason *not* to believe them makes itself evident. They don't have the money or the manpower. Simply put, a lot of people lie, they create hoaxes, they mistake stars for moving vehicles, and they make stupid mistakes on an unsurprisingly consistent basis. *That's all part of being human*, and although the U.S. Air Force recognizes that aspect of the UFO phenomenon, they see little reason why they should have to pay for such investigations, or waste the

¹³³ Greer, Steven M., M.D., Director, and Loder, Theodore C., III, Ph.D., "Disclosure Project Briefing Document Prepared for: Members of the Press, Members of United States Government, Members of the US Scientific Community", April, 2001.

extensive man hours carrying them out. It's a lot less expensive just to say, "please stop telling us about every UFO you guys see – we don't investigate UFOs anymore." Most UFO reports are not significant at all, and due to this, the Air Force has determined not to screw around with them anymore. It's an incredible waste of time and money that the Department of Defense simply cannot afford to throw away. But that doesn't mean the USAF doesn't investigate *airborne threats*. They have to consider them as a threat if there's any real evidence to support such a belief. Base Commanders are both *required* and *trained* to take such matters into account when assessing a threat to the security of the United States. This is spelled out plainly in Appendix B to Air Force Regulation 80-17, which replaced AFR 200-2 in September 1966: "It may be possible that foreign countries may develop flying vehicles of revolutionary configuration or propulsion,"¹³⁴ which justifies entirely the examination of UFOs considered to be a threat.

In addition, if a UFO is reported to the police, and they call the nearest Air Force base to see if any flights were in the area, or helicopters were on patrol, or training was being conducted, this request would indeed be logged down, and the request would be complied with as long as the information being requested was both completely and peripherally UNCLASSIFIED. If the police requested information that was, on the other hand, *classified*, it would very likely not be given to them. And if the police notified the Air Force of a UFO, and the Air Force had any reason to suspect that this sighting might represent a threat to national security, they would, of course, look into it. On the whole, however, the Air Force does not investigate UFOs, and the primary effect of that initial declaration was to prevent people from reporting every UFO they see to the local Air Force command. And that was a grand idea, because – as we've seen and noted many times in the past – most of the sightings that were being reported to the Air Force consisted primarily of nothing – *just crap*. And if the Air Force actually *did* find something – such as any airborne threat – that represented in any way an unknown threat to the national security, they would be required *by law* to classify it, simply to disallow its appropriation by foreign governments or corporate interests. For the most part, this is a very good idea, one that those who demand "full disclosure" refuse to take into account. Of course, they know better than the USAF – even though *they're* the ones at the top of that list of individuals who will very likely *never* be granted access.

¹³⁴ Air Force Regulation 80-17 (AFR 80-17, 19 September 1966)

As a result of this understanding, when Malmstrom AFB openly recorded all of the UFO and November Flight information in the command history as (U), or UNCLASSIFIED, they were saying in effect that *nobody* at Malmstrom AFB *at any time* believed any kind of a threat to national security was associated with any UFOs near any of the missile flights, and that *nobody* at Malmstrom AFB *at any time* believed a UFO was responsible for the missile failures at Malmstrom AFB in March 1967. If UFOs were a threat, they would not have been considered UNCLASSIFIED in relation to this incident. This also means that Salas' little story about a flying saucer could not have occurred at any of the flights attached to Malmstrom AFB on March 16, 1967. *The classification alone proves absolutely that his story is a silly, ridiculous lie.*

If a UFO was the cause of the Echo Flight Incident, the Commanding Officer at Malmstrom would *never* have authorized that every mention of UFOs in relation to that incident retain an UNCLASSIFIED status in a SECRET environment, primarily because such an act could never be justified – and when it comes to the classification of documents originating at a military command, *justification is everything*. That's why "flagging phrases" were created by those men and women actually drafting the documents: *to justify classification*. Because if you can justify your actions, you can defend them legally. In fact, the justification for security classification is so important, that the ability to carry out punitive measures for *over-classification* of materials was abolished entirely in the absence of extenuating factors relating to conspiracy charges. In September 1961, President Kennedy's Executive Order No. 10964 removed *completely* any possible sanctions against government employees or military personnel for applying unnecessary classification or over-classification of information or material.¹³⁵ However, it *maintained* sanctions for the unauthorized release or disclosure of classified information or material. Over-classification may have been considered *zealous*, but there would have been no rebuke, official or otherwise. *Under-classification*, however, was still a serious infraction because it could result in the illegal disclosure of classified information.

SEC. 19. Unauthorized Disclosure by Government Personnel. The head of each department and agency is directed to take prompt and stringent administrative action against any officer or employee of the United States, at any level of employment, determined to have been knowingly responsible for any release or disclosure of classified defense information or material except in the manner authorized by this order, and where a violation of criminal statutes may be involved, to refer promptly to the Department of Justice any such case.¹³⁶

¹³⁵ <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/EO10964.htm>

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*

It should be emphasized here that “knowingly responsible” includes any authorized individual who assigns a classification *lower* than the materials would generally warrant, such a charge being related to gross negligence. Civilian employees of the Department of Defense are also bound by these orders.

This is all information that any USAF member would have been aware of if he or she had ever worked with any level of classified materials. Salas *should* have known this, but he’s never even raised the issue. Because of that, and his numerous other misinterpretations and general disconnect from known history, his credibility is, frankly, non-existent and his professional ethics seem to have been *severely* curbed – or *absent*. And, unfortunately, this character defect of his never seemed to improve much over time.

These aren’t the only issues that ought to be raised involving the classification of Salas’ resources that tend to raise doubts regarding the honesty of his interpretation of such matters – not by a long shot. *All* of the message traffic that Salas and his coterie cite regarding the Echo Flight Incident were originally classified SECRET under President Kennedy’s Executive Order No. 10964 as Group 4 documents.¹³⁷ In addition to the changes in section 19 noted above, *EO 10964* also divides classified information into four groups: Groups 1 and 2 contain information that is *exempt* from automatic declassification, Group 3 contains information that can be automatically downgraded a single step at 12-year intervals, and Group 4 contains information that can be automatically downgraded at 3-year intervals *and* automatically *declassified* after 12 years. *All* of the message traffic pertaining to the Echo Flight Incident was classified under Group 4.¹³⁸ This means the information wouldn’t even need an administrative review before being automatically declassified *entirely* after 12 years, which would have been 1979. This is all very clearly marked on the documents themselves, so there’s no way this was just accidentally overlooked by Salas and crowd. Group 4 documents represent pretty much anything that the originator – in this case SAC – does not believe should be exempt from automatic declassification; in 1967 this was the “lowest” level of security oversight for classified military documents. This means the information was not considered important enough to warrant any

¹³⁷ Msg, (S) P 172250Z Mar 67, SAC to Info 15AF, Malmstrom AFB, Boeing Seattle, Subj. Loss of Strategic Alert, Echo Flight, Malmstrom AFB.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*

degree of classification for an indefinite period, and could therefore be declassified automatically and *without* the direct, intervening authority of anybody else. It doesn't even remain SECRET, because it's automatically downgraded at three-year intervals until the lowest classification is reached, so it was automatically downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL in 1970. Far from proving any interference by UFOs at Echo Flight, *all of the documents* they use to support this UFO angle prove undeniably that there was *nobody* – from the Commanding Officer on down – who believed UFOs had anything to do with the Echo Flight Incident on March 16, 1967 even if such interference was only *peripheral*. If they *had* believed such a thing, they would have been required by the Department of Defense as a legally binding imperative to classify it differently. Instead, we see them assigning it the *lowest* classification possible almost *immediately*. The message traffic alone was classified less than 40 hours after the event. If *anybody* believed that nuclear missiles were dumped into a No-Go status by a UFO of undetermined national origin, the classification of *all* of this material would have been significantly different – it would have been a higher security classification, and it would not have automatic downgrading instructions. Even if the command didn't yet know the *extent* of such interference, *any suspicion at all* would have demanded a much different response.

In Salas' book *Faded Giant*, he states that "Upon completing our briefing, we were told that the incident was to be considered highly classified",¹³⁹ but as we've seen, by 17 March, the incident at Echo Flight was not considered any more "highly classified" than any other standard activity at a nuclear-based command. The classification – one easily proven from at least 1979 – was still the lowest classification appropriate for any other information document, dozens of which were very likely sent out from SAC every week. *Nothing* here indicates an exceptional case was made for the high security classification that such an event as accounted for by Salas would ordinarily demand. And as stated above, President Kennedy's Executive Order No. 10964 removes *entirely* any possible sanctions against government employees or military personnel for applying unnecessary classification or over-classification of information or material. However, it certainly *did* maintain legal sanctions for the unauthorized release or disclosure of classified information or material, which tends to occur on at least some level whenever documents are insufficiently classified. Over-classification may have been considered overly *zealous*, but there would have been no rebuke, official or otherwise, since overly

¹³⁹ Salas, Robert and Klotz, James, *Faded Giant*, BookSurge, LLC, 2005, ISBN 1-4196-0341-8.

protective is *always* better than not protective enough when the classification of Department of Defense or national media is concerned. *Under*-classification, however, was still a serious infraction. There's absolutely *nothing* in those documents to show any level of official concern for national security beyond those technical concerns evidenced by an undetermined equipment malfunction. And because of this ridiculous UFO angle that these men have publicized without cause for their own benefit, my father's service to his nation has been turned into a *footnote* for fools, idiots, and conspiracy junkies who have apparently lost what even some species of lower primates necessarily possess: the inborn, genetic ability to reach logical conclusions resulting from a well-reasoned judgment based on a thorough and studied inventory of the environment – of *facts*.

If Robert Salas, Jim Klotz, Dale Goudie, Robert Hastings or any other members of this weird little group hanging around in the dark behind the unethical, organizational Babylon of the *Computer UFO Network* had truly wanted to know exactly what was going on with the nation's missile squadrons in 1967, or if they were really possessed of the ability and the *desire* to conduct scholarly, well-reasoned research as they have continuously insisted since originally *publishing* this arrogant little abortion of an investigation, they would have centered their search on highly classified documents written in 1969 or later by individuals trained and recognized for their ability to synthesize personalities and events into history, *not* mythology. That's what any *good* researcher would have done. Had Salas and crew done so, they likely would have come across at least some mention of an ICBM history, once classified TOP SECRET NOFORN but declassified due to a lawsuit initiated by the National Security Archive at George Washington University. *This* history discusses *exactly* what happened on March 16, 1967, including the events preceding the incident, and those that followed soon after. *And it wasn't written up for our edification by an E-2 with insufficient supervision like the FOIA documents these guys invest so much faith in.*

The document in question, drafted in September 1969, is a publication of the Office of Air Force History, entitled *USAF Ballistic Missile Programs 1967-1968*, a work that was originally highly classified and maintained as such at the USAF Historical Division Liaison Office. Currently maintained in the UNCLASSIFIED National Security Archive at George Washington

University, when it was originally drafted in 1969, the information it contained was highly sensitive, and for that reason it was classified TOP SECRET NOFORN; NOFORN is a caveat meaning “No Foreign Nationals,” and forbids access by citizens or representatives of any nation other than the United States, including as well those attached to any allied nations. Many of the sources the author used were identified by the caveat AF EYES ONLY, which forbids access by members of any of the United States’ military forces excepting the *Air Force*. In 1969, this was among the highest classifications that historical documents could be assigned, and for that reason its contents were very well protected. Unlike the command history that Salas and others have interpreted so wildly and irresponsibly, USAF Ballistic Missile Programs 1967-1968 was written by an acknowledged military historian, and therefore requires little interpretation.

Bernard C. Nalty, the author of the document, is also the author of literally dozens of definitive works on U.S. military history. He’s authored works for the Office of Air Force History, the Air Force History & Museums Program, the History and Museums Division, Headquarters, of the U.S. Marine Corps, Historical Branch, G-3 Division, of the U.S. Marine Corps, the Department of the Navy, and the Air Force Association, among many others. His book Winged Shield, Winged Sword 1950-1997: A History of the United States Air Force is considered by many critics to be the single best history of modern Air Force development ever written, while his many works on the use of Air Power during the Vietnam War are required reading at military schools all over the country. He’s a historian of the highest caliber, but many of his works have been very highly classified, and as a result few outside of the military were familiar with his works until he began publishing a series of books detailing minority contributions in the U.S. military, all of which have been very well received.

As for the document itself, *it is complete*, so we don’t have to rely on the few pages that Salas and Klotz have posted on the internet in order to get the entire story, which in this case is very much dependent on the politics, technology, and financial status of the Air Force in 1967, as well as the climate surrounding our military commitments in South Vietnam (to give credit where it is due, however, there is *nothing* in the theory Salas and crew are now the proponents of that relies on the documents they’ve received via FOIA; they’re way beyond that now – which is good for them, because God forbid they’d have to propose ideas or alternative histories that oppose in some way the documented facts they themselves made public – it’s so much easier to simply make it up as you go along; that way, you’re never responsible). USAF Ballistic

Missile Programs 1967-1968 is particularly valuable for our purposes because it provides the historical context necessary to understand exactly what was going on within the entire ICBM program, and why the events insisted upon by Robert Salas and the coterie of crazies following him with an unbroken message of nonsense could not have occurred. In fact, many of Salas' homespun fantasies are directly contrary to the events detailed in Nalty's history of this period. There are no mistakes here that one can forgive Salas for, as if his poor memory were once again to blame. The events outlined in USAF Ballistic Missile Programs 1967-1968 prove unambiguously that Robert Salas is simply a liar. There is no "middle ground" overgrown with weeds that he can hide within.

The incidents and environment that Nalty has documented is a fascinating story, one that its author took great pains to organize properly, allowing for full understanding of each and every essay within, but enabling as well a full understanding for those who elect to study only a portion of the entire work. Nalty mapped out in stages all of the events of this two year period in order to communicate more thoroughly both the environment defining and the gravity of the events themselves. Due to this, he's had to repeat a number of details so that the reader can avoid having to continuously refer to subnotes and end-of-chapter discussions. Because of the large amounts of information this practice made necessary, it will be easiest for everyone if I simply extract large sections from the document itself, and leave out repeated points and arguments. I am, however, very scrupulous regarding my use of sources, and will not leave necessary discussions out to fester, as Salas and Hastings have repeatedly done. Some people might find this method tedious, and to them I apologize. If anyone believes I might be leaving important information out, such individuals can easily obtain their own copy of USAF Ballistic Missile Programs 1967-1968 from the Nuclear Vault of the National Security Archive at George Washington U. Just go to <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb249/index.htm>, and download a copy of this or any of the other ICBM histories that are freely available in the archive. On that note, I would like to introduce you to the *actual* history of Wing I in 1967. It wasn't the best of times in Air Force history, and part of the reason for that was the fact that the Minuteman program was working through a force-wide deficit, and had to contend with constant equipment malfunctions, upgrades to equipment that didn't work as well as expected, and the near ubiquitous failures of guidance and control systems across the entire Minuteman force.

Minuteman: Problems of Men and Money¹⁴⁰

During fiscal years 1967 and 1968 the Minuteman program ran short of skilled system managers and funds [fiscal years begin when funds are first disbursed from Congress; prior to 1976, the fiscal year started on July 1 of the previous year, and ended on June 30 of the year named; fiscal year 1967, therefore, actually runs from July 1, 1966 to June 30, 1967; the Echo Flight Incident occurred near the end of 3rd quarter, fiscal year 1967, and not at the end of the 1st quarter]. Gen. James Ferguson, Commander of the Air Force Systems Command (AFSC), was especially concerned about the reassignment, after extremely short tours, of officers whose scientific, engineering, or managerial skills were essential to supervise the continuing Minuteman research and development effort. A major factor contributing to this problem was the transfer to flying duties in Southeast Asia of qualified pilots working in the Minuteman System Program Office and other important management posts. Possibly related to this turnover was the gradual blurring of lines of managerial responsibility. For example, the Aerospace Corporation – which was assigned the job of system engineering and technical direction – seemed, in Air Force eyes, to have encroached upon the rightful preserve of the Minuteman office.

To stabilize the Minuteman staff, General Ferguson directed that the required number of officers be assigned, insofar as possible, to complete four-year tours of duty. An AFSC study, prepared at the direction of the Air Force Chief of Staff, resulted in other actions. For instance, the program office was reorganized to provide for more centralized control, and the Aerospace Corporation began withdrawing from Minuteman development to concentrate exclusively on advanced reentry systems.

One of the other effects of this reorganization was a measured sharing of assets. For instance, during the same quarter as the Echo Flight Incident, Project How Now (Service Star) was in the process of testing the Mk-5 reentry vehicle for effectiveness at Malmstrom Air Force Base.¹⁴¹ Although the Mk-5's had been used successfully on the Minuteman IA missiles since June 1962,¹⁴² their future use in the Minuteman program was not intended; work had already begun on the Mk-17 and Mk-18 reentry vehicles, and one or the other was intended for use in the already planned deployment of the Minuteman III. The Mk-5, however, was also used in the Navy's Trident weapon systems, so testing for effectiveness was still necessary. In any case, it's very possible that Project How Now (Service Star) was the source of at least some of the UFO sightings reported in the Malmstrom AFB region throughout this period. If the project itself included any classified elements, it's unlikely that the Air Force or any other Department of

¹⁴⁰ Nalty, Bernard C., USAF Ballistic Missile Programs 1967-1968, Office of Air Force History, September, 1969.

¹⁴¹ 341st Strategic Missile Wing and 341st Combat Support Group HQ SAC DXIH 67-1865 (Command History, Vol. 1).

¹⁴² Norris, Robert S., Arkin, William M., & Cochran, Thomas B., US - USSR Strategic Offensive Nuclear Forces 1946-1987, NWD 87-1 (Rev.2), August, 1988, p.19, para.13.

Defense activity would have voluntarily disclosed such information to civil authorities, so any reported sightings would have been appropriately logged as *unidentified*.

This practice of refusing to inform civil authorities when UFO sightings occurred as a result of classified acts and programs instituted by the Department of Defense has been acknowledged by the military on numerous past occasions, and should not be seen as an improper use of classification; it's simply the maintenance of secrets necessary to protect technological advantages the United States has over foreign governments. One good example of this involved the protection of the U-2 spy aircraft program, originally run by the Central Intelligence Agency. The below information was taken from a Central intelligence Agency History Staff publication, entitled *The CIA and the U-2 Program, 1954-1974*; it was classified SECRET NOFORN when it was originally published in 1998.

High-altitude testing of the U-2 soon led to an unexpected side effect – a tremendous increase in reports of unidentified flying objects (UFOs). In the mid-1950s, most commercial airliners flew at altitudes between 10,000 and 20,000 feet and military aircraft like the B-47s and B-57s operated at altitudes below 40,000 feet. Consequently, once U-2s started flying at altitudes above 60,000 feet, air-traffic controllers began receiving increasing numbers of UFO reports.

Such reports were most prevalent in the early evening hours from pilots of airliners flying from east to west. When the sun dropped below the horizon of an airliner flying at 20,000 feet, the plane was in darkness. But, if a U-2 was airborne in the vicinity of the airliner at the same time, its horizon from an altitude of 60,000 feet was considerably more distant, and, being so high in the sky, its silver wings would catch and reflect the rays of the sun and appear to the airliner pilot, 40,000 feet below, to be fiery objects. Even during daylight hours, the silver bodies of the high-flying U-2s could catch the sun and cause reflections or glints that could be seen at lower altitudes and even on the ground. At this time, no one believed manned flight was possible above 60,000 feet, so no one expected to see an object so high in the sky.

Not only did the airline pilots report their sightings to air-traffic controllers, but they and ground-based observers also wrote letters to the Air Force unit at Wright Air Development Command in Dayton charged with investigating such phenomena. This, in turn, led to the Air Force's Operation BLUE BOOK. Based at Wright-Patterson, the operation collected all reports of UFO sightings. Air Force investigators then attempted to explain such sightings by linking them to natural phenomena. BLUE BOOK investigators regularly called on the Agency's Project Staff in Washington to check reported UFO sightings against U-2 flight logs. This enabled the investigators to eliminate the majority of the UFO reports, although they could not reveal to the letter writers the true cause of the UFO sightings. U-2 and later OXCART flights accounted for more than one-half of all UFO reports during the late 1950s and most of the 1960s.¹⁴³ [This last comment is based on "Information supplied by James Cunningham to Donald E. Welzenbach." Welzenbach is, of course, one of the authors. James Cunningham, however, according to Joseph

¹⁴³ Pedlow, Gregory W. and Welzenbach, Donald E., *The CIA and the U-2 Program, 1954-1974*, History Staff, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1998, pp.72-73.

J. Trento, author of *The Secret History of the CIA*, was "the CIA's 'go-to' man running the logistics of the U-2 program."¹⁴⁴

This is exactly the method the United States Air Force would have adopted regarding UFO sightings or reports that were thought to be the result of otherwise properly classified programs. The information would not have been lied about or deleted from associated records or reports, as Brad Sparks has imagined and detailed for our necessary criticism above; it would have simply been classified, and there would have been no further discussion of the matter. The value inherent to the technological advances used by the nation in its defense is the only motivation necessary to explain the high classification of documents, exercises, or activities, and these matters are taken very seriously, appropriately so, by both the Department of Defense and the State Department. Any discussion of such technological advances as those represented within the entire Minuteman system must take the protection of these technologies into account. Nalty's discussion of the NS-17 guidance and control systems used on the Minuteman II missiles shows that the United States Department of Defense was willing to use classification protocols to keep secret any perceived weaknesses that were noted as characteristic of such technologies. This was entirely justified as necessary to maintain the deterrent quality of those forces. Keep that in mind while reading Nalty's discussion of the problems then facing the Air Force's Minuteman system, because the secrecy it represents was standard operating procedure that will *always* take precedence over CUFON's demands for "full disclosure" – *and rightfully so*.

Gaining control of rising Minuteman costs was another purpose of this AFSC management survey, which also reviewed existing contracting procedures and financial techniques. One activity given close scrutiny was a program to end Minuteman II NS-17 guidance and control unit failures. This undertaking was expected to cost a total of \$68 million during fiscal years 1968 and 1969. Some of this money could be saved, AFSC officials maintained, through careful supervision of the contractor, acceptance of a mean time between failures of 2,200 hours (less than half what was desired), and possibly by greater competition for production contracts.¹⁴⁵

In other words, failures were expected and included in systems planning, a characteristic far from Salas' oft repeated claim that "We rarely had more than one missile go down for any

¹⁴⁴ Trento, Joseph J., *The Secret History of the CIA*, Carroll & Graf, 2005. ISBN: 0-7867-1500-6.

¹⁴⁵ Nalty, Bernard C., *USAF Ballistic Missile Programs 1967-1968*, Office of Air Force History, September, 1969.

reason at all. And this was very rare.”¹⁴⁶ *In 1967, it was far from rare.* Walt Figel has already detailed how four maintenance crews spent the night at four of the ten missile sites the night and early morning of the Echo Flight Incident. He mistakenly characterized this as “routine”, but it was only routine because the failures of various components in the system were routine. It certainly wasn’t planned that way. The Air Force had to live with this “routine” because there was too much of a deficit to repair everything as soon as they would have liked. And although a number of problems that were affecting the system as a whole were eventually made public – as we’ll see – the *extent* of those difficulties was being kept a closely guarded secret from everybody. This was necessary to maintain the deterrent character of the Minuteman system. The generally accepted “health” of the Minuteman force was, however, far from the actual character of that force that the Air Force tended to keep secret.

Four operational Air Force systems underwent one phase of testing or another during fiscal years 1967 and 1968. Minuteman I, with the LGM-30A missile, completed its follow-on operational series late in 1966 and awaited retirement from the operational force early in 1969. Minuteman I, with the LGM-30B missile, underwent follow-on operational tests, and Minuteman II, LGM-30F, began demonstration and shakedown operations. Titan II was engaged in follow-on operational launches. Of those that remained under test in the summer of 1968, only Titan II had encountered no serious difficulties.

Between 11 July and 2 September 1966, a dozen LGM-30B missiles were launched in follow-on operational tests of the Minuteman I system. Seven of the flights ended in failure. An AFSC analysis group, which included representatives from the missile industry, sought to discover some flaw that might have contributed to all the failures, but no pattern emerged. On one test, for example, the retro-rockets which were to slow the third stage after reentry vehicle separation fired too soon, so that their exhaust struck the reentry vehicle and propelled it some eight miles beyond the target. Two other failures were caused by defects – a hollow retaining pin that could not withstand the tension generated during launch and faulty motor insulation – that already were being corrected. The remainder appeared to be random failures.¹⁴⁷

The random quality of these failures, typical of the Minuteman I follow-up testing, is a familiar refrain. After all, random failures are a useful measuring stick for *electrical* failures resulting from *transient voltages*, an all too typical reason for many of the failures faced all the time by complex military systems. While a comparison with the Minuteman II shows a marked difference, delays were nonetheless a fact of life in the Minuteman system as a result of

¹⁴⁶ Greer, Steven M., M.D., Director, and Loder, Theodore C., III, Ph.D., "Disclosure Project Briefing Document Prepared for: Members of the Press, Members of United States Government, Members of the US Scientific Community", April, 2001.

¹⁴⁷ Nalty, Bernard C., USAF Ballistic Missile Programs 1967-1968, Office of Air Force History, September, 1969.

numerous other failures. Salas' implication throughout his various accounts that failures were a rare thing, doesn't hold up too well to any actual examination.

The LGM-30F missile emerged from R&D testing with a record of 20 successes, two partial successes, and no failures. Despite this impressive performance, Secretary Brown ordered a delay in starting the demonstration and shakedown phase. He considered a two-month postponement to July 1966 necessary to permit maintenance crews to eliminate a work backlog – principally the replacement of defective guidance and control units – at the operational sites.¹⁴⁸

As we'll shortly see, defective guidance and control systems were particularly pervasive in the Minuteman system, although failures in general were at near plague levels – and the Office of the Secretary of Defense was having a difficult time paying for everything. The goal was to provide an effective deterrent to nuclear war, so the funds allocated were significantly higher than for any other national goal, with the possible exception of the Apollo moon shot program engineered by NASA. There were, however, limits to this seeming generosity, and every penny had to be fought over.

The proposals offered by the Systems Command might help ease the financial strain, but could not end it. The fact remained that fiscal year 1968 funds allocated by OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] – about \$907.5 million – fell some \$289 million short of covering every aspect of the year's Minuteman program. Additional costs were incurred in correcting shortcomings in the NS-17 guidance and control unit, providing greater protection against radiation and other nuclear effects, improving penetration aids, and resolving various difficulties.

To keep the program within the financial limits imposed by OSD, the Air Staff panel made three main suggestions. The Air Force should: (1) delay Minuteman III's initial operational capability, originally set for July 1969, until July of the following year; (2) postpone the completion of force modernization from October 1972 until October 1973; and (3) wait a year before beginning work on a solid post boost propulsion system [*Note: The post boost propulsion system would be used to position the PBV prior to successive ejection of the warheads.] for use with Minuteman III and the lightweight Mk-18 reentry vehicle. Other of the panel's proposals called for deploying the basic Mk-1 Minuteman penetration aids in January 1968 as planned, introducing an improved version two years later, and completing the heavy Mk-17 reentry vehicle development program as planned.¹⁴⁹

As the weeks passed, the financial pressure on Minuteman seemed to grow worse. The research and development deficit, reckoned at some \$72 million in May 1967, was calculated a month later at \$112 million. The revised figure included the previously calculated costs of system improvements and also reflected unexpected deficits in reentry vehicle development and a possible requirement for funds to investigate and correct a recently discovered inaccuracy that

¹⁴⁸ Nalty, Bernard C., USAF Ballistic Missile Programs 1967-1968, Office of Air Force History, September, 1969.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

seemed characteristic of Minuteman. In acknowledging these funding problems, Robert N. Anthony, assistant comptroller for OSD, predicted a long delay in deployment of Minuteman III.¹⁵⁰

One can't help but wonder why it is that unlimited funds would not have been immediately disbursed to the Minuteman program had it actually been shut down so easily by one or more UFOs. You would think that *someone* would have been clued-in to the necessity for a more immediate deployment of the *far* more advanced Minuteman III in this type of "crazy man rules" environment – unless, of course, UFOs simply were *not* considered a threat. On the other hand, if Minuteman III deployment was initiated to deal with the "really real" world threat represented by the Soviet Union, *circa* 1967, and not a bunch of unknowns from outer galactica or wherever, it's perfectly understandable that the budget problems, the defense deficit, and the more generalized technical difficulties encountered by the Air Force would have been worked through exactly as Nalty describes. We already know how quickly and efficiently the U.S. military can react and deploy its resources in an emergency. Its reaction to December 7, 1941 showed exactly what resources could be mustered in response to any perceived threat, and we were still pulling out of the Great Depression at that time. I can't help but wonder whether Robert Salas really expects people to believe that the Air Force would have been obliged to adopt tactics like *delay and pray* in response to the nation's highest security defensive alert and munitions systems being threatened by an unknown vehicle piloted by unknown individuals representing an unknown, foreign government or military force. *But does he really think that the Secretary of Defense would have gone along with that kind of strategy so easily?* We are talking about Robert S. McNamara, here – this is the guy who told Major General Curtis LeMay during World War Two that he should stop the high-altitude bombing of Japan's industrial centers and instead saturate them with low-altitude, incendiary attacks on population centers – a tactic that placed American pilots and bomber crews in far more danger of being shot down or captured, but also led to the devastation of 64 Japanese cities and more than a *million* civilian casualties – all because it was a statistically more viable and efficient form of terror. Granted, we *were* at war, and McNamara was absolutely right that the effect would be more devastating, but his recommendation was based on a statistical summary of numerous economic, scientific and psychological aspects taken into consideration, well balanced and thought out before anybody else even thought to *request* such a summary of airborne offensive weaponry; the

¹⁵⁰ Nalty, Bernard C., USAF Ballistic Missile Programs 1967-1968, Office of Air Force History, September, 1969.

point is, this man would *never* respond to an attack of *any nature* by delaying the improvements that might be necessary to protect the system from further such attacks. He would have already had a contingency plan for any attack of any sort already prepared in order to be immediately carried out. In this case, the Department of Defense responded by delaying as much as possible pretty much *everything* until they were in a better position to pay for the previous two years of upgrades.

If a UFO had shut down Echo Flight the morning of March 16, 1967, the one absolutely definite response would have been the *immediate* deployment of as many Minuteman II's and III's as could be accomplished in as short a time as possible, and *nobody* would have been paying much mind to those annoying schedules that had been originally made a year or two before. The defensive measures attained by the enhancement of electromagnetic and radiation protection, already scheduled as part of the force modernization program, would have been immediately advanced *system wide*, along with the immediate correction of "shortcomings in the NS-17 guidance and control unit", while the improvement of the penetration aids system used to camouflage the warhead during its reentry into enemy environments would have been set back as far as possible, because if you're threatened by an enemy of unknown origin, unknown nationality, and unknown motivating philosophical discourse that can shut down all primary systems of any sort on any electrical grid anywhere in the world by only *peripheral* contact – which is exactly what's being implied here if these stories have any factual basis whatsoever – penetration aids are basically *useless*. Your military focus would go massively defensive in a heartbeat. And in the midst of all this, the new *budget* would have easily exceeded the most satisfying dreams of any state administrator or Congressman since the beginning of time, because in America we tend to throw *plenty of money* at any and every military emergency while we're in the process of mustering troops and overwhelming force. *None of this happened*. Apparently the only suitable response to this obscene threat of a maniacally mystic UFO floating like a red balloon at the front gate of an Air Force activity housing a nuclear missile flight's primary control center where this vehicle then capitalized on its apparent ability to disable that entire flight of missiles that were spread out over literally many, many dozens of square miles of snow and ice-covered dirt on top of twenty feet of concrete and steel using a radiated electro-magical wave front acting like some kind of an Alistair Crowley sentence in an Art Buchwald War of the Words that unexplainably affected

nothing else excepting the imaginations of world-weary men in their dark-blue uniforms with little more to do than exercise those said imaginations was a decision, carefully yet expeditiously made at the highest levels of the United States government, to continue the gradual, well-timed, on-schedule resolution to problems stemming from the development of the NS-17 guidance and control units that – according to the manufacturer, the Autonetics Division of North American Aviation – *weren't even in use at Wing I at the time of the Echo Flight Incident*, since the 564th Missile Squadron, the only squadron at Wing I to be fully equipped with Minuteman II's, wasn't yet considered fully operable and wouldn't be for another month. No offense, folks, but you're a bunch of gullible fools with no wind at your back if you believe this story without even looking into it. The Air Force didn't even reschedule the deployment, repair, or testing of *anything*. Their only immediate response to the supposed threat represented by a UFO taking out an entire flight of nuclear missiles – *using, primarily, the powers of magic* – in the same amount of time it takes to empty a security building and then make a follow-up phone call was to initiate a very standard equipment malfunction investigation, and then delay making any other decisions or doing *anything* aside from interviewing those military personnel who were on watch until the Boeing and Autonetics reps could fly into town two days later. *Does nobody else see that this crap about UFOs is obviously a stupid fucking fabrication?*

The ambiguity that we sometimes note in Nalty's discussion up to this point is due entirely to the fact that it was published in September 1969, well before any long term effects resulting from the incidents described could be properly analyzed, fully understood, or even rationally acknowledged. Other effects, however, were *definitely* noted by Nalty at the time of writing.

Taking finances into consideration, Secretary Brown studied ways to achieve the best possible balance between research and development activities and the immediate needs of the operational force. Indicative of this approach was his decision on 3 July 1967 to postpone Minuteman II for five months – from July to December 1969 – instead of a year and to suspend modernization work for five months upon completion of Wing I. The latter would delay completion of the final wing from October 1972 to July 1973 ...¹⁵¹

¹⁵¹ Nalty, Bernard C., USAF Ballistic Missile Programs 1967-1968, Office of Air Force History, September, 1969

Completion of Wing I would see the replacement of the Minuteman I's with Minuteman II's as part of the already scheduled, routine updating procedures for all facilities. This was crucial, because the newer NS-17's included in the Minuteman II deployment after June 1967 were expected to not only correct the failures inherent in the older model NS-17's used in Minuteman II's *prior* to this upgrade, but would also resolve some issues with associated equipment that were later determined to be the primary cause of the Echo Flight Incident. Once the defensive measures incorporated in conjunction with these "routine" facility updates were completed, there would be no further failures of this type throughout the Minuteman force. We will discuss this in more detail further in this narrative.

The Secretary also directed the Air Staff to postpone acquisition of the Mk-18 reentry vehicle one year to July 1972 and to reschedule the initial operational capability of the Mk-17 reentry vehicle and Mk-1A penetration aids from January to July 1969. He further authorized an 18-month delay in incorporating the status authentication device – basically a scrambler for cable traffic – into the Minuteman wings, and advised that research on the solid post boost propulsion system would receive funds through the advanced ICBM technology program [thereby establishing "the best possible balance between research and development activities and the immediate needs of the operational force"].

While the Minuteman program was being thus revised, Secretary Brown reviewed for Secretary McNamara the history of the current financial crisis. Dr. Brown wrote that OSD's decision on the previous year's budget had provided the Air Force some \$181 million less than it had requested. Among other things, the budget reviewers had ignored an Air Force warning that bringing the NS-17 guidance and control unit to acceptable performance standards would be extremely expensive. "These unfortunate events," he continued, were "by no means entirely the result of OSD decisions." The Air Force had been late with its submissions, imprecise in estimates, and vague in justifying requests for added funds. But the Office of Secretary of Defense had, in Secretary Brown's opinion, sometimes ignored "even these tardy and underestimated amounts."

Even as Dr. Brown sought to explain the situation, the Minuteman program underwent further changes. In late November 1967 the Strategic Air Command urged the Air Staff to allocate money for a number of new items including radiation sensors, a device to cancel a launch already in process, and so-called "memory augmentation" for Minuteman's airborne computer. While advocating these additions to the program, the command opposed an OSD proposal to obtain the necessary funds by cancelling the Mk-17 reentry system or delaying still further the operational appearance of Minuteman III. SAC spokesmen protested that these actions would "degrade the Minuteman force" and urged deletion of less important items instead.¹⁵²

This doesn't sound very much like a typical military activity response to an unknown but hauntingly effective threat to the most valued munitions element the USAF could possibly

¹⁵² Nalty, Bernard C., USAF Ballistic Missile Programs 1967-1968, Office of Air Force History, September, 1969.

muster, does it? Of course, these actions *would* be appropriate in any universe noted for the *absence* of such UFO threats – you know, like in the real world where science fiction is still fiction, and flying saucers are grounded due to poor weather.

Difficulties Overcome at Minuteman Operational Sites

During the winter of 1965-1966, the operation of several Minuteman sites was disrupted after storms had severed commercial power lines and the diesel engines that were supposed to turn standby generators failed to start. The refurbishment or replacement of standby power system components began in 1966 with emergency modifications – principally to the mechanism for switching automatically to internal power – in Minuteman Wings I through V. The first series of alterations was scarcely under way when it was discovered that the new switching mechanism was overly sensitive to fluctuations in commercial current. The solution arrived at was to arrange a two-second delay between sensing a change in voltage and shutting off outside power. If the weather or some defect in the commercial system caused a minor variation in current, normal power was expected to return within that time; if the fluctuation persisted, the system would shift to standby power before any damage could be done.

Interruptions of electrical power had been unusually frequent at the Minuteman II wing at Grand Forks, N.D. During the first six months of 1966 commercial power failed on 450 occasions, and 126 times, almost one in three, the standby system did not work. Although commercial power was usually restored within a quarter of an hour, the diesel-powered system was clearly in need of modifications to make it more dependable. Repairs undertaken included modifying circuit breakers, replacing diodes and relays in generator circuits and switching panels, and providing diesel fuel pressure gauges and shut off valves. When this job seemed likely to last through 1968, the Air Force directed the Ballistic Systems Division (BSD) [*Note: BSD was later absorbed by the newly created Space and Missile Systems Organization (SAMSO) a few short months later.] to schedule the work in conjunction with routine facility update.

The repeated failure of the launch site generators also imposed a severe strain on the storage batteries – 32-volt for Minuteman I and 160-volt for Minuteman II – which were used as emergency sources of power. The revisions in plans and delays in overhauling the unreliable diesel system resulted in a continued reliance on emergency power to do what had been planned for the standby diesels and expected a heavy toll in expended batteries. The Air Force soon found it necessary to purchase more batteries in order to replenish a dwindling supply of spares. Recharging exhausted batteries was a normal procedure, though the task required caution. These emergency power sources – especially the heavier one used in Minuteman II – could explode if filled too full with fluid or allowed to overheat.¹⁵³

It was due to the repeated failures of launch site emergency power systems that required maintenance teams to spend the night at four of the Echo Flight launch facilities the night before the full flight of missiles was taken off alert. Far from being the “routine maintenance” LT Walt Figel referred to in his egregiously interpreted interview with

¹⁵³ Nalty, Bernard C., USAF Ballistic Missile Programs 1967-1968, Office of Air Force History, September, 1969.

“researcher” Robert Hastings, this work was anticipated to take much longer than originally thought, so BSD rescheduled all of it to be done *in conjunction with routine facility updates*. The work itself was certainly *not* routine. Although the problems were worst at Grand Forks AFB, the Ogden Air Logistics Center incorporated modifications to the diesel powered systems across the entire force, because they had become so undependable *force-wide*.

Another problem of yet undetermined gravity [undetermined as of September 1969, well before the success or failure of the corrective measures undertaken could be fully determined] appeared in March 1967 when an entire flight of Minuteman I missiles at Malmstrom went abruptly off alert [this, of course, refers to the Echo Flight Incident; it's interesting to note that Nalty mentions no other flight failures in reference to this entire period (in reference, in fact, to the entire year), whether the occurrence was at November Flight or Oscar Flight, suggesting thereby that no such failures occurred outside of the already documented Echo Flight Incident; nor are there any other documented references of any sort to support Salas' claim of failures occurring at the November or Oscar flights; it's almost as if he just made everything up out of the thin, *thin* air. We have come across additional sources that discuss the one full flight failure noted at Echo Flight in March 1967, but no others are mentioned; any review of the available documents and literature are very clear: there was only one failure of an entire missile flight in March 1967 – it was at Echo Flight, and no others followed. All of the contemporary documents, including a discussion written by a UFO investigator for Condon's University of Colorado UFO Study, are unanimous in their complete avowal that UFOs had absolutely nothing to do with the matter.]. Extensive tests at Malmstrom, Ogden Air Materiel Area, and at the Boeing plant in Seattle revealed that an electronic noise pulse had shut down the flight. In effect, this surge of noise was similar to the electromagnetic pulse generated by nuclear explosions. The component of Minuteman I that was most vulnerable to noise pulse was the logic coupler of the guidance and control system. Subsequent tests showed that the same part in Minuteman II was equally sensitive to this same phenomenon. At the end of fiscal year 1968, however, filters were being installed to suppress electromagnetic effects, and these might also screen out noise.¹⁵⁴

Since the problem never resurfaced, we can safely assume that the suppression filters installed as part of the scheduled force upgrades *were* successful; in addition, the scheduled replacement of all Minuteman I's and II's with the newer Minuteman III missiles – which also incorporated a wide margin of electromagnetic suppression elements in its construction – also accounts for the Air Force's success correcting this vulnerability of the guidance and control unit logic coupler. In any case, it's difficult to believe that the Secretary of Defense or any Air Force commander would have been willing to wait until “the end of fiscal year 1968” to install such filters if a *UFO* had actually shut down Echo Flight by the method proposed by Salas and CUFON. In such a high security environment, a *UFO* attack would have motivated an

¹⁵⁴ Nalty, Bernard C., USAF Ballistic Missile Programs 1967-1968, Office of Air Force History, September, 1969.

immediate response. In this case, however, the chain of command was perfectly willing to not only wait for the casual corrections to be instituted, but to schedule them as part of a routine facilities update. This would *never* have happened if the UFOs referred to by Salas and Klotz were anything more than imaginary glammers.

Now, let's clear up all of this garbage about Echo Flight missiles going down because of the EMP caused by a nuclear explosion, or by a UFO's magical ray gun that mimics the *effects* of a nuclear explosion – and if people who believe this story, or the journalists and bloggers who think they've got to repeat it, would spend a little bit of time educating themselves before accepting an unbelievable story told by some idiot with a badge, maybe we wouldn't have to go through this much trouble, but there you are, I guess fools and the lazy all plumped together in a pudding of the market dreams authors like Salas and Klotz have when they're really, *really* drunk on the glow of speaking to a crowd of UFO groupies at a MUFON conference just don't have the time or the inclination to pick up a book guaranteed to be non-fiction and teach themselves something useful *and* true. So, please, pay attention.

An EMP is *not* always caused by a nuclear explosion. An EMP is simply a pulse of electromagnetic energy, and can have many sources. And the effects of an EMP on electrical components can also be mimicked by other sources such as, for instance, an "electronic noise pulse", which can be generated within micro-circuitry, such as that used by Autonetics when they designed the new generation of guidance and control units for the Minuteman system. A little research of the type generally assumed to have been completed by authors attempting to discuss such matters will show that there are, in fact, *numerous* electromagnetic threats, both man-made and natural, that are injurious to military systems, creating internal electrical stresses in the form of undesired voltages, currents and signals. These threats include internal interference from other circuits, transient over-voltages and over-currents on power and signal lines, radiating electric and magnetic fields from nearby equipment and systems, electrostatic discharge, and even lightning. *All of these* can create additional transient (as in random or momentary) voltages and currents as a result of electrical coupling within the system, which can be particularly aggravating in complex electronic systems.

Coupling of an electromagnetic field to the circuits and circuit elements inside of an otherwise enclosed system takes place through intentional penetrations such as antennas and

waveguides, but there are also many *inadvertent* electromagnetic coupling paths through elements such as cables, apertures, and grounding loops that can create access. Although electrical components are designed to handle the normal signal and noise background adequately, a system that's subjected to more stress than it can handle will generally react in one of two ways: (1) if the voltages and currents created are comparable to the voltages and currents that are part of the normal electronic environment, they can cause electromagnetic upsets, such as shutting down a main power source, or creating fluctuations of current that register as equipment faults, and (2) if the voltages and currents created are large in comparison to the normal environment, they can produce both upsets *and* permanent damage to electrical components. In addition, the more complex an electrical system is, the more likely it is to develop transient voltages as a result of electronic noise pulse coupling; also, the more microminiaturized, integrated circuits that are used in a system, the more complex that system becomes, and, again, the more susceptible that system is to internally generated, electromagnetic agents, or interference mediums. This is a weakness inherent to the guidance and control system designed by Autonetics Division of North American Aviation for the Minuteman II, particularly the all-inertial NS-17 Missile Guidance Set (MGS), which included the newly upgraded D-37C, the main computer component that allowed designers to include so much additional targeting information, increasing thereby to a far greater extent both the missile's effectiveness and its application in significantly more multinational scenarios. There was a period during which this particular unit was responsible for an increasingly more bewildering series of failures in the Minuteman system.

By the summer of 1966, the Air Force appeared to have solved an especially serious problem – the unreliability of the NS-17 guidance and control unit used in the LGM-30F missile. The solution adopted included modifying the design, careful handling of the device while in transit to the site, and cautious starting, especially in cold weather, to avoid a "thermal shock" believed to occur when coolant was added too rapidly to a unit being brought to operating temperature. But despite these actions, NS-17's continued to fail at an alarming rate. By April 1967, for instance, there were 107 fewer units on hand for the Minuteman force than plans called for; the deficit was due to the unexpectedly large number under repair. ¹⁵⁵

Because of the importance of these units to the Minuteman II force, the Air Force asked for and OSD provided \$13.7 million for modifications to begin in the summer of 1967. This sum, however, turned out to be a little more than a third of the amount needed. Meanwhile, AFSC and BSD investigators studied the performance record of the NS-17 to determine the circumstances under

¹⁵⁵ Nalty, Bernard C., USAF Ballistic Missile Programs 1967-1968, Office of Air Force History, September, 1969.

which units were failing and scrutinized both the design and the method of manufacture to identify probable cause of failure. [The pattern of monies requested vs. monies actually needed, combined with the Air Force's apparent inability to determine the cause throughout years of system failures indicates that they were looking at a random series of electrically induced failures brought about by complications that the Air Force evidently didn't understand as well as everybody would have liked; this had nothing to do with how intelligent the men tasked with this mission were – it had everything to do with the use of new technologies that were not fully understood at the time; more discussion regarding this aspect of the system failures will follow.]

The TRW Systems Corporation, which participated in the NS-17 probe, concluded that poor quality control and sloppy workmanship were among the major causes of failure. Another factor, according to the BSD program manager, was that the manufacturer, Autonetics Division of North American Aviation, had been overly bold in attempting to advance the science of microminiaturized electronics. He suggested that a more conservative approach would have eliminated the need for many of the modifications now required by the NS-17. As a result of these assessments, Systems Command tried to persuade Autonetics to do a better job, mainly by reminding the firm's executives of the importance of the Minuteman II system to the nation's security. [It's no coincidence that the logic coupler used by Autonetics in their design and manufacturing of the NS-17 guidance and control system was the very same component that they used in the guidance and control system used in the Minuteman I missile systems, nor is it a coincidence that this single component was found to be responsible for the Echo Flight Incident. One single reason was never found to be responsible for the NS-17 failures, but they certainly occurred, and were not only very well documented, they also happened around the same time period as the Echo Flight Incident, and yet, oddly enough, nobody – *even once* – tried to blame these failures on UFOs.]

In the aftermath of the investigation came improved methods of production and numerous changes in the units themselves. Each group of modifications was identified by a color code, and SAC at one time found itself with yellow, blue, and red dot NS-17's in stock. By June, 1967, however, the modifications had been standardized so that there were only two types of NS-17's: the old and the new, with the latter having increased radiation shielding as well as other improvements.¹⁵⁶

These *other improvements* also included the installation of electromagnetic suppression filters that were expected to and succeeded in correcting the electrical vulnerability issues that caused the Echo Flight Incident. The effect of the NS-17 corrections on systems capability was equally dramatic. Note that incidents of guidance and control unit failures were highest in March 1967, the same month as the Echo Flight Incident.

As a result of the corrective program, mean time between failure of guidance and control units increased from 1,400 hours in March 1967 to about 2,950 hours in July 1968. Some of the newer units, however, had operated in excess of 4,000 hours.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁶ Nalty, Bernard C., USAF Ballistic Missile Programs 1967-1968, Office of Air Force History, September, 1969.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

This dramatic change in the operability of the Minuteman force had to have been the effect of something, some change that was enacted force wide – and common sense tells us that this *change* could not have been simply “routine” maintenance.

Let's take some time out for another quick electronics lesson:

The noise immunity of a logic circuit refers to the circuit's ability to tolerate noise voltages at its inputs. A quantitative measure of noise immunity is called noise margin. Unwanted spurious signals are called noise. Noise may be ac noise or dc noise. A drift in the voltage levels of signals is called dc noise. The ac noise is a random pulse caused by other switching signals. [This is the same type of random noise pulse that by September 1969 the Air Force was convinced had caused the Echo Flight Incident.] Noise margin is expressed in volts and represents the maximum noise signal that can be added to the input signal of a digital circuit without causing an undesirable change in the circuit output [such as taking a flight of Minuteman missiles off alert; at Echo Flight, the noise margin for the circuitry in the guidance and control logic coupler wasn't high enough to prevent the incident from occurring.] This is an important criterion for the selection of a logic family for certain applications where environmental noise may be high.¹⁵⁸

Internally generated electronic noise pulses are more than capable of coupling with surrounding conductive materials, circuits, circuit elements and other inadvertent coupling paths into adjacent components and systems, affecting them in the same way external events like high-altitude EMPs (HEMPs) do – except electronic noise pulses aren't as large as nuclear HEMP, and they don't penetrate unconnected systems, because they're primarily *internal events*. Analyzing and predicting where and when such inadvertent coupling occurs is necessary to assess any possible damage to such equipment and to protect complex electrical systems before they're built. At least that's the ordinary plan, but it doesn't often work out that way. It's difficult to predict a transient, random event, and errors when assessing such matters occur often.

Normal engineering design practices take into account the possibility of these type of stresses and attempt to produce designs that can survive and operate under such stresses with only occasional isolated problems. The process starts by modeling the specifications of the environment that any electrical component must tolerate without damage and within which it has to operate properly. All of this can be determined in advance using a combination of experience and knowledge about the environment and the stresses typical of that environment

¹⁵⁸ Kumar, A. Anand, Fundamentals of Digital Circuits, Prentice-Hall of India Private Limited, New Delhi, 2001, p. 469.

in order to be as realistic as possible. And then, using mathematical analysis and modeling tools, engineers actually design the circuits that can be expected to meet those specifications. This design process includes the selection of components with sufficient ruggedness for the anticipated stresses. Since individual electrical components of a given type are not *identical* when they are actually manufactured, the designer will select component types with enough of a safety margin to allow for manufacturing viability. In some critical cases, the designer may require that each component of a particular type be individually tested before being used in the equipment, although this can be admittedly problematic when the mass production of circuits is a much desired part of this same process.

Having completed the initial design process, design engineers will then arrange for the production of *prototype* versions of the equipment. Such prototype equipment also needs to be tested in the laboratory under conditions that simulate the anticipated real environment (including, for example, simulated stresses due to lightning or electronic noise pulse or even high-altitude EMP, which is the nuclear explosion EMP that Salas has repeatedly linked to the Echo Flight Incident story). However, since the prototype equipment will normally contain only representative samples of components necessary for it to function as expected, you can never be absolutely certain that the results of all your testing in advance will apply to the vast majority of the units that will ultimately be deployed. Also, the simulated environment may not be totally representative of the *extremes* of the actual environment, so faults can be encountered even under very strictly conformed means of production.

Any design deficiencies discovered in the testing of the prototypes are necessarily corrected, and a second round of prototype testing proceeds. Theoretically, this process is then repeated *ad infinitum* until the design engineers have verified, through testing and simulation, that the equipment "meets the desired specifications" contracted for.

The equipment is then manufactured and deployed. It is not unusual, however, particularly in complex electrical systems, to discover design defects well after deployment. One expects some incidence of random failure of isolated pieces of equipment due to defects in components and to operating environments that are more severe than those anticipated in the design phase. However, some types of failures, which occur all too frequently, will eventually be traced to *design* errors. That is, components within the circuitry, although not defective, are being stressed beyond their tolerance. Design errors at this point must be corrected by a *very*

costly process, including such measures as modification or recall of units deployed in the field, modification of units in manufacture or in inventory, and modification of documentation. This costly process is avoided as much as possible by careful initial design and testing *before* deployment; nevertheless, it typically occurs in complex products on a fairly frequent basis.

Now, if you're discussing this process as it would have been completed in 1965-1967 when the integrated circuits that we're concerned with were in use, or even as far back as 1961-1963 when these same circuits were, to a great extent, originally designed, there are additional variables that have to be considered. For one thing, microminiaturized, integrated circuitry was very, *very new*, which meant they were untested to a greater extent than would have ordinarily been desired. Although Autonetics Division of North American Aviation did an *exceptional* job, really, considering the real time pressure they were then operating under, they were nonetheless unable to predict the effects of relatively minor transient voltage events on the microminiaturized circuitry over time – and the degrading of some electronic modules became an unanticipated problem as a result. In addition, integrated circuits are far, *far* more susceptible to damages caused by what were previously thought to be relatively minor fluctuations of current, pulsed voltage spikes, electrical noise, and the degrading effects of electromagnetic fields in general. And this susceptibility to damage caused by what we used to think of as the normal electromagnetic environment increased with the complexity of circuit design. In addition, although integrated circuits can be produced in mass quantities, variables in the way they're handled during the manufacturing process, or during transport to whatever facility they're eventually going to be put into service at, less than perfect quality control or workmanship and even too strict a dependence on the test results achieved during the design process resulting in the incorporation of far less give and take in the electrical resistance of the circuits than is actually needed, can all result in poor quality circuits being installed throughout whatever system is being discussed. The working *extremities* of this process was still being figured out while the Minuteman II was actually in the process of being *deployed*, and as a result of this, they were encountering a lot of problems, particularly with the NS-17 Guidance and Control units that were incorporated into the Minuteman II missiles. Unfortunately, a number of decisions, including the scheduling of many system upgrades, were based on the belief that the problems they had faced with the NS-17 in 1965-1966 had been solved. As things turned out, the Air Force was somewhat hasty reaching this accord.

NS-17's continued to fail at an alarming rate. By April 1967, for instance, there were 107 fewer units on hand for the Minuteman force than plans called for; the deficit was due to the unexpectedly large number under repair. ...

... AFSC and BSD investigators studied the performance record of the NS-17 to determine the circumstances under which units were failing and scrutinized both the design and the method of manufacture to identify probable cause of failure.

The TRW Systems Corporation, which participated in the NS-17 probe, concluded that poor quality control and sloppy workmanship were among the major causes of failure. Another factor, according to the BSD program manager, was that the manufacturer, Autonetics Division of North American Aviation, had been overly bold in attempting to advance the science of microminiaturized electronics. He suggested that a more conservative approach would have eliminated the need for many of the modifications now required by the NS-17. ...

... By June, 1967, however, the modifications had been standardized so that there were only two types of NS-17's: the old and the new, with the latter having increased radiation shielding as well as other improvements.¹⁵⁹

As we've already discussed, these "other improvements", which included the installation of electromagnetic suppression filters, were responsible for an increase of mean time between failures from a low of "1,400 hours in March 1967 to about 2,950 hours in July 1968."¹⁶⁰

The electrical systems that were used in the Minuteman II were actually designed and tested from 1961 through 1964, and the general practice at the time, at least for systems like the Minuteman force, was to work quickly, get the systems online as fast as possible, and then maintain what worked and adjust what didn't work on-station. The history of integrated circuitry makes the motivation behind such practices somewhat obvious. In 1962, Texas Instruments, fundamental in the design and use of the first integrated circuits, won the contract from Autonetics Division of North American Aviation to design 22 custom circuits for the Minuteman II missile guidance and control units; Clevite and Westinghouse also developed some of the circuits for the Minuteman project. In 1965, the Minuteman force surpassed NASA's Apollo procurement as the largest single consumer of integrated circuits in the world.¹⁶¹ *Everything* about this type of instrument was new and untested, and how environment acts upon it through time was to a great extent unknown, and, more importantly, *unsuspected*. These corporations

¹⁵⁹ Nalty, Bernard C., USAF Ballistic Missile Programs 1967-1968, Office of Air Force History, September, 1969.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁶¹ <http://www.computerhistory.org/semiconductor/timeline/1962-Apollo.html>

were nonetheless justifiably lauded for their achievements in the Minuteman force; and their overall record is nothing short of remarkable. They were at the forefront of an electronic revolution – *and they knew it*. Just check out some of their ads:

FLIGHT International, 9 May 1963¹⁶²
Autonetics' Minuteman Contribution

Microminiaturized electronic circuits made by Autonetics, a division of North American Aviation, Inc, 3370 Anaheim Road, Anaheim, Calif, will form part of the navigation and flight control systems for the improved Minuteman ICBM. These systems, used also in US nuclear submarines, are designed to operate under all conditions without reliance on radio, magnetic or other references, and for long periods without failures. Minuteman systems include a gyroscopically leveled platform, velocity meters, electronic digital computer, and flight control units for nozzles on each of the missile's three stages. The computer continually checks the Minuteman in its silo, carries out countdown tests before the launch and, in flight, transmits steering signals to the nozzle controls. Autonetics also build ground checking equipment for these systems.

FLIGHT International, 14 January 1965¹⁶³

MINUTEMAN II SCORES COMPLETE SUCCESS ON 5000-MILE MAIDEN TEST FLIGHT; IT WAS THE FIRST MISSILE FLIGHT WITH FULLY-INTEGRATED MICROELECTRONICS SYSTEMS

The first flight of the Minuteman II represents a breakthrough in the application of microelectronics to military and space systems. The guidance, control, and checkout systems for the Minuteman II were designed, developed, and produced for the U.S. Air Force by NAA/Autonetics and its nationwide team of suppliers.

FLIGHT International, 24 February 1966¹⁶⁴

Why is the Minuteman missile important to future electronics needs?

Today's Minuteman represents more than a super-reliable missile. It is a spearhead of electronics progress.. .the forerunner of even more advanced microelectronics systems. The micro-electronics advances pioneered by North American Aviation/Autonetics can now be applied to future systems. In the Minuteman I program, Autonetics systems met or surpassed goals of reliability, accuracy, and weight. Improvements in reliability reached up to 700% higher than contract objectives. This was accomplished while lowering weight by 15% and increasing accuracy by 30% beyond contract requirements. The fully-integrated microelectronics system built by Autonetics for the Minuteman II program represents 99% of all electronics in the missile except for the reentry vehicle. In addition to the airborne guidance and flight control systems, Autonetics provides the supporting automatic ground checkout and alignment equipment. This totally integrated system is proving itself in the Minuteman II and establishing a whole new

¹⁶² <http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1963/1963%20-%200725.html>

¹⁶³ <http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1965/1965%20-%200066.html>

¹⁶⁴ <http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1966/1966%20-%200478.html>

standard of reliability for electronics systems. Autonetics, one of the world's largest electronics producers, is uniquely qualified and experienced to help the Free World meet the need for lightweight, reliable electronics systems for use on land, sea, air and in space.

As outstanding a job these pioneers of electrical engineering were typically capable of, there were some aspects of the field that they were simply *unaware* of, particularly in the case of microminiaturization of circuitry, a complex field with a habit in its early days of changing everything we know about component design and reactive application on a fairly regular basis. The idea behind the integrated circuit was first published in 1952. And although everyone instantly saw the inherent value in the proposal, nobody pulled it off successfully until 1958, when both Jack Kilby of Texas Instruments and Robert Noyce of Fairchild Semiconductor, working independently of each other, did so for the benefit of the world and the corporations they worked for. Almost immediately, incredible progress was made at an equally incredible rate. In July 1958, the Air Force Ballistic Missile Division began to develop the components and select the contractors for the Minuteman missile ICBM based entirely on earlier advances in solid-fuel propellants and the potential promise of integrated circuitry. By the following September the missile development command had made sufficient progress to convince the Air Force to support full Minuteman system development, and the following month the Boeing Airplane Company was selected as the missile assembly and test contractor. In 1959, when the Department of Defense contracted for a concerted review of the entire field of microminiaturized circuitry in order to try to predict the application and extent of future use, the circuitry itself was already being applied in the Minuteman missile program. The contracted review discussed everything that was going on but was unable to make many predictions for the future, because the entire field was just wide open, and *nobody* could predict the extent of the revolution.

Rapid advances in microminiaturization of electronic equipment will affect missile and space vehicle electronic design within a short period of time. To assess the potential impact of the new techniques, a field and literature survey of current progress has been made.

Approximately 150 firms in the electronic equipment and parts industry are energetically engaged in microminiaturization research, development, and technical support. A wide variety of techniques are employed. ¹⁶⁵

¹⁶⁵ Horton, P. V. and Smith, T. D., Survey of Microminiaturization of Electronic Equipment, Space Technology Laboratories, Inc., Los Angeles 45, California, Contract No. AF 04(647)-309, 31 December 1959.

Some manufacturers are fabricating microelements of thin films deposited on very small glass or ceramic wafers; these microelements are then stacked, interconnected, and encapsulated into complete circuits. One firm has deposited complete 14-part circuits on 1/4 square inch of surface. Various semiconductor manufacturers have developed complete circuit modules on silicon or germanium material no larger than a conventional transistor. Other approaches utilize molecular techniques to obtain circuit effects from a single block of material without identifiable electronic parts. Additional firms use resistance welding and small encapsulated printed circuits for high-density packaging of very small parts. Still another organization is developing an evacuated ceramic thermionic circuit module for high-temperature use. Rapid progress is being made.

A wide variety of fabrication techniques are used, ranging from vacuum, electrical, and chemical depositing of thin films to the growing of semiconductor ribbons. Among methods used are spectrographic plates for photo resists, screen and photolithographic printing, micromachining, air abrasion, ultrasonic machining, and electronic etching.

Microminiature circuits of some types are expected to be available soon for limited applications. Improved performance, resistance to environmental extremes, and increased reliability can be anticipated. Reduced size will eventually permit satellite payloads with highly sophisticated instrumentation and completely redundant control systems.¹⁶⁶

Expectations for the future use of such components was justifiably high, especially in the fields of ballistics and space technology. The process of developing such circuits for specific uses, however, added time to the procedure, which in turn added to the degradation of specific components used in their development. Eventually, it became so important to determine when that degradation would necessitate the replacement of circuits, that a new industry developed around simulation tools that could be readily applied to device and circuit designs. In the first few years, however, nobody really suspected what the real time effect or degree of long-term degradation would be, nor when or even *if* it would occur. And both the effects and the time differed as much as the circuits themselves. It wasn't simply a matter of designing them, making them, and using them, either. By New Years, 1960, the Air Force knew only that a new field of electronics was being created that was expected to improve *everything*, but that's about it.

Information has been sought on the estimated time scale required for development of microminiature equipment. The length of time devoted to research by each organization and accomplishments to date have been used to estimate when circuits and modules may be expected to be available for testing and evaluation. Estimates have also been sought on test programs, design of complete equipment utilizing microminiaturization techniques, tooling, and availability of production models.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁶ Horton, P. V. and Smith, T. D., Survey of Microminiaturization of Electronic Equipment, Space Technology Laboratories, Inc., Los Angeles 45, California, Contract No. AF 04(647)-309, 31 December 1959.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

Everybody wanted to get right into the use of microminiaturized circuits, and the Air Force was no different than anybody else in this respect. The Minuteman I was developed from original drawings throughout 1960, and was first test fired on 1 February, 1961. The first one deployed was entered into the Strategic Air Command's arsenal in 1962, at Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana, and it proved to be an effective weapon. It was, however, tremendously complex electronically, a characteristic that made it *intrinsically vulnerable* to electrical events such as voltage surges, transient events such as current and noise pulses, and all manner of random effects that today would be taken into account as much as possible during the design process. The Minuteman I utilized the NS-10Q missile guidance system, designed and manufactured by Autonetics Division of North American Aviation. The three main components of the system included (1) a stable platform for the entire structure, which included, for the most part (2) the guidance and control system main power supply which provided 28 VDC utilizing 19-25 amps from an external source for (3) the D-17B computer, which at about 62 pounds, contained 1,521 transistors, 6,282 diodes, 1,116 capacitors, and 504 resistors, all mounted on double copper-clad, engraved, gold-plated, glass fiber laminate circuit boards. *There were 75 of these circuit boards* and each one was coated with a flexible polyurethane compound to protect all of it from moisture and excessive vibration. Over the following decades this computer proved to be highly reliable, and very rugged for an example of such early use of microminiaturized integrated circuitry.¹⁶⁸ This hardiness, however, doesn't come even close to *perfection*. In fact, while perfection may have been a worthy goal, *it was never expected, and its absence was actually planned for years in advance*.

It's important for people to realize that this depiction of a military orchestrating the immediate use of technologies that were *not* perfectly acquired, were to an extent *imperfectly* tested, and reflected a propensity for deploying technological systems that could be considered *incomplete* from a purely industrial standpoint was actually a well-studied strategy of national security enterprise that was adopted and exploited by the United States throughout the 1960s and well into the 1970s. One source of this strategy is found in the works of Dr. Stefan Thomas Possony, the Austrian-born U.S. economist and military strategist who originally conceived the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative, popularly known as *Star Wars*, after the well-known film

¹⁶⁸ <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/D-17B>

series. In 1963, Possony published a significant essay entitled *Toward a Strategy of Supremacy*¹⁶⁹ detailing some of his thoughts on U.S. military strategy for the coming decade.

Incessant and accelerating progress of technology is the foremost fact of the military environment. Since in many ways technology develops as though it were an impersonal force, it is impossible to decelerate technological change, let alone to stop it. If one side deliberately retards its technological programs, the other side, almost inevitably, will win the technological race, perhaps even without strenuous effort. Other things being equal, the winner of the technological race can impose his law upon the loser.

At the present pace, weapons systems must be replaced every five to ten years by new "generations" of equivalent weapons. Compare, for example, the progression of Soviet jet interceptors from the Mig-15 through the Mig-17 and the Mig-19 to the Mig-21. Similarly, our bombers advanced from the B-17 via the B-29 and B-36 to the B-52, perhaps to the RS-70 and an operational version of the Dyna-Soar. This advance was paralleled by the development of ballistic missiles from Thor and Jupiter via Atlas and Titan to Polaris and Minuteman, and beyond. Within each of these "generations" there are subsidiary progressions, e.g., from a B-52A to B-52H, and from Atlas A to Atlas D, and from Titan I to Titan II.

According to the standards of weapons under development or in the blueprint stage, the weapons that are deployed in battle order are always obsolescent or obsolete. Thus, irrespective of the size of the military budget and the number of soldiers and weapons, a country that stops modernizing will be disarmed within one or two weapons cycles. If its modernization rate is slower than that of the competitor, that country will fall behind in military capability. By contrast, the country which modernizes faster and pulls ahead of the opponent by one or more generations of key weapons systems, will "outarm" the adversary, possibly to the point of impotence. The continuous acceleration of technological change tends to bring about the "unilateral disarmament" of the nation that falls behind. The defeat of France in 1940 gave a foretaste of this military "law" which controls modern strategy.

The military purpose of war is to disarm the opponent or render his forces harmless. In the past, this objective could be attained only through battle. Today, this same objective is potentially attainable, more or less without bloodshed, through winning the technological arms race.

"Victory" achieved by technical means only would not be durable, nor always conclusive. Superiority can be preserved only by regaining "technological victory" several times in succession. To recreate this "victory" repeatedly and continue winning the race until the threat abates is a formidable task. The modernization of weapons would have to be accomplished, albeit at a slower pace, even if there were no acute threat. Moreover, this type of military contest is less risky and destructive than ordeal through battle; and it allows more satisfactory options for peace-making. The very fact that we now are able to choose a strategy-short-of-catastrophe surely constitutes progress about which we should rejoice.

Does it follow that the Free World's struggle against the Communists can be waged exclusively as a technological contest? There is little doubt in my mind that the Soviets have grasped the

¹⁶⁹ Possony, Stefan T., "Toward a Strategy of Supremacy", National Security : Political, Military, and Economic Strategies in the Decade Ahead, The Center for Strategic Studies, Georgetown University, Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher, 1963.

essence of technology and presently are trying to win the technological arms race for communism. At the same time, their propaganda and political warfare is aimed at bringing about a slow-down of Free World military technology. If we allow the Soviets to win but one or two rounds of the technological contest decisively, the United States might be lost; at best, it would be in serious trouble. If the race remains inconclusive, war probably will be avoided (unless "irrationality" takes over), but the balance will be so delicate that an unexpected "breakthrough" in Soviet technology might allow the Kremlin to overtake us in a sudden spurt.¹⁷⁰

This was the primary motivation behind the technologically-oriented military strategy of *imperfect deployment*, a strategy that resulted in the immediate deployment of weapons systems that did not meet the ordinary standards that would be expected of civil industry; they *expected* to replace equipment; they *expected* to suffer losses; they *expected* a relatively high mean time between failures. They just didn't expect these things to be as plentiful or as high as they eventually turned out to be. It's not an easy strategy to carry out successfully, and it isn't a *safe* strategy; nobody wants to do things this way, and it's never considered with any thought of permanence – but it's sometimes necessary when the immediate goal is one of *deterrence*. Immediate deployment has a functional motivation, that in the case of the Minuteman missile force was measured entirely in the number missiles that could respond to a given threat.

Consequently, the only safe course of action is to ensure that the United States will stay technologically ahead of the Soviet Union and to lengthen this lead through successive weapons cycles; a broad margin of superiority must be maintained until peace is assured. This is a technological-industrial challenge. But the contest must also be won in the psycho-political arena. This task is partly defensive: we must prevent being deflected from our course. But there also is the offensive task: we must see to it that the Communist dictatorship exits from the scene, hopefully through gradual internal reform. It is important to understand that negotiation cannot end the conflict unless and until the Communist regime either is transformed in orientation and structure, or is replaced by another regime which is peaceful in intent. ...

... Only if we prove conclusively successful in the technological contest can we hope for the internal evolution within the Bloc which would pave the way toward a stable settlement.¹⁷¹

Technological victory, by itself, does not permit a drastic reduction of force levels. Nor can the funds required for accelerating technology be procured by reducing forces-in-being. Such reductions, however, may be feasible after a substantial qualitative lead has been gained. In most cases, security can be bought more cheaply and with smaller numbers if technological superiority is preserved throughout the contest. A technological program that is systematic and fast, in the end is far cheaper – and safer – than a program in which development decisions are

¹⁷⁰ Possony, Stefan T., "Toward a Strategy of Supremacy", National Security : Political, Military, and Economic Strategies in the Decade Ahead, The Center for Strategic Studies, Georgetown University, Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher, 1963.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*

delayed and accelerations and "stretch-outs" follow each other in erratic progression [which throughout the 50's and 60's was basically the way such things were conducted in civil industry].

Any technological program that is suitably "systematic and fast" can only be attained by the rapid deployment of imperfect weapons systems, which are then maintained and upgraded on-station. In 1967, pre-testing of all integrated circuitry and the refinement of guidance and targeting communications between systems could not be accomplished at the speeds demanded by industry, because the speeds demanded by industry are *too slow*. A technological race between political and military super-powers demands *more*. And a technological *nuclear* race between political and military super-powers demands more at *much higher force levels*.

In passing: a mutual agreement to reduce force levels would save money but hardly would help the defender's security. On the contrary, the lowering of nuclear force levels would enhance the feasibility of surprise attack. Under pre-nuclear conditions, low force levels made it practically impossible for the aggressor to execute a successful blitzkrieg attack; hence, in the past, controlled force reductions would have been in the defender's interest. Under nuclear conditions, the situation is reversed: since severe devastation can be achieved through a relatively small number of high-yield weapons, it is not necessary to use large numbers against a weakly armed opponent. Moreover, it is far simpler to plan and execute a small-scale attack involving tens or hundreds instead of thousands of weapons and targets. If the attack fails, the risk of retaliation is less in a small-force than in a big-force war. Under nuclear high-yield conditions, therefore, the defender is safer with a regime of high force levels.

Thus, in the midst of a permanent revolution of technology, the safest method of deterring nuclear attack is to maintain, within a regime of high force levels, a military force which, at all times, enjoys qualitative and quantitative superiority over the putative aggressor. The broader the margins of the defender's superiority, the more dependably peace can be maintained.¹⁷²

The deterrent strategy that the nation depended on, that fostered the necessity for a nuclear arms race that few people, even today, understand well, was dependent in turn on a technological superiority that was driven almost entirely by our economy – a source of advantages and disadvantages that the Soviet Union simply didn't have to deal with. The Soviet regime preferred the growth of military power to the growth of social security, and did not hesitate to sacrifice living standards for arms.

¹⁷² Possony, Stefan T., "Toward a Strategy of Supremacy", National Security : Political, Military, and Economic Strategies in the Decade Ahead, The Center for Strategic Studies, Georgetown University, Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher, 1963.

The Soviets also possess specific advantages: they are able and willing to make faster decisions; with their subversion and intelligence capabilities, they are parasitic on Western science and technology; they exploit the substantial scientific resources of Eastern Europe; and they finance their enormous military effort by manipulating the currency and putting much of the burden upon the peasants and the Satellites. In addition, Iron Curtain secrecy and the political capability to strike first whenever the military situation may be optimal are worth billions of rubles (or dollars), and these "free commodities" must not be paid for. Since they underpay their soldiers and sustain them on an austere basis, and since they pay low civilian wages, the "military ruble" goes a longer way than the "military dollar." We do not always recognize the economic magnitude of the Soviet challenge. The fact is that with their narrow resource base, the Soviets produce almost as much military hardware as we do, perhaps as much as 80 per cent, and their expenditures for military R&D may equal or surpass ours. [American could not afford to forget that the first satellites sent into space, and the first men sent into space were Soviet. The fact that so much effort was expended throughout the "space race" and the Apollo missions is proof that America had no intention of losing the technology race to the Soviet Union; In fact, both our government and the military believed that doing so would be fatal.]

One need not assume that the Soviet economy will make quantum jumps forward, nor must entire series of revolutionary technical breakthroughs in Soviet weapons be anticipated. (Contingencies of this type, however, are not to be ruled out.) Adjustment to the high energy weapons that exist or will exist soon; the problems posed by global ranges and the near-astronomical speeds of delivery systems; the high rate of discovery and invention; and many additional factors are driving the costs of defense upward automatically. Yet practical politics determine the Government's tax income, and unfortunately even a healthy economic growth rate tends to be lower than a moderate technological growth rate. Hence the decisive winning of the technological race does pose a most difficult resource problem.¹⁷³

Possony details a number of problems that America had to contend with in order to win the technological race, a race that both the Pentagon and Congress believed America must either win or risk losing the liberty so dearly fought for throughout its history. *All* of the points he developed so brilliantly and discussed so well necessitated a technological strategy of *"imperfect deployment"*.

Despite the fact that, in terms of firepower and, hence, risk to our forces and people, the Soviet threat is increasing, we are holding back development of both ground and space-based anti-ICBM's. More specifically, we are slow in pushing new designs for suitable weapons systems, we are slow in testing the models we have, we are holding back deployment, we carry out only insufficient, high altitude nuclear-effects tests, and we practically refuse to develop the new nuclear technology ...¹⁷⁴

¹⁷³ Possony, Stefan T., "Toward a Strategy of Supremacy", National Security : Political, Military, and Economic Strategies in the Decade Ahead, The Center for Strategic Studies, Georgetown University, Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher, 1963.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

It was considered a strategic necessity to deploy technologically imperfect systems; it wasn't what the Pentagon and Congress would have *preferred*, and it wasn't intended to be a permanent reaction to Soviet technological growth, but it *was* thought to be necessary. The fact that so much attention was placed on the *statistics of failure* – an example of which is the *mean time between failures* that the Pentagon considered so important a facet of weapons development – is proof that the technological dependability of our weapons systems was as much an adjustable commodity as any other factor brought to bear in the Cold War, and as much as any other factor, it was also responsible for not only ensuring the Cold War remain “cold”, but for ensuring as well the eventual victory of the United States.

When analyzed from this point of view, the failures of the NS-17 guidance and control units force-wide, while disappointing as a result of the ubiquitous quality of the failures and the fact that the lessons learned were so generalized and vague, cannot be seen as a total surprise. The most annoying factor of this whole connected series of incidents is focused more on the failure of the various contractors' to define a specific procedure in construction or handling that could ultimately be blamed. Unfortunately, the tendency to failure was most likely an effect of the logic couplers' incapacity to sustain transient voltages, and transient voltages can be induced by a large number of incidents and random electrical occurrences. The cause was an effect of its *vulnerability* to relatively common electrical events. The only correction available – other than scrapping the whole effort and designing an entirely new replacement, which would have been intolerably expensive in both dollars and time – was to make it *less* vulnerable. Fortunately, this wasn't too difficult – the difficulty was in determining what the problem was in the first place.

Readers should be forgiven at this point for asking what possible reason is there to link the Echo Flight Incident to the well-documented NS-17 failures that the Minuteman force was plagued with throughout 1965 to 1967. Nalty discusses in some detail the failures that were caused by the NS-17 guidance and control units, which had a penchant for breakdowns, as already discussed. These failures were examined by both the Air Force and civil contractors, and one of the primary causes they eventually settled on was the oft noted fact that the Autonetics Division of North American Aviation had been “overly bold in attempting to advance the science of microminiaturized electronics. ... a more conservative approach would have

eliminated the need for many of the modifications ... required by the NS-17.” These “modifications” included the installation of suppression filters to protect the logic couplers from the damage caused by electromagnetic interference such as electronic noise pulses, to which they were particularly vulnerable.¹⁷⁵ Nalty also makes it very clear, however, that the NS-17s were not used in the Minuteman I’s that were deployed at Echo Flight, so what connection could there possibly be?

Although the NS-17 guidance and control units were designed *exclusively* for Minuteman II missiles, the *logic couplers* used in the NS-17 were also used in the guidance and control system of the Minuteman I missiles. And these logic couplers were far more susceptible to damage by transient voltages than the Autonetics Division of North American Aviation originally claimed or thought, a quality that a joint investigation of the NS-17 failures by the Air Force Safety Center (AFSC), the Ballistic Systems Division (BSD – which was later absorbed into the new Space and Missile Systems Organization, or SAMSO), and the TRW Systems Corporation (later acquired by Northrop Grumman) determined to be the result of poor quality control, sloppy workmanship, and the fact, as mentioned above, that the Autonetics Division of North American Aviation “had been overly bold in attempting to advance the science of microminiaturized electronics”. The BSD program manager suggested in his report “that a more conservative approach would have eliminated the need for many of the modifications now required by the NS-17.”¹⁷⁶ *All of these characteristics* – poor quality control, sloppy workmanship, too much dependence on the possibly poor understanding of new science and technologies – are faults that can contribute to an unexpected vulnerability to random, electrical events even when such vulnerabilities are taken into account by electrical engineers during the design process. This would also explain why it was so difficult to determine what the problem was, and how the Air Force could repeatedly misinterpret so egregiously the cause of these system-wide failures of the guidance and control units, a factor leading ultimately to the Air Force’s increasing reliance on widely differing solutions – almost as if attempts to find a real-time solution was being introduced by way of a “hail Mary” pass in the last few seconds of a football game.

¹⁷⁵ Nalty, Bernard C., USAF Ballistic Missile Programs 1967-1968, Office of Air Force History, September, 1969.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

In the aftermath of the investigation came improved methods of production and numerous changes in the units themselves. Each group of modifications was identified by a color code, and SAC at one time found itself with yellow, blue, and red dot NS-17's in stock. By June 1967, however, the modifications had been standardized so that there were only two types of NS17's: the old and the new, with the latter having increased radiation shielding as well as other improvements. As a result of the corrective program, mean time between failure of guidance and control units increased from 1,400 hours in March 1967 to about 2,950 hours in July 1968. Some of the newer units, however, had operated in excess of 4,000 hours.¹⁷⁷

By July 1968, these same improvements had also been completed for the Minuteman I guidance and control systems, thereby solving the problem as well for the Echo Flight Incident. One of the primary differences between the Minuteman I and II was the Minuteman II's use of:

an improved guidance system, incorporating semiconductor integrated circuits and miniaturized discrete electronic parts. Minuteman II was the first program to make a major commitment to these new devices. Their use made possible multiple target selection, greater accuracy and reliability, a reduction in the overall size and weight of the guidance system, and an increase in the survivability of the guidance system in a nuclear environment.¹⁷⁸

This characteristic is the primary reason for an entire flight of Minuteman I missiles being taken off-alert when the same problem only resulted in a *single* Minuteman II failure noted by operators whenever one of the NS-17's crashed. The component logic coupler in use by the Minuteman II was incorporated on board the missile itself, giving commanders far more real time flexibility during the actual targeting procedure. This was not the case within the Minuteman I systems. Most of its targeting was processed within the launch control center itself. At Echo Flight, the electronic noise pulse within the system shut down all of the missiles by being generated *within* the launch control center. The same component onboard the Minuteman II could only affect individual missiles because *the affected computer system was entirely onboard the missile*. This wasn't the case at Echo Flight, although it was shut down for pretty much the same reason. This difference was one of the many advantages the Minuteman II had over the Minuteman I that it was replacing. It's worth remembering that real-time situations involving the Minuteman I missiles indicated some years later that the mean time between failures (MTBF) for the D-17B computer that it used was just over 5.5 years.¹⁷⁹ And *that* meant those missiles deployed started to fail around 1966, *about the same time the Minuteman II*

¹⁷⁷ Nalty, Bernard C., USAF Ballistic Missile Programs 1967-1968, Office of Air Force History, September, 1969.

¹⁷⁸ <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LGM-30-Minuteman>

¹⁷⁹ Allen, CAPT Douglas J., USAF, Laboratory Conversion and State Description of the D-17B Computer, Air Force Institute of Technology, June, 1972.

guidance and control units were also failing system wide. This could hardly have been a coincidence, not when both systems shared a common component of integrated circuitry that was prone to failure as a result of its unsuspected susceptibility to electromagnetic interference in the form of an AC- generated noise pulse. It wasn't magic; it wasn't UFOs; it was *electrical* – and it was all very, very normal.

If we go back and examine the *complete* documents containing the command histories for this period, we note almost *immediately* that everything Salas and Company *didn't* publish confirms exactly everything that I've been discussing in this narrative, so we'll take another quick look at all of the command histories and how exactly they confirm the mediocrity of this event, and the absence of interference by UFO or nuclear EMP attacks. These documents spell out *everything*, and apparently they were ignored by everybody in the CUFON camp – excepting those few individuals who really wanted to know what happened in lieu of really wanting to invent something that did *not* happen.

On page 35 of the 67-1865 command history (notably absent from the otherwise extensive write-up on the CUFON website, we note that “The crew also stated; the LF, E-8 had a channel 26 which indicated it was operating on diesel at the time of fault. The 465L (SAC Communications & Control System) and communications equipment was not processing traffic at the time of the incident.”¹⁸⁰ This confirms Figel's statement regarding the general environment, as well as Nalty's insistence regarding the debilitating state of that environment. We note as well that “Neither of the crew members were using any electrical equipment. Such as electric razor ... etc. At the time of fault the deputy commander was turned away from the console to brief the commander who had just been awakened from sleep. The commander was the first to see the faults.”¹⁸¹ This confirms two things: (1) that investigators were consciously looking for electromagnetic causes for the fault, and (2) Robert Hastings was once again creating fiction when he claimed that my father, the commander, was asleep throughout the incident and was therefore not a good source of information regarding the events of that day.

We also find that analysis of the Channel 50 data dump showed “that both sites were shutdown as a result of external influence to the G&C, no No-Go's were detected by the G&C”

¹⁸⁰ 341st Strategic Missile Wing and 341st Combat Support Group HQ SAC DXIH 67-1865 (Command History, Vol. 1), p. 35-36.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*

This means that something outside of the guidance and control units shut down the flight of missiles without actually instituting a No-Go procedure. This indicates as well that the problem was electromagnetic in nature, and was precipitated by pulse coupling as a result of the equipment in use at the LCC, *not* the LFs.

On Sunday, 19 March 67, a team was dispatched to sites E-2 and E-9 to dump channel 50 data. These two sites were in strategic alert at this time but were selected because they had never experienced a restart since the last time that a maintenance tape had been used. Information from the No-Go sectors of channel 50 indicated that these G&C's had never entered a No-Go loop at any time. This hardens the case against a No-Go causing a shutdown of the flight. If a No-Go had shutdown the flight, it would have been recorded in channel 50 data.

The only non-detectable fault from the G&C section which could have caused a No-Go would have been loss of confirm codes. This type of fault would not have produced a VRSA channel 9 and 12, but only a channel 9. This information eliminated the No-Go theory as the cause of the incident.

As stated earlier, all 10 launch facilities shutdown with a VRSA channel 9 and 12 (G&C No-Go and Logic Coupler No-Go) recordings. Because of this consistency considerable investigation was expended in the Logic Coupler area. In the channel 50 analysis it was shown that the guidance section did not experience a No-Go and therefore, it was felt that the VRSA channel 9 report was not valid. It is possible, however, for the Logic Coupler to generate both of these No-Go indications.

The logic of the coupler was studied by the investigating team in an effort to identify a method by which both VRSA 9 and 12 could be activated. The opinion of the team was that external generated signals caused the generation of these two channels and shutdown of the launch facilities. The possibility of this is very remote due to the fact that all 10 couplers would have to fail in the flight within a few seconds of each other.¹⁸²

Salas, Klotz and Hastings, et al, have apparently interpreted these few paragraphs to mean that the team's initial opinion was that something otherwise extraordinary or even impossible had to have taken place in order to cause both a channel 9 and 12 VRSA report, but by reading the entire context, and not just page 38, we note that (1) "external generated signals" does not refer to signals generated outside of the *entire* system, but signals generated outside of the *launch facility only*, because the only thing they looked at here was the dump channel 50 data at the E-2 and E-9 launch facilities – this analysis only took the dump data into account, and nothing else, such as, for instance, *anything at the launch control center*; (2) "all 10 couplers would have to fail in the flight within a few seconds of each other" is only a remote

¹⁸² 341st Strategic Missile Wing and 341st Combat Support Group HQ SAC DXIH 67-1865 (Command History, Vol. 1), p. 36-38.

possibility in the context of the channel 50 data at the launch facility; once the assumption is made that the fault must have occurred at the launch control center, that “remote possibility” skyrockets to “high”; and (3) it’s easy to mislead people when you don’t give them all of the information. When Salas reported that “The only possible means that could be identified by the team involved a situation in which a coupler self test command occurred along with a partial reset within the coupler”, he neglected to mention that the team was only looking at data retrieved from two of the ten LFs, and nothing at all from the LCC. In addition, these findings weren’t even considered *close* to conclusive, since they were based only on the data collected on-site on March 19, 1967, well before the actual investigating team had even decided upon a necessary course for the investigation. They were simply collecting information in order to make an educated plan of attack. As I’ve said before, and will doubtless say again, there is *nothing* in the documents used by Salas and team that discusses *any* conclusions of the investigation whatsoever, regardless of what they may insist.

In addition to the above, the Echo Flight Incident was not even considered an isolated event. According to the investigation, a similar incident had occurred at Alpha Flight on December 19, 1966, although only LFs A-6, A-7, and A-10 shut down at that time. We know these failures were associated, because they also resulted in a “VRSA channel 9 and 12 (G&C No-Go and Logic Coupler No-Go)” indication – a combination that had never been noted in the entire Minuteman system prior to that event. This Alpha Flight event was also similar to the Echo Flight Incident in that interference by UFOs was not the cause.

Although each of these events were initially investigated at the launch facilities, the investigating team certainly didn’t leave it at that, although Salas and Hastings repeatedly imply that this investigation focused primarily on the LFs, an implication resulting from the fact that they emphasized only those earlier discussions involving a “situation in which a coupler self test command occurred along with a partial reset within the coupler. This could feasible cause a VRSA 9 and 12 indication. This was also quite remote for all 10 couplers would have to have been partially reset in the same manner”.¹⁸³ Basically they’ve used such phrases to show how unlikely it was to achieve the shutdown resulting from an electrical malfunction. The investigation did not, however, stop at the LFs.

¹⁸³ 341st Strategic Missile Wing and 341st Combat Support Group HQ SAC DXIH 67-1865 (Command History, Vol. 1), p. 38.

Since the only common item determined in this investigation was the LCC. The LCC power fault transmitted to the LFs on the hardened cable was considered the only power fault capable of causing the Echo Flight incident.

The investigation teams at Malmstrom, were unable to determine a logical cause for the incident. Further investigation in the area of shutdown results will be conducted in an effort to determine a possible cause of this incident. These studies will be conducted at the contractors facility and will be included in the next history.¹⁸⁴

Although the investigation continued at the contractor's facility, Salas ignores for the most part anything substantial that came about as a result of this continuance. He points out that the "investigation teams at Malmstrom, were unable to determine a logical cause for the incident", while ignoring all but the most self-serving aspects of what was uncovered at the Boeing facility later in the year. Both he and Hastings act as if the investigation *ended* once the on-site investigation team decided – after only a cursory examination of the LF data available – that no “logical cause for the incident” could be determined from that data alone. The actual Echo Flight Incident investigation actually continued for another few months, releasing information that these gentlemen give the impression of never having considered. It's important to realize that there's nothing particularly alarming about this aspect of the investigation. Given the necessity to keep operating facilities operating, it's hardly surprising that nothing more definitive was determined at that point. In fact, after the first task group that was formed met on March 28, 1967, they released a very clear statement detailing their initial findings "that insufficient data on the incident existed to resolve the problem or for adequate engineering analysis without additional testing."¹⁸⁵

The present data suggested that the problem was a Wing I peculiar problem. Since the OOAMA Expermintal [sic; due to the many typo errors noted in the documents A2C Gamble prepared, from here on such errors will be corrected without utilizing a "sic" signal; the original documents have been reproduced in the section beginning on page 67 of this narrative for anyone who wishes to examine these in their original state.] Test Facility (ETF) was not a Wing I type, it was necessary for the experiments to be conducted at Malmstrom. Further analysis of the problem showed that experiments would be of no real value until a No-Go Mode could be reproduced at least at a LF level.

It was decided by the group to first develop a way to reproduce a No-Go Mode at the LF level then at the Launch Control Facility (LCF) level before a test could be made at Malmstrom. The group was to reconvene at Boeings' Seattle plant on 4 April 67 for development of a way to safely

¹⁸⁴ 341st Strategic Missile Wing and 341st Combat Support Group HQ SAC DXIH 67-1865 (Command History, Vol. 1), p. 42.

¹⁸⁵ 341st Strategic Missile Wing and 341st Combat Support Group HQ SAC DXIH 67-3922 (Command History, Vol. 1), p. 30.

reproduce a No-Go effect. The plan was to be developed at the Network Resolution Area (NRA) at Boeing, with a completion date for the plan set at 5 May 67.

During testing at Boeing, a 30 micro sec Pulse (-10 to 0 volt square wave) was placed on the Self Test Command (STC) line at the C-53P Coupler Logic Drawer Interface (STC). Seven out of 10 separate applications of a single Pulse, would cause the system to shut down with a Channel 9 & 12 No-Go.

Subsequent testing at Autonetics has resulted in the following explanation of what probably happens in the Coupler Logic Drawer. The Pulse inserted is long enough to initiate the Coupler Self test sequence within the C-53P. However, it is not of long enough duration to enable control lines to the computer to place the computer in a Coupler test loop Mode. This causes the Coupler to issue a sequence error due to lack of coincidence between G&C and Coupler Modes. This sequence error, together with the action of two other flip flop outputs (M-17 & M-20), is sufficient to initiate the Coupler and G&C No-Go shut down. [It's almost funny how all of this can happen without any interference whatsoever from UFOs.]

The effort at Boeing NRA was to determine the source and most likely path of noise Pulse to the Logic Coupler. [This would be the electrical path taken by the noise pulse; investigators couldn't simply say that the noise pulse or EMP or voltage spike simply followed the electrical wiring, because in any such random event, that wouldn't necessarily be the case; any pulse coupling that occurs could easily put "the path of least resistance" in any one of a dozen places from surrounding equipment through unattached cabling; the problem isn't necessarily the pulse coupling or even the noise pulse itself – the problem is the *susceptibility* of the logic coupler to the effects of the noise pulse; if you can't solve the problem of the noise pulse, which, being a random event of an uncertain source is not a given, you *can* solve the problem of *susceptibility*.] The results of the Electro Magnetic Pulse (EMP) testing at the LF and Wing IV indicated that the Sensitive Information Network (SIN) were susceptible to noise of the type that could have caused the problem. [Source message indicates this should read "testing at HETF and Wing IV";¹⁸⁶ you'll notice that nobody here is saying that the EMP is caused by a nuclear detonation or a UFO; this is because an electromagnetic pulse is far more common than nuclear detonations or UFOs; when an event like this occurs, it is idiotic to assume that the most uncommon source of the event is the one that caused the event simply because one man who has changed his story dozens of times said so without providing one iota of evidence to back his claim up. It is absolutely pathetic that this claim has become the accepted version of events, when there is no evidence to support his claim, and plenty of evidence – real evidence that can be measured and examined – to believe otherwise.]

The SIN lines go only from the LCC to all of the LFs in the flight, which could explain the flight peculiar aspect of the problem.¹⁸⁷

Salas' version of these events neglects any discussion of the findings of the Echo Flight Incident investigation, except to say that no absolute conclusions were reached. He neglects to mention that in *any* investigation centered on a random noise electrical event, a conclusion is

¹⁸⁶ Msg, (S) OONC 02525, OOAMA to SAC, "Malmstrom Echo Flight Incident," 7 Aug 67..

¹⁸⁷ 341st Strategic Missile Wing and 341st Combat Support Group HQ SAC DXIH 67-3922 (Command History, Vol. 1), p. 30-32.

always unlikely. This is because the cause is *random*, and cannot always be determined. The investigation determined fairly early that the weak link in the process that resulted in the flight failure was the logic coupler and its susceptibility to a 10 volt noise pulse. They were able to reproduce the *exact same process* that took down the system and resulted in the same message indicators, these being the VRSA channel 9 and 12 (G&C No-Go and Logic Coupler No-Go) recordings, so Salas' and Klotz's and Hastings' claims that no cause was ever discovered is plainly a lie – not a mistake, but a *lie*, this certainty being based on the fact that they had available to them the very same resources I have used to *prove* that their claims are the baseless mutterings of fools, idiots, and con-men. After fifteen years, it's plainly pathetic that there's any debate whatsoever. We know what happened, we know what caused it, and we know that the men conning the world into believing that this electrical malfunction was the result of interference by UFOs whose presence was never at any time substantiated by *anybody* until Salas came forward in 1995 to make the claim have been continuously lying to the public and hiding – or at least refusing to discuss – the actual investigation that took place in 1967. The only witness they've ever brought forward to this event who was *actually present during the event* is LT Walt Figel, and we've seen how poorly his version of events was interpreted by Robert Hastings, when his version very clearly assures us that nothing extraordinary ever occurred. They've ignored *totally* my father's testimony of these events, he being the commander present at the scene when the events took place, with Robert Hastings even going so far as to assert that he was *asleep* during the event, when the investigation makes very plain the fact that my father was the first person to notice that the missiles were going offline; and yet, these immoral, unconscionable, *sickening* individuals have the balls to publish that he has *confirmed* the facts of their story.

The investigation was not flawless, but few things are when an unknown electrical failure is the subject under investigation. The investigation team assumed at first that the cause of the fault was commercial power, because a transformer had failed adjacent to a stock watering thoroughway in the Echo flight area. It was initially believed that a shorting to ground of the single phase transformer may have unbalanced the three phase "Y" connected system enough to cause ground currents to flow back to the generator. The Hardened Intersite Cable (HIC) shields could have provided a path for the ground current, thereby inducing voltage spikes, or pulses, on the SIN lines to all of the launch facilities. After a series of experiments designed to

check this theory, commercial power as a cause was, however, eventually discounted. It makes no sense for anybody to have conducted this very expensive series of experiments if a UFO had been responsible for the failures. What would be the point of investigating to the extent of recreating under laboratory conditions the effects of a transformer failure due to current fluctuations in the commercial power system (that Salas and Klotz have continuously asserted could not have possibly sent an electrical signal to the launch facilities, because the cabling was shielded – an assertion that is just as plainly *wrong*), if the Air Force was already aware that a UFO had shut down the flight of missiles from the front gates to the launch control center? The only reason to conduct such experiments would be the belief that the failed transformer might have created enough of an electrical current event to couple with the Hardened Intersite Cable shields, which would in turn provide an appropriate path to the LFs. *A UFO wasn't necessary* – which worked out well for everyone, since a UFO plainly wasn't there. While EMP testing at other facilities prior to the Echo Flight Incident had “proven that there is significant coupling between the shields of the SIN lines and the Self Test Command (STC) line into the C-53P Logic Coupler”,¹⁸⁸ and testing at the Boeing NRA had proven that the specific cause of the incident was the logic coupler's susceptibility to electromagnetic noise, the onsite testing at Echo Flight had proven only that commercial power fluctuations, while sufficient to shut down the electrical power grid at the LF, thereby triggering the diesel generators, could not have created a noise pulse sufficient to take advantage of the coupling between the shields of the SIN line and STC line to affect the entire flight of missiles. This convinced the investigators that they were looking for an electrical event integral to the launch control center, not the individual launch facilities.

The tests run at Boeing in the NRA have proved that the C-53P Logic Coupler was the receiver to the noise Pulse irregularity. The normal signal on the STC in the C- 53P is (-10 to 0 volt Pulse of duration between two and 200 micro sec) was applied at this point. When the Pulse width was set at 30 micro sec, 12 Channel 9 & 12 No-Go's, one Channel 9 No-Go, and four Coupler Self Tests (CST), were experienced out of 20 separate applications of the Pulse.

In other words, 60 percent of the time the responses were the same as experienced at Echo Flight [On pg. 30-32 of this same document, Gamble says the percentage is 70; the actual message he used is unavailable.] and 85 percent of the time the response would have placed the system in a non EWO status.¹⁸⁹ [The cause of the Echo Flight Incident simply cannot be said

¹⁸⁸ Msg, (S) OONC 02525, OOAMA to SAC, "Malmstrom Echo Fight Incident," 7 Aug 67..

¹⁸⁹ 341st Strategic Missile Wing and 341st Combat Support Group HQ SAC DXIH 67-3922 (Command History, Vol. 1), p. 33-35.

any simpler than this. There were no UFOs, there was no nuclear detonation. There was a fairly common electromagnetic event that effected the Logic Coupler, an extended integrated circuit that was too susceptible to such an event, and needed more protection than Autonetics had originally provided.]

A 30 micro sec Pulse is equivalent to a frequency of 3 KC [300 Hz], and previous testing at the LF and NRA [actual message traffic asserts that this should read "testing at HETF and NRA" ¹⁹⁰] have indicated the Pulse coupling within the LF is present at frequencies in this general area. OONE has conducted tests at the Hill Experimental Launch Facility on the Wing II-V Logic Coupler to determine if it could be a receiver to this same type Pulse. This testing will indicate if the Wing II-V, Logic Coupler will respond to a random Pulse similar to the response observed on the C-53P Logic Coupler during tests at the Boeing NRA. ¹⁹¹

The tests that were made revealed to the investigators one very essential element in the structure of the incident: "Due to the fact that the tests were essentially negative, it appears that the cause of the Echo Flight problem was of the EMP or electrostatic nature."¹⁹² Unable to correlate the "Echo Flight problem" – *that they had already proven was the result of a voltage event interacting with the logic coupler* – with a commercial power fault of some sort, investigators were now certain that the cause was an electromagnetic event. And that gave them plenty enough to go on without the necessity of bringing flying saucers into the picture, contrary to what Salas and Company claim.

A Channel 9 & 12 No-Go shut down had *never* been reported at Wings II-V, and had only been reported once before at Wing I: at the silo failures noted in December 1966 at Alpha Flight. This told the investigators two things: (1) when they reproduced the effects of the Echo Flight Incident *exactly*, even to the point of duplicating the "Channel 9 & 12 No-Go shut down" VRSA errors indicated, they had determined *exactly* what caused the incident, and (2) the Echo Flight Incident was peculiar to Wing I utilities. The investigators recognized that this was due to the significant differences between Wing I and the other Wings in the system, including important differences in both the inter-site and the launch facility cabling.¹⁹³ Had a UFO been involved, there not only would have been no reason to conduct the commercial power tests, there would have been no reason to believe that the events at Alpha Flight were associated. In any case, once the Wing I peculiarity had been noted in conjunction with the investigating team's proof that the noise pulse had not traveled through or originated within any components

¹⁹⁰ Msg, (S) OONC 02525, OOAMA to SAC, "Malmstrom Echo Fight Incident," 7 Aug 67..

¹⁹¹ 341st Strategic Missile Wing and 341st Combat Support Group HQ SAC DXIH 67-3922 (Command History, Vol. 1), p. 33-35.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*

¹⁹³ 341st Strategic Missile Wing and 341st Combat Support Group HQ SAC DXIH 67-3922 (Command History, Vol. 1), p. 36.

attached to the commercial power grid, it was immediately apparent that the problem was at the LCC. An overvoltage event in the LCC generated a noise pulse, which adversely affected the Logic Coupler – *exactly as every history detailing the event has ever reported*. And from 1967 to 1995, when Salas and Klotz started their campaign to make fools out of the United States Air Force in their witless attempts to secure full disclosure, that's exactly what everybody believed, because that's *exactly* what happened.

The problem causing both the Echo Flight and the NS-17 guidance and control system failures was solved fairly easily once it was determined what that problem was. So why does anybody believe an EMP from a nuclear explosion caused the failures? *Because Robert Salas said so*. He claimed that:

Several military activities and other engineering firms participated in the investigation, but no positive cause for the shutdowns was ever found, despite extensive and concentrated effort. [This is a singularly odd comment to make, in light of the fact that none of the resources Salas has ever used to support his fictional tale actually discuss the conclusions reached by the investigation.] One conclusion was that the only way a pulse or noise could be sent in from outside the shielded system was through an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) from an unknown source. The technology of the day made generating an EMP of sufficient magnitude to enter the shielded system a very difficult proposition, requiring large, heavy, bulky equipment. The source of the actual pulse that caused the missile shutdowns remains a mystery to this day.¹⁹⁴

What we've got here is just another of his many lies – another instance of misleading his audience. *You don't need an atom bomb to create an electromagnetic pulse*. Only fools and idiots would believe everything this man has claimed since 1995-1996 without checking the facts. EMP is a relatively common phenomenon, although the term *has* come to be associated primarily with the high-amplitude electromagnetic pulse caused by a nuclear explosion. When Salas told everyone that it could *only* occur as a result of a nuclear explosion or technology that wasn't available in 1967, he was once again lying, embellishing, or whatever you want to call it, in order to convince the world that UFOs took out the weapons system at Echo Flight. And an EMP doesn't have to be "sent in from outside the shielded system", as Salas asserts either, because it can be generated *internally* – which is exactly what happened.

¹⁹⁴ <http://www.mtpioneer.com/March-Malstrom-UFOs.html>

Actually, the Air Force knew a pretty good bit about electromagnetic pulse phenomenon, because they had put a little time into studying it – which is more than Salas managed to do.

For some time the Air Force had been concerned about the vulnerability of missile systems to the effects of nuclear blasts, which endangered both launch complexes and missiles in flight. For example, the silos and launch control centers were more vulnerable to shock (overpressure) and electromagnetic pulse and various forms of radiation. By timing the bursts of nuclear weapons high above the silos, an attacker could theoretically create a radioactive barrier capable of crippling any unshielded missiles, a possibility that might force a defender to postpone his own launchings. Similarly, there was some concern that the first warheads to detonate on an enemy target might create a radiation barrier which would disable the reentry vehicles following after.

For some time the Air Force had studied the problem of protecting launch sites. Its most spectacular experiments, the high explosive simulation tests (HEST's), helped to determine their vulnerability to earth shock from nuclear detonation.¹⁹⁵

The HEST's were conducted near Warren AFB, Wyoming, beginning in December 1965. HEST 2 was completed in July 1966, while HEST 3, which was conducted at a Minuteman II launch facility near Grand Forks, North Dakota, was performed on 22 September 1966.

During the second of the HEST exercises at Warren, three launchers went off alert for experiments designed to improve methods of measuring electromagnetic pulse and calculating its effects. The measuring techniques refined at Warren, employed at modernized sites near Whiteman AFB, provided evidence that high voltage pulses, such as might be produced by a nuclear blast, could break down electrical surge arrestors and disrupt the hardened cable network linking the silos to the launch control centers. Electromagnetic pulse, it was found, could knock out cable communications within a flight, although in some circumstances an automatic restart device would restore the command link between launcher and control console. To overcome this threat, steps were taken to insert electronic filters in the cable network to protect it against electromagnetic pulse and the false signals. Installation of these devices became a part of force modernization. Cost was placed at \$5.4 million in fiscal year 1968, \$4.6 million in 1969, and \$7 million in 1970. [This proves unequivocally that the corrective measures that “solved” the Echo Flight Incident problem – *electronic filters in the cable network to protect it against electromagnetic pulse and other false signals* – was the result of experiments the Air Force had been conducting for years before the Echo Flight Incident established the necessity for such filters; this is why the Air Force was able to conclude that no further actions to correct the problem needed to be taken; the “fix” was already in – and it was already scheduled as part of force modernization. If the USAF hadn’t already been working on correcting all possible deficiencies that might result from all possible forms of attack, the supposed UFO that Salas claims caused the flight to go off alert would have basically caught us with our pants down, and it would have taken an additional 2-3 years to correct a problem that in the “real” world – the one that doesn’t blame an equipment malfunction on flying saucers – had, for the most part, already been solved.]

¹⁹⁵ Nalty, Bernard C., USAF Ballistic Missile Programs 1967-1968, Office of Air Force History, September, 1969.

To counter the threat posed to inflight missiles by radiation, the Air Force had directed installation of zircalloy shielding to prevent hot X-rays from penetrating the LGM-30F's guidance and control mechanism and burning out its electronic components. By the summer of 1966, however, tests showed that tantalum shielding offered the "best compromise for effectiveness and weight." Air Force officials estimated 170,000 pounds of tantalum sheet, roughly .025 inches thick, would be required to protect the guidance and control units of all F missiles, replacing zircalloy where necessary.

Besides providing protection for the guidance and control package from X-rays, the Air Force approved the installation of radiation shielding elsewhere in the missile. Certain nozzle components, for example, were vulnerable to X-rays. Also, the angular accelerometer and related electronic guidance circuitry had to be kept secure from neutron bombardment.

The second nuclear phenomenon that menaced missiles in flight was electromagnetic pulse. Tests conducted during summer and fall of 1966 disclosed that safeguards previously installed against this nuclear effect were inadequate. [These were the HEST 2 and HEST 3 tests discussed above.] In the LGM-30F, for example, existing grounding and shielding did not protect antennas and inductive loops that were especially vulnerable to electrical overload. Modifications to provide additional protection were undertaken, while experiments continued to verify the adequacy of the changes and to determine if other alterations were needed.¹⁹⁶

This series of experiments and conclusions was kept secret for a number of reasons, but primarily because disclosure would severely hamper the deterrent strategy adopted by the United States, thereby allowing the Soviet Union a possible advantage in a first-strike scenario. Weakness of this sort was believed to be convincing enough to persuade Russia or other nations to attack, since normally expected retaliation would be minimal as a result of HEMP. The investigations and experiments carried out by the Air Force can be tracked back well before the Echo Flight Incident, disarming completely any argument that this line of research was a result of any type of UFO attack on the Malmstrom missile systems. The USAF had been aware of the threat for years, and for years had been modifying equipment to best defend our deterrent interests not only from any form of nuclear weapons attack, but any form of electromagnetic disturbance whatsoever, whether it's the result of nuclear detonation, lightning strike, or electronic noise pulse.

This doesn't mean that the Echo Flight Incident had no effect on such matters. It was, after all, an electromagnetic event. It also presented a great opportunity for SAMSO, especially since the 564th SMS at Malmstrom AFB had very recently been made an operable command. As part of its ongoing series of EMP experiments, and because the Echo Flight Incident investigation team with the cooperation of the Boeing Corporation had already been conducting

¹⁹⁶ Nalty, Bernard C., USAF Ballistic Missile Programs 1967-1968, Office of Air Force History, September, 1969.

EMP experiments to determine whether or not the commercial power grid had any causal connection to the incident, it was decided that further experiments necessary to determine the possible effects of an electromagnetic pulse on the commercial power grid adapted by the Sylvania Corporation for the Minuteman II missile systems in use at Wings II-V could also be completed. The 564th SMS differed from all of the other squadrons at Malmstrom AFB in that it was constructed and outfitted specifically for Minuteman II missiles.

In direct relation to the Echo Flight incident as covered in the April - June 1967 History of the 341st SMW was the Electro Magnetic Pulse (EMP) testing conducted by SAMSO, later joined in the testing by the Boeing Company. The EMP tests by SAMSO and Boeing were to discover the weak spots in the different type of Minuteman configurations within the EMP field. Whenever a weak or faulty area was found, an ECP was to be initiated to correct the discrepancy, or eliminate it.¹⁹⁷ [It should be again emphasized here, that when these records refer to EMP, they are not referring solely to the pulse caused by nuclear detonation; EMP is an Electromagnetic Pulse of any sort – it can be caused by nuclear detonation, but that's a very rare occurrence of EMP; EMP can also be caused by lightning strikes, the passage of current through a medium, electrostatic charge, or electronic noise pulse – these are all EMP, and this is what the technicians are referring to. Throughout everything that Salas and Hastings and Klotz have written, they tend to give the impression that EMP is *always* an effect of a nuclear detonation, and that is just nowhere near the truth of the matter. It should also be emphasized that all of the tests on Sierra-39 of the 564th SMS were initiated because the Echo Flight Incident forced SAC to question whether or not the same thing could happen with the Minuteman II missiles at Wings II-V. All of the testing on commercial power inputs were being done at Malmstrom AFB as a result of what happened at Echo Flight, but Malmstrom AFB had also very recently commissioned the 564th Squadron – and it was equipped with only Minuteman II missiles. That's why they conducted the tests there – it didn't really have much to do with solving the problem brought to light by the Echo Flight Incident, because it was an entirely different system – but it did ensure that the same thing would not occur with newer force upgrades. SAC was very concerned that there might be good reason to believe in a far more generalized susceptibility to electromagnetic damage, and they had to figure that out. They never found good, evidential reasons to associate such damage, including the Echo Flight Incident, with anything that may have come from commercial power systems, whether it was due to a transformer blowing out, or a lightning strike near the cabling to and from the LCC, but they certainly spent a lot of money testing for it, a lot of money that nobody could afford at the time, and that would not have been spent unless it was believed that commercial power could possibly damage the Minuteman system. Frankly, a UFO floating around the front gate of the LCC is not going to convince anybody – whether they're associated with the military services or the power companies – to run through months of needless testing simply to give the impression that they're concerned with a very specific type of EMP and its effect on commercial power transmission. It's not just excessively paranoid, but absolutely insane to expect that this would actually be done. The system was *broke* – these people were begging for money; nobody was going to throw money away simply to hide something, particularly when it could be far more easily hidden by simply re-classifying it.]

¹⁹⁷ 341st Strategic Missile Wing and 341st Combat Support Group HQ SAC DXIH 68-0356 (Command History, Vol. 1), p. 57-58.

One of the primary theories of the Echo Flight incident was connected with some type of adverse power affect. [This is a reference to the commercial power system only, and has nothing to do with emergency power from the generators, or the generation of electronic noise from the equipment at the launch control center.] All tests conducted toward this end proved negative results. The EMP tests at Sierra-39 were considered to be the final series of tests in this area. [This does not mean that they never found out what caused the Echo Flight Incident, although that is certainly what Salas, Klotz and Hastings want people to believe. A negative finding as a result of the EMP tests means only that they were convinced the problem did not arise from any possible configuration of commercial power – and that is *all* it means. They already knew what caused the Echo Flight failures: *the susceptibility of the Logic Coupler to electronic noise pulse*. The EMP tests proved that the noise pulse was not generated in the commercial power system – but that's all it proved. Once they knew that, it was very apparent that the noise pulse was generated within the LCC, because it could not have been generated elsewhere and still affect Echo Flight as it did. UFOs were never even considered.]

Personnel of the Air Force Special Weapons Command, Kirtland AFB, New Mexico, joined SAMSO and Boeing personnel in observing the EMP tests from 14 November through 15 December. The Sylvania Electronic Company also sent representatives to discuss the field of lightning effects and EMP.¹⁹⁸

Actually, Sylvania reps were present because Sylvania had been awarded the contract to build the field electrical grid at the 564th SMS. Salas has recently stated that Sylvania was involved in the Echo Flight Incident investigation, because if that were true, Raymond Fowler, a NICAP investigator who worked for Sylvania, would look like a more believable source of information regarding that investigation, even though the information that he presented seems to have been in error. At Malmstrom AFB, Sylvania only worked on the 564th SMS Minuteman II system; they had nothing to do with the other squadrons, which were all Minuteman I SMSs. Sylvania, for this reason, was also not involved in any way with the Echo Flight Incident investigation. Raymond Fowler's security clearance would not have been sufficient to grant him access to the results of that investigation, and Robert Salas is once again caught grinding up the facts to fit – *poorly* – into his little UFO tale. I will discuss this in more detail with all of Salas' most recent assertions further in this manuscript.

The Autonetics Division of North American Aviation designed completely the guidance and control system in use at Echo Flight, which was the system that failed as a result of the electronic noise pulse substantiated by the investigating team. It was also instrumental in the

¹⁹⁸ 341st Strategic Missile Wing and 341st Combat Support Group HQ SAC DXIH 68-0356 (Command History, Vol. 1), p. 57-58.

development and manufacture of the Apollo Guidance and Navigation Computer that was used in the many moon-shot missions throughout the 1960s and 1970s, so it's useful to compare these two contemporary systems then under development. The following discussion is from the IEEE Transactions on Electronic Computers, *A Case History of the AGC Integrated Logic Circuits*, written by Eldon C. Hall, published December 1965.¹⁹⁹

Military and space objectives require the very latest in technological development coupled with reliability goals that require successful operation for several years. A compromise must often be made between the use of new technology and high reliability objectives. With judicious planning this compromise can be instituted effectively. For example, integrated circuits using planar technology have made new objectives possible by reducing the size and weight of a system while introducing an important future reliability gain. The inherent reliability gains must be implemented in the design stages of the computer. Hence the decision to use one simple single logic element for the logic in the Apollo Guidance Computer. This resulted in high volume procurement of the integrated circuit from multiple sources, so that the needed high reliability could be developed and proven within a short period of time.

The standardization approach, which is particularly adaptable to digital computers, has been demonstrated with the Polaris flight computer and extended with integrated circuits to the Apollo Guidance Computer. Both computers were designed to use a three input NOR Gate as the only logic element. All logic functions are generated by interconnecting the three input NOR Gate with no additional logic blocks, resistors, or capacitors.

Although the NOR Gate is far less complicated, it is essentially what the Minuteman guidance and control unit logic coupler is – a combination of integrated circuits or series that provides a safe interface between two or more logical elements such as the targeting configuration onboard the launch control facility with the guidance systems at the launch facility for the Minuteman I, or, more efficiently *and* more complex, between the targeting modules and the guidance units onboard the Minuteman II. The connectivity that was thereby provided for information transfer between different logical elements, or between such elements and memory or database structures, or any peripheral equipment or other systems that might also contain transformer coupled circuits is especially important; since transformers act as low pass filters because of the inductors they utilize, any information going through them is *destroyed*, so a safe conduit or interface between these types of elements is necessary. This type of electronic, system-dependent interface wasn't possible until the integrated circuit was invented, and the

¹⁹⁹ Hall, Eldon C., *A Case History of the AGC Integrated Logic Circuits*, IEEE Transactions on Electronic Computers, No. E-1880, prepared under DSR Project 55-238, sponsored Manned Spacecraft Center of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Contract NAS 9-4065, December 1965.

immediate design of such elements was accelerated by a market almost *entirely* driven by military and space technology.

At first glance, it appears that using only one type of logic block greatly increases the number of blocks required for the computer. But, by judiciously selecting and organizing the logic functions it is quickly apparent that few additional blocks are necessary. The few additional units required are greatly counter balanced by the increased reliability gain during both the manufacturing of components and fabrication of the components into modules.

... At the time that the decision was made to use integrated circuits, the NOR Gate, as shown, was the only device available in large quantities. The simplicity of the circuit allowed several manufacturers to produce interchangeable devices so that reasonable competition was assured. Because of recent process development in integrated circuits, the NOR Gate has been able to remain competitive on the basis of speed, power and noise immunity. [Noise immunity, as previously discussed, was and is extremely important to the proper function of integrated circuitry.] ... The basic simplicity of the three input gate aids an effective screening process. All transistors and resistors can be tested to insure product uniformity. The simplicity of the circuit also aids in the quick detection and diagnosing of insidious failures without extensive probing as required with more complicated circuits [such as those used on the Minuteman guidance and control units].

One additional integrated circuit used in the Apollo Guidance Computer is the memory sense amplifier. ... [this] circuit is considerably more complex than the NOR Gate. The experience with this more complicated circuit has been comparable with the logic gate. However, since it is a low usage item there is available less information of historic interest, that is, reliability information such as failure rates and modes of failures. ²⁰⁰

It's a shame that this type of information is currently unavailable; it is, however, axiomatic that the more complex a circuit is, the less reliable it becomes, and the more catastrophic failures are noted. Just for visual reference, the two figures below give an idea of the differences between the NOR Gate and the "more complicated" memory sense amplifier. The Logic Couplers used in the Minuteman system were basically "layers" of such circuitry, which provided a safe interface for information transfer between logical systems. The discussion regarding the sensitivity to noise inherent to circuitry of this type applies directly to the cause of the Echo Flight Incident.

²⁰⁰ Hall, Eldon C., A Case History of the AGC Integrated Logic Circuits, IEEE Transactions on Electronic Computers, No. E-1880, prepared under DSR Project 55-238, sponsored Manned Spacecraft Center of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Contract NAS 9-4065, December 1965.




FIGURE 1





FIGURE 2

[An] interesting and much discussed problem is that of noise in logic circuits using integrated circuits.²⁰¹ It is well known that all digital computers have noise problems and there are well known design techniques which when properly applied will minimize these problems. In the electrical design as well as the mechanical design there are tradeoffs that must be made in order

²⁰¹ Hall, Eldon C., A Case History of the AGC Integrated Logic Circuits, IEEE Transactions on Electronic Computers, No. E-1880, prepared under DSR Project 55-238, sponsored Manned Spacecraft Center of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Contract NAS 9-4065, December 1965.

to meet all of the ground rules placed on the computer designer. Noise is one of the major constraints that must be considered during the design. One must consider both self induced [such as an electronic noise pulse] and externally induced noise [such as a high-altitude electromagnetic pulse associated with a nuclear detonation]. Although the cause is different for both types, the effect is usually the same ... [This can be seen in the illustration below.]



From this figure it is seen how switching currents in the circuit ground plane can cause voltage transients that will erroneously switch the transistors shown. These ground currents can also be induced from the outside either by conducted or radiated interference. [A high-altitude electromagnetic pulse associated with a nuclear detonation is initially conducted as a radiated interference, but due to coupling within the environment, currents are then conducted along power lines, cabling, structural elements, etc.] To maximize the immunity of the computer the designer should,

1. Select circuits that have maximum immunity: there is about a factor of 2 realizable between the worst and best integrated circuits.²⁰² [Again, this increases with the complexity of the circuit under examination, and increases as well when due care is not undertaken in treatment of the circuits by those manufacturing or installing them in equipment for use. It is for these reasons that Air Force investigators eventually attributed the excessive failures of the NS-17, asserting initially that "modifying the design, careful handling of the device while in transit to the site," and avoiding "thermal shock" would eliminate the failures, but eventually concluding that "poor quality control and sloppy workmanship were among the major causes of failure. Another factor, according to the BSD program manager, was that the manufacturer, Autonetics Division of North American Aviation, had been overly bold in attempting to advance the science of microminiaturized electronics" – all of which indicate that the problem was attributed by

²⁰² Hall, Eldon C., A Case History of the AGC Integrated Logic Circuits, IEEE Transactions on Electronic Computers, No. E-1880, prepared under DSR Project 55-238, sponsored Manned Spacecraft Center of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Contract NAS 9-4065, December 1965

investigators as the result of a much lower noise margin in the circuitry than was necessarily desired, a situation oftentimes resulting from degradation within the circuitry for the reasons already noted.]²⁰³

2. Provide good ground planes and signal paths. [circuit degradation due to poor quality "ground planes and signal paths" can also decrease the noise margin of a circuit.]

3. Provide proper shielding, grounding and filtering of the computer, and all interface wires. [This was the solution that eventually solved the problem of the NS-17 failures, and ensured that there would be no repeat of the Echo Flight Incident.]

Obviously one must compromise here also, otherwise the protection as well as the magnitude of the noise would continue to escalate. In the choice of the NOR Gate, the Apollo Computer may have sacrificed some noise immunity for simplicity and availability. Testing of the finished computer has shown that its susceptibility is much lower than the limits specified in MIL-1-26600 which is the specification for electromagnetic compatibility. In fact, in order to locate areas of weakness, spark discharges have been used during testing. The normal radiation susceptibility tests do not generate levels high enough to induce computer failure. In fact, MIL-1-26600 is weak in other areas when applied to digital computers. For example, a power transient between a power input line and case is notorious for inducing troubles and locating areas of weakness, although this test is not a requirement of the MIL spec. [These same MIL specs, however, were used during the Minuteman force development, and most likely contributed to the guidance and control problems already noted that were not actually solved until 1968.] The Apollo computer has been subjected to and passed these more stringent tests.²⁰⁴

This may not have been entirely realized in 1965 when this document was originally published. During the Apollo/Saturn 204 (AS-204) mission training exercise of January 27, 1967 at Pad 34 (Launch Complex 34, Cape Canaveral, then known as Cape Kennedy), Command Pilot Virgil I. "Gus" Grissom, Senior Pilot Ed White and Pilot Roger B. Chaffee died in a fire that seems to have originated with a transient voltage spike in the command module's computer.²⁰⁵

The crew members were reclining in their horizontal couches, running through a checklist when a voltage transient was recorded at 6:30:54 (23:30:54 GMT). Ten seconds later (at 6:31:04) Chaffee said, "Hey..." Scuffling sounds followed for three seconds before Grissom

²⁰³ Nalty, Bernard C., *USAF Ballistic Missile Programs 1967-1968*, Office of Air Force History, September, 1969.

²⁰⁴ Hall, Eldon C., *A Case History of the AGC Integrated Logic Circuits*, IEEE Transactions on Electronic Computers, No. E-1880, prepared under DSR Project 55-238, sponsored Manned Spacecraft Center of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Contract NAS 9-4065, December 1965.

²⁰⁵ All of the sources for the Apollo 1 fire discussion, unless noted in the text, include the following materials: NASA Special Publication-4029, NASA History, "Apollo 1 Fire Timeline", http://history.nasa.gov/SP-4029/Apollo_01c_Timeline.htm; Palm Beach Post, "Apollo 1 astronauts honored at Cape", 2007-01-27, retrieved 2007-11-14, <http://www.palmbeachpost.com/state/content/state/epaper/2007/01/27/0127apollo.html>; Seamans, Robert C., Jr., "Memorandum", Report of Apollo 204 Review Board, NASA History Office, 1967-04-05, <http://www.hq.nasa.gov/pao/History/Apollo204/seamans.html>; Seamans, Robert C., Jr., "Findings, Determinations And Recommendations", Report of Apollo 204 Review Board, NASA History Office, 1967-04-05, <http://www.hq.nasa.gov/pao/History/Apollo204/find.html>.

shouted *"Fire!"* Chaffee then reported, *"We've got a fire in the cockpit,"* and White said *"Fire in the cockpit!"* After nearly ten seconds of frenetic movement noises Chaffee yelled, *"We've got a bad fire! Let's get out! We're burning up! We're on fire! Get us out of here!"* Some witnesses said they saw Ed White on the television monitors, reaching for the hatch release handle as flames in the cabin spread from left to right and licked the window. Only 17 seconds after the first indication by the crew of any fire, the transmission ended abruptly at 6:31:21 with a scream of pain as the cabin ruptured after rapidly expanding gases from the fire overpressurized the Command Module to 29 psi.

The ignition source of the fire was never conclusively identified. A number of hazards in the early Apollo command module certainly added to the overall effects. "Among these were the use of a high-pressure 100 percent-oxygen atmosphere for the test, wiring and plumbing flaws, flammable materials in the cockpit (such as Velcro), an inward-opening hatch that would not open in this kind of an emergency, and the flight suits worn by the astronauts."

Autonetics Division of North American Aviation had earlier suggested the cabin atmosphere be an oxygen/nitrogen mixture as on the Earth's surface, but NASA had objected, citing heightened risks such as catastrophic decompression sickness and mismanagement of nitrogen levels, which could cause the astronauts to pass out and die. NASA officials asserted a pure oxygen atmosphere had been used without incident in the Mercury and Gemini programs so it would be safe for use on Apollo. Also, a pure oxygen design saved weight, an important factor in early space technology. There's no doubt the command module was plagued with dozens of acknowledged but unresolved flaws. The crew expressed serious concerns about fire hazards and other problems well before this particular mission, but both NASA and Autonetics Division of North American Aviation considered the training exercise to be "not hazardous", since it was basically a "plugs-out" test to determine whether the Apollo spacecraft would operate nominally on internal power while detached from all cables and umbilicals. There was hope that if the spacecraft passed this and subsequent tests it would be ready to fly on February 21, 1967.

Problems noted early in the testing included episodes of high oxygen flow apparently linked to movements by the astronauts in their flightsuits, and faulty communications between the crew, the control room, the operations and checkout building and the complex 34 blockhouse. The voltage spike that occurred, however, is also conclusive, and one cannot help

but suspect that it had something to do with the fire's ignition in the all-oxygen atmosphere. While one cannot characterize the practice a failure, it was nonetheless common for corporate entities such as Autonetics to use common materials or material designs in multiple contexts and projects, particularly in the case of micro-miniaturized integrated circuitry due to the mass produced character of such elements.

In 1967, a vice president of North American Aviation, John McCarthy, speculated that Command Pilot Virgil I. "Gus" Grissom had accidentally "scuffed the insulation of a wire" whilst moving about the spacecraft, but his remarks were ignored by the review board and strongly rejected by a Congressional committee. Frank Borman, who had been the first astronaut to go inside the burned spacecraft, testified to Congress, "We found no evidence to support the thesis that Gus, or any of the crew members kicked the wire that ignited the flammables." The voltage transient recorded at 6:30:54 (23:30:54 GMT) simply cannot be ignored, and the problems Autonetics was having within the NS-17 guidance and control units used by the Minuteman forces is curiously coincident with this Apollo catastrophe. Soon after making his comment McCarthy had said, "I only brought it up as a hypothesis."²⁰⁶

Oddly enough, neither Robert Salas, Robert Hastings, nor anyone at CUFON or NICAP has ever proposed that UFOs were the ultimate cause of the Apollo 1 disaster. *Thank God for small favors, yes?*

It should also be noted here that even the measured failure rates of micro-miniaturized integrated circuitry could not be fully depended on during the period we're most interested in.

The reliability history of the NOR Gate will exemplify some of the difficulties encountered and successes achieved in building a digital computer utilizing integrated circuits.²⁰⁷

Table II [reproduced below] is a summary of the reliability data for the NOR Gate accumulated up to October 1964. This data has been previously discussed in detail but is presented here to show the extreme differences among manufacturers. The electrical failure definitions during screen and burn-in were any inoperable devices or any device exceeding the electrical specifications. The percentages include approximately 0.05 to 0.1% combined induced failures and testing errors. The initial qualification results are also included in Table II where the failure definition was an inoperable device. The extreme differences among the manufacturers is also reflected in the failure modes generated during both the initial qualification and screen and burn-in. For the data in Table II, Manufacturer A rarely exhibited the nonscreenable, and/or long-time dependent failure

²⁰⁶ "Blind Spot", *Time Magazine*, 1967-04-21, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,843575-2,00.html>, retrieved 2008-05-21.

²⁰⁷ Hall, Eldon C., *A Case History of the AGC Integrated Logic Circuits*, IEEE Transactions on Electronic Computers, No. E-1880, prepared under DSR Project 55-238, sponsored Manned Spacecraft Center of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Contract NAS 9-4065, December 1965.

modes while both Manufacturers B and C consistently did. The inoperable failures generated at computer use conditions for Manufacturers B and C were of the nonscreenable, long-time dependent failure modes.

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VENDOR	PRE QUALIFICATION % FAILURES	SCREEN & BURN-IN % FAILURES		FAILURE RATES AT USE CONDITIONS 90% CONFIDENCE
		TOTAL	2nd & 3rd ELECTRICAL	
A	5	1.8	0.3	0.005% / 1000 HRS (0 FAILURES)
B	26	3.8	1.7	0.3% / 1000 HRS (2 FAILURES)
C	58	5.0	2.5	1.8% / 1000 HRS (26 FAILURES)

TABLE II

It is interesting to note that the same devices used to generate the data of Vendor A of Table II have since exhibited a field failure rate of 0.0015%/1000 hours at 90% confidence as of 30 September 1965 with one operational failure. The same devices of Vendors B and C have not improved their failure rates because additional failures have occurred.

The more subtle differences in quality and reliability may be observed in variations of lots shipped from one manufacturer. The data of Fig. 15 [reproduced below] indicates the numerical variations for the NOR Gate from one qualified manufacturer. Here, only the inoperable failures are plotted and induced failures and testing errors have been eliminated from the data. These NOR Gates were exposed to the screen and burn-in procedure ... Each point in Fig. 15 represents a shipment lot of 2000 to 5000 NOR Gates. Figure 15 (a) shows the percent catastrophic failures at the incoming electrical tests. Figure 15 (b) shows the percent catastrophic failures which were generated after stressing with incoming catastrophic failures removed.²⁰⁸

²⁰⁸ Hall, Eldon C., A Case History of the AGC Integrated Logic Circuits, IEEE Transactions on Electronic Computers, No. E-1880, prepared under DSR Project 55-238, sponsored Manned Spacecraft Center of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Contract NAS 9-4065, December 1965.




FIG. 15

It's particularly evident here that *even with a logical element as simple as the NOR Gate*, catastrophic failures have become an accepted, and widely variable component of the electrical environment. Generalizations can, of course, be made; for instance, it was accepted as a general point of fact that the logic couplers used by Autonetics in both the NS-17s and in the guidance and control system at Echo Flight were *highly susceptible to failure* (measured at 80% by the Echo Flight Incident investigators) when cross loaded by transient voltages of 10 volts or more. Whether the voltage spikes were the result of radiative emanations from the circuitry or a result of coupling due to the environment itself is almost irrelevant, because in the long run, it was an easy problem to get rid of. When the upgraded NS-17's were installed in the Minuteman II complexes, that problem was solved, and when the addition of electromagnetic suppression filters were added to the force modernization upgrades at the Minuteman I facilities, the Echo Flight problem was solved. The whole *UFOs-caused-some-kind-of-a-magically-directed-high-altitude-EMP-that-took-Echo-Flight-off-alert* story is just more *fluff*. As for November-Oscar Flight, there's no record that anything out of the ordinary happened there *at all* – at least not until Salas, Hastings, CUFON and NICAP created the incident out of their carbon monoxide dream gas (which is why we call it thin) air. And the closer you look at the fluff, the more you tend to notice that Salas' dozens of confirmative witnesses simply don't exist.

If we didn't know anything at all about electromagnetic phenomena, we would still believe that Salas was lying to the world, because we know that *nobody* who was actually there, or who actually took part in the investigation, believes that a UFO took out the missiles (except maybe Salas, but I don't think even he believes it). I know for a fact that Frederick Meiwald, who was supposedly Salas' commander, and my father, who *was* the commander at Echo Flight, don't even *believe* in UFOs, so you're welcome to make of that what you will. As for me, because Salas has repeatedly affirmed for a decade now that both of these men who served their country so well for so long have *confirmed* his story, I can't help but conclude that the man is a liar, because if you don't even *believe in UFOs*, what kind of confirmation can you actually attest to that supports such a story? I think that Salas has simply decided that if he can get twenty individuals together willing to report that he was indeed in the Air Force at Malmstrom AFB in 1967, this is sufficient reason for him to claim that twenty individuals have confirmed his story. Common logic – which in some circles isn't, apparently, *so common* – tells you that this kind of confirmation is useless and misleading. Unfortunately, after a while, at least with Robert Salas, you tend to expect it, not because it's uncommon, and not because it's useless and misleading, but because it's inherently *dishonest*.

None of the documents provided by Salas and company offer any information at all regarding the conclusions obtained from the investigation that immediately followed the incident, so it's a little hard to figure out how they can discuss so definitively what these conclusions are. The command history that Salas and Co. put so much faith in is, after all, incomplete. Since the classification of the entire history was eventually downgraded, it's a complete mystery why Salas and Klotz have only provided pages 32 through 34, and page 38 for examination. Other pages, especially those for the three quarters following the command history they rely on so much, make it clear that the cause of the Echo Flight Incident was an electronic fault associated with the equipment inside the LCC. Whatever their reason for producing only a partial discussion of the event, the documents they *have* provided state only that

Further studies of this problem will be accomplished at the contractors [sic] facility since a full engineering investigation is not feasible at this level.²⁰⁹

According to Robert Salas, his tale of UFOs was confirmed by Robert Kominski, who was the Boeing Company engineering team leader for the Echo Flight Incident investigation. Salas assures us that Kominski said “There were no significant failures, engineering data, or findings that would explain how ten missiles were knocked off alert,” and “...there was no technical explanation that could explain the event.”²¹⁰ This is completely false, and Kominski admitted as much when he added that the “most that could be done was to reproduce the effects by introducing a 10 volt pulse onto a data line.”²¹¹ The first point to note here is one of alluded authority that didn’t exist. Robert Kominski did not “[head] up the organization to look at all aspects of these shutdowns” as Salas claims; he did *not* tell Salas nor imply that these were “UFO related ICBM” incidents, as Salas now claims, and he did not act *in any way* as the “head of the Echo Flight Incident investigation”. He was an employee of the Boeing Corporation acting as a member of an investigation team headed by Major James H. Schraff, and was subordinate in every way to the military authority running the show. In addition, if Kominski implied that no reason could be found for the incident, then he was most likely either misunderstood by Salas, or Salas twisted his statements to fit into a plot-outline that he himself was writing, a standard of proof he has relied on continuously to support an otherwise irresponsible and baseless account involving UFOs that *nobody saw*. The only thing Kominski could speak of was the ambiguity of the related cause, because *that is its nature*. One of the effects typical of noise pulse and similar electromagnetic interference phenomenon is the generation of transient surges of voltage in the equipment affected wherever the means to produce them exists, or when pulse coupling occurs. Since most power supply loads draw a current which varies with time, a time-varying interaction among the loads is going to result, and this *alone* can cause pulse coupling. There are numerous other means by which this can occur as well. In some cases, it can be ignored, but in most applications the pulse coupling or the interference that rises out of the fluctuations can and do generate transient voltage surges. Transients in electrical systems occur at random, and two transients are seldom alike, either in wave shape or in amplitude.

²⁰⁹ 341st Strategic Missile Wing and 341st Combat Support Group HQ SAC DXIH 67-1865 (Command History, Vol. 1), p. 32-34, 38.

²¹⁰ <http://www.mtpioneer.com/March-Malstrom-UFOs.html>

²¹¹ *Ibid.*

The fact that the surges generated are “transient” is the “trick” these guys are using to convince ignorant people that nobody knows why the missiles were taken offline. It’s little more than an information lie of the same type these clowns repeatedly accuse the Air Force of. The truth is, we don’t know exactly where this transient surge was generated, because it is “transient”. That’s what the term “transient” refers to. The pulse coupling or the means to create the voltage surge from the original electromagnetic disturbance came about when the pulse interacted with an “unknown event or condition.” That unknown quantity could have been one of a dozen or so different aspects of the electromagnetic environment, so we don’t know *exactly* which event caused the coupling. We *do* know that it happened, however, because every byte of data collected during the investigation and immediately after the incident could be accounted for by only *one* cause – an electromagnetic noise pulse at the time of the fault. When that happens in relation to already proven vulnerable equipment, we can prevent its recurrence by making that equipment *less* vulnerable or susceptible to electromagnetic interference and coupling. Kominski was aware of this, and was also aware that there was no point in continuing the investigation, because the cause was already determined, as was the means to correct the deficiency. *Why?* Because it’s a very well-known phenomenon that’s been observed on many, *many* occasions.

It’s an accepted tenet of all Department of Defense activities that the use of commercial and military electronic systems in tight spaces – such as aboard military ships, aircraft, vehicles, and launch control facilities – can cause unintended electromagnetic interactions among these systems; and such interactions are likely to have adverse impacts on operations. The Department of Defense considers the discipline of analyzing and managing relatively friendly, unintended adverse electromagnetic interactions and susceptibilities an important task to be taken into account for *every* operation; this discipline is referred to as electromagnetic environmental effects or E3. Joint Pub. 1-02 defines E3 as: ²¹²

The impact of the electromagnetic environment upon the operational capability of military forces, equipment, systems, and platforms. It encompasses all electromagnetic disciplines, including electromagnetic compatibility/electromagnetic interference (EMC/EMI); electromagnetic vulnerability (EMV); electromagnetic pulse (EMP); electronic protection (EP); hazards of

²¹² Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, March 23, 1994 (as amended through Feb. 10, 1999).

electromagnetic radiation to personnel (HERP), ordnance (HERO), and volatile materials (HERF); and natural phenomena effects of lightning and p-static (precipitation static).²¹³

These unintended electromagnetic interactions have been responsible for a comparably large number of unfortunate incidents that the Department of Defense has had to contend with, including the Echo Flight Incident of March 16, 1967.

Many E3/SM incidents already have occurred that have limited mission effectiveness, destroyed systems, and may even have resulted in friendly casualties. For example, in recent operations in the Balkans, a jammer aircraft experienced an engine shutdown when it began to transmit jamming signals. A remotely piloted vehicle for which a payload of electronics was rapidly configured without regard to E3, experienced interference problems that caused dropouts in the downlink. Our own jammer aircraft interfered with an artillery counter-battery radar. In Macedonia, electronic equipment experienced problems when hooked up to the local power grid. In a test flight over a range in the southwest United States, a Global Hawk Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) experienced interference from an adjacent test range that was testing auto-termination transmissions on the same frequency. The result was initiation of the self-destruct mechanism in the UAV; the aircraft was destroyed. [I sometimes wonder whether Salas, Hastings, CUFON, and NICAP believe these incidents were also the result of UFO interference, as opposed to electromagnetic interference.]

A highly memorable incident occurred during the Vietnam War when an explosion and resulting fire occurred aboard the aircraft carrier USS Forrestal, operating off Vietnam. Stray voltage was thought to be a possible cause. A potential source was one of the ship's radars, which may have ignited a rocket on one of the aircraft waiting to be catapulted. A number of lives and aircraft were lost. A more recent incident was the loading of ordnance on Army attack helicopters aboard the carrier USS Eisenhower in 1994. The helicopters aboard the Eisenhower were bound for Haiti and intended for use in Operation Uphold Democracy. The Navy was concerned that since the Army helicopter ordnance had not been certified for the carrier's electromagnetic environment, a disaster might occur. The ship's radar could not be used, which limited operations.²¹⁴

UFOs had nothing to do with these failures. And the characteristics of the “evidence” Salas employs indicates that UFOs also had nothing to do with the Echo Flight Incident and any possible associated failures proposed by Salas. For instance, why did nobody ever come forward with this ridiculous UFO story until Salas did thirty years after the fact? Why is there no documentation anywhere on the planet that suggests UFOs were involved? Why is it that even the most highly classified documents we have been able to access don't even *mention* UFOs in relation to the incident? Why is it that the closer we look at all of these “confirming” witnesses

²¹³ Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, March 23, 1994 (as amended through Feb. 10, 1999).

²¹⁴ Lucchese, Mario; Golliday, Dr. C. Leslie, Jr.; Joglekar, Dr. Anil N., Operational Evaluation of Electromagnetic Environmental Effects (E3), New DOT&E Policy Calls for More Systematic Assessment of E3, Electromagnetic Spectrum, IIT Research Institute, PM: May-June 2000.

that Salas insists support his insane UFO lies, the more the confirmations and positive statements fall apart and melt like mist when the light of day hits it? There's only one answer that fits all of these conditions: *Robert Salas is lying*, with the immoral and irresponsible support of James Klotz, Robert Hastings, CUFON and NICAP.

In Salas' initial 1997 article he states that "Further discussions with individuals from Boeing who had provided technical assistance and performed additional tests during the investigation into the cause of these shutdowns, confirmed that there was never a resolution as to cause or explanation for these incidents. The unit histories for 1967 also confirm that conclusion."²¹⁵ This is an especially ridiculous lie, since the few pages of the command history that he's made available to us don't even *discuss* the conclusions of the investigation at all, only that an onsite investigation was not practical at the necessary level. Nalty's history proves conclusively that the rest of this statement is equally misleading.

An article Salas and Klotz wrote for *The Montana Pioneer* states that another "Boeing Company engineer on the team, Robert Rigert, came up with this pulse that repeated the shutdown effects 80 percent of the time, but only when directly injected at the logic coupler. No explanation could be found for a source of such a pulse or 'noise' occurring in the field and getting inside the shielded missile system equipment."²¹⁶ This is also misleading. The "explanation" was the inherent vulnerability of the logic coupler. When the electronic noise pulse generated a separate voltage surge in the logic coupler of the guidance and control unit, the Echo Flight missiles went offline. The same thing had been noticed on Minuteman II missiles all over the country, and as soon as the suppression filters were added to the new versions of the NS-17 guidance and control unit, the problem was solved. The fact that "No explanation could be found for a source of such a pulse or 'noise'" is meaningless. It's an electromagnetic phenomenon that sometimes happens as a result of fluctuations in the electric and magnetic fields, or due to the susceptibility of the electronic components being used, and there isn't much you can do about it except protect your equipment from interference and environmental pulse coupling, if it can possibly occur. Some equipment is more vulnerable to the effect than others, and that's the case here; in fact, usually the more complex the electrical equipment is, the more

²¹⁵ Salas, Robert L., "Minuteman Missiles Shutdown", Mutual UFO Network UFO Journal, January, 1997, No. 345, pp. 15-17, cont. 22, 23.

²¹⁶ <http://www.mtpioneer.com/March-Malstrom-UFOs.html>

microminiaturized circuits that are in use, the more vulnerable the equipment is to electromagnetic interference. The micro-circuitry that Autonetics was using was top-of-the-line; it was brand new technology, and it was so vulnerable to these effects, that the Air Force ultimately suggested that maybe Autonetics was being “overly bold in attempting to advance the science of microminiaturized electronics. ... a more conservative approach would have eliminated the need for many of the modifications ... required by the NS-17.”²¹⁷

After the new NS-17s were installed there was no more problem with the logic couplers. This is the same thing that happens with personal computers all the time, and you can't say “why” and you can't fix it, because it's an inherent quality of the electrical equipment. You just buy a better laptop. And you may have equipment that's particularly susceptible to this sort of effect, but that doesn't mean the equipment is *broken*. It doesn't mean that once you figure out the reason for the failure you just fix it and everything's okay. All it means is you were unlucky, and you bought a cheap computer that isn't equipped to avoid such effects. Of course, your PC may *never* fail for these reasons, but on the one day that it *does*, you'd be an absolute idiot to blame it on UFOs.

The bottom line is simple: in 1967 nobody knew exactly how vulnerable such equipment might be to electromagnetic interference of this type. And as such things go, before long they found out.

Now we need to discuss and review some standard electromagnetic engineering, because otherwise an event that people are not generally aware of is going to reintroduce itself to the world as a *UFO*, and while I recognize that this may have occurred at one time or another in the past, or may occur at some time in the future, it absolutely did *not* occur in March 1967 at Malmstrom AFB. Most people, however, are basically *unaware* of electromagnetic phenomena and their effects on the environment, so a little tutorial review is necessary.

Electromagnetic Pulse, EMP, also sometimes called *transient disturbance*, arises wherever a source emits a short-duration pulse of energy. The energy is usually broadband by nature, although it often excites a relatively narrow-band damped sine wave response in the victim. The *source* is the electrical component or condition which generates the pulse. The *victim* is the electrical component or condition that fails or responds by producing a voltage

²¹⁷ Nalty, Bernard C., USAF Ballistic Missile Programs 1967-1968, Office of Air Force History, September, 1969.

spike as a result of pulse coupling, which happens when an electromagnetic pulse of any type encounters a conducive electrical medium or event; this can be anything from common grounding, two circuits sharing the same impedance, proximity to power cables, signal cables, improper ground cables or buses, induction pick-up, or even the common radiation that's emitted all the time from the very standard use of micro-circuitry; *all of these examples can create sufficient electromagnetic interference to generate the 10 volt spike that investigators discovered would recreate the Echo Flight Incident 80% of the time.*²¹⁸ This is a transient, or random, phenomenon, which means you can't always determine when or where the voltage spike will occur. The actions actually taken by contractors and Air Force personnel suggest very strongly that both were aware of the original cause, and had a very good idea how to prevent its recurrence.

It isn't difficult to determine the susceptibility or vulnerability of electrical components in use to the effects of an electronic noise pulse. At Echo Flight, one vulnerable component was the logic coupler of the guidance and control system, already associated system-wide with Minuteman II guidance and control failures. What we don't know is the exact cause of the pulse, because it could have been almost *anything*. Once steps were taken to remove the vulnerability of the logic coupler to electromagnetic pulse, however, *the incident was never repeated*. Removing the vulnerability, or susceptibility, of the logic coupler entailed taking the steps necessary to *prevent* any pulse coupling from occurring within it or in proximity to it. The solution the technicians came up with was one that had already been scheduled as part of the standard upgrading of the NS-17 guidance and control units in use on all of the Minuteman II missiles. They simply instituted the same upgrading of components to the Minuteman I guidance and control units, because many aspects of this were the same ones in use on the Minuteman II missiles, which had a penchant for failure.²¹⁹ There was nothing mysterious about this, nothing that was even very difficult to fix once they determined what the problem was, because it was already being worked on, and the upgrades to NS-17 had already been scheduled for this very reason. In fact, had this event occurred *only* on Minuteman II missiles, it's very likely that nobody would have even mentioned it as especially important or for historical retention, because it had been happening *continuously* in the Minuteman II missiles, and a

²¹⁸ <http://www.mtpioneer.com/March-Malstrom-UFOs.html>

²¹⁹ Nalty, Bernard C., USAF Ballistic Missile Programs 1967-1968, Office of Air Force History, September, 1969.

solution to this problem was well on the way to being instituted. What makes the Echo Flight Incident important as a historical event, is the fact that it happened to a flight of Minuteman I missiles, a topic that will be examined later in this narrative.

Sources of isolated EMP events can include any of the following: (1) the switching action of electrical circuitry, particularly micro-circuitry, which is also far more susceptible to damage by electromagnetic pulse; (2) electrostatic discharge (ESD) that builds up as a result of two charged objects coming into close proximity or even contact with each other; this is just static electricity that can build up in any environment and can easily discharge the 10 volts that Salas asserts was necessary to repeat the effects of the Echo Flight Incident 80% of the time; lightning electromagnetic pulse (LEMP); nuclear electromagnetic pulse (NEMP), also called high altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP), which occurs as a result of a nuclear explosion that Salas insists was necessary to inject the pulse into shielded cable line, which is a ridiculous assumption that only someone trying to sneak in a UFO where it doesn't belong would ever claim; this is the pulse that Salas insists was necessary to create the 10 volts that was needed to repeat the effects of the Echo Flight Incident 80% of the time; non-nuclear electromagnetic pulse (NNEMP) weapons, which were not available in 1967 (which does not mean we assume UFOs used such devices to create the EMP, although Salas and Co. might very well suggest this is true); and power line surges/pulses, which are very common in components that depend on commercial power or are even in close proximity to devices that depend on commercial power. Sources of repetitive EMP events, sometimes referred to as regular pulse trains, include: electric motors, gasoline engine ignition systems, and electric fast transient/bursts (EFT). To reiterate, *electromagnetic pulses are fairly common*, and most of the time you don't need a nuclear explosion to generate one. In addition, all of these mechanisms can operate singly, or in combination, and conversions from one to another can also occur. In other words, all of these can mix together nicely. And when "coupling" occurs in relation to an electromagnetic pulse, a voltage spike will very often be generated as a result in adjacent or nearby systems.

Nalty's history of American ICBM use specifically states that:

Extensive tests at Malmstrom, Ogden Air Materiel Area, and at the Boeing plant in Seattle revealed that an electronic noise pulse had shut down the flight. In effect, this surge of noise was similar to the electromagnetic pulse generated by nuclear explosions. The component of

Let me repeat that so you get the message: *“In effect, this surge of noise was similar to the electromagnetic pulse generated by nuclear explosions.”* “Similar” does *not* mean “the same as.” The electronic noise pulse referred to by Nalty is a form of electromagnetic interference (EMI), one of the components now defined by the Department of Defense as part of the consideration for E3. For instance, the EMI that’s generated by any standard power supply, can be propagated either by conduction (via the input and output leads) or by radiation from the units’ case, so cable connectivity isn’t even necessary. The terms “noise” and “radio-frequency interference” (RFI) are sometimes used in the same context. EMI can also be a natural byproduct of switching mechanisms in a computer, which tends to happen quite often. For this reason, modern technology generally uses built-in shields and filter networks that substantially reduce EMI and control any output ripple and noise. In 1967, however, this was not done anywhere *near* as regularly as it is today. And while the effects of electromagnetic pulse was understood by technicians and the contractors at Autonetics, the extent necessary to protect the micro-circuitry and microminiaturized electronics that were only then being developed was not completely realized until events like the Echo Flight Incident made it obvious. It honestly did not take that long for everybody to realize that microminiaturized electronics are particularly sensitive to a pulse environment, which is why this protection, either by shielding or suppression filters or others means that are in use, is now standardized, so much so that it isn’t even noticed by those who aren’t already familiar with it. There’s nothing new or “magic” about this vulnerability – it’s a character of the equipment that can be removed with suppression filters or shielding, which is exactly the course that was taken to solve the problem presented by the Echo Flight Incident and the system-wide NS-17 failures.

A high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) generated by a nuclear detonation is best characterized by the production of a very short (hundreds of nanoseconds) but intense electromagnetic pulse, which propagates away from its source with ever diminishing intensity, governed by the theory of electromagnetism. Fast rise time signals of this sort are identical in all aspects but intensity and range to electronic noise pulses; not surprisingly, the principle sources of electrical noise of this type *worldwide* are digital logic circuits – not nuclear

²²⁰ Nalty, Bernard C., USAF Ballistic Missile Programs 1967-1968, Office of Air Force History, September, 1969.

detonations As for the radiation that accompanies nuclear explosions and constitute a hazard to numerous electrical components, integrated circuit chips themselves are a major source of radiative emanations. Switching power supplies and rectifiers are sources of conducted emissions brought about by coupling. Video circuits are also sources of noise typified by the fast rise times and high amplitudes normally associated with high-altitude electromagnetic pulse. Relay contacts, switches and thermal devices are all sources of fast rise time, low duty cycle pulses. Signals which contain ringing, overshoot, or undershoot are potential sources of EMI, while motors with brushes, or any arcing high voltage circuit may also require filtering to eliminate broad band noise.²²¹ Electrical engineers must take all such emanations into account for a full understanding of those assets that affect their profession, even for general maintenance. Designer contractors for the military are *required* to do so.

The task of the designer of airborne navigation systems is immeasurably complicated by the demand for ultra highspeed airborne weapon systems with increasing quantities of complex electronic subsystems and a more stringent demand for reduced size and weight of components. Regardless of the infusion of these problems into the research and design effort, scientific and technological capability permits an optimistic view of an attainable goal. Evidence that the goal is in sight is underscored by the design trend toward microminiaturized electronic components, microintegrated electronic circuitry, hybrid circuit elements, new assembly techniques, and simplicity in lieu of complexity. ...

... Space for location of equipment within an airborne weapon system continues to be at an absolute premium. The requirement for increased numbers of subsystems within the airborne weapon systems escalates at an unprecedented rate. These two factors, in conjunction with the accuracy, performance, reliability, and maintainability requirements in present and future tactical airborne navigation systems, establish the network of criteria that must guide the design and development effort of the industrial complex.

Significant strides have been made in the state of the art, but the scientific and technological surface has merely been scratched in terms of the goals that must be achieved in the design and development of these navigation subsystems. To accommodate the reduced space available for placement of the navigation system within the airborne weapon system, maximum miniaturization of components is mandatory. Platforms, gyroscopes, electronics, computers, and power-supply components must be designed for the ultimate in accuracy and performance but not at the expense of the size, weight, and minimized space available for these vital components. Neither can the navigation system designer succumb to the weakness of previous systems wherein, at best, reliability was questionable, mean time to failure was too short, and the ground support package far exceeded in cost and maintenance requirements those of the basic subsystem installed in the weapon system complex.²²²

²²¹ McConnell, Roger A., Avionics System Design for High Energy Fields, A Guide for the Designer and Airworthiness Specialist, Final Report No. DOT/FAA/CT-87/19, prepared by CIS Consultants under Contract No. NAS2-12448 with the Federal Aviation Administration, June 1987.

²²² Curtis, Colonel Edward H., "Navigational Requirements for Tactical Weapon Systems", Air University Review, May-June 1971.

The evolution of techniques in the design of navigation systems to meet the confining requirements dictated by present and future tactical airborne weapon systems is in a state of restlessness. For example, research and development have moved ahead in the solid-state technology field. Present programs include work on photoconductive detectors, cadmium telluride devices, and optical transistors. Coupled with this research are the research and development programs producing new chemical processes to provide the setting for the new electronic elements. Successful research programs that produce new materials lead to their use in new devices and systems.

The using agencies can anticipate a host of advantages as these newly developed design techniques find their way into more and more production items. The application of these techniques in the design of new airborne navigation systems for tactical aircraft will be especially significant. Computer programmed memory capacities can be more than doubled through the use of microminiaturized electronics; weight and volume can be reduced by as much as 50 percent through the use of semiconductor integrated circuits; and reliability can be increased by a factor of as much as 75 percent. These newly designed components can and should provide for data processing, malfunction analysis, and function sequencing in addition to the airborne duties of control and/or guidance over a preplanned route to the destination of the weapon system.²²³

Published in 1971, the above article shows exactly what value the Department of Defense placed on microminiaturized circuitry then in development; it also shows very distinctly how limited the understanding of such circuits was in 1971. In comparison, *1967 was the dark ages*.

A joint publication *Final Report* of the U.S. Department of Transportation and the Federal Aviation Administration, *Avionics System Design for High Energy Fields, A Guide for the Designer and Airworthiness Specialist* also discusses the susceptibility of digital elements to transient effects. The *Executive Summary* is particularly enlightening.

Until recently, avionics equipment was primarily analog, possessing limited bandwidths and utilizing time averaging indicators. Such equipment was not responsive to transient disturbances unless they exceeded the analog device damage level. Now digital electronics are becoming common-place and their use, even in normally analog systems, will prevail in the near future. However, unlike their analog predecessors, they are very susceptible to transient effects, as well as to discrete-frequency radiation. Digital device performance can be adversely affected before the device damage transient level is reached. The operation of many digital devices is at least 10 times more susceptible to transients than that of their analog counterparts.²²⁴

²²³ Curtis, Colonel Edward H., "Navigational Requirements for Tactical Weapon Systems", *Air University Review*, May-June 1971.

²²⁴ McConnell, Roger A., *Avionics System Design for High Energy Fields, A Guide for the Designer and Airworthiness Specialist*, Final Report No. DOT/FAA/CT-87/19, prepared by CIS Consultants under Contract No. NAS2-12448 with the Federal Aviation Administration, June 1987.

Other factors are also involved. Modern aircraft are increasingly using fly-by-wire control systems in which direct mechanical or hydraulic linkages are being replaced by solid state digital systems controlling electrical actuators. There is an increasing use of composite materials in the airframe, which, while offering strength and weight advantages, give little or no shielding compared to aluminum.

Because of the significant differences in transient susceptibility, the use of digital electronics in flight critical systems, and the reduced shielding effects of composite materials, there is a definite need to define design practices which will minimize electromagnetic susceptibility, to investigate the operational environment, and to develop appropriate testing methods for flight critical systems.

A major part of this report describes design practices which will lead to reduced electromagnetic susceptibility of avionics systems in high energy fields. A second part describes the levels of emission that can be anticipated from generic digital devices. It is assumed that as data processing equipment becomes an ever larger part of the avionics package, the construction methods of the data processing industry will increasingly carry over into aircraft. These portions of the report should, therefore, be of particular interest to avionics engineers and designers.²²⁵

Readers should keep in mind that this *Final Report* was published June 1987, twenty years worth of experimentation and experience after the Echo Flight Incident. And yet the urgency of the report is unmistakable.

Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) is the ability of electrical equipment and systems to function in a given electromagnetic environment without mutual interference.

Although nearly every electrical and electronic device is capable of generating or being affected by interference, the proliferation of digital control systems in aircraft and the use of ever-faster digital logic requires greatly increased attention to EMC problems.

Concurrently with the introduction of digital control in flight critical systems, composite materials such as kevlar and graphite-epoxy are increasingly being used in airframes, offering significant weight and strength advantages, but providing little or no electromagnetic shielding in comparison with aluminum. It should be noted that embedded metallic meshes and foils adhered to the surfaces can greatly alter the shielding properties of composite materials.

It will be noted that many of the design practices described here have to do with minimizing circuit board emissions. Not only do these practices enable a system to function without interfering with its own operation, but the very practices which reduce system emissions also work to minimize susceptibility. Control of loop areas, grounding design, by-passing, filtering, and attention to the precise methods of connecting cable shields are all extremely important in both the emission and susceptibility problems.²²⁶

²²⁵ McConnell, Roger A., Avionics System Design for High Energy Fields, A Guide for the Designer and Airworthiness Specialist, Final Report No. DOT/FAA/CT-87/19, prepared by CIS Consultants under Contract No. NAS2-12448 with the Federal Aviation Administration, June 1987.

²²⁶ *Ibid.*

There is a very high degree of reciprocity between emission or radiation from a circuit, and the susceptibility of that circuit to external fields. Throughout this report "susceptibility" can be substituted for "emission" and "radiation", and the meaning will remain substantially the same.

In an aircraft, some of the most severe threats are from its own on-board communications and radar systems, and from radiation from systems which were never intended to radiate. Although these systems are of significantly lower power than the ground-based high energy threats, their proximity to flight critical systems means that close attention must be directed to the purity of emissions of intentional radiators, and to the minimization of radiation from other sources.²²⁷

This report presents an excellent discussion of electromagnetic compatibility problems affecting all forms of digital devices.

EMC problems can be broadly divided into the categories of emission and susceptibility. Each of these categories in turn can be broken down into radiation and conduction.

Emission refers to the ability of an electrical or electronic device to act as a generator and radiator of radio frequency energy, in the manner of a radio transmitter, except that the radiation is unintentional. Susceptibility refers to the ability of a device to act as a receiver of radio frequency energy, again unintentionally.

Radiation refers to the transmission of radio-frequency energy through space in the form of plane waves, also known as E-H, or transverse electromagnetic (TEM) waves. Radiation as a plane wave is measured at distances greater than one-sixth of a wavelength from the radiating device, in what is referred to as the far field. At closer distances a preponderance of electric field or of magnetic field may exist, depending upon the exact nature of the radiating device and the influence of nearby objects.

Conduction refers to the transmission of radio frequency energy along or through metallic elements such as power or I/O (input/output) cables, or even on the surface of a cabinet or chassis.

Once energy escapes from an enclosure along a cable, it can turn into radiated energy. Conversely, a radiation field can induce current or voltage in a nearby conductor, and turn into conducted energy. Thus the distinction between conduction and radiation is not always straight-forward.

In general, emission problems are easier to deal with than susceptibility problems. In the case of emission, the sources and their characteristics, such as rise time and frequency, are under some degree of control by the designer, whereas in the case of susceptibility, the number of interfering sources and their characteristics are outside his control. But, as mentioned above, many of the measures taken to reduce emission also operate to reduce susceptibility, because of the high degree of reciprocity between the "transmit" and "receive" situations. For example, shielding which reduces emissions is equally effective in reducing the strength of incoming interference.²²⁸

²²⁷ McConnell, Roger A., Avionics System Design for High Energy Fields, A Guide for the Designer and Airworthiness Specialist, Final Report No. DOT/FAA/CT-87/19, prepared by CIS Consultants under Contract No. NAS2-12448 with the Federal Aviation Administration, June 1987.

²²⁸ *Ibid.*

Circuit layout and configuration should provide separation and isolation of susceptible circuits from EMI sources, and confinement of EMI sources to nonsusceptible areas. Low level stages of high susceptibility, such as analog video amplifiers, may have to be enclosed in shields and kept separate from all other circuits, and all leads penetrating the shield must be appropriately filtered. Similar isolation measures should be applied to sources of EMI. For example, power supply or logic circuitry should be shielded and filtered to prevent the EMI it generates from reaching other circuits. Orientation and placement of transformers should be planned to minimize mutual magnetic coupling. Wiring runs should be planned so that susceptible wires are not brought close to EMI-generating circuits, or so that EMI-bearing wires are not brought close to susceptible wires or circuits. Typical EMI sources on PC boards are: digital logic, lamp drivers, relays and relay drivers, deflection amplifiers, crystal oscillators, pulse width modulators, DCPC switching converters, plasma display drivers, and capacitive discharge circuits. Typical susceptor circuits are: video amplifiers, low level analog circuits, sense circuits, and synchro circuits.

It is most effective to attack EMC at the sources of radiation and conduction, rather than attempt to protect the many potential recipients of this interference. Attention given to reducing emission and conduction at the board level can also ease EMC problems within the system itself.

EMC problems should be confronted early in the design phase of a new board or system. The production cost of a well laid-out board is little more than that of a poor layout, but the poor design is likely to require expensive modifications later in the form of add-on shielding, bypassing and filtering, or extensive re-design. Designs become increasingly difficult to modify as they mature and the pressure to meet schedules becomes more severe late in a project.

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Hidden forces can seem very mysterious to those who aren't aware of them, or to those who seem willing enough to note the effect, but not the cause; and yet, there's something very wrong when the only people willing to blame such effects on a plague of UFOs are those generally considered to be among the well educated.

To summarize, the Echo Flight Incident was caused by an electromagnetic noise pulse that was described as similar in nature to an EMP caused by a nuclear explosion; the description came from investigators who simply wanted to explain an electromagnetic phenomenon in terms that the military men representing their primary audience would understand. This was a common practice with civil contractors of the Department of Defense. In fact, the practice is even referred to in the Echo Flight Incident files on record. In a discussion regarding major changes to the Minuteman forces structure resulting from the EMP lightning simulation tests on the Minuteman II power systems in use by the 564th SMS, it's

mentioned that there would be “changes to the EMP for Force Mod. Because of the complicated engineering terminology, a detailed explanation given by the Boeing Engineers will not be presented of the changes to the EMP.”²³⁰ As I've noted elsewhere in this narrative, EMP changes had already been scheduled for Force Mod as a result of the HEST EMP tests; the changes discussed here represent further changes to what had already been scheduled. As a result of this, the Force Mods could no longer be described as "routine" maintenance, but that's exactly what they were made to look like, since such changes to the system were scheduled to take place during routine maintenance and coincident with Force Mods already scheduled to take place and therefore in effect. Nalty also discusses this in more detail in his ICBM histories. “Changes will be presented in brief explanation given by the ECP.”²³¹ This is a reference to the Boeing Corporation's *Engineering Change Proposals*; copies of these ECPs are included among the FOIA documents reproduced beginning on page 67 of this manuscript.

Granted, use of a description associated with nuclear detonations was somewhat misleading because an EMP caused by a nuclear explosion is an *external* event that has to be powerful enough to surpass the protection of shielding in order to affect electrical components. The electromagnetic pulse that shut down the Echo Flight missiles, however, was an *internal event* that was generated within the system itself, so however much the equipment was “shielded” is irrelevant to any understanding of the event. The description was nonetheless appropriate, because any electromagnetic pulse is still a valid electromagnetic pulse, regardless what its origin might be. Anyone who misunderstands the phrase has only himself to blame, and the fact that he's too lazy to try and understand what he's reading or listening to.

The electromagnetic pulse interacted with an unknown event or condition of the environment, which could easily have been one of a dozen or more elements that were in use in the system, or it could have been one of a dozen or more characteristics of the electromagnetic environment. This unknown quality is the only thing that was not determined, and it remained unknown due to its transient character. This interaction resulted in a voltage spike in the logic coupler of the guidance and control unit, and this in turn basically “turned-off” the Flight Control Center's access to the missiles. Every aspect of this chain of events is relatively common and has been observed on many occasions in other electrical components.

²³⁰ 341st Strategic Missile Wing and 341st Combat Support Group HQ SAC DXIH 67-5122 (Command History, Vol. 1), p. 66-68.

²³¹ *Ibid.*

Today, all of these details are taken into account by the Department of Defense as an aspect of the E3 discipline, but in 1967, the microminiaturized circuitry used by Autonetics was not expected to be as vulnerable to EMI as they turned out to be. When this was realized, it was pointed out that the means by which this problem could be solved was already scheduled as part of the expected force upgrade, such measures being implemented to solve problems already noted in the NS-17 guidance and control units that the Air Force had been plagued with for the previous year. This was helpful, because the logic coupler used in the Minuteman I missiles at Echo Flight and elsewhere at Malmstrom AFB was the same as those used in the NS-17s that were installed in Minuteman II missiles. All of the Minuteman I missiles were going to be replaced before too long, in any case, so until that changeover took place, all they needed to do was add filters to protect the logic couplers from electromagnetic effects, this being one of the measures adopted for the Minuteman II's NS-17 units. In March 1967, this "fix" was already scheduled to take place by June 30, 1968, and due to the budget crisis, the Air Force decided to simply retain this schedule as the easiest course of correction for everybody.

A "No-Go" status condition occurs when the launch crew can no longer launch their missiles without making them accessible first. It isn't necessary, as Salas has in the past asserted, for each missile to be shut down separately to bring about a "No-Go" status; it can, in fact, be done by the launch crew itself, if they wanted to do so for some reason; in fact, by 1966 it could also be done by SAC commanders from one of the airborne launch commands as Nalty has also documented so well. There's absolutely nothing mysterious about these events, and no reason to believe that UFOs must have created a nuclear EMP of some kind to achieve this. In fact, such an excuse is laughable, not because the *idea* of UFOs is so silly, but simply because so many people *believe* that this happened, without the evidential reliance on *anybody at all* who can say they actually saw such a thing happen.

In pursuit of our primary purpose for this narrative, readers should also note Nalty's commentary regarding the Air Force's contemporary adjustments to the research and development deficit that it was suffering under throughout this entire period, particularly those elements of the newly revised deficit, which "included the previously calculated costs of system improvements and also reflected unexpected deficits in reentry vehicle development and a *possible requirement for funds to investigate and correct a recently discovered inaccuracy that*

seemed characteristic of Minuteman [my emphasis].”²³² This otherwise ambiguous “recently discovered inaccuracy” is also a reference to the Echo Flight Incident of March 1967, since that event also represented to the Air Force a newly discovered vulnerability of Minuteman I missiles. This *vulnerability* had, prior to its discovery, been thought to apply only to the Minuteman II missiles, so when the Air Force discovered that it applied as well to the Minuteman I, it became “characteristic of Minuteman” in general, a characteristic that was to have some important repercussions over the next few years, including a system-wide rescheduling of Minuteman III deployment, and a tendency within the Department of Defense to reject further development of both Minuteman II and the NS-17 guidance and control unit. By July 29, 1967, some of the more spectacular problems faced by the Minuteman program landed on the front page of every city newspaper in the nation.

USAF Reports High Rate Of Missile Failure²³³

WASHINGTON (AP) — The Air Force has detected a high rate of failure in guidance and control components of the newer Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missiles, backbone of the nation's strategic force.

To what extent the difficulties have degraded the strike potential of the 1,000-missile land based ICBM force is not clear.

The success of any pre-emptive or retaliatory nuclear strike against an enemy would hinge largely on the accuracy of U.S. missiles.

The situation, raising again an old question of missile reliability, has prompted the Pentagon to order a major multimillion dollar program to correct the technical problems.

Guidance and control packages are being pulled out of Minuteman II models for modifications by Autonetics, a subsidiary of North American Aviation which builds the Apollo spacecraft.

Secretary of the Air Force Harold Brown said Minuteman II's guidance and control system "is proving to require more maintenance than predicted earlier" but he said this will improve "as the system matures."

He said test launches of the missile show that the ICBM force "is indeed reliable."

"All weapons, whether they be aircraft, missiles or guns have parts which must be replaced periodically," Brown said in a statement.

The number of Minuteman missiles which are temporarily out of commission at any one time is secret.

There are 250 Minuteman II missiles and 750 older Minuteman I models, successors to the now-extinct Atlas.

The primary reason for the importance of this revelatory news item can be summed up in the last paragraph: *“There are 250 Minuteman II missiles and 750 older Minuteman I models,*

²³² Nalty, Bernard C., USAF Ballistic Missile Programs 1967-1968, Office of Air Force History, September, 1969

²³³ Associated Press Wire Release, "USAF Reports High Rate of Missile Failure", The Cumberland News, Cumberland, Maryland, July 29, 1967.

successors to the now-extinct Atlas.” Those 1,000 missiles represented the entirety of the United States’ land-based nuclear munitions force, situated to strike targets in the Soviet Union and China via the shortest route – over the North Pole – making it the nation’s primary defensive force against a first strike nuclear attack. The results of the Echo Flight Incident investigation, summed up further in Nalty’s historical record, make it very plain that the same equipment responsible for that entire flight of missiles going off alert was also responsible for the numerous Minuteman II failures throughout the previous year: a component integrated into the NS-17 guidance and control unit that was used at the time on all of the Minuteman II’s in service. This component was the same logic coupler that was used on the Minuteman I missiles; we can say this with some confidence, because even before the investigative team had been gathered together at Malmstrom AFB, and within a *few hours* of the incident itself, actions taken by the Technical Analysis Division at Echo Flight show that they already had some idea where the failure within that flight of missiles was located, a suspicion that would never have been anticipated if the problem had been caused by UFOs. Salas’ own FOIA documents support this line of reason more than anything else. According to those documents, *the very first step taken in response to the incident* was already focused on this specific component.

Guidance & Control channel 50 dump data was collected from E-7 facility and E-8 Facility and all 10 sites were then returned to strategic alert without any LF equipment replacement. All 10 sites were reported to have been subject to a normal controlled shutdown.²³⁴

Had a UFO been the cause of the Echo Flight Incident, there would have been no reason for the Technical Analysis Division to immediately assume that the problem was with the guidance and control system. In addition, it’s doubtful that they would have returned the entire flight of missiles to strategic alert immediately after collecting *only* this data. It’s obvious that they already had some reason to suspect that the malfunction at Echo Flight had something to do with a component integral to the guidance and control system, *and no other*. The only prior information that the Technical Analysis Division had to go on was a "No-Go indication of Channels 9 and 12 on Voice Reporting Signal Assemble (VRSA)."²³⁵ This is hardly reason enough for them to focus *all* their attention on the guidance and control system, and to then,

²³⁴ 341st Strategic Missile Wing and 341st Combat Support Group HQ SAC DXIH 67-1865 (Command History, Vol. 1), p. 32-34, 38.

²³⁵ *Ibid.*

without collecting any more information whatsoever, return all 10 sites to strategic alert. If the incident had been caused by a UFO, the Technical Analysis Division would have immediately collected *all* information that was available, not simply one data dump from the guidance and control system on only two of the ten launch sites. And they would not have *immediately* returned all ten sites to strategic alert, for fear that something may have been tampered with in the process of shutting it down. And if any other flights had also been shut down, as Salas has insisted for over eight years, the Technical Analysis Division would have done exactly the same thing with them. It would have been grossly negligent *not* to.

If the press had ever broken the story that *the same component* responsible for the numerous failures of the Minuteman II missiles throughout the previous year was also used on many, if not all, of the Minuteman I missiles, it would have given both Congress and the general public more than enough reason to suspect that not only were the 250 Minuteman II missiles throughout the system subject to failure, as was reported nation-wide on July 29, 1967, but the 750 older Minuteman I models were *also* subject to failure. *This would have been a disaster*, because it would have been the equivalent of admitting that the *entire land-based North American defense system* was unreliable, and therefore lacked any deterrent qualities whatsoever. The Department of Defense and the Air Force simply couldn't afford to admit that, not in the middle of the budget crisis so aptly discussed by Nalty in his ICBM history.

In a discussion of the Echo Flight Incident by Roy Craig, one of the primary investigators for the Condon Colorado UFO Study, in his 1995 book *UFOs: An Insider's View of the Official Quest for Evidence*, he refers to this same necessity for the Air Force to keep this information secret even from the citizenry it protected:

In one such instance, the integrity of a major weapon system was brought into doubt by a failure which rumor attributed to the presence of one or more UFOs in the vicinity. It is easy to understand why the information that such a failure had occurred would be closely guarded, for if a potential enemy knew that a major defense system could be made inoperative, the deterrence value of that system could be lost.²³⁶ [Since Robert Salas uses Craig's personal notes and this book, *UFOs: An Insider's View of the Official Quest for Evidence*, in his most recent load of codswallop in a pathetic attempt to justify his faulty interpretations, I will discuss it in more detail further in this narrative; I believe this is necessary, not only because Salas slanders the memory of both Roy Craig and Lt. Col. Lewis D. Chase, the UFO Officer for Malmstrom AFB, in such an

²³⁶ Craig, Roy, *UFOs: An Insider's View of the Official Quest for Evidence*, 1995.

insulting, sloppy, and easily refuted way that proves the man has no conscience and little understanding of the military, but also because I simply cannot resist pointing out the stupidity typical of Salas' sad attempts to do so.]

Due to this, it became far more necessary for the Air Force to protect the most powerful deterrent system in world history by keeping its temporary vulnerabilities a secret. And in the event that the vulnerability of the components inherent to the guidance and control units could *not* be corrected by the measures already scheduled as part of the force modernization program – measures that *were* ultimately responsible for correcting these deficiencies – the USAF would still have time to work out another cure. After all, Minuteman III deployment was consistently being pushed back as a result of the equally consistent Minuteman II failures – failures that even Salas eventually acknowledged in his Disclosure Project interview:

These weapons were Minuteman One missiles and were of course nuclear-tipped warhead missiles. As they started shutting down, immediately he gets up and we both start querying the status board. We've got the ability to query and determine what the cause of the shutdowns were. As I recall, most of them were guidance and control system failures.²³⁷

This, of course, doesn't mean that Salas' tale of the events at Echo-November-Oscar Flight is a trustworthy account; he's already told far too many lies for anyone who might want to apply to his testimony the description "trustworthy" regarding *anything*. The point is, guidance and control system failures were *typical* of the Minuteman program in 1966-67. One can't help but wonder why aliens in UFOs would use *magic* to take out a flight of missiles as a result of guidance and control errors, which by then we were kind of expecting to see anyway, instead of just cutting off the power or something – *but maybe that would have been too hard*. Or maybe it wouldn't communicate the right message, which in this case can only be interpreted as, hell, I don't know – *Look what we can do?!!* Or were they just having a good time, little green guys listening to some reggae and fuckin' with the Americans? In the command history Salas originally used to support his outrageous fable, the first step taken, as we noted above, was a collection of Guidance and Control channel 50 dump data from the E-7 and E-8 launch facilities. Following this, however,

²³⁷ Greer, Steven M., M.D., Director, and Loder, Theodore C., III, Ph.D., "Disclosure Project Briefing Document Prepared for: Members of the Press, Members of United States Government, Members of the US Scientific Community", April, 2001.

Targeting support was scheduled for a G&C [Guidance and Control] Channel 50 data dump at LFs E-2 and E-9 which, although returned to alert, were still felt to possess useful data.²³⁸

Everything indicates that the command believed the problem originated within the guidance and control system almost immediately following the incident. It's probable that this belief was due to the many problems system technicians had already encountered within that same system. Documented history tells us they were right, that UFOs had nothing to do with the problem, and that the only threat posed to the system was entirely of our own creation. With the only exception being the fact that the target of our interest involved Minuteman I missiles instead of the already well-known problems affecting the Minuteman II missiles across the entire system, the Echo Flight Incident was, for the most part, *unremarkable*.

We've come a fairly long way in our trek to discover the depths of formless dishonor and imagination and how they link into the culture of this nation's armed forces and in response to the faithless demands made upon those forces by the ignorance and erudite stupidity of small minded men, but we're not quite finished yet, because the *heart* of Salas' tale is still walking around and fleecing the base senses of Americans, stretching the winding and widening spiral of madness just a little more, not yet completely snapping, but only because the men and women who want most to believe in this tale of three flights of fancy are more willing than a child is to believe in Tinkerbelle. Of course, Tinkerbelle is still set into time like stone, and these days Salas' Echo-November-Oscar Flight is decidedly *not*.

Up until fairly recently as such things go, Salas has asserted that his creeping storyline was best set into the world of March 16, 1967. We've seen, however, that the imperfect and dreaded point of view Salas possesses is not a permanent one, but one that reinforces itself from time to time by changing some fundamental aspect of itself in response to base criticism and common disbelief. We've shown in many ways how ridiculous the story looks, but we've not yet seen the absolute *insanity* of it. But now he's changed the fundamentals again, and now the insanity is bouncing like a dream, fully unfettered by its natural avoidance of any fact whatsoever, because now he's changed *time*.

According to Robert Hastings, author of the very flawed *UFOs and Nukes*, witnesses that he has interviewed have proven that the incidents Salas recalls the best could not have

happened on March 16, 1967 as Salas and Klotz and CUFON have so energetically claimed in the past, but occurred instead on March 24, 1967 – *a full week later*. I congratulate Hastings for reaching the conclusion that nothing Salas has previously maintained could possibly have anything at all to do with the well-documented events of March 16, 1967, because that's the same conclusion I reached many years ago, and I like it when ignorant people accept the arguments of common sense. I agree with him that the many arguments that have been made – mostly by my father and me and backed up by the full weight of the United States Air Force and the many well-documented discussions and events proceeding from these sources and others – show pretty conclusively that nothing Salas and Klotz and CUFON have asserted could possibly have taken place on March 16, 1967, but to reach the conclusion that everything these guys have claimed in relation to the event *really did happen*, and they just got the *date* wrong is a little too much like a drowning man reaching for a tank of oxygen set in a box on the wall of a locked building in another city on a different continent. The choice of March 24 is amusing, because there actually *were* a number of sightings of UFOs recorded for that date, one of which was investigated by Project Blue Book and determined to be “unidentified”. But the ultimate supposition that makes Hastings' version of these events look more and more like the opening comedy act on a late night talk show is his assertion that UFOs *still* took down the missiles of Echo Flight on March 16, 1967, and then *also* took down the missiles of Oscar Flight a week later. This is like robbing Peter, Paul and Mary to pay Simon Magus.

Robert Hastings' assertions of February 22, 2006 have paved the way for yet another journey into the quark of darkness – and I don't think anybody ever expected that.

When Salas and Klotz published their article ... some years ago, they believed that the two shutdown incidents had occurred within the same 24-period, on March 16, 1967. As my article points out, Klotz still believes that. However, Salas now agrees with me that they probably occurred on two separate days. This alternate time-line is based on the testimony of my source, Bob Jamison. In light of that, I propose that the Oscar Flight shutdown probably took place on the night of March 24/25, 1967 – the same night as the Belt, MT incident. (The Echo Flight shutdown is documented as having occurred on March 16, 1967, in the 341st Missile Wing unit history.)²³⁹

Bob Jamison's story as told by Hastings is a little interesting – and thus far he's had the good sense not to change it, although he is a bit ambiguous sometimes.

239 http://www.nicap.org/670324_malmstrom.htm

Jamison states that he assisted in the re-start of an entire "flight" of ten Minuteman ICBMs which had simultaneously and inexplicably shut down immediately after a UFO was sighted in their vicinity by Air Force Security Police. Jamison is certain that the incident occurred at one of the missile flights located near Lewistown, Montana, perhaps Oscar Flight. This event probably occurred on the night of March 24/25, 1967, based on Jamison's portrayal of related events.²⁴⁰

The flights that are closest to Lewistown are Mike Flight and November Flight, Mike being substantially closer. For a rough sense of the scale, November Flight is about twice as far from Lewistown as Mike Flight, while Oscar Flight is about twice as far from Lewistown as November Flight. It's a shame that Salas changed his story's location from November Flight to Oscar Flight (the 3rd closest of these sites to Lewistown). He really could have used the corroboration Jamison's testimony would have given him. One thing about Hastings leaping at Oscar Flight as the subject of Jamison's "testimony" that bothers me a bit is the fact that Lewistown is about the same distance from Oscar Flight as it is from Echo Flight, and yet Hastings doesn't even consider Echo Flight an outside possibility. So he either doesn't believe that Echo Flight was the subject of a UFO encounter, or he's once again molding and shaping testimony (that doesn't even have a *date* attached to it) in order to make it fit into his own closed-off little world view. Personally, I think Jamison is hedging a bit much. The only thing he's "positive" about is that "the incident occurred at one of the missile flights located near Lewistown, Montana", and anybody who can look at a map can tell you that's not Oscar Flight or Echo Flight. It has got to be Mike or November Flight, which means *oh, my God* we've got another incident entirely!

It's worth considering, however, the possibility that Jamison only associates the flight in his story with Lewistown because he remembers going to work via the daily C-47 "Gooney Bird" that flew the flight crews the 100 miles from Malmstrom to the Lewiston Airport. If that's the case, he could have been attached to any of the five 490th Squadron crews (Kilo, Lima, Mike, November, or Oscar), or one of the 10th Squadron's Charlie, Delta or Echo crews.²⁴¹ The only thing we can say for certain, is that we really don't know where he's talking about; in the absence of any more information, his testimony gets to be lumped in with pretty much all of Hastings' other witness testimonies: in the *this-is-really-a-waste-of-everybody's-time* pile.

²⁴⁰ http://www.nicap.org/670324_malmstrom.htm

²⁴¹ Association of Air Force Missileers AAFM Newsletter, "Transportation and Missileers", Volume 5, Number 3, August, 1997.

It's probably a good idea to interrupt Jamison's story as told by Hastings at this point, so we can bring in an unbiased summary of the type of mission that Jamison is basically describing. This is just for background so readers can understand exactly what's being described here – because God knows you're not going to get any background information from Hastings or Salas.

This detailed report was written by another of the Target and Alignment Officers at Malmstrom AFB, Mr. Allan Wright, who served from 1967-1970 on team Tango 4 of the Minuteman II system. It was originally published in the Association of Air Force Missileers (AAFM) Newsletter, Volume 15, Number 1, from March, 2007.²⁴²

A target and alignment team had three basic jobs to do at a missile site. The first and simplest was called an Overwrite and Shutdown. When a missile went off alert due to some malfunction in the guidance and control unit (G&C) or reentry vehicle (RV), the first thing that needed to be done was to overwrite the target information loaded in the G&C for security purposes. The missile site was then shut down so that other maintenance teams could remove and replace the defective part. No actual repair was undertaken at the site. Everything on the missile was remove and replace. Running the overwrite tapes and shutting down the site only took a couple of hours once we were inside. If the weather was nice, the next maintenance team arrived on time, and the site wasn't too far from base, we might be out for as little as eight hours. We still needed to turn in all our equipment – essentially the reverse procedure of getting ready to go out – but an eight hour job was considered a luxury.

Once the problem at the site was fixed, a target and alignment team was needed to perform a TASU (Target, Alignment, and Start Up). Most often the other maintenance teams had departed so we would penetrate the site. Once inside we had three basic tasks to perform. One was to align the collimator, located on a concrete bench on the upper level of the launcher equipment room (LER), to the reference mirror bolted onto the wall of the LER. The reference mirror was about a foot in diameter, two to three inches thick, and what was called a "first surface mirror." This meant that the reflecting surface was on the outer layer of the mirror, unlike ordinary mirrors that have clear glass over the reflecting surface. This allowed for an undistorted reflection. The mirror was very precisely ground. It was intended that the mirror could not move, and also very important not to touch the surface of the mirror.

The alignment process involved using a theodolite to measure the angle from the mirror to the collimator. The theodolite was positioned in front of the collimator on the bench built into the LER wall. One person did all the shooting while another recorded the measurements. One began by aligning the theodolite with the reference mirror and "shooting" at the light beam reflection from the mirror (the light beam was generated inside the theodolite, bounced off the mirror and the reading was measured by the theodolite). This gave the direction that the surface of the mirror was pointing. We then turned the theodolite toward the collimator and aligned it on the edge of the light beam transmitted by the collimator. The light beam in the collimator could be adjusted to

²⁴² Wright, Allan, Association of Air Force Missileers AAFM Newsletter, "Target and Alignment Officer at Malmstrom", Volume 15, Number 1, March 2007.

achieve the correct angle. Once the angle was set, we had to verify it with 20 measurements from the mirror to the collimator, each being within a very strict tolerance. One measurement was taken with the theodolite in the normal position, then the second was taken by inverting the telescope and taking a reverse measurement. The third was taken normally and the fourth in reverse etc. These measurements were taken to 1/1000 of an arc second (a circle is measured by 360 degrees, 60 minutes to a degree, 60 seconds to a minute, and a second broken into 1/1000s). (After 40 years, I am not sure the accuracy measurement correct). This was a very time consuming procedure and if any measurement fell outside the tolerances then the personnel switched jobs and the whole process was done again. When a team was new, team members were slow and often the procedure had to be repeated (sometimes several times).

The second job was to load the target tapes into the computer on the missile.²⁴³

Jamison would not have worked through this part of the process, because it wasn't necessary for most of the missiles at Malmstrom AFB; the Minuteman II missiles were the first of the Minuteman's to be equipped with targeting data installed directly to the missile's onboard computer. All of the targeting information for the Minuteman I missiles, which is what our narrative is mostly concerned with, was stored on the computers in the launch control centers. This is one of the reasons that the Minuteman II was so superior to the Minuteman I. It's guidance system on the onboard computer was capable of pre-storing the location of a large number of alternative targets, thereby increasing its effectiveness as both an offensive weapon and a deterrent.

This was done from an equipment rack located on the upper level of the LER. We lowered and installed a tape transport and control monitor into the rack. Following the technical orders we were then able to load the tapes (about 10+ spools of tape) one at a time through the tape transport. The mylar type tape was about one inch wide and contained numerous perforated holes. It did not appear to be electromagnetic tape. The target and alignment team had no need, and therefore did not know what information was being transmitted to the missile.²⁴⁴

This statement of Allan's is a reference to the "need-to-know" policy of the Department of Defense classified materials protocol that most of the individuals discussing UFOs in this context – particularly Robert Salas and Robert Hastings – appear to be completely ignorant of, which I personally find surprising in an officer like Salas who worked so closely with classified materials on such a regular basis.

²⁴³ Wright, Allan, Association of Air Force Missileers AAFM Newsletter, "Target and Alignment Officer at Malmstrom", Volume 15, Number 1, March 2007.

²⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

Once the tapes were loaded we received a numerical readout which we reported back to the base. If the readout matched the number at the base Code Room, the tapes were successfully loaded.

The final job on a TASU was to start up the site. This involved carefully following the tech orders through a series of pressing buttons and turning switches. Once the G&C acquired the collimator (meaning locking on to the light beam) and the start-up process was completed, we pressed a button which caused a yellow light to come on showing missile “enabled”. We verified this status with the LCC and we were then able to begin to close up the site.²⁴⁵

This part of the procedure shows us exactly how easy it was to “enable” the missile once it was properly aligned in the silo. Basically, they were following a checklist procedure. It’s also important to realize that the job these guys did so well was so time-consuming primarily for either security reasons, or due to the insistence that no onsite repairs be conducted. Equipment and components were *always* swapped out – no repairs were ever initiated at the launch site. They had to overwrite the target information loaded in the guidance and control unit, and later rewrite the entire series – this was especially time-consuming, and the only reason it was done was for security purposes, and to ensure targeting data was not subjected to transient voltages, which could easily disrupt or damage the normal targeting database. Of course, this wasn’t entirely necessary with the Minuteman I guidance and control units, because they weren’t capable of storing the targeting data to the onboard computer. It does show us, however, that the guidance and control units were subject to this type of disruption. Security protocol alone would not account for the insistence that all targeting data be rewritten. The only reason to rewrite entirely a computer’s database – which is essentially what’s going on here – is due to the possibility of corruption. And since the logic coupler used on the guidance and control units for both types of Minuteman was the same component, that possibility of corruption extends to Minuteman I as well. It’s very possible that in the case of the Echo Flight Incident, the missiles could have been simply “enabled” from the LF, since we know from the Salas’ FOIA documents that the missiles gave every appearance of a “normal controlled shutdown”.²⁴⁶ With the protocols in place, however, this couldn’t be done – they would have been forced to swap out equipment regardless, simply to preserve system integrity. There’s nothing strange in this – it’s purely procedural. Turning the missiles off as the

²⁴⁵ Wright, Allan, Association of Air Force Missileers AAFM Newsletter, “Target and Alignment Officer at Malmstrom”, Volume 15, Number 1, March 2007.

²⁴⁶ 341st Strategic Missile Wing and 341st Combat Support Group HQ SAC DXIH 67-1865 (Command History, Vol. 1), p.32-34, 38.

result of a guidance and control error is easy in a system that automatically shuts everything down when a transient signal gets unexpectedly processed, but re-enabling those missiles is a labor-intensive act, mostly because of the same protocols in use.

The target and alignment team was always the last team to leave the LF. All other teams had left prior to the TASU being started. Closing the site was also a time consuming process. All our equipment had to be lifted up the access tube and carefully loaded into our vehicle. I made the last check of the LER and switched the "plug" to start it up into the tube. This took about 10 minutes. I then closed the locking bolts for the plug and climbed out of the tube for the last time. We pulled and unbolted the top of the ladder, pulled the safety barriers, finished loading the vehicle, and closed and locked the personnel access hatch (PAH). We then left the site and locked the gate. Once outside the gate we called the LCC and asked them to reset security. This could take up to a half an hour. We then had to wait for them to report security (both inner and outer zone security) was set, and we were free to return to base. If the job, including the time to get back to the base, took longer than 16 hours, we were directed by Job Control to the LCF to rest, eat, and sleep for eight hours before returning. When a team was fairly new this wasn't uncommon for a TASU. Also if weather was bad, the LF was a long way from base, or if things just didn't go smoothly we might have to divert to the LCF for rest.²⁴⁷

It was obviously a long job, especially if you were a member of an inexperienced team. It's more than apparent, however, that everything had to be done by the book all the time. In any case, now that we understand the mission more applicable to the context, we can return to Bob Jamison's story via Robert Hastings.

Jamison said that while his and other teams were preparing to respond to the stricken flight, they were ordered—as a precaution—to remain at Malmstrom until all UFO reports from the field had ceased. He further states that his team received a special briefing prior to being dispatched, during which it was directed to immediately report any UFO sighted while traveling to or from the missile field. In the event that a UFO appeared at one of the missile silos during the re-start procedure, the team was directed to enter the silo's personnel hatch, and remain underground until the UFO had left the vicinity. According to Jamison, the Air Police guard accompanying the team was to remain outside and relay information about the UFO to the base Command Post. Jamison's own team re-started three or four missiles but did not observe any unusual aerial activity.²⁴⁸

Hastings certainly seems willing to believe such an outrageous story without any sort of confirmation whatsoever. This tends to reveal an absence of journalistic standards more than anything else. One man comes up forty years after the fact to discuss an incident participated in by literally dozens of individuals, none of whom have ever come forward in the in-betweens,

²⁴⁷ Wright, Allan, Association of Air Force Missileers AAFM Newsletter, "Target and Alignment Officer at Malmstrom", Volume 15, Number 1, March 2007.

²⁴⁸ http://www.nicap.org/670324_malmstrom.htm

and only one of whom has ever described this specific characterization of the event, and the first person who hears this story credits it as fully believable and publishes details of it internet-wide and sticks it in as verified fact in a book. *Why are the spokesmen for UFO proponents so stupid, and why do UFO proponents believe them?* Personally, I find it difficult to refrain from asking questions when something outlandish is being described in an environment that doesn't make much sense. So I ask the questions and that tends to point me in the right direction most of the time. What strikes me most about Jamison's tale thus far is pretty well summed up by his orders: "they were ordered—as a precaution—to remain at Malmstrom until all UFO reports from the field had ceased." Now. I don't want to be trivial, but from a military perspective, that's a *ridiculous* order, especially since *none of the sightings that night* were reported anywhere near those flights serviced by Lewistown. Because this guy is apparently being put on hold for an undetermined period of time because an entire flight of nuclear missiles was supposedly disabled by a UFO, and although he's supposed to bring those missiles back online for possible use in an offensive attack on enemies of the United States, he's being told to wait until any possibility of a personal threat to him is gone – but there's no way for him to know when that's supposed to happen, or when the conditions will be right for him to do his job, and it assumes a danger to personnel as a result of enemy activities *within our own borders*. I assure you, the military does not solve immediate threat problems in that way, and it never has. A UFO on a military base is, first and foremost, an unknown airborne threat, and when nuclear missiles are in a condition of uncertainty, which this would absolutely be interpreted as, personnel are *not* going to be put on stand-by until confirmation that the threat and the uncertainty is *gone*. He still has to drive 120 miles or so to get to his duty location, but he's been ordered not to do so until UFO reports cease? Reports that all accounts insist did not cease until nearly 0500? From that perspective, those orders should not even *exist*. Also, if he's supposed to stay at Malmstrom AFB until reports from the field have ceased, he would either be waiting until daylight hours when he could then take the regularly scheduled transport to Lewistown, which is a hundred miles to the east, or he could arrange for his own transportation from Malmstrom AFB sometime during the night, which would mean he's driving, so he wouldn't get to Lewistown very much sooner. The point is, even *without* these orders, if he's at Malmstrom AFB, he's going to remain there until the regularly scheduled transport can take him to Lewistown, or until he can drive there once his team has been

properly mustered. The orders seem to be totally unnecessary from *any* point of view. It makes far more sense for a crew to either be on permanent standby at a detachment in Lewistown, and there are suggestions in the internet library maintained by the Association of Air Force Missileers that this was indeed the case, or if possible at one or more of the flights themselves; either that or special transport has to be arranged, and it has to fly at night – and according to Hastings' own sources, *nobody flies at night*.

In a second interview with Hastings, Jamison claims that while he was on standby, he was called by Malmstrom AFB to muster for immediate duty. This call came sometime between 2200 and midnight (and why is it that none of these guys ever know the time?). He was forced to wait 2-3 hours, after which they drove to Oscar Flight. So they would have had to leave Malmstrom sometime between midnight and 0300. Unfortunately more calls were still coming in reporting UFOs during that entire time, so his story that they were forced to wait until *after* the UFO reports ceased is nonsense. Had they been forced to wait until UFO sightings coming in had ceased, they would have been waiting until a little before 0500. The most important point to remember here is that there was only one sighting that was properly investigated on March 24, which is the date Hastings has settled on, because Jamison originally couldn't remember the date, and when he finally did, it was well after Hastings had already suggested that March 24 was the date in question. The one incident investigated by the Base UFO officer Lt. Col. Chase was the sighting by truck driver Ken Williams, an incident that was over and done with well before Chase arrived on scene at 0100. *Everybody* agrees that this particular incident was over and done with four hours earlier. *None* of the subsequent sightings were very spectacular, being represented solely by slow moving lights observed at a distance. And we're supposed to believe that the Air Force grounded Jamison's maintenance team until unverified and uninvestigated UFO sightings had ceased being reported? You would have to be a brain-damaged, gullible fool to believe this story – there's not a military detachment in the *world* that would give orders this ridiculous.

That's the main problem with Jamison's story – *it doesn't make sense, unless some of it is wrong*, and that's not generally the kind of testimony that instills confidence. Events and actions that need no explanation at all are imbued with mysterious motivations. For instance, Jamison is supposedly ordered that if a UFO appears at one of the missile silos during the re-start procedure, "the team was directed to enter the silo's personnel hatch, and remain

underground until the UFO had left the vicinity.”²⁴⁹ But as Allen’s narrative above makes very clear, during the restart procedure, nobody’s going anywhere, and they’re already through the personnel hatch and underground, making the order pointless. I’m satisfied, at least somewhat, that Robert Hastings does not associate any of this with Echo Flight, but beyond that, we have to wonder why Jamison doesn’t give us the names of any other witnesses who were there, he doesn’t tell us where his otherwise inappropriate orders came from, and why they don’t make much sense, and he doesn’t even tell us the date or the time – *nothing*. Most importantly, “Jamison’s own team re-started three or four missiles but did not observe any unusual aerial activity.” And three or four missiles is what? Six hours? Eight hours? And nobody saw a thing, not even the police escort supposedly ordered to remain outside consciously *looking* for UFOs. And it’s unfortunate, but none of this is very important, because Hastings doesn’t care to use any of the details, few as they are, that Jamison can personally attest to. As a witness, he doesn’t really have anything of interest to report, because his orders are useless and he doesn’t know the time. And the whole theory that the flight involved was Oscar Flight is entirely baseless, representing a location that *Robert Hastings alone selected* – Jamison, by his own account, was unsure of the date, the time, and the location. This entire story was forced to fit a theory of Hastings’ based on the nonsense coming from Salas, and unbelievable claims from Jamison. Any examination of the incident as a whole, shows nothing more than the pathetic lengths these people will go to satisfy the parameters of an event none of them can otherwise prove. Why would someone believe this story of Jamison’s? *There’s nothing to support it* – there’s no reason to trust him; there are no documents, no written accounts from the period, no other witnesses to confirm it, and no reason at all to assume that it took place at Oscar Flight. All they’ve got is a miserable story full of holes, with no date, time, or location, that Robert Hastings beat and twisted into a shape sufficient to fit his own little paradigm of nonsense. *Everything* – date, time, and location – was a question mark until Robert Hastings came along and made a few suggestions and recommendations.

I can tell you exactly how this happened. Hastings solicits accounts on the internet; Jamison, having a bit of fun, contacts him with a stupid story that doesn’t have much in the way of real information attached to it, and Hastings swallows it all – hook, line, and stinker,

²⁴⁹ http://www.nicap.org/670324_malmstrom.htm

because that's in his job description. But now he wants to fill in the holes, and Jamison just eats up the attention – attention nobody else is going to give him, because when you look at this thing in its natural habitat, it's invisible – *there is nothing there*. Hastings molds everything nice and stupid until he feels it's ready to publish, and then 1, 2, 3, *boom!* We've got crapola, Houston ... *signing off*. Hastings is the guy telling this story – not Jamison.

Jamison said that while he was at the missile maintenance hangar, waiting to be dispatched to the field, he overheard two-way radio communications at the temporary Command Post, relating to another UFO having been sighted on the ground in a canyon near the town of Belt. He states he recalls hearing that a top commander—either Malmstrom's base commander, or the 341st Strategic Missile Wing commander—was on-site with other personnel. Based on these recollections, it appears that Jamison is describing the well-documented Belt, Montana UFO sighting of March 24/25, 1967.²⁵⁰

I concur – that's exactly what it sounds like; unfortunately, there's nothing new in that description excepting the errors – everything here was reported in the newspapers and was discussed in books well before Jamison's story reached Robert Hastings' oh so willing ears. Some of the things we *do* know about that sighting is because Lt Col. Chase reported it as a result of his Blue Book investigation that was also forwarded to Edward Condon, care of the University of Colorado UFO Project under contract to the Air Force,²⁵¹ and because it was thoroughly reported in local newspapers.²⁵² For instance, aside from truck driver Ken Williams' original description of the UFO, vague and useless as that is, we know that he and police deputy, Bud Nader, observed together a light they described as like that coming from a farmhouse – not terribly bright and not moving a whole lot, and then it disappeared. We know that Lt. Col. Chase, the Malmstrom UFO Officer, and Maj. John Grasser went to the scene of the report in order to evaluate the "terrain for any possible helicopter survey at daylight",²⁵³ and they had a driver and a photographer with them. Malmstrom's base commander, or the 341st Strategic Missile Wing commander were absolutely *not* there, so what Jamison overheard was little more than rumors and gossip – definitely *not* testimony, and certainly *not* useful.

Chase and Grasser arrived at the scene at about 0100, four *hours* after the original sighting. Because of the terrain and the darkness, nobody went to the scene of the supposed

²⁵⁰ http://www.nicap.org/670324_malmstrom.htm

²⁵¹ Chase, Lewis D., Lt. Colonel, USAF, Chief Operations Division, Malmstrom AFB investigation report to FTD (TDETR), Wright Patterson AFB, RE: "Investigation of UFO Reported Landing on 24 March 1967".

²⁵² Rice, Ron, *Great Falls Leader*, "UFO Directly Over Malmstrom AFB", 25 March, 1967.

²⁵³ Chase, Lewis D., Lt. Colonel, USAF, Chief Operations Division, Malmstrom AFB investigation report to FTD (TDETR), Wright Patterson AFB, RE: "Investigation of UFO Reported Landing on 24 March 1967".

landing until well after 0700, about a half hour after sunrise. They found *nothing*, and no indication that a landing was ever attempted, and the terrain, in fact, was not the sort of landscape that anybody *could* land on, being described by Chase in his report as "extremely steep and rocky and not accessible to the highway patrol."²⁵⁴ This tends to leave one wondering why the first witness, truck driver Ken Williams of Laurel, Montana, said that he saw something land. Sheriff's deputies checked out the area on foot from about 0230, and said they found "nothing unusual other than quite a few freshly broken twigs on bushes and branches"²⁵⁵ which might have been caused by something possibly *attempting* to land, but broken twigs and branches was pretty much *all* they found. Unfortunately, by 0100 on the night of the sighting, radio reports had attracted a large number of sightseers to the area, and Sheriff Martin, of Belt, Montana, admitted to Lt. Col. Chase that some of them had gone on to the site of the supposed landing before he could stop them. That means some broken branches found a couple hours later can't be used to indicate anything – *the scene itself had been thoroughly compromised*.²⁵⁶ Between 3 and 4 in the morning, an FAA radar scope picked up *something*, and a number of reports came in afterwards of a UFO sighted near Malmstrom AFB that was described as "bright with orange lights on the bottom". Most reports indicate the object was flying low for a time, made zig-zag movements or "jerky movements" not typical of aircraft, but was also traveling slowly at 7-8 miles per when it disappeared from the FAA radar. Every one of these reports *also* fits the description of the February 18-19 sightings in Michigan that were reported nationwide, and *those* sightings were believed by everybody to be the result of some teenager sending up weather balloons with flares attached to the bottom. There's absolutely *nothing* in the March 24 sightings that suggests anything other than a possible hoax, and if there *is*, then it certainly hasn't been reported yet or argued very well. There's nothing here of interest, and nothing that suggests anything spectacular may have occurred. In fact, if this is all there is, the Air Force gave this nation the only responsible and necessary announcement possible when it reported that "there's nothing here, you guys are wasting our time, and we're not gonna deal with it anymore – from now on, you call a cop. *We're out.*" Does any of this sound like a good or even sufficient reason to prevent a maintenance crew from driving 120

²⁵⁴ Chase, Lewis D., Lt. Colonel, USAF, Chief Operations Division, Malmstrom AFB investigation report to FTD (TDETR), Wright Patterson AFB, RE: "Investigation of UFO Reported Landing on 24 March 1967".

²⁵⁵ Rice, Ron, Great Falls Leader, "UFO Directly Over Malmstrom AFB", 25 March, 1967.

²⁵⁶ Chase, Lewis D., Lt. Colonel, USAF, Chief Operations Division, Malmstrom AFB investigation report to FTD (TDETR), Wright Patterson AFB, RE: "Investigation of UFO Reported Landing on 24 March 1967".

miles to bring up a flight of nuclear missiles that went off-alert? Most people would correctly assume that this nonsense is a wild story told by some guy screwing around for a kick; but not RH – he *publishes*.

It's worth noting that the *Great Falls Leader* reported an object was seen around 3:10 am northeast of Malmstrom AFB by A2C Richard Moore. At 3:42 am this or another object was picked up on the FAA radar to the northwest of Malmstrom AFB and was tracked traveling southeast at what was basically a short jogging pace. It left the FAA's radar at 4:26 am heading towards the Belt Mountains to the south of Belt. According to A2C Moore, in a report that's never been verified, a sabotage alert team saw an object above Malmstrom AFB at 4:40; this object was never picked up on the FAA radar. Moore stated, however, that he saw the same object, adding that it was small in size, but could not have been a satellite, because it moved with uncharacteristic "jerky movements."²⁵⁷ All of these reports agree with each other on one particular detail that interests us: *the location*. They were all a *minimum* of 80 miles outside of Lewistown, which is in turn another twenty-five or so miles from Oscar Flight. Keeping in mind that by this time, everybody in the state of Montana was outside looking for UFOs to the extent that they had not only compromised the supposed "landing spot" investigated by Lt. Col. Chase, but also had airmen all over Malmstrom with their "eyes to the skies", *how exactly did this UFO get to Oscar Flight* – or any of the flights that were provided transport out of Lewistown – *without being seen*? And in time enough for the event – as dictated by Salas – to occur? Because, remember, he insists that the UFO that supposedly took out the missiles at November-Oscar Flight did so when it was *dark*. How in the world does Hastings take all of this information and conclude that not only is Jamison's story perfectly *believable*, but also supports entirely Salas' own little tale, albeit indicating that Salas' event occurred not on March 16, as he's claimed since 1995-1996, but on March 24? And how the *hell* does he convince Salas that this is indeed the case, leading inevitably to Salas *once again* changing a fundamental aspect of his own story?

In a later version of this same story related in September 2008 to the *Bad Astronomy and Universe Today Forum* at <http://www.bautforum.com> – one that Hastings again interprets

²⁵⁷ Rice, Ron, *Great Falls Leader*, "UFO Directly Over Malmstrom AFB", 25 March, 1967.

for us, thereby creating an additional step between what Jamison *may* have said and what Hastings *tells us* Jamison said – Hastings states outright that

late one evening in March 1967,²⁵⁸ [a date Jamison was completely uncertain of in his earlier version] Jamison was relaxing at home when he received an urgent telephone call from the missile maintenance hanger [sic]. In two separate interviews, combined here [another good way to hide interpretive information], Jamison told me, “One of my jobs as a missile targeting officer was to go out and re-start [missile] sites that had shut-down for various reasons. We were called that particular night because a lot of sites were shut-down. The Job Control office called me at home at, uh, probably 10, 11, 12 o’clock at night. [Of course, while Salas insists that it was still dark when the missiles went off-alert, any examination of the event he describes leaves us with the only possible conclusion that the event must have occurred around or more likely *after* sunrise – if not Salas is again lying; Salas himself eventually reaches the conclusion that the event must have occurred after three in the morning (which doesn’t coincide with *anything* he’s previously reported), but any examination of Jamison’s time scale insists that Oscar Flight went down fairly early: “probably 10, 11, 12 o’clock at night.” But he was ordered to hang out until UFOs were no longer being reported, which means he couldn’t actually *leave* for Oscar Flight until sometime after 4:40 in the morning, when the UFO reports actually ceased being reported. Even a wide open time scale between ten o’clock and midnight, as Jamison asserts here, just does not fit into the events everybody else describes – unless it just didn’t happen.] *It might have been even later than that. Oscar was the flight that went down.* [Jamison is still uncertain of the time, but he’s now positive it was Oscar Flight. Or is this just Hastings again? ...] *That’s the one our team responded to.”* Jamison added that he had been on scheduled alert stand-by and, after receiving the call to report, got down to the MIMS Operations Center—the hangar—probably within ten minutes.

Upon arriving there, but even before reporting to the Job Control office, Jamison overheard other targeting team personnel discussing rumors of a UFO connection with the problem at hand. [More new information? What happened to the story that he heard over the two-way radios? Sounds like this guy’s been coached.] *Supposedly, the ten missiles comprising Oscar Flight had gone off alert status—malfunctioned—just after a UFO had been reported in the vicinity of their Launch Control Facility.* [So now we see that Oscar Flight was shut down “after a UFO had been reported in the vicinity of their Launch Control Facility”, except there are no reports of UFOs anywhere near Oscar Flight or *anywhere near that part of Montana* for the 24-25 March timeframe – *nothing*. And by 0100 the *entire state* was outside looking for UFOs! Once again, we have another claim made 40 years after the fact with absolutely nothing to back it up – no witnesses, no nothing – just Mr. *I’ll-believe-anything-you-fucking-say* Hastings combining two separate interviews and then reinterpreting everything for us; this whole thing stinks of a lie in action by a man more concerned with convincing than reporting and not doing a very good job of either ...] *Once Jamison arrived at Job Control, a Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) confirmed those reports, telling Jamison that Air Police guards at the stricken flight had indeed reported a UFO just prior to the missiles malfunctioning.* [And what was his name, and why hasn’t he come forward, and why is he absent from the first version of this tall tale, and where are the Air Police guards, and why have they never come forward, and why is there no mention of UFOs or a full flight of missiles going off alert, or anything that’s been documented at one time or another? Why

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does anybody even bother listening to more of this crap? These are *obvious* lies that only a *fool* would ever believe.]

Startled by these disclosures—which were still unofficial [a condition, apparently, that’s never changed]—Jamison expected to be ordered to the missile field immediately. He was surprised to learn that all of the targeting teams had been directed to remain at the hanger, as a precaution, until all UFO reports from the field had ceased. [only one of which was ever investigated by the UFO officer at Malmstrom, and which had pretty much ended hours before Jamison came on the scene. Sorry, boys and girls, but this is way too much bullshit to swallow ...] At that point, however, there was still no official confirmation of the reason for the delay. [No, of course not.] Jamison estimated that the teams waited 2-3 hours before being given the go-ahead to proceed to Oscar Flight.²⁵⁹ [Well, we’ve been over this crap before, at least. No official confirmation, but personnel still aren’t allowed to do the job they were called in from home late at night to do – but nobody’s allowed out to do that job, they aren’t told why, and there’s nothing official yet; what, not even the orders? They’re just delayed over a period of time that everybody else, i.e., Robert Salas, disagrees with totally, or at least he did until Hastings called him up and discussed how the “new claims” could be forced to fit into the “old paradigm”. These guys are a joke even when they’re trying to convince us how *unfunny* they are ...]

All of this is particularly odd in light of Jamison’s earlier assertion that he didn’t remember what flight he was called to, only that it was one of those closest to Lewistown. I’m relatively certain, because of this, that either Hastings’ interpretation of what Jamison said convinced him that he was talking about Oscar Flight, implying thereby that we’ve got another case of Hastings trying to twist a story to fit his needs without any real evidence to do so, or Hastings at some point convinced Jamison that Oscar Flight was the actual location of the events he remembered so poorly. In any case, this is obviously more crap artist scribbling from the “UFO Claims Committee”; the fact that these guys do us the “favor” of interpreting stories with obvious errors associated with them – something Hastings in particular has done throughout his entire UFO speakeasy career – is nothing short of hiding the data they base their scribbles on. And these guys want to be taken seriously? *Ouch* ...

While waiting, Jamison walked to a temporary command post which had been set up in the hanger. There he overheard another squadron member talking on a two-way radio about a second UFO which had apparently landed in a deep ravine, not far from the base. Later that night, as events unfolded, Jamison and his team traveled past the alleged landing site and, as they did so, he observed a small group of Air Force vehicles positioned just off the road, at the top of the ravine.²⁶⁰

²⁵⁹ <http://www.bautforum.com/members/robert-hastings.html>

²⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

With this particular revelation, Jamison seems to be providing a new, behind-the-scenes perspective on the already well-documented UFO sighting at Belt, Montana, which occurred on March 24, 1967. If this is the case, it appears that Oscar Flight went down on that date, not eight days earlier, as previously believed.²⁶¹

It still makes no sense to ground the maintenance team at the command post for three hours waiting for clearance to do their job simply because there were unverified and uninvestigated UFOs reported, but we've been over that. They didn't postpone anybody doing anything at Echo Flight on March 16, and according to these guys, UFOs were reported there as well – although once again there's no evidence to support that claim. It's kind of a moot point anyway, because the Air Force doesn't prevent maintenance teams from driving out to where they're expected to bring up a flight of nuclear missiles that went off alert simply because UFOs were reported by a truck driver and a traffic cop. Real or not, the streets were full of people trying to spot UFOs because of the radio reports updating the incident all night. The Air Force had already gone on the record with a statement that UFOs were not a danger or a threat to national security, so the order makes no sense; most of the sightings were tiny spots of light in the sky, and nobody considered any of this to be threatening, or jets would have been immediately scrambled, and regardless what Hastings or his witnesses may claim, those guys do fly in the dark.

"Jamison and his team traveled past the alleged landing site and, as they did so, he observed a small group of Air Force vehicles positioned just off the road, at the top of the ravine."²⁶² It's interesting that none of this was mentioned in the first interview. I guess Hastings decided that just hearing about it on a two-way radio wasn't quite convincing enough for his readers. All of a sudden we now have an *eyewitness* – but not to a UFO, and certainly not to an investigation that Chase was present at. According to Lt. Col. Chase, the UFO base officer conducting the investigation, he arrived at the scene of the UFO report at 0100, and returned to report his findings to Col. Klibbe by 0215. He was preparing the notification message with CAPT Bradshaw at the Wing Command Post, IAW AFR 80-17 by 0350.²⁶³ Since the helicopter survey was scheduled for around 0700, there was no reason for him to do anything else until then. In fact, he didn't even accompany the helicopter when they conducted

²⁶¹ <http://www.bautforum.com/members/robert-hastings.html>

²⁶² *Ibid.*

²⁶³ Chase, Lewis D., Lt. Colonel, USAF, Chief Operations Division, Malmstrom AFB investigation report to FTD (TDETR), Wright Patterson AFB, RE: "Investigation of UFO Reported Landing on 24 March 1967".

their survey, which ended by 0800, and during which nothing odd was noted throughout. One wonders then, exactly when Jamison drove past in time to notice a “small group of Air Force vehicles positioned just off the road, at the top of the ravine” when Chase asserts *definitively* that the only Air Force personnel present until the helicopter overflew the site was the group of four – Chase, Maj. Grasser, a photographer, and one driver – in one vehicle? This doesn’t exactly qualify as a “small group of Air Force vehicles positioned” anywhere, and yet, according to Hastings, this is “a new, behind-the-scenes perspective on the already well-documented UFO sighting at Belt, Montana, which occurred on March 24, 1967.” I think Hastings’ standards of proof are way off here, but that doesn’t surprise me; he’ll believe *anything*. Case in point, check the following:

Then Jamison returned to the subject of the UFO which had been sighted as it landed in a deep ravine near the base. “The night that the Oscar Flight went down, there was a report of a UFO dropping into a canyon not too far from Malmstrom. There were some [Air Force] personnel there watching it. [There were no Air Force personnel watching a UFO drop into the canyon – only Ken Williams, the truck driver, saw this; Bud Nader, the patrol officer, saw only a light in the distance; and everything else, UFO, imaginary lover, demon light in the breeze, whatever the hell you might want to believe, was all gone *for hours* by the time the Air Force arrived on the scene.] The canyon was steep-sided. They wouldn’t send anyone down into it, and they wouldn’t send any choppers at night. They were going to wait until morning to send some personnel, and maybe some choppers down. But when daylight came, this UFO—or whatever it was—just took off. [What a vivid imagination! And he couldn’t remember *any of this* when he first reported to Hastings – these memories only showed up after the fact. And he still got it wrong! The UFO in question did not leave when daylight came, as he supposes, *because it was already gone*. Chase was notified – after the UFO had already left – at 2205 on the 24th; *nobody* claims it stuck around until daylight; in fact, when officer Bud Nader got to the scene, he only witnessed a distant light that disappeared – and this was *well before Chase arrived*.] I heard all of this while I was in the command post. That’s what they were talking about. They were talking to the people at the site. The canyon was just off the main road out of Malmstrom, going east, where the road starts sloping down.” [Chase affirms in his investigation report that he was “concerned with resulting publicity and the need to notify other agencies prior to press releases.” In accordance with standard routine, Chase would not have used the two-way radio to speak with *anybody* at the temporary command post, especially in light of the fact that he was not answerable to *anybody* who was there.]

In my view, everything about this recollection points to the well-documented Belt, Montana UFO incident of March 24/25, 1967. As mentioned earlier, the sighting had received quite a bit of coverage in the Great Falls media immediately afterward.²⁶⁴ [And yet, Jamison and Hastings still got it all wrong.]

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Hastings adds that Salas confirmed “the rampant rumors following the shutdown incident(s): He once told me, ‘From all we have heard from the maintenance people we have interviewed [since the mid-1990s], the rumors and comments [about UFO activity at Malmstrom] were rampant. I personally received a call from an NCO after the Oscar shutdowns, practically begging me to come talk to him and others about the incident. Believe me, it was all over the base and some of the troops were flat scared.’” Since when is commentary that can’t be examined a *confirmation* of anything? We only have his word that he spoke to anybody – this isn’t a *confirmation* ... *it’s a fucking anecdote that means nothing*. Once again, Hastings has proven *nothing* of lasting importance except the rumors of UFOs were rampant – and we already knew that. When are these idiots going to put anything on the record? We’re supposed to believe this crap based on the word of people we’ve already substantiated have no ability to tell the truth. Hastings contends that he is “simply faithfully reporting the testimony of those involved in such incidents”,²⁶⁵ but he’s already confirmed for us that *his* interpretation of such events is paramount, even when all the evidence shows that his interpretation is notably weak and ultimately irrelevant. People who are simply *reporting* do not *interpret* for others – when they do it’s not science; it’s a *folktale*, an opinion. And in light of the numerous errors in Jamison’s statements, it’s an unbelievable one. As for his audience of military people who have confirmed everything to his satisfaction, one hundred witnesses over a 20 year period of interviews and storytelling – which is what Hastings proudly claims – does nothing except tell us he’s gathered up five people a year to make these claims, which isn’t exactly a huge bounty. In fact, when we take into account Hastings’ methods for recruiting such a clan of ex-military “witnesses”, it’s far more likely that he found five vivid storytellers each year, not five trustworthy witnesses – after all, we’ve already seen how his Oscar Flight “witnesses” get simple details of previously documented events *completely wrong*. And once again, *none* of these stories stand on their own once they’ve been put under examination. By his own words, he gives us far too many reasons to *doubt*, and none at all to *believe*. And once again, his only “proof” regarding the nature of these events is “they can’t all be lying, can they?” Five people a year? *Fuck yeah, they could all be lying!* It’s not like he’s given us plenty of reasons to *believe* any of this drivel ...

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Jamison's story is interesting – *but that's it*. He *doesn't* mention that the military presence on the ground at this *nameless-but-I'm-sure-we-all-know-what-he's-referring-to* canyon found nothing, and he didn't witness anything himself that can't be thoroughly described as the effect of more UFO rumors spread around by a bunch of young and impressionable airmen doing little more than walking around in the dark every night waiting for a security call to come in, so they can finally drive off to where they were supposed to be doing their job in the first place, but *oh my God* on the way there everybody in the car experienced the abject terror of seeing *absolutely nothing*. There's *nothing* that indicates anything strange may have occurred, except some brainless orders to wait until after the UFOs stop being reported before they can be allowed to leave the temporary command post in the hangar in order to drive on to Oscar Flight and bring a bunch of nuclear missiles back on alert, which fortunately wasn't that long – maybe two to three hours according to this new version of events, although according to Lt. Col. Chase, numerous UFO sighting reports were phoned in between 0230 and 0340 in the morning, while newspaper reports insist sightings were being reported *from Malmstrom AFB* until 0440 in the morning, all of which means that while I have no solid reasons to distrust the man, I also have no good reason to *believe* everything he says, especially in light of those weird orders that he claims he received – orders that I'll say again would *never* be given to military personnel.

I've got lots of reasons not to trust Hastings' version of *anything*, and I suppose that influences my judgment here more than anything else – 'cause that guy's a confirmed flake. Now, a lot of people would say I'm just looking for reasons not to trust him. *Those critics would probably be right* – I tend not to trust people who tell unbelievable stories, and I *do* notice, on a fairly consistent basis, aspects of those stories that lend them a quality of fabrication. But I'll give Jamison the benefit of the doubt, because he may very well be an honest man who just reports stupid things. What I *don't* see in his testimony, however, is any reason to consider it supportive of those claims asserted by Robert Salas. I already know for a fact that Robert Salas is not only a terrible witness, he's also a liar. On the other hand, Bob Jamison's statement doesn't mention Salas at all, so I'm inclined in general to trust the man until I have good reason not to, which at one time, many years ago, I also said in reference to Salas himself, who has since given me a whole library full of reasons to doubt that *he's* an honest man. Also, Jamison isn't claiming that his story is *meant* to be supportive of Salas' tale of

Echo-November-Oscar Flight – *Robert Hastings is*, although Jamison apparently *is* claiming that the event happened on March 24 (or maybe that's also Hastings' spin – it's hard to tell whether or not this is *all* just Hastings polishing up a turd in the field). I can't help but wonder why there's no documentation of *another* full flight of missiles once again being disabled. You'd think *someone* would have mentioned it. Of course if it was disabled in the same way and for the same reason as we saw at Echo Flight, it's very possible that the Air Force would have wanted to keep it very quiet and away from the press for the reasons we've already discussed, this being the inherent weakness of the guidance and control system in all Minuteman missiles until electromagnetic suppression filters were installed during force modernization. Of course, in a situation like that, UFOs are irrelevant, so why mention them? Maybe because we know that's exactly what Hastings would jump at first? *Possibly*. Maybe Jamison wants to be in a book. But, that might also be grossly unfair of me to leap at that as an excuse. I would *immediately* do so with Salas or Hastings, but for now, I can't apply that reasoning to Jamison, primarily because most of his story is coming to us through Robert Hastings, who has apparently decided that we don't "need-to-know" *exactly* what Jamison said of his own accord. I'm struck by the fact that his story originally involved a happening at an unknown flight of missiles, close to Lewistown, but after speaking with Hastings during a second interview, he is now certain that it was at Oscar Flight, and significant details from his first interview changed or are now absent. The only difference between then and now is another discussion with Hastings – and that's revealing. His original statements were simple:

Jamison is certain that the incident occurred at one of the missile flights located near Lewistown, MT, perhaps Oscar Flight. This event probably occurred on the night of March 24/25, 1967, based on Jamison's portrayal of related events. [An interpretation, we must add, that originated with *Robert Hastings* – RH – *not* Jamison.]²⁶⁶

I think Hasting *persuaded* him to change those parts of his story that he admits he had difficulty remembering, or made suggestions that Jamison grabbed at, much in the same way that suggestions made to hypnosis patients or child witnesses at a trial can convince them that they're actually remembering something that didn't necessarily happen. This isn't difficult to achieve; all Hastings would have to do would be to advise Jamison that this sure sounds like a well-documented case that happened on March 24-25, 1967, and check this out, you must

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have been at Oscar Flight, because Mr. Robert Salas talks about an event just like this, and are you sure you don't remember hearing anybody mention a UFO that landed in a ravine? Here, read these newspaper articles, and tell me if this sounds familiar – *is your memory coming back yet?* The primary fact that everything goes through Hastings before coming to us is revealing, to say the least. Is that poor reporting by RH? *Absolutely.* Does this give us reason to doubt the interpretation of these events by RH? Again – *definitely yes.* And can we affirm from all this that Jamison – like Hastings, Salas, and the boys and girls at Camp CUFON or Vacation Retreat NICAP – *can't be trusted?* No, of course not – but only because we don't know exactly what he told RH – all we know is what RH told *us*. But we also don't have to call this experiential account "The Gospel According to Jamison" either; we can say pretty conclusively that there are far more errors that don't agree with already documented versions of the same story. In other words, we can with some confidence assert that he is simply *mistaken*, because nothing else fits.

Here's another habitual failing typical of Robert Hastings – he makes wild claims based on information only *he* is privy to. Past experience plainly makes his testimony doubtful, to a large extent useless as history, aggressively interpreted to better suit his insistent needs, and poorly argued from the get-go for all of these reasons. It's also difficult to ignore the fact that nobody else has ever confirmed any of Jamison's story other than to agree that there were "rumors" of UFOs in the area, and these qualities do not tend to make any of the ridiculous stories retold by Robert Hastings in any way more believable. Hastings himself, in fact, has become little more than a mouthpiece for a bunch of ultra-imaginative old men with access to the internet who don't even bother to remember events already discussed by other ultra-imaginative old men with access to the internet. Each one seems to want to add *new* information in place of confirming *old* information. The result of this is that all of these guys discuss only the ridiculous and the unconfirmed and the mundane. This alone doesn't mean these men are lying, of course, and I would never suggest that stories be doubted simply because they contain elements that have never been discussed before, but forty years of silence in the absence of any but the most inconsequential confirmation does little to make their stories believable, and, frankly, one can say the same about Robert Hastings. After all, Hastings is using this undated, impressionable, and insufficient memory of unconfirmed events, ridiculous characteristics of military behavior, and completely second-hand, hearsay

information regarding the only aspect of it that we're interested in examining, as testimony to confirm Robert Salas' on again, off again, claim that an event he participated in – one with far more reasons to doubt than to trust – should be dated at March 24, 1967 instead of March 16, 1967; and this new date is attached primarily because information admittedly obtained second-hand from an overheard radio communication containing provably incorrect information seems to resemble a previously dated event. *What the fuck are we doing here even listening to this idiocy?*

There's a very good reason newspapers and respected media journalists will not report a story, regardless of its newsworthy qualities, unless there are two confirmations from two separate sources – because newspapers and respected media journalists are well aware, as Robert Hastings is demonstrably not, that many people simply make up their little stories because they like to see their names in print.

Mostly, however, Jamison's story just *annoys* me, like a buzzing and hovering mosquito when all you want to do is get through a bad cold or a hangover while trying to read the newspaper. It's very evident that, once again, Hastings is suggesting that we give credence to another “non-witness” witness who never saw anything, never witnessed anything like the remarkable event he's supposedly attesting to, and never addressed any of the issues under discussion until forty years had gone by. In the long run, forty years worth, all he's really got to report is a couple of nonsense orders and rumors of UFOs in the area.

While I don't believe that Robert Hastings is inherently dishonest, I do think that he's a naïve fool who believes far too many claims that he's solicited on the internet, and I personally don't think such a crowd of witnesses should be entirely trusted. Would you spread around your social security number at such a banquet? Would you give out your checking account number to someone you met on the internet? *Of course not.* So why would you automatically believe their stories about aliens or voodoo witch doctors or flying saucers or *anything* on the very fringe of general, well known science? You'd have to be an idiot to believe everything you've been told, and I'm personally confident that Hastings sincerely belongs in that particular clubhouse, with all of the accorded pride and arrogance such membership apparently gives him. I'm confident of this primarily because when I first asked him about many of the little details I've discussed in this narrative, details that most men and women would agree indicates

that there is some depth to the lie Salas has been telling for the past decade, his response has always been the same: “so you think *all* of these people are lying?” *I’m afraid only an idiot would claim that as a valid argument.* A story like this with so little to recommend it and so many others willing to affirm that lies have indeed been told, and his only response is to attack the credibility of those doing no more than pointing out the deficiencies in his own argument and to ask whether or not “all of these people” could be lying? *Hell, yes, they could all be lying* – what they’re saying is ridiculous, unsupported nonsense that is completely contrary to facts that everyone is already aware of! Only a *fool* would believe everything they’re saying! Of course, Hastings, like Salas, is firmly in the “full disclosure” camp, which means he’s willing enough not to ask too many *important* questions that the rest of the world seems to be grounded in – not if a UFO is even *remotely* involved. If you’re a *believer*, he’ll trust you completely, here, take my credit card number but don’t use more than twenty dollars, oh, and here’s my car keys, can you get me a soda, please? and if you’re a *skeptic*, you’re both blind *and* dumb and your arguments are not relevant or even worthy of being listened to.

As for Bob Jamison, I’m on the edge – he’s said more than a few things that I happen know would *not* happen if he were really telling the complete truth, and being 100% honest. For instance:

Jamison said that immediately after the missile shutdown incident, for a period of approximately two weeks, his team received a special UFO briefing, identical to the one described above, before being dispatched to the field.²⁶⁷

I know for a fact based on decades of experience that this wouldn’t happen – not in 1967 and not now. You don’t *ever* brief personnel from a position of ignorance, and our military has never done that unless the commander was in the field and his ignorance was due to enemy behavior that cut him off from his chain of command. This would never happen at a major command situated within the borders of the United States, and in my opinion only an uneducated civilian would *believe* that something like this occurred forty years ago at Malmstrom AFB. There might be an administrative decision that all personnel are required to report all unidentified aircraft during duty hours, but that would about be the extent a commander would willingly go, when standing orders to do so are already in place – and in

²⁶⁷ http://nicap.org/babylon/missile_incidents.htm

1967 standing orders related to Project Blue Book *were* already in place. Military commanders will deny *everything* before briefing their troops from a position of ignorance. And not a single commander in the United States armed forces is going to react to a possibly fictional enemy that nobody has yet reported – *not one*. Salas reports that an unnamed member of his security team was injured and required helicopter evacuation from the scene of the incident he describes, yet Jamison, who was supposedly briefed on the UFOs for about *two weeks* fails to mention *anything* in that brief that would instruct airmen how best to avoid such injury, and if your brief to military personnel doesn't include that bit of information, than it is *functionally* without any practical use whatsoever. Commanders just don't brief personnel without the need to do so, because doing so tends to *confuse* personnel, and that detracts from efficiency and adds to whatever problems are being faced in the field.

There's no need at all to tell personnel how to respond to an enemy when they've already been trained how to do so. In 1967, military personnel knew exactly what was required of them if they saw a UFO. *There were standing orders that addressed this*. For all of the above reasons, I just don't believe that these two weeks of special UFO briefings ever occurred – sorry. But that doesn't mean I consider Jamison a liar – after all, Robert Hastings is the man telling us all of this, and he confirmed for me a long, *long* time ago his complete ignorance of United States military forces conduct, operations, and procedure. He consistently talks about multiple witnesses to the same events, but when you examine these multiple accounts they are all different from each other on significant details. He tells the world that this account of Jamison's is just like a newspaper account from 1967, which is just like the account Robert Salas claims to have documented, but if you look at it, you see that Jamison's account is way off from accounts in the newspaper, and in fact, he didn't even know the date or year when he first brought it to Hastings' attention, and as for confirming what Salas reports, *Christ almighty*, it took Salas over *eight fucking years* to settle on Oscar Flight as the location of his little *soirée*, and *another two* to decide on the March 24 date. His so-called "multiple source testimony" is no more than a bunch of people adjusting their stories so they eventually look like "multiple source testimony". But examine them closely, and they fall apart.

Jamison said that approximately two weeks after the full-flight missile shutdown, his team responded to another, partial shutdown—involving four or five ICBMs. Prior to being dispatched, Jamison's team received a report that the missile failures had occurred immediately after a UFO was sighted over the flight's Launch Control Facility. Jamison recalls that this incident took place

at a flight located south or southwest of Great Falls, possibly India Flight, and during daylight hours.²⁶⁸

Once again, nothing confirmed and no UFO report to attach – just a worthless hearsay incident from forty years ago that means nothing and gives nobody reason to feel confident that it ever occurred. It's apparent that he's talking about India Flight, because there's nothing else down there. Except no UFO was ever reported there, and standing orders *required* such a report be made. Lt. Col. Chase never investigated a UFO report at I-Flight and there are no records indicating such a missile failure ever took place. It's just another meaningless commentary regarding another imaginary incident that Hastings solicited over the internet, and we're expected to believe it because someone took the time to mention it to *him*. And the fools associated with this cause consider this to be *convincing* evidence? The only worthy response to most of what Jamison says, is "*so what?*" We established pretty strongly a long time ago that a lot of UFOs were reported, and most were hoaxes or came from poor witnesses or amounted to a large load of *nothing*; we also established that a lot more missiles were failing then the Air Force was willing to admit at the time – all of which has been well-documented by the Air Force. We've established that there were standing orders to report all UFOs to Lt. Col. Chase, so if he didn't investigate them, there's no reason at all to believe they actually occurred. In the long run, any well-conducted analysis has no choice but to recognize this *at the very most* as another reflection of the same rumors admitted to and dissected a long, long time ago by the people directly involved with the Echo Flight investigation – and they've got a hell of lot more credibility than some guy who answered an internet advert on Hastings' website forty years after the fact. *There's still nothing here to convince anyone of anything* – just more "rumors" that most people ignored then, and should probably ignore now.

Jamison said that he had subsequently spoken with several individuals, mostly missile security guards, who had witnessed various UFO-related incidents. He reports that they were "visibly shaken" by their experiences.²⁶⁹

I'll bet they were – but, again: "so what?" They were security guards and they were kids and people all over the country were seeing flying saucers and pulling pranks – it wasn't a big deal then, and it isn't a big deal now. More importantly, Jamison doesn't even name these

²⁶⁸ http://nicap.org/babylon/missile_incidents.htm

²⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

possibly imaginary individuals, and in light of the nonsense he's already detailed (if the word "detail" can even be used to describe such ambiguous, unsupported, undependable, unproven, undated, and pointless 40-year old memories), we have no reason to believe him. All Jamison does is confirm an environment *everybody* was already aware of. Everything here, so well-documented by the Hastings rumor mill, means *nothing*. Concerning Jamison's credibility, there's not much there, for the reasons discussed above, so his claim that he talked to a bunch of other unnamed individuals to support an otherwise unsupportable thesis doesn't necessarily instill in me the confidence that it might with others. It would bear more fruit if we were to question instead why it is that Robert Hastings and others supporting this drivel believe to such an uncompromising extent the reports that they've received from such individuals. For instance, Hastings report also mentions some of the really deep research that James Klotz has conducted.

Significantly, the unit historian, David Gamble, told Klotz that while compiling material for the official history, he had learned of reports of UFO activity within Malmstrom's missile fields. When he made inquiries, Gamble received "no cooperation" from those in-the-know. He further said that written changes regarding "the UFO aspect of the missile shutdown incident" had been made by superiors. The final version of the unit history states, "Rumors of Unidentified Flying Objects (UFO) around the area of Echo Flight during the time of the fault were disproven."²⁷⁰

This is "significant"? David Gamble was the E-2 enlisted person who gave us the mess that Salas and Klotz have used so poorly as "proof" of UFO interference. I'm willing to bet that not only were his "inquiries" of the most shallow sort imaginable, if they were, indeed, made at all, but that he received "no cooperation" from those in-the-know" because he was the E-2 enlisted person who gave us the mess that Salas and Klotz have used so poorly as "proof" of UFO interference. As an E-2 he hadn't even been in the Air Force that long, less than a year, unless he had an uncharacteristically hard time making rank, so I doubt very much he was possessed of enough confidence and concern to make full "inquiries" about *anything*, let alone a topic that the chain of command – if we're to believe Hastings and Salas – wanted to keep quiet. It's far more likely that he heard a bunch of rumors of UFOs, and upon asking "those in the know" for details, was told by a somewhat exasperated officer that there's nothing there, so quit asking stupid questions and get back to work. More importantly, while it's true that A2C

²⁷⁰ http://nicap.org/babylon/missile_incidents.htm

David B. Gamble prepared the command histories, he wasn't necessarily responsible for their contents. For instance, from 1 January to 31 March, 1967, CAPT Herman DeHaas, Chief of the Information Division, approved of everything that went into the command histories. His signature is on the cover sheet, and he had initial responsibility, while Wing Commander Col. John W. Carroll had ultimate responsibility.²⁷¹ This means that for the entire period of the Echo Flight Incident and the initial investigation, Gamble wasn't responsible for approval of *anything* that was included in the histories; and he didn't sign off on any of the contents for that same reason. His opinion, therefore, is pretty much irrelevant, while his claim that changes were made is *meaningless*, because the contents were *not* his responsibility. He can say whatever he wants and it means literally *nothing*, because he was nothing more than a *clerk*, if that. He had no authority and offers no reason why we should believe his claim. After all, *he approved nothing*. Readers introduced to these documents on the CUFON website up through February 2010 are given a different impression entirely, because the cover page associated with the documents that discuss the Echo Flight Incident is actually the cover page for the following quarter, beginning 01 April, 1967.²⁷² The CUFON website displayed these documents unchanged since at least 1999, which means they either kept this information hidden from readers, refusing to correct the deficiency, or were so ignorant regarding the information displayed for the public on their own web pages, that they neglected to notice such glaring errors. In any case, Klotz's and Hastings' insistence that Gamble believes changes were incorporated to documents that he was responsible for makes little sense, because Gamble clearly wasn't responsible for *any* of the documents detailing the Echo Flight Incident. And it's also very apparent, upon reading the documents that *were* approved by Gamble, that any written changes to those documents he prepared were far more likely to be *corrections* instead of *changes*.

The period of time during which A2C David Gamble *was* responsible for approval of the contents of the command histories is evidenced by his name and signature displayed prominently and appropriately on the cover sheet; we note this only for the dates 1 April ²⁷³ until sometime between 1 July and 30 September, 1967 when he was *replaced* by a junior E-4, Sgt.

²⁷¹ 341st Strategic Missile Wing and 341st Combat Support Group HQ SAC DXIH 67-1865 (Command History, Vol. 1).

²⁷² <http://cufon.org/cufon/malmstrom/341cover.htm>

²⁷³ 341st Strategic Missile Wing and 341st Combat Support Group HQ SAC DXIH 67-3922 (Command History, Vol. 1).

William D. Napton.²⁷⁴ It was sometime during this period that Gamble was finally advanced to E-3 paygrade, so it's possible that Gamble was at this time given duties more applicable to an E-3 billet, but the fact that he was replaced by an E-4 suggests that he wasn't doing a very good job as a USAF Historian. It's interesting that during the quarter ending 30 June, when preparation and approval was signed by Gamble alone as representing his office, numerous errors were approved and became part of the official record, mistakes that Gamble was *entirely* responsible for, and should have noted and corrected before allowing the history to be sent up the chain of command. For instance, Gamble utilizes sources that discuss future plans to be taken by the investigating team as sources for information discussing the results of these plans. This may seem minor, but its effect on the official command history was significant. The drafter of the source message he used repeatedly erred by replacing a single dash with a "7", as in "C753P" for "C-53P" and "E78" for "E-8". As a result of this, Gamble continuously refers to testing on LF E-78, a launch facility that has never existed.²⁷⁵ Since he was referring to a history of tests already completed, he could have avoided such errors by using the proper message traffic or by interviewing one of the Officers-in-Charge. In the same history, he discusses how the "results of EMP testing at the LF and Wing IV indicate that the SIN lines are susceptible to noise of the type that could have caused the problem." This gives us the definite impression that EMP testing was specifically conducted to determine the susceptibility of the SIN lines to EMP at Echo Flight, and that absolutely did not occur; testing to determine the source and most likely path of the noise pulse was all done at the Boeing NRA utilizing data collected elsewhere. The drafter of the source message²⁷⁶ that Gamble used discusses the "results of EMP testing at HETF and Wing IV", which is a reference to testing at the Hill Experimental Test Facility (HETF) that had nothing to do with the testing at the Echo Flight LF's. HETF and Wing IV were responsible for EMP tests on the Minuteman II systems, many of which had actually started some months prior to the Echo Flight Incident. This testing determined that most of the shielding used on intersite cabling system wide was susceptible to pulse coupling of the type that could provide a current path between LCC and LF, which suggests that the actual current or voltage spike could have been generated by just about any internal electrical system or by any powerful external system such as the commercial power

²⁷⁴ 341st Strategic Missile Wing and 341st Combat Support Group HQ SAC DXIH 67-5122 (Command History, Vol. 1).

²⁷⁵ 341st Strategic Missile Wing and 341st Combat Support Group HQ SAC DXIH 67-3922 (Command History, Vol. 1), p.31-32.

²⁷⁶ Msg, (S) OONC 02525, OOAMA to SAC, "Malmstrom Echo Fight Incident," 7 Aug 67..

system that was tested for at Echo Flight. In August 1967 it would also prove that the logic couplers used in Minuteman II systems was equally susceptible to electronic noise pulse. The HETF reference is to an important portion of EMP testing that Gamble neglected to mention entirely, discussing instead testing at the E-Flight LF's that had not even started. The testing at Echo Flight would not take place until *after* the investigating team had been able to duplicate the errors characteristic of the incident under investigation. In fact, it wasn't until April 18 that the investigating team even met to review the preliminary test plan for the transformer failure simulation tests they wanted to perform at Malmstrom. And this was the only testing that was necessary to conduct there, its only purpose being to determine what part, if any, the commercial power system might have played in the course of the incident itself. In any case, since Gamble's discussion of this part of the testing process was so flawed, it had to be corrected in the following quarter's history.

Ultimately, of course, these errors were the responsibility of the commanding officer, Wing Commander, Col. John W. Carroll. And apparently in response to this, he took what he considered to be appropriate action, and replaced A1C David Gamble with Sgt. William D. Napton, an E-4 NCO. It's certainly possible that Gamble was simply removed as part of a general billet reassignment once he made rank to E-3, but the fact that he was replaced by an E-4 NCO seems to indicate something else was going on. In any case, neither Klotz nor Hastings gives us no reason whatsoever to believe Gamble's claim – one asserted forty years after the fact, and never mentioned prior to Klotz's interview. There is, however, more than sufficient reason for us to *doubt* Gamble's claim, including his lack of experience, his very low rank along with the obvious handicaps that would accompany this, and numerous indications that he was simply incapable of doing the job assigned to him at the quality expected by his chain of command. I don't think we're going to find anybody who actually served in the Air Force who would be willing to accept his word that "changes were made by superiors" against his will, unless that person, of course, was Robert Salas. Christ man, *everybody* was this guy's superior! If that's all he's got, he's got *nothing*. And as for those documents that Airman Gamble *was* responsible for, I've got to tell you, the Air Force doesn't ordinarily force E-2 personnel to sign the final copy of documents that they drafted when they didn't draft them. E-2 personnel don't keep secrets very well, and any concerted practice of intimidating E-2 personnel results in extremely poor retention – and *nobody* wants to fuck with that. This little

story just shows that both Klotz and Hastings will take any crap at all home for polishing. This little collection of people in support of Salas is just a ridiculous reminder of their own idiocy. *They don't even believe their own resources.* They dig up a document they say supports their little fiction, tell the world that it's incomplete because it doesn't record a similar incident and refuses to mention that UFOs were involved, and then explains that only some of it is true because the E-2 who drafted this piece of crap told them that *changes* were made? It's unfortunate for their families that they're constantly bewildered when people tell them they're full of shit. After all, it's generally nice to be related to individuals who know how to connect the dots.

C'mon Hastings – you can do better than an E-2's word that they changed everything he wrote...

In my opinion, the documents that might shed light on the true facts relating to the missile shutdowns will remain hidden indefinitely, whereas those supporting the official version of events, including unit histories, will sometimes be declassified.²⁷⁷

This is the primal creep show skeptics love the most – Hastings is telling the entire world, *in advance*, that any new information that gets declassified or released to the public under similar conditions, that does *not* include UFOs in the explanation is *wrong*, more lies from the Air Force, and therefore useless to consider. *It's no wonder people think this guy's a flake* – he has no common sense, he doesn't understand military culture, he believes literally *anything* he's told by *anybody* as long as UFOs are concerned, and because of this he will never admit otherwise. This brainless twit's like a serial killer or something from *Silence of the Lambs*: *"he'll keep doing it, he'll never stop – never; he's got a taste for it now, and you'll have to kill him to get him to stop ..."*

If Jamison's recollections are correct, and he did indeed respond to a large-scale missile shutdown at Oscar Flight on the same date as the well-documented Belt UFO sighting, then the date proposed for the Oscar event by Salas and Klotz—March 16, 1967—would seem to be in error. Salas has now acknowledged this possibility, however, Klotz remains skeptical about the alternate date.²⁷⁸

²⁷⁷ Hastings, Robert L., "UFOs observed at ICBM sites and nuclear weapons storage areas", MUFON UFO Journal, No. 456, April 2006.

²⁷⁸ http://nicap.org/babylon/missile_incidents.htm

You see how these guys think? Jamison *never* said that he responded to a large-scale missile shutdown at Oscar Flight on the same date as the well-documented Belt UFO sighting. *Hastings* said that. Jamison said it was at an unknown flight that was one of those closest to Lewistown – and Oscar Flight, as we’ve demonstrated, just doesn’t qualify, unless it’s qualified as a result of its being part of the Malmstrom to Lewistown transport used by the crews manning Charlie, Delta, Echo, Kilo, Lima, Mike, November, *and* Oscar Flights, in which case we might as well pick one by throwing darts at a dartboard. In either case, there’s nothing here to give one pause, because it’s either just another rumor or it’s just another lie. But Hastings lives in a world all of his own, and his conclusions are already made before he’s actually *looked* at any of the evidence. And he’s already on record saying exactly that. That’s why most of his so-called *evidence* is *worthless* to even consider.

I have to say, it’s Klotz, though, who makes me smile. He *knows* how many changes Salas has made in the past ten to fifteen years, and he’s just not willing to go along with it anymore. You think he’s sticking to March 16, 1967 because it’s the logical choice? *Oh, hell no!* He’s sticking to March 16 like glue because he’s not willing to go one step further with these idiots and clowns. I can hear him now: “*fuck* you guys – I’ve already paid for my ticket, and I know *exactly* where it’s taking me. You morons can take the *I-don’t-know-what’s-gonna-happen-next* express to God knows where if you want, but I want to get home sometime tonight!” Granted, that’s not *exactly* what he said – but this is:

Prior to my posting the Jamison-related material on the NICAP and NCP websites, I sent it to Klotz for his review. He responded, "I think that while witnesses' memories of 'events' tend to be pretty clear, memories of dates tend to be less accurate. I am a document-driven guy and I'd like to see some documentary evidence of multiple events. Lacking this, I only wish to keep open the idea that memories may be of a 'single' UFO-related missile shutdown event at Malmstrom. Certainly the indications from witness testimony are that multiple events may well have occurred."²⁷⁹

It's a big dream world, baby, and you gotta have the guts to fly ... Let’s wrap this Hastings stuff up, shall we, and take a look at something with a little more teeth. Blanket acceptance only goes so far, and when it’s combined with abject toadying and the kind of smile that says “I believe” and nothing else, I just get ill. In any case, he discusses a lot of witnesses, none of whom are convincing. His witnesses tend to disagree with each other on significant

²⁷⁹ http://nicap.org/babylon/missile_incidents.htm

points like the time, the weather, and sometimes, witnesses who should have at least noticed the presence of other witnesses assert that they were alone. They toss off “facts” to explain incidents like it wasn’t a helicopter, because I was told helicopters don’t fly at night, while other witnesses, like Salas himself, for instance, claim significant, opposing “facts”, such as an injured security guard being evacuated by helicopter for the same time period.

None of these “witnesses” seem very willing to pinpoint a date, instead relying on catch-all phrases like “Although the date is uncertain, one night, around 11:45 P.M.” or “This must have happened sometime in early 1967, or late 1966”, and none of the events they describe can be confirmed in any way, since there aren’t any names mentioned or any methods spelled out that make you think *any* of these quote unquote witnesses might have at least *tried* to confirm some aspect of the story. They continuously qualify statements with descriptions that are just outrageous such as “This light would move at incredible speeds, make right-angle moves, and continue for hours,” or describe an event that the whole world should have been able to see, but I guess they were all asleep. C,mon guys – *for hours*? Every launch control center at Malmstrom came with its own security team, and all of them were required to patrol the fence line, and yet, no other teams ever noted UFOs in transit to any of the flights proposed by Salas and Klotz – they always just show up, Salas gets notified when his commander is conveniently asleep, and then they disappear. These “witnesses” discuss incessantly sudden displays they themselves didn’t see, but they heard someone at the barracks mention it, or they were told that such and such happened, but only to someone they knew about, never to them. There are some genuinely interesting stories here, well worth paying the price of a child’s admission, *once*, but without documentation or even a date, they represent *nothing*. And there are a number of odd little “taps” in the stories that I just do not believe would ever happen, unless the guy telling the story was only in the Air Force for a year or two, tops, and then made up a bunch of stuff to color his glorious memories bright and loud instead of that blasted black and white, none of which really manages to convince me of the veracity of these accounts or to trust these witnesses; they just convince me immediately that these guys are telling a story and nothing more. Security guards were *never* alone; two-man integrity was *always* strictly observed, and yet, none of the witnesses who were security guards have ever been able to present corroborating testimony from their security partner, and those who *do* mention that others were with them at the time, admit that they can’t remember their partner’s name, *damn it*,

it was just so long ago, and now I can't recall his name. *It's pathetic*. There's absolutely *nothing* to discuss here, because there's no real history. History is *names* and *dates* and *events* – history is *verification*, and none of that can be found in *any* of the tales that Robert Hastings claims as a support system for Salas' outrageous lies. They're just a bunch of stories that don't even agree with each other. None of them represent two of the same story from different angles – they're all just really sloppy attempts to hold your attention like a bad magic act, and frankly, I'm offended that anybody would even consider this load of crap to be historically relevant. It very clearly is *not* – all of this is no more than a bunch of old anecdotes that Uncle Bob collected as a project for his alcohol rehab class at the local gym.

It might be nice to believe everything everybody ever tells you, but what a tool you'd eventually turn into. I'm sorry, but if you're telling a story involving the actions of men in the Air Force that had serious repercussions, you'd better have a little bit more heft to that story than something you picked up after reading the newspaper. And if your story is 30-40 years old, and the most convincing arguments around are those that have already been documented and accepted as history for the past four decades, you are going to need something with more weight than a local newspaper with no date on it.

In conclusion, Jamison's statements are important because they indicate that the Air Force was fully aware of UFO involvement in at least two missile flight shutdown incidents prior to dispatching the missile maintenance teams to restart the ICBMs. Specifically, according to Jamison, the 341st Missile Maintenance Squadron undertook certain precautions and formally implemented various procedures to protect the teams' safety while in the field. In this respect, his testimony is unprecedented.²⁸⁰

Oh, please! UFO involvement in at least two missile flight shutdown incidents?? One that has been *repeatedly* documented as a completely believable and well-supported electrical malfunction with serious ramifications for the entire Minuteman system and the other that was *never even mentioned* in documents, newspapers, or personal accounts *anywhere on the entire planet* until somebody pointed out to Salas that he never stood duty at Echo Flight?? These historical commentaries that these brain dead idiots have collected don't prove or support *anything* except the fictional characteristics they invented one night when the Sci-Fi Channel was showing some little kids Halloween special, and they felt the need to create their

²⁸⁰ http://nicap.org/babylon/missile_incidents.htm

own TV entertainment. Most importantly, if “the 341st Missile Maintenance Squadron undertook certain precautions and formally implemented various procedures to protect the teams’ safety while in the field,” it would have been *written down* at some point, because that’s what “formally implemented” MEANS – and someone other than Jamison and Hastings would also have been aware of it, and would have mentioned it sometime prior to *forty fucking years* later.

Oh, and this shit about the testimony being *unprecedented* – this is that part about the psychological character these brilliant forensic examiners *always* seem to get *wrong*; the fact that Jamison’s statements are “unprecedented” is exactly why they *can’t* be true. Unprecedented stories that are supposed to reflect the official line on *anything*, simply don’t exist. A squadron level chain of command follows *written* commands, scheduled guidelines, daily conditions set at quarters every morning, and *everybody* hears it at once. All of this should be *easy* to verify, if it really happened, and it doesn’t matter whether it’s classified or not, because great events on a squadron level cannot be kept secret for forty years. *Anecdotal evidence is never unprecedented if it’s true*. Unprecedented, my ass. If it’s unprecedented, than somebody’s screwing around with the Stephen King paperback plotline in the toilet. Publications and documents are classified in order to limit their exposure. But you cannot successfully classify large, commonly experienced *events*, and Robert Salas knows that or he wouldn’t be continuously claiming that the documents are lying, and the *events* tell the story. As soon as he tried to convince the world that you *could* classify events, and you could do so by forcing somebody who’s already subject to orders to sign a non-disclosure agreement, is *exactly* the moment that people should have responded by saying, “*that’s bullshit*.” Events don’t stay secret – only *interpretations* of events stay secret, and that’s a rule of human interaction that Shelley’s Ozymandias, Ramesses the Great, Pharaoh of an antique land, the proud, heroic warrior angel, proved handily soon after the duel in Kadesh in the lands of the Amurru upon declaration of a great victory tarnished only by the truth. Nobody ever, in all of history, attempted to claim that the Battle of Kadesh never happened, but a lot of people tried to convince the ancient Egyptians that the Battle of Kadesh was a great victory for Egypt when it actually precipitated the first recorded non-aggression pact between two superpowers. People may attempt to change the *interpretation* of events, but it’s a waste of effort to try and deny they exist if they’ve already been commonly experienced. *All of human history is*

testimony to the fact that events cannot be hidden upon reaching a commonly experienced point of view; when an event reaches that level of commonality, it's ridiculous to even try, and the Department of Defense is well aware of that.

Why have no other witnesses ever mentioned being forced to sign a non-disclosure agreement with their chain of command as the result of a single witnessed incident? LT Walt Figel has repeatedly insisted that he never signed such an agreement, and we *know* he was there. Nobody else has *ever* mentioned being forced to do so. And yet, Salas insists that it happened. But after supposedly agreeing as a contractual obligation not to divulge such matters, and after supposedly being *ordered* not to discuss such matters, Salas did so anyway, and there were no phone calls from Department of Defense lawyers in response. Why do you suppose things happened that way? There are only two possibilities here: (1) nothing they've discussed was classified; this is supported by the numerous claims of the Department of Defense to both Hastings and CUFON that all such materials were declassified a long time ago, and every time they've asked for documents describing specific events, they didn't receive any because they don't exist; for instance Salas receives information on Echo Flight, because the incident occurred, but didn't get squat on Oscar Flight because it did *not* occur; and (2) when the Department of Defense has you sign a non-disclosure agreement or orders you during your separation from service brief not to discuss any matters at all that are classified unless you can affirm that such matters were *declassified*, it has no intention of ever prosecuting you should you do so; this one has *no* support – in fact, a lot of people in America have been jailed or fined for doing this very thing. And yet, Robert Salas has been pretty much ignored. It stands to reason that he hasn't done anything *illegal*.

Events that happen at the common level we're talking about don't stay secret for forty years without anybody mentioning it and no documents to support it. Testimony of this sort is *never* unprecedented. The only phenomenon that we're examining at this point is *creativity* – the workings of the human mind during the creation of *fiction*. And not one of the witnesses that Robert Hastings has ever collected is all that important, because none of them can attest to anything that everybody didn't already know 30-40 years ago. Everything that *does* look new, is just fluff, because there's nothing in it that can be re-examined – it's just noise, like a guy screaming dirty limericks from the back seats of a theater: yeah, we can hear it, but we'd just as soon not, because, *my God*, it's annoying, doesn't make sense, and can't be

interpreted as fact, because, let's face it, *they're a bunch of fucking limericks*. There's not much point to it, there's nothing new being said, and there's no evidence to support what's being claimed. *Unprecedented??* It barely qualifies as *conversation!* Nothing that any of these supporting cast members has produced has a definitive date or location on it, none of it can be corroborated, and none of it provides information or deserves on its own to be listened to – this is all little more than interesting stories populated with rumors. Hastings puts them all together and says that by doing so we can reach conclusions, but that's absolute nonsense – altogether, they're still just a bunch of stories that describe nothing in common except lights in the sky, and we have no reason to believe or trust *any* of them. All these guys have done is come forward after forty years wandering in the desert to tell us what we could have read in the newspapers forty years ago – everything else is dirty limericks. *There's nothing here but fluff...*

None of this that can support Salas' claims, because Salas' claims have already been shattered by the evidence we do have in combination with the proof of repeated lies from the horse's mouth. None of it establishes any proposition at all that remains convincing. And if everything that Bob Jamison says is true, it still doesn't prove that there were any equipment failures at all attached to any activity on Malmstrom AFB on March 24, 1967. What we do have, however, as detailed for our edification by Robert Salas himself, is incontrovertible and official documentation that there were no such failures observed on March 24 – *and you'll love this!* absolute proof that nothing happened; Salas and Hastings believe there are documents that support their claims regarding March 24, 1967, but those documents are actually definitive proof that *nothing happened on that date*, and Salas just wasn't capable of interpreting those documents properly. *Keep reading...*

Recently, Salas has continued his paranoid, irresponsible attempts to either persuade the public to demand "full disclosure", or to force his nation's government into a public relations position *requiring* "full disclosure". In doing so, he has made obvious his distaste for official secrecy on any level, and to such an extent that he is at least willing to say, if not believe, some of the most self-serving, and insulting garbage an ex-military serviceman like myself has ever encountered on a public forum. His vitriol for the Department of Defense and the Air Force

steps forth like a vicious mammal from the dark, now giving birth to a whole *host* of alien creatures while calling for an end to that same darkness, not by the light of reason, but by an otherwise worthless measure of shame that he refuses to acknowledge within himself.

As has been stated many times before, The Condon study was a whitewash of the UFO 'problem' and that paint job was bought and paid for by the Air Force. This was a critical period in time on the question of public disclosure of information held by our government about the phenomenon. As a result of the 'findings' of the Condon Study, the Air Force took and has ever since taken the position that the phenomenon has no bearing on our national security interest and therefore no relevance to the Air Force or any other government agency. Therefore, they claim, they no longer investigate UFO reports. This policy has, of course, allowed the withholding of facts and information from the public to continue. It has allowed the making of policies and government intervention with and about these unknown objects without oversight, public discourse or approval. It has allowed an intolerable abuse of secrecy in our government.²⁸¹

One of the problems with a lot of these UFO proponents is their complete lack of grounding when it comes to the study of UFOs, leading them to make statements – and there are a great number of these – that are simply idiotic in nature, overbearingly arrogant in tone, and completely baseless in content. For instance, the statement “As a result of the ‘findings’ of the Condon Study, the Air Force took and has ever since taken the position that the phenomenon has no bearing on our national security interest and therefore no relevance to the Air Force or any other government agency”²⁸² is a *gross* oversimplification of the facts. The Air Force didn't evolve their current position as a result of the Condon study; their position had developed over a period of many years, and the primary reason for its adoption was *fiscal* in nature, just like everything else that happens in the military. The Air Force simply didn't want to waste their resources conducting a thorough investigation of every UFO sighting that came their way when they were certain that nothing substantial would ever come of it. And most of the time – as even great UFO-study luminaries like Dr. J. Allen Hynek and Donald Keyhoe have repeatedly asserted – the sightings they were asked to investigate were no more than spastic chimera haunting the heads of poor witnesses, mistaken observers, schizophrenics, drug users, drunks, hoaxers, all types and breeds of men and women who get a huge kick out of seeing their name in the local newspaper and people who don't know and don't try to understand the difference between a star, a planet, a sliver of the moon on a cloudy night, or a meteor and an

²⁸¹ <http://www.theufochronicles.com/2009/10/air-force-cover-up-deception-distortion.html>

²⁸² *Ibid.*

actual flying saucer. The investigation of UFOs by a military activity of *any* sort – even one as naturally solvent as the United States Air Force – is simply *too expensive* to conduct properly with all intentions of doing a thorough job. And as soon as the Air Force – or any other government office – got involved, so did the kooks, fools, and tools, people who sometimes find that the reporting and discussion of fake UFOs is as good a method as any of political protest. And in 1967, these are the people who can't be heard when they scream and pound the floor because their children are dying in Vietnam, or think the country is falling apart because hippies are taking over California and Massachusetts, or because Cubans are swarming into Florida, and Mexicans into Texas, or because Dick and Sally Whitewash are leaving for Canada where they're not going to be drafted, or even because they think the government just isn't doing its job the way it should be – the way it did when Mom and Pop were young. In 1967, these are the people who suddenly find that when they report seeing a light in the sky, not only do newspaper reporters suddenly appear from the woodwork like termites on the Spruce Goose, but their own government's military officers eventually appear at the front door and take what they have to say seriously, listening carefully, taking notes or recording every word, and often returning to clarify or refine matters for their own records. It's not a coincidence that all of this was going on throughout the 1960's until the USAF finally broke down and said, "this has got to stop." The only surprising thing about the entire affair is that it took until 1969 for the Air Force to metaphorically respond with "screw it! You want UFOs investigated – *do it yourself*," which is exactly what happened, at which point people like Salas, Klotz and Robert Hastings popped up out of crazy town, and let it be known that from now on, they'd be doing the listening, since the USAF had opted out, and that – as Salas and Company have continuously asserted – "We welcome information about this or any other military/UFO incident from anyone" – a pretty standard invitation for cranks and fools *anywhere* in the world. Proof of this easy to find. It's apparent to anyone with the patience to read Hastings' exhaustive *UFOs and Nukes* that he's predisposed to accept as everlasting gospel just about *every* report *ever* made to him, whether they contradict known and already established facts or not, sometimes to the extent where his supposedly "vetted" witnesses disagree on substantial details with other supposedly "vetted" witnesses.²⁸³ Out of a huge load of nonsense and reports of lizard-like behavior amongst the

283 <http://www.bautforum.com/conspiracy-theories/78952-ufos-nukes.html> [some people might think that I, as well as the people at "Bad Astronomy and Universe Today Forum", are unfair in our criticisms of Robert Hastings, but before adopting that viewpoint, please read this little

rabble, the Air Force had been able to pull out a nice little number of genuine mysteries, some cases that absolutely deserved further study and investigation, but the cost was *tremendous* – and no matter what anybody else might think, in the extremely observant eyes of the Department of Defense, *it just wasn't worth it*. It's so much easier and far less expensive to let somebody else ferret out the very few diamonds in the rough and hope that there's enough evidence *this* time for someone with the necessary intelligence to reach a viable conclusion, something a little more substantial than “wow – that's a little weird,” which is the only *possible* response to some 99% of the sightings ever reported. Frankly, you'd have to be an absolute *idiot* to expect anything else from just about any administration in the country. When you factor in the mental cost of having to deal with nuts, corndogs and folks like Salas and Hastings and the little group of schizophrenics they've gathered about them due to their unfettered use of the internet, the price is just *way too high*. Let the nut jobs have it – anything interesting will eventually float to the top. It speaks volumes that the most memorable cases to float to the top thus far were all filmed by Steven Spielberg at one time or another.

The decision to cease the public investigation of UFOs by the USAF may not have been the best administrative or public relations step the Department of Defense could have taken, and it is, in fact, very likely one of the worst, but I think we can forgive them for making such a decision, considering the character of the men directly involved. A civil administration might well have come up with a different solution to the problems faced by the Air Force, but to a military mind, a unit in the midst of a strategic disaster very often finds itself with only one viable solution to the problem: *cut and run*. You gather what resources you can, and you retreat – which is exactly what the Air Force did in this case. And let's not interpret the situation wrongly here – the Air Force investigation of UFOs was an unmitigated *disaster*, from the very beginning. First, almost all sightings the Air Force was asked to investigate had already occurred and little or no evidence for determining the character of the objects under investigation could be collected. Even when forensic methods *could* be realistically applied to

collection of entries, and reflect a bit on the concerns expressed. Hastings, arrogantly foolish, refuses entirely to answer very valid questions put to him, even on his own forum at <http://www.theufochronicles.com/2009/01/ufos-did-shutdown-minuteman-missiles-at.html> – a characteristic not exactly typical of those hoping to convince others of *anything*, let alone that UFOs have consistently interfered with the nuclear weapons resources at our nation's command. And his “vetting” of witnesses is notably weak, bearing little resemblance to the skeptical examination of witnesses not only expected, but *required* of those reporting doubtful events. As Carl Sagan once said, “I believe that the extraordinary should be pursued. But extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence.” The carelessness of the “vetting” that Hastings and others apply to their witnesses does little to instill confidence in the stories related, and gives the likely impression that these guys will believe anything. As for Hastings, when this is pointed out to him and clarification requested, his reaction is to attack those making the observation, a reaction he repeatedly resorts to and is for that reason very well-documented. It's apparently easier for him to attack his critics than it is for him to defend his witnesses and his conclusions.

such reports, the results were statistically the same – *nothing to investigate and little evidence to collect*. This put the Air Force into the unenviable position of an investigator forced to reach a decisive conclusion regarding an extraordinary event that leaves little or no evidentiary residue upon which to base that conclusion, with the sad exception being the witnesses, most of whom were unable to add anything of value to the mix other than definitive statements affirming how positively *odd* the event they witnessed actually was, and some of whom were severely disturbed individuals nobody really wanted to interview in the first place. And you can't even frame someone for a crime without a little more heft than that.

Second, in order to fulfill the needs required for any possible investigatory mandate, the Air Force had to rely on eye-witness testimony in nearly every case brought to their attention, evidence that even the Supreme Court insists has the least value to investigators attempting to determine actual facts upon which to base viable conclusions. Legal systems that are depended upon throughout the world to prosecute crime give us more than enough testimony to prove the inherent weakness of eyewitness reports, as well as the dangers encountered when the *only* testimony is authored by an eyewitness. This is true even for witnesses directly involved as a *participant* in the event. Even in cases that rest on the simple identification of another person, very often one observed in close proximity to the witness and requiring no more mental calisthenics than the identification of standard features like hair color, or how tall a person is, the testimony of the witness, especially in the absence of any other evidence, has to be considered suspect.²⁸⁴ The mistaken identification of an arrested individual by either an uninvolved witness to a crime or the very much involved *victim* of a crime is unfortunately far more common than most people are aware of, and when this characteristic is embedded into a culture that normally considers eyewitness testimony *infallible*, such as the United States jury system, the results can be *disastrous*, particularly for an individual accused and tried for a crime he or she did not commit – and unfortunately, this, too, does not represent an entirely uncommon conclusion in many criminal cases. Add to this the well-documented tendency eye-witnesses have of making more errors regarding what's "really real" in comparison with what they *report* as "really real" the higher their general level of stress happens to be, and the reliance on such testimony that the Air Force or any other Department of Defense activity is

²⁸⁴ The Innocence Commission for Virginia (2005, March). A Vision For Justice: Report and Recommendations Regarding Wrongful Convictions In The Commonwealth Of Virginia.

forced to work through eventually becomes less endearing and far less *reliable* than anybody seems willing to admit. And whether we admit it or not, the study of UFOs by the Department of Defense resulted in little more than a statistical analysis that serves little tactical use for anybody, due to the generally undependable or ambiguous nature of the reports received. The statistical nature of UFO reports is simply not a good enough reason to continue spending so much money and expending so many man-hours – at least not for the military. The Department of Defense has far too many commitments of a more immediate and demanding nature to worry about.

The United States Air Force recognized a very long time ago that the eye-witness testimony of UFOs has little value in and of itself. It's worth remembering that a similar conclusion was reached by the Supreme Court of the United States, which affirmed that the "vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken identification."²⁸⁵ And yet, in the vast majority of UFO sightings reported worldwide, the *only* available evidence is eyewitness testimony, a characteristic of the evidence that has remained consistent for *decades*. It's a sad disappointment that this aspect of the evidence is not very significant in the consideration of "true believers", who would apparently approve the collection of such data without pause for the rest of eternity, whether there's any viable use for it or not.

Robert Salas nonetheless insists that the position long held by the Department of Defense regarding the investigation of UFOs is primarily the result of the Colorado UFO Study, headed by Edward Condon. This, just like most of the arguments that he's ever made, falls apart soon after examination. The position held by the military is primarily the result of the unfortunately limited worth of the evidence uncovered by the Air Force during the entire period of its public interest in UFOs. When 96% of all you have is undependable eye-witness testimony, you have very little to hold an argument together, and nothing at all that's convincing; more importantly, the military has no use for information of this sort. It should be noted here that the evidence presented by Robert Salas in favor of his own personal little work of fiction lacks even *that* level of proof, since eyewitness testimony is testimony that can be *examined*, and Salas has never been able to *name* any of the supposed witnesses he has presented, none have ever come forward, and there is *no* evidence that such witnesses exist apart from his own

²⁸⁵ United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967).

insistence. Every witness he actually names in his reports cannot testify at all regarding the existence of the UFOs, nor do they agree with each other in the few details they *do* report. And of the witnesses he *has* managed to bring together, both my father, CAPT Eric Carlson, the Crew Commander at Echo Flight on March 16, 1967, and CAPT Frederick Meiwald, who was *possibly* the Crew Commander at Oscar Flight on either or both March 16, 1967 and March 24, 1967 (neither of which dates can actually be documented, so we're forced *once again* to simply accept Salas' assertions in place of fact), claim that they do not even *believe* in UFOs! So exactly how valuable can that testimony be? *His two primary witnesses do not believe in the existence of UFOs.* Somewhere in this *crap storm* Salas calls evidence, there is a fundamental *misidentification* of suspects that he has brought together with an equally worthy load of interpretation to invent an incident that simply did not happen, and he's now trying to change Department of Defense policy by publicizing this non-event. It would be an absolute laugh-riot if so many fools and errand boys didn't believe him entirely and credit their own concern with such policy as somehow equal in weight to that of elected officials and the Joint Chiefs.

In the judicial environment, the mere *suggestion* regarding details that are later reexamined by witnesses can be sufficient to negate in its entirety eyewitness testimony leading to an identification. For this reason, the Supreme Court asserted over forty years ago that pretrial identification procedures that are "impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification" are unreliable, violate due process, and may not be used in court.²⁸⁶ On a judicial or investigative level, this can range from the mundane – such as what occurs when two friends, both witnesses to the same event or crime, discuss what they saw with each other before setting their testimony in stone for the court to reason through at its leisure – to the manic – which is what we see when an investigator mentions offhandedly "we already know this insane little rapist was only five feet, two inches tall with white-blond hair cut clean at middle of the ear length, but we want to know what *you* saw running down the street" This can lead to a lot of problems, all of which can be made to appear obvious to the average thinking American jurist, and all of which can be detailed, measured, and discussed convincingly in a courtroom whenever we encounter the phenomenon of *human observation*. Now shift that scene a little bit and imagine that two friends – one drunk and belligerent, the other driving – see a white light in the sky hanging just a bit off the horizon, and

²⁸⁶ United States v. Simmons, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968).

the driver says, “you ever seen a plane that low in the sky?” Drunk and belligerent responds with “that’s no plane – planes don’t fly that low, and they *never* show just one light like that. It’s not a helicopter either – it’s just weird. Why don’t you pull over?” which they do, but by the time they’re parked, it’s gone. With this hypothetical we get a UFO report with two witnesses out of a glimpse of a planet or star at sunrise because the sober witness was driving and neither knew what the hell they were talking about. As they’re driving home, they start talking between themselves about what they saw, and before too long each has convinced the other of the rare and important details highlighting their standard, unimportant, and uninteresting astrological observation. Had each been questioned alone, the truth of what was witnessed would have been obvious to everyone, even the two witnesses. But when they discuss the matter, the mundane can easily fade into the mistaken or the nonexistent. MAJ Hector Quintanilla, Jr., the last Commander of the Air Force’s Project Blue Book, tasked with studying reported sightings of UFOs, admitted that this was a common difficulty encountered by investigators, asserting that “one of the biggest problems is talking to people while their sightings are still fresh in their minds. After a few days, they forget particulars and, even more often, come up with a far more interesting embellishment.”²⁸⁷ This delay between report and investigation was entirely the result of the Air Force’s standing order for every Air Force base in the country “to take full details on all sightings reported to them and to send the reports along to Blue Book.”²⁸⁸ By the time Blue Book was discontinued in 1969, it had investigated over 12,000 sightings. Only four to five percent of these remained “unidentified”. And, yet, according to Salas, Blue Book was shut down because of the Condon Report, *not* because it was a waste of funds and personnel.

In early 1967, after only three months of basically low-level investigation, the aforementioned Dr. Edward U. Condon – referred to by Salas in his most recent attack on the Air Force – mentioned to a reporter that “It is my inclination right now to recommend that the Government get out of this business. My attitude right now is that there’s nothing to it,” adding, with a smile, “but I’m not supposed to reach a conclusion for another year.” His conclusions, however, seem undeniable. “UFOs are not the business of the Air Force.”²⁸⁹ Only rarely,

²⁸⁷ Editors, United Press International and Cowles Communications, Inc., Flying Saucers, Look Book Division, United Press International, 1967, excerpted The Progress, Clearfield, Curwensville, Philipsburg, Moshannon Valley, PA, “Twenty Years of Flying Saucers . . . Trips in Strange Discs, Talks With Space People Are Reported”, March 3, 1967.

²⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁸⁹ Fuller, John G., “Flying Saucer Fiasco”, Look, May 14, 1968, pp. 58-63.

however, do proponents of “*the military should be investigating UFOs*” viewpoint give Condon’s reasons for reaching that conclusion: “What we’re always reduced to is interviewing persons who claim they’ve had some kind of experience ... I don’t know of any cases where the phenomenon was still there after the person reports it ... and it seems odd, but these people always seem to wait until they get home before they report what they saw.”²⁹⁰ Donald Keyhoe, the head of NICAP, even released a statement admitting that “Having met most of the scientists involved, we are generally satisfied with their fair-mindedness and their thorough plans.” Privately, however, he did express some doubts, none of which adds or detracts *anything* from the question of whether the Air Force should investigate UFOs.²⁹¹

For the most part, there is sufficient reason to suspect that the conclusions of the Colorado UFO Study under Condon *may* have been anticipated to deny the existence of UFOs, and that this outcome was expected before any of the investigators had been assigned under contract with the Air Force. The only real question of interest, however, is whether or not the conclusions were *planned* in advance or merely *anticipated* in advance. If the latter, nothing approaching the paranoid theories advanced by UFO proponents like Salas holds up very well – only confidence that Condon’s group would reach conclusions already expected by those in possession of the facts, and could do so under the rigorous examinations of qualified scientists. After all, the Air Force had been saying for *years* that it considered the study of UFOs to be a waste of Department of Defense resources. Even in this environment, however, there’s no evidence *at all* that more than one or two members of the study commission was aware of any such expectations. Robert J. Low, the project coordinator and key operations man for the commission, might have believed that a specific outcome may have been necessary for the Air Force to fund the study, but there’s no evidence at all to support that kind of supposition. And Dr. Condon may also have been aware that the Air Force expected a specific result for their money, but, again, there’s no believable evidence to support this. Upon reviewing his statements, it seems equally likely that he simply didn’t care much about it one way or another, finding the whole thing amusing more than anything else, and having absolutely no idea how one could even *begin* to attack the problem that the study faced. It’s certainly true that upon discovering this possibility, he did everything he could to prevent its disclosure, making the

²⁹⁰ Fuller, John G., “Flying Saucer Fiasco”, Look, May 14, 1968, pp. 58-63.

²⁹¹ *Ibid.*

extent of his earlier knowledge irrelevant. On the other hand, this quality of predestination may also have been irrelevant, because all it does is support the proposition that the individuals supervising Condon's commission expected a conclusion upon which the Air Force could establish a new policy that had already been decided upon. If they were confident that UFOs were imaginary, and that the UFO Study group would prove that, and in doing so, answer in full all of the questions that had originally been used to instigate the study of UFOs – what is the true nature of UFOs, where do they come from, what force is most responsible for their actions – there would be no need to establish such an outcome in advance. More importantly, the establishment of such an outcome would be nearly *impossible* without the entire study group conspiring to do so, and we know for a fact that most of the men and women in the group took the investigation *very* seriously, and dedicated themselves to reaching an outcome that would stand up on its own merit. This was a very public investigation, so any report coming out of the study would still have to meet scientific standards, and bear the balanced scrutiny of the nation's entire scientific community.

It's not an easy thing to run a public, scientific investigation intended to "whitewash" the public perception of the topic being examined if the public includes men and women trained in the scientific method who have conducted scientific investigations of their own on any subject you care to name. A "whitewash" simply cannot bear close scrutiny by well-educated, experienced men and women who understand exactly how such a study should be conducted and judged in order to qualify as scientifically viable. To dismiss the conclusive report entirely because it doesn't reach the conclusion you desire is simply whining in front of the mirror, gazing at your own failures in the field of science. And in the forty years since the Condon commission released its report, *nobody* has ever been able to show that it wasn't a viable study supported by rigorous dissection of the topic conducted by well-respected and well-educated men and women with high standards and ethics. The Condon UFO Study has stood the basic tests of time and close examination on its own accord, while those who insist that it was poorly conducted because it didn't reach the "obvious" conclusion that UFOs are a point a fact, not fantasy, are still – forty years later – unable to prove their point with evidence that the world's scientific community would accept as even *approaching* conclusive.

In any case, none of this shows that “The Condon study was a whitewash of the UFO ‘problem’”²⁹² as Salas insists. Condon may have been selected because of his inherent predisposition to trivialize the UFO phenomenon, and Robert J. Low may well have understood the outcome desired by the Air Force, but so what? It’s not as if the Air Force was trying to *hide* anything. After all, by February, 1967 – a full twenty-three months before the Condon Report was released – the Air Force had already “firmly” concluded that (1) “No unidentified flying object reported, investigated and evaluated by the Air Force has ever given any indication of threat to U S security”; (2) “No evidence has been discovered to indicate that any sightings categorized as unidentified represent technological development or principles beyond the range of present-day scientific knowledge”; and (3) “There has been no evidence that any unidentified sightings were outer space vehicles.”²⁹³ This revelation, however, *does* make it a bit difficult to believe Salas’ claim that as “a result of the ‘findings’ of the Condon Study, the Air Force took and has ever since taken the position that the phenomenon has no bearing on our national security interest and therefore no relevance to the Air Force or any other government agency.”²⁹⁴ The Condon Report can hardly be blamed for reaching a conclusion the Air Force had in fact publically asserted at least two years earlier. And, in fact, Project Blue Book remained in operation for another year after the Condon Report was completed, so there’s some sort of weird, cognitive leap going on here, if we’re supposed to believe that “they no longer investigate UFO reports” as a result of the Condon Report. In any case, *none* of these assertions invalidate in any way the scientific worth of the Colorado UFO Study nor its conclusions, regardless of the many statements to the contrary released by NICAP. Critics should remember that Condon had a well-deserved reputation for *decades* before the UFO Study was even contemplated as a man with an independent mind who lobbied his concern “over government interference with, or misuse of, science.”²⁹⁵ It’s hardly surprising, therefore, that his conclusion, possibly considered and debated prior to his supervision of the Colorado UFO Study, would mirror one that was already held by the Air Force when the primary result of such a conclusion was a recommendation to separate the government from further scientific enquiry into UFOs. And those individuals who assert that Condon simply fell into line when the

²⁹² <http://www.theufochronicles.com/2009/10/air-force-cover-up-deception-distortion.html>

²⁹³ Associated Press, Daily Northwestern, Dayton, Ohio, “Sky Objects Seen Oftener During 1966”, February 15, 1967.

²⁹⁴ <http://www.theufochronicles.com/2009/10/air-force-cover-up-deception-distortion.html>

²⁹⁵ Story, Ronald D. (Ed.), The Encyclopedia of UFOs, Doubleday and Company, Inc., Garden City, New York, 1980.

Air Force let him know what they expected should remember that during World War Two, Condon was considered the top theoretical physicist in the nation who was also trained by the Germans, as Oppenheimer was, and for that reason was asked to serve at Los Alamos in the first atom bomb project. He grew so sick of the high security environment, that he quit after a week when the Department of Defense refused to relax the high security, and returned to the *less-secure-but-still-important-to-the-war-effort* laboratories at Westinghouse.²⁹⁶ He was not a man who “fell into line”, particularly when the line was directed by the military, and he was well-prepared to simply walk away if government interference became more than he was willing to bear. He faced down McCarthy and the House Un-American Activities Committee when that offensive little man and his group of toadies tried to accuse him of consorting with communists, and he quit his job in the private sector rather than be cowed by Richard Nixon, for which his security clearance was revoked *twice*. Edward Condon never toed the line. More importantly, he was also not a man who reached scientific conclusions that he could not prove.²⁹⁷

Nothing Condon ever said or did invalidates the scientific worth of the Colorado UFO Study that he headed. Condon placed great, almost arrogant, emphasis on his own intellectual worth and reputation, so it's *extremely* unlikely that he would willingly throw that away simply to assert a conclusion that could not be supported without the well-reasoned and confident scientific evidence such a study would invariably demand. Condon, after all, was *extremely* well-qualified for this task. After serving as an associate professor of physics at Princeton during the 1930s, he was selected to be the associate director of Westinghouse Research Laboratories throughout WWII, distinguishing himself while participating in both the development of radar and much of the preliminary build-up in theoretical physics that led directly to the completion of the atomic bomb that so immediately ended the war. He was also an appointed advisor to the Special Senate Committee on Atomic Energy for the Congress, and was instrumental in placing the newly formed Atomic Energy Commission under civilian control instead of the Department of Defense, which many Congressman had previously insisted on. Afterwards, he assumed the directorship of the National Bureau of Standards, U.S. Department of Commerce, and after *that* headed the research and development division of Corning Glass Works during its most productive and lucrative expansion into new technology markets. Upon

²⁹⁶ Rhodes, Richard, The Making of the Atomic Bomb, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1986.

²⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

deciding to devote his works to education, he became the Wayman Crow Professor of Physics at Washington University, and finally joined the University of Colorado as a professor in the Department of Physics and Astrophysics. He was named a fellow in the Joint Institute for Laboratory Astrophysics, and was an emeritus professor by 1970. At one time or another between 1953 and 1969, he served as the President of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, the American Physical Society, the American Association for Physics Teachers, and the Society for Social Responsibility in Science. A member of the National Academy of Sciences, his primary research interests involved quantum mechanics, atomic and molecular spectra, nuclear physics, and solid state physics. Condon was very critical of those who believe in UFOs, and considered their study a waste of otherwise valuable academic resources, and he fully expected his opinions to be sustained by the facts uncovered and investigated in the course of the Colorado UFO Study. Nothing in any of this supports Salas' contention that the study "was a whitewash of the UFO 'problem' and that paint job was bought and paid for by the Air Force."²⁹⁸ Condon – and the other members of the study commission – had a little bit more integrity than that, a quality that shouts out with every examination of the man's life.

Salas tends to forget a lot of details of interest that don't support his conclusions, and he does this regularly, obviously, and with little concern. For instance, we can truthfully assert that many members of the Colorado group, particularly Dr. J. Allen Hynek, Dr. Norman Levine, David Saunders, and Dr. James McDonald, among others, were entirely ignorant of any predetermined nature of the contracted study, and upon discovering the mere *possibility* that their work might be used to deny the existence of UFOs, even if such an outcome could not be supported, they were utterly dismayed, being well-established proponents of scientific integrity, and greatly valuing their reputations in the scientific arena. Even Condon, convinced as he was that UFOs were a misleading chimera of man's own invention, was uneasy that the public might believe the group's findings were predetermined, telling many people that he wished he could just give back the money and discontinue the whole thing as more trouble than it was worth. Most members of the commission were equally troubled, and discussed resigning from the study, drafting and releasing a "minority report", or simply breaking the story as it was to the press. "There was general agreement that an objective study of the UFO problem should be

²⁹⁸ <http://www.theufochronicles.com/2009/10/air-force-cover-up-deception-distortion.html>

made and that accurate and unbiased findings should reach the National Academy of Sciences, the public and the Air Force.”²⁹⁹ People critical of the Condon Report tend to forget that this is *exactly* what happened. While NICAP was running around telling anybody who would listen that the study “lacked impartiality” and was therefore invalid, the Condon commission and the Air Force were submitting that same study for extensive review by the National Academy of Sciences, the very group NICAP had recommended in the past. Any question of a “fix” disappeared *entirely* as soon as this was done.

The National Academy of Sciences is “dedicated to the furtherance of science and its use for the general welfare,” and as a result is often called upon by the federal government to conduct studies or to advise on specific areas or policies related to science.³⁰⁰ Its membership includes numerous Nobel Prize awardees in addition to numerous other honorees nationwide, making it one of the most respected scientific review academies in the *world’s history*. In response to the Air Force’s request to review the Colorado UFO Study’s final report, the National Academy of Sciences set up a special review panel of NAS members that was chaired by the late Gerald Clemence, an astronomer at Yale University. An article written by author and lecturer J. Richard Greenwell for *The Encyclopedia of UFOs* summarizes in full the National Academy of Sciences’ review of a scientifically valid report that Salas seems to believe was a sham that was used to convince the public that their government’s disinterest in UFOs was just a pretense to hide its true purpose: *put a lockdown on any and all information having to do with UFOs in order to . . . well, that’s a problem; he and his ilk never answer that question, “why?” But they’re just insistent as hell that they be told all the secrets. I suppose it’s possible they just don’t understand any of the science . . .*

On November 15, 1968, the panel members received the report, which rejected the possibility of extraterrestrial visitation and stated that UFOs did not constitute a subject worthy of scientific study. Following a two-week examination of the three-volume, 1,465-page document, the panel met on December 2 and, following a month of further discussion and consultation, met again on January 6, 1969, to finalize its findings.

The panel’s review was divided into four sections: Scope, Methodology, Findings, and Panel Conclusion. Under Scope, the panel believed that the Colorado study had been “adequate to its purpose.” Under Methodology, the panel stated that the university’s approach “had been “well chosen, in accordance with accepted standards of scientific investigation.” Under Findings, the

²⁹⁹ Fuller, John G., “Flying Saucer Fiasco”, Look, May 14, 1968, pp. 58-63.

³⁰⁰ Story, Ronald D. (Ed.), The Encyclopedia of UFOs, Doubleday and Company, Inc., Garden City, New York, 1980.

panel concurred that (1) UFOs had not been "shrouded in official secrecy"; (2) UFOs did not represent a ~national defense or security hazard; (3) UFO reports should be handled routinely by the Air Force (rather than by a specialized agency such as PROJECT BLUE BOOK); (4) it was unnecessary to create a new federal UFO agency; (5) "nothing has come from the study of UFOs in the past 21 years that has added to scientific knowledge"; (6) certain little known areas of the atmospheric sciences had received appropriate attention as a consequence of UFO reports; (7) UFO reports should be of interest to social scientists; and (8) that "scientists with adequate training and credentials who do come up with a clearly defined, specific [UFO] proposal should be supported."

The panel also examined the UFO writings of the late Donald MENZEL, the late James MCDONALD, the 1953 ROBERTSON Report, and the 1968 CONGRESSIONAL hearings, among others, and concurred that "no high priority in UFO investigations is warranted by data of the past two decades." The panel's final conclusion stated:

"On the basis of present knowledge the least likely explanation of UFOs is the hypothesis of extraterrestrial visitations by intelligent beings." The panel did not disclose how this determination was made.

According to President Seitz, a former student of Condon, the panel "devoted considerable time and effort to a careful review of the scope, methodology, and findings of the Colorado study" Besides Clemence, the other members of the panel were: Horace R. Crane, a physicist at the University of Michigan; David M. Dennison, also a University of Michigan physicist; Wallace O. Fenn, a physiologist at the University of Rochester; H. Keffor Hartline, a physiologist at the Rockefeller University; Ernest R. Hilgard, an experimental psychologist at Stanford University; Marc Kac, a mathematician at the Rockefeller University; Francis W. Reichelderfer, a meteorologist (former chief of the U. S. Weather Bureau and past president of the World Meteorological Organization); William W. Rubey, a geologist at the University of California, Los Angeles; Charles D. Shane, a former Lick Observatory astronomer; and Oswald G. Villard, Jr., an electrical engineer at Stanford University.

The panel's findings were submitted by President Seitz to Assistant Secretary of the Air Force Alexander Flax on January 8, 1969, and the Condon Report was publicly released by the Air Force on January 9; it was later published as a commercial volume. As recommended in the report, Project Blue Book was terminated by order of the Secretary of the Air Force in December of 1969, relieving the federal government of all UFO responsibility.³⁰¹

Is Salas also suggesting that the National Academy of Sciences was in cahoots with both the Condon UFO Study group and the United States Air Force to "whitewash" UFO claims? Because, frankly, the National Academy of Sciences would *never* be able to keep such a secret from being exposed. Most scientist-members of this highly esteemed organization are generally very ethical in scope, being, as they are, protective of their professional reputations and nearly unanimous in their desire to keep the fruits of science freely available to the public.

³⁰¹ Story, Ronald D. (Ed.), The Encyclopedia of UFOs, Doubleday and Company, Inc., Garden City, New York, 1980.

As for Salas' claim that the decision to adopt qualified recommendations of the Condon Study to shut down Project Blue Book enabled the Air Force to continue to investigate UFOs without public or civil interference, one question immediately comes to mind: *investigate what?* Once Blue Book was shut down, people pretty much stopped reporting UFOs to the Air Force on any significant level, because the Air Force told people *not* to. If people ceased reporting UFOs to the Air Force, how exactly was the Air Force supposed to find out about them in anything approaching a timely manner – *read about the sightings in the fucking newspaper?* And if the Air Force continued to study UFOs at any appreciable level after Blue Book was shut down, why hasn't anybody noticed it? Why haven't witnesses been interviewed by Air Force personnel? Why has the Air Force continued to turn UFO witnesses away without even getting a statement first? And please God don't mention "men in black" – another sickening joke from the hinterlands of the human behavioral lollapalooza. And how did the Air Force's decision to shut down Blue Book and its refusal to take action on reported UFOs allow for the withholding of facts and information from the public? When any component of the Department of Defense wants to withhold facts and information from the public, it doesn't need to create such a paranoid subterfuge to convince people that the information doesn't exist. All it has to do is assign a security classification and then refuse to answer any questions regarding the matter, even so much as the confirmation of its existence. It serves no purpose at all to lie about it and then hope nobody finds out, not when the military doesn't need to justify any of its acts at all to the public. In fact, there's a much higher risk of disclosure should such a lie be undertaken, because every time a new UFO sighting is investigated, the number of people who find out about the lie invariably increases; you just can't get away from that, not if you still intend to investigate UFOs.

Salas' insistence that the Air Force's decision to cease investigating UFOs "has allowed the making of policies and government intervention with and about these unknown objects without oversight, public discourse or approval"³⁰² is equally worthless. Wherever the government intervenes, particularly if it's been doing so since 1969, it is eventually noticed; witnesses need to be interviewed, forensic examinations need to be approved and conducted, reports need to be written and disseminated. Someone *always* blows the whistle on intervention – it simply cannot be hidden for any extended period of time. And if such an intervention *should*

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occur, and this is purely hypothetical, because it doesn't, oversight would be far from absent. It would be provided by either the Department of Defense or Congress. As for "public discourse or approval," this whole line of discussion is simply irrelevant. Was "public discourse or approval" necessary when the hydrogen bomb was being created? Was "public discourse or approval" necessary when the United States went to war against Iraq? Was "public discourse or approval" necessary when silos of nuclear missiles were planted in the dirt in Montana? And how exactly has the Air Force's decision to cease investigating UFOs "allowed an intolerable abuse of secrecy in our government"? More importantly, *who the hell is Robert Salas to decide when government secrecy is intolerable?* This is the same guy who admits that he doesn't consider his disclosure agreement with the Air Force to be a valid agreement that needs to be honored, an attitude arguably disloyal to his own *nation*. He isn't, in any case, privy to military classified materials anymore, so this "judgment" of intolerance that he's published is probably a bit outside his scope of expertise. My advice – *stop the incessant whining, grow the fuck up already and accept that you're no longer qualified to access classified materials, so your opinion regarding such information is less than meaningless.*

Salas' article "The Air Force Cover-Up: Deception, Distortion, and Lying to The Public About the Reality of the UFO Phenomenon", quoted extensively here, is not simply a diatribe against the government's supposed secrecy regarding UFOs – far from it. Primarily, it's just another method for him to publicize and discuss his own case, and how he's gone up against the American secrecy machine to tell the truth of what exactly happened at Echo-November-Oscar Flight on March 16 or 24, 1967. For that reason, it necessitates some closer examination. Experience tells us that his claims will fall apart upon closer examination, so let's take a look, shall we? ³⁰³

On August 9, 1967 Dr. Roy Craig made a visit to the home of Raymond Fowler to discuss some reports of sightings. Craig was part of the University of Colorado UFO Study Group i.e., The Condon Committee (chaired by Dr. Edward Condon) financed by the U.S. Air Force. Fowler had been assigned the title of an "Early Warning Coordinator" for the group by virtue of the fact that he was an investigator for National Investigations Committee on Aerial Phenomenon (NICAP). He was also on the Sylvania Minuteman Production board in support of their contract for the Minuteman Missile ground electrical systems. Fowler had received reports of missile equipment failures at missile sites in Montana and he told Craig about the reports he had received from

sources on site that these failures were associated with the appearance of unidentified aerial objects around the missile sites. Craig was interested because he was assigned to look into such incidents as part of the study.

Background of Dr. Roy Craig and his position with Condon Committee

Craig received his Ph.D. in physical Chemistry. In 1966 he was an Associate Professor at the University of Colorado when the university was awarded \$500,000 by the Air Force to do a scientific study on the UFO phenomenon. Craig had no experience or training in investigative procedures and only had a passing interest in UFOs. He knew little of the history of the phenomenon when he began working with the group. Yet, he was assigned as one of three principal investigators for the study.

“My assignment would be to investigate the physical aspects of current UFO reports, working with a staff psychologist, who would study the psychological aspects of the report. My associate would look into the minds of the persons reporting the sightings.” So, even before looking into cases, Craig was tasked to work with a psychologist.³⁰⁴

Indeed he was – this was a standard practice of the Condon Study Group, and one that was supported by *everybody* involved, including NICAP, because the entire group was nonetheless well-balanced in scientific expertise. It was necessary, because some people lie, some people pretend, some people are stupid, and some people are just crazy – and a lot of them report UFOs and believe they’re regularly visited by individuals from other planets. Does this mean most witnesses are crazy? *Of course not!* In fact, the opposite is true. But when all you’ve got are *witnesses*, scientists who know a little about human perception are *necessary*, and that means “psychology” has to be a subject of investigation as well. It may come as a surprise to Salas, but psychologists are also pretty good at ferreting out the nutcases in a group of potential witnesses. The FBI and the CIA both use psychologists, and it doesn’t mean they *expect* to interview crazy people; it just means that “perception” has to be covered as well. Psychologists are necessary when you’re interviewing people who may have experienced an event that can’t normally be codified or defined, and that aspect has to be examined as much as any other – more so, because it’s the psychological character of a witness that causes him to believe he saw a flying saucer. Maybe if a psychologist had interviewed Salas sometime in 1995 or so, I wouldn’t have to read his crap just to point out the obvious to a bunch of TV and newspaper reporters, bloggers, and mass media whores who should have done it themselves years ago. *Live with it, buddy* – we’ve all got our crosses to bear.

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The clear implication here is that the group leadership had a pre-disposition to thinking that the reports of UFOs could be explained as delusions of the mind.³⁰⁵

And as we've seen, no such "pre-disposition exists" or has ever existed within the Condon group. *Nobody* on the commission has ever suggested that such a predisposition directed *any* of their interviews. Craig goes into some detail regarding this in his book. "Perhaps these people [witnesses] have psychiatric problems. Yet we all have our hang-ups, on one subject or another. Are the miraculous tales related by these people fundamentally different in nature from those which millions of Americans find admirable on Sunday mornings?"³⁰⁶ Craig was more than willing to concede that psychologists were necessary to meet the obligations of the contract Condon's group had with the Air Force, but only when these events are taken out of their natural context can anybody possibly conclude, as Salas does, that "a pre-disposition to thinking that the reports of UFOs could be explained as delusions of the mind"³⁰⁷ had any bearing on their interpretations and the conclusions they reached. In fact, it was one of the team's psychologists, Dr. David Saunders, who eventually wrote what many people consider to be the "minority report" of the Condon commission – *UFOs? Yes! Where the Condon Committee Went Wrong*, published in 1968. Craig also very clearly states that the "pre-disposition" to any beliefs of *delusional thinking* in those asserting first-hand encounters with UFOs originated most often with *others who made the same claim*. "Wherever I went on UFO investigations, I found different individuals and groups of individuals referring to each other as 'kooks' and regretting the fact that kooks were associated with their serious interests in flying saucers. One civilian organization even notified us that it had its own undercover agent checking into some of the 'kook' groups."³⁰⁸ Taking into consideration the obvious fact that his charges are so easily thwarted by simply *reading* the sources he himself has applied, it's difficult not to conclude that Salas, so willing to grasp at straws to make a needless point, must not be in the possession of very much *real* evidence at all. Since my own studies assured me of that long ago, the reader is forgiven for reaching such a conclusion on his or her own accord.

³⁰⁵ <http://www.theufochronicles.com/2009/10/air-force-cover-up-deception-distortion.html>

³⁰⁶ Craig, Roy, *UFOs: An Insider's View of the Official Quest for Evidence*, 1995.

³⁰⁷ <http://www.theufochronicles.com/2009/10/air-force-cover-up-deception-distortion.html>

³⁰⁸ Craig, Roy, *UFOs: An Insider's View of the Official Quest for Evidence*, 1995.

In addition, he had stipulated to Condon that he would accept the assignment if he did not have to deal with any classified information.³⁰⁹

Craig has explained this on numerous occasions as well. In *UFOs – An Insider's View of the Official Quest for Evidence*, for instance, he states “I wished the freedom to speak openly about any part of the UFO investigation in which I participated” – a fairly admirable point of view that gave him full control of *everything* he reported. Simply put, he didn’t want to be forced into a position where he had to either lie, refuse to comment, or tell the truth and thereby break the law and probably be convicted of disclosing national military secrets. He opted otherwise, giving him the freedom to discuss anything he came across, because he wasn’t legally responsible for maintaining a secret he shouldn’t have access to. And if he had sought access, he would never have been able to discuss this matter until it was declassified. That could, after all, lead to people doubting either his integrity or his love of country, much in the same way that I and others have come to doubt both such qualities in Robert Salas, thereby forever tarnishing any worthiness of character attendant to the individual whatsoever.

“If an investigation led to a requirement for access to secret information, which seldom happened, I turned the case over to another member of the project and accepted his judgment regarding the extent of UFO pertinence to the case.”

As the group was organized, Condon deputy, "Robert Low" was the only member (presumably other than Condon) who was authorized to review classified material. That was also problematic from the beginning since prior to the start of the study Robert Low had written a now infamous memo in which he had characterized the study as being done by non-believers and to trick the public into believing it was objective.³¹⁰

Once again, Salas misinterprets and gets his facts wrong. First of all, Robert J. Low was not Condon’s “deputy”. He was the project coordinator and the key operations man in the study, and as such was answerable to the University of Colorado administration. In addition, it was Low who originally convinced both Edward Condon and the University of Colorado to undertake the study for the Air Force, even though, as John Fuller states in his self-serving article “Flying Saucer Fiasco”, the subject itself “comes pretty close to the criteria of nonacceptability” as a university function.³¹¹ Furthermore, the memo he wrote actually said “the trick would be, I think,

³⁰⁹ <http://www.theufochronicles.com/2009/10/air-force-cover-up-deception-distortion.html>

³¹⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹¹ Fuller, John G., "Flying Saucer Fiasco", *Look*, May 14, 1968, pp. 58-63.

to describe the project so that, to the public, it would appear a totally objective study, but to the scientific community would present the image of a group of nonbelievers trying their best to be objective, but having an almost zero expectation of finding a saucer.” The memo was written by Low to the University’s higher administration *before* the contract by the Air Force had been awarded, the purpose of which was to outline some of his ideas about the conduct of the project, and the possible perceptions of it by others. This memo was written for a specific audience, and its primary purpose was to persuade the University to accept the contract – a contract no other university was willing to fulfill for the very reasons he points out. The Air Force had originally wanted a number of schools to complete parallel studies, but nobody wanted to accept such a contract, because the subject matter was, frankly, considered embarrassing to all of the schools contacted on the Air Force’s behalf. They asked Harvard University, the University of California, Berkeley, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill to consider the study, but they all declined. Some schools were afraid of attracting controversy if they mishandled the study, but most simply regarded UFOs as an improper, unscientific field of study from the get-go. Even the National Center for Atmospheric Research declined the opportunity.

Low wasn’t trying to “trick the public”, as Salas claims, and nobody who was aware of the memo’s contents ever believed that was the case. Even J. Allen Hynek, possibly the most virulent critic in the entire world of the Colorado UFO Study, defended this interpretation, stating that: “I believe that Low has been unduly criticized for this memo. I can appreciate the dilemma Low faced. He wanted the University to get the contract (for whatever worldly reason) and to convince the University that they should take it. He was aware, as I certainly have been for years, that scientific opinion was such that even serious mention of the subject was equivalent of scientific tar and feathers. He wanted to invoke a cloak of responsibility.”³¹²

This aspect of the Colorado UFO Study and the discovery of Low’s memo has been taken out of context and misrepresented by UFO proponents for *years*, which is unfortunate, because the memo itself and the environment within which it appears is completely benign. There’s *nothing* “problematic” about this memo, and anybody who’s familiar with this aspect of the Condon investigation would know that. Low *never* “characterized the study as being done by non-believers” and never advocated an attempt “to trick the public into believing it was

³¹² Hynek, J. Allen. The UFO Experience A Scientific Inquiry. New York: Marlowe & Company 1972.

objective.” How could he? The University of Colorado hadn’t yet accepted the Air Force’s contract, and many in the school’s administration were against it’s doing so. Low himself would have been sickened by any actual attempt to “trick the public.” Once again, we see Salas twisting the environment to fit his little agenda, and ignoring aspects of the study that have been well-documented for years.

When it counted the most, Robert Low failed to push the Air Force for the release of information on a classified investigation that very much involved UFOs.³¹³

Had he done so, he still would have failed to get access to the report he wanted to review. He had the clearance, but he lacked “need-to-know”, so the report had too high a classification to be accessed by him. It is within this commentary, however, that Salas reveals his only real purpose in bringing up Craig’s 1995 book and his personal notes: *to try and show a connection to the Echo Flight Incident he has reported on, where no real connection exists*. He suggests that had Robert Low only insisted a bit more that the incident be uncovered for him in its full effervescent splendor and brilliance, all of the proof anyone could ever desire causally linking the Echo Flight missile failures to the extraterrestrial interference of flying saucers on a bender flight would have been substantiated, and his own glory sustained forever, and it’s *oh so sad* that Low didn’t try hard enough, but thank God the world still has courageous men like Robert Salas to take up the slack of imperfect UFO investigators and tell the world the truth of UFOs, revealing in the process the deplorable secrets of the United States Air Force – *but it’s all just another load of pathetic, self-glorifying bunk*. Robert Low lacked the “need-to-know”, and that is why he was not granted access to read the investigation’s report. And because he was refused such access, we can confidently and truthfully assert today that UFOs had *nothing at all* to do with the Echo Flight Incident, whether it occurred on March 16 or March 24, as Salas now claims. There’s no mystery; there’s no administrative error – there’s only Robert Salas lying again, and changing his story again, all appropriate to the character defects that he has repeatedly exposed.

[A Visit to Malmstrom AFB \(October 9-14, 1967\)](#)³¹⁴

³¹³ <http://www.theufochronicles.com/2009/10/air-force-cover-up-deception-distortion.html>

³¹⁴ *Ibid.*

According to his notes, written during his visit, Craig had four objectives. First, he wanted to review with Lt. Col. Lewis Chase regarding his UFO encounter in 1957 while flying a training mission as aircraft commander of an RB-47.

The Missile site shutdowns and the possibility of UFO involvement was also on his list. Craig knew of the Shutdowns at missile sites from Ray Fowler. It is significant that he lists the date of the shutdowns as March 24, 1967. That significance will be discussed later.³¹⁵

Nah ... *let's discuss it now*. Craig lists the date of March 24, 1967 because he was either told by Fowler, a NICAP investigator, that the Echo Flight event was coincident with the UFO sightings of March 24-25, or – being told by Fowler that the Echo Flight Incident was coincident with UFO sightings – determined for himself that the date was March 24, because the only UFO sightings reported to Project Blue Book over the course of the *entire month of March* was that specific group of sightings. It doesn't take a genius or a trained technician to make a connection like that. Personally, I suspect that Fowler was acutely aware that the March 24-25 sightings represented the *only* UFO sightings reported, assumed that was the actual date, and passed that on to Craig as well. When all you've got to investigate are "rumors", your conclusions are rarely accurate – and the one telling indication of this is the fact that everybody referring to UFOs in association with this event invariably reports them as "rumors". It's ironic that when Fowler originally told Craig about this weird correlation, it was *Fowler* who was spreading these incessant rumors, and *Fowler* who was unaware of the actual date, and *Fowler* who passed on the wrong information regarding an event that he knew nothing about, because he wasn't cleared to know anything about it. You can talk about Fowler being an employee of Sylvania all you want, or even being on the Sylvania Minuteman Production board in support of their contract for the Minuteman Missile ground electrical systems, but it has no meaning as far as Echo Flight is concerned, because *Sylvania had nothing at all to do with that investigation*. They didn't pick up any contracts at all for any of the ground electrical systems in use with the Minuteman I sites, because they were all developed by the Boeing Corporation. In fact, the only thing Sylvania did at any of the Malmstrom AFB systems was the development of the new ground system used by the only squadron of Minuteman II missiles actually assigned to Wing I. This was the 564th Squadron, which was also referred to as the "Collocated Squadron" or "Squadron 20," since it was the 20th Minuteman squadron deployed in the force.³¹⁶ Sylvania

³¹⁵ <http://www.theufochronicles.com/2009/10/air-force-cover-up-deception-distortion.html>

³¹⁶ <http://themilitarystandard.com/missile/minuteman/upgrades.php>

wasn't responsible for *anything* at Echo Flight, and they weren't involved in the investigation – all of which can be confirmed with the Defense Technical Information Center. Fowler probably learned of the missile losses at Echo Flight, but he wasn't cleared for any details, so any errors in the information that Craig had very likely came from Fowler himself. As far as Echo Flight is concerned, Fowler was nothing more than another NICAP investigator – and nothing special, at that.

You'll also note that in all of the documents Salas uses to affirm his interpretation of these events, the Echo Flight Incident is the only one named by anybody. Nobody has ever discussed November Flight losses; nobody has ever discussed Oscar Flight losses; and there's no documentation *anywhere* to indicate that either of these flights were also shut down – *nothing*. There isn't even reason to suspect that maybe Craig knew of a *different* incident that may have occurred at another flight entirely, and that it possibly occurred on March 24; at least *that* would support in some way what Salas now claims. But, frankly, it looks like the only thing we've got here is just another NICAP investigator getting his facts wrong. And since the incident that NICAP investigator and Craig are discussing for our edification was *classified*, nobody would have been willing to correct the error for either Fowler or Craig. They wouldn't even have been willing to *discuss* it – all of which is made very clear throughout Roy Craig's notes.

We note that the civilian agencies involved, such as Sylvania and Boeing were not allowed to talk about it. [Except that Sylvania didn't know anything about it, period. These guys can't even get their facts straight, facts that are easy to confirm one way or another. *Sylvania was not involved in the Echo Flight Incident investigation*, period.] In fact Fowler has told me that he only mentioned the rumors of the Echo Flight shutdown of 10 Minuteman missiles to Craig with some trepidation of losing his job and security clearance. [I love this part – he actually refers to the shutdown of the missiles at Echo Flight as “rumors”; presumably the UFOs were “fact”. In either case, it's very apparent that Fowler was simply passing on “rumors” to Craig, which means this is where the story and the date and all of the events that Salas so blindly steers past got screwed up – Fowler was passing on “rumors” and Craig had nothing better to go on; I laughed my ass off when I first read this, because it's so OBVIOUS why all of them fucked up on something so simple as the date.] The report of the shutdowns was cloaked in secrecy even before Craig arrived at Malmstrom. The depth of that secrecy would soon be escalated after his arrival. [There was no escalation – the incident was classified SECRET from the very beginning, and it stayed that way. What Salas is claiming to be an “escalation” is nothing more than the normal and appropriate application of “need-to-know” to determine right to access information.]

In Craig's book on his experience with the Condon Committee, he describes his encounter with Lt. Col. Chase, whose position description included the title of Base UFO Officer.³¹⁷

Chase was primarily Chief of the Operations Division; Base UFO Officer was a secondary assignment maintained at every Air Force base, such a structure being instituted to ensure that UFO sightings were properly reported to Project Blue Book, and investigated as soon as possible once the Air Force was informed. This was a standing order at every Air Force command. The UFO Officer was required to conduct a preliminary investigation of any UFO report made to the command. If he was unable to identify the UFO as a natural phenomenon or known aircraft, or if he had any doubts at all, he was required to draft a message listing Project Blue Book as INFO, thereby initiating additional investigation access to resources. This went beyond base chain of command. Where UFOs were concerned, Chase answered to Project Blue Book's chain of command at Wright-Patterson AFB. He was supposed to ensure that no frivolous reports were made to Blue Book, such reports being considered a waste of everybody's time. It speaks volumes that Blue Book was never contacted to investigate either the missile failures or the imaginary UFOs at Echo Flight on March 16, 1967, such absence indicating that Echo Flight was *not* considered to be a UFO event by *anybody*. And while it's true that a UFO reported on base had additional avenues of support and means of reporting such contacts, this has never meant that such UFOs were *not* to be reported to Project Blue Book – *Blue Book was part of standing orders nationwide*. They received *everything* and they transcended all local chain of command.

After Colonel Chase and I had exchanged pleasantries in his office, I asked him about the Echo incident. The Colonel caught his breath, and expressed surprise that I knew of it. 'I can't talk about that.' . . . If I needed to know the cause of this incident, I could arrange through official channels, to see their report after completion of the investigation. ...Although local newspapers carried stories of UFO sightings which would coincide in time with Echo, Colonel Chase had assured me that the incident had not involved a UFO.³¹⁸ [Salas leaves out a bit here: "Since Colonel Chase was the last man I would doubt when he conveyed this information" – which qualifies strongly that he was telling the truth. Craig didn't simply "accept" that Chase was being truthful; he was confident that such was the case, because he knew the man well. After all, Chase was being completely honest when discussing his own experiences with a UFO; what possible reason would he have to not only lie to Craig regarding UFOs in connection with the Echo Flight Incident, but then point out to him the group investigating the incident, and introduce him to the Major who was supervising the investigation? There is no reason. He was telling the truth, while explaining the reason Craig or Low would ultimately fail to get access for review of the event. Confirming that UFOs were not involved was a courtesy, nothing more. If UFOs had been involved, Chase would have simply stated that he could not discuss the matter at all, because

318 <http://www.theufochronicles.com/2009/10/air-force-cover-up-deception-distortion.html>

officers in the Air Force are told from the very start of their training that lying is never an acceptable course of action. But I guess that part of the training never took with Salas.]

I accepted the information as factual and turned review of Major Schraff's report (on the Echo Incident) over to Bob Low, who had received security clearance to read secret information related to the UFO study. Low, in turn, had to interface with his Air Force liaison in Washington, Col. Hippler.

Low's note at the bottom of this handwritten memo states:

"Roy, I called Hippler and he said he would try to get this, but he suspects it's going to be classified too high for us to look at it. Says he thinks interference by pulses from nuclear explosions is probably involved."

The tone of this note indicates that Low was simply accepting this rationale for classifying the missile shutdowns as a non-UFO event. According to records of Dr. McDonald, Robert Low never followed up on this request. If Low had followed up on his request and asked for more details, such as the possibility of nuclear explosion EMP from the Air Force, he might have discovered that the U.S. did not test any nuclear weapons in the period from March 10 through April 4, 1967; the time period of the shutdowns (source: D.O.E. Report DOE/NV-209 rev. 15, December 2000, U.S. Nuclear Tests 1945 – 1992). Even on the face of it, Low should have realized that if nuclear EMP was truly involved, it would have created widespread havoc throughout our strategic missile forces. Clearly the reasons given by Hippler were simply intended to give cover to Low and others to back away from any further investigation by the Condon Committee.³¹⁹

Clearly, Robert Salas still doesn't know what he's talking about. Actually, this clearly shows that the UFO Project didn't have the "need-to-know" anything about the missile shutdowns. Access to classified materials is *always* two-fold: the clearance has to be current, and the recipient has to be qualified with a "need-to-know". When Hippler informed Low that it was classified too high, he was basically telling him that UFOs had *nothing* to do with any missiles being shutdown, and as a result the documents were classified too high. Low's only interest in the documents was the possibility that UFOs were involved, so any classified materials he wanted access to *must* involve UFOs, otherwise "need-to-know" can't be established and Low can't examine the document. Salas should know that – it's standard operating procedure, and it *never* changed during this entire period. It's just an affirmation that Low had no reason to examine the report, because it wouldn't affect the Condon Study one way or another, which was the *only* basis for his security clearance. It's also another one of many, *many* examples of Salas interpreting wrongly an aspect of this case that – being an ex-Air Force officer with accorded knowledge and experience – *he should have understood more fully*.

And when somebody who knows better makes that many stupid, irreconcilable errors, it's perfectly natural to assume that they're either brain-damaged or lying. *Pick one...*

In addition, any examination of the documents discussing the Echo Flight Incident shows immediately that *nobody* believed a nuclear explosion EMP was the cause of the flight going down. This is absolutely ridiculous, because everybody was aware that such a hazard would affect not only the missiles, but every other electrical system associated with the missiles that wasn't properly shielded, and that obviously did not occur. It's unfortunate, but understandable, that those conducting the investigation – including both the Air Force personnel and the contractors – described the noise pulse that actually did the damage in terms that involved nuclear explosion-sourced EMP, but we can't always pick and choose the vocabulary of others, can we? Of course, nobody ever misunderstood this description at quite the same level Salas and his friends have done, but by using the description applied, the investigators enabled this misunderstanding. Let us all be clear: *there was no EMP caused by nuclear explosives*. EMP is simply a burst of electromagnetic radiation that can be generated in many different ways, and a nuclear explosion is only one of those means. In the case of the Echo Flight missile failures, the pulse was a burst of self-generated noise that created a voltage surge in the logic coupler of the guidance and control system, most likely as a result of environmental pulse coupling, an effect that the microminiaturized circuitry in use was especially vulnerable to. This same sensitivity to electromagnetic effects also caused a number of failures within the Minuteman II guidance and control systems as well, and had been doing so since day one.

This is all made very clear in USAF Ballistic Missile Programs 1967-1968, currently maintained in the Nuclear Vault of the National Security Archive at George Washington University. Once the cause was identified, technicians noted that suppression filters were scheduled for installation on all Minuteman II missiles as a result of the NS-17 failures. Since most of the contractors believed this would “fix” the problem, the Air Force simply expanded the force modernization program to include installation of the filters on the Minuteman I missiles in order to suppress electromagnetic effects. Once this was done by July of 1968, the problem disappeared for good.³²⁰

The only thing that's proven by the little note that Bob Low left at the bottom of Craig's papers is that the military liaison – presumably Hippler, but it may well have been described to

³²⁰ Nalty, Bernard C., USAF Ballistic Missile Programs 1967-1968, Office of Air Force History, September, 1969.

him in these terms by whomever he questioned – didn't understand the conclusions of the investigatory report at quite the level demanded, and used the purely descriptive terms that the report used in explanation. An electrical noise pulse is similar *in effect* to the electromagnetic pulse (EMP) of a nuclear explosion, but a nuclear explosion is *not* necessary to generate it. It's perfectly understandable, and a very well-practiced technique used by civilian contractors answerable to military authority, for an investigation report to use terms that are understood by military audiences. *That is the case here.* Military personnel who are daily exposed to very specific knowledge involving nuclear explosions as a result of their employment maintaining Minuteman missiles would be far more familiar with electromagnetic effects discussed in those terms *they already understand.* And the Air Force had been actively pursuing a research and experimental campaign to determine the effects of high-altitude electromagnetic pulse on electrical equipment since the early 1960s, and understood the phenomenon well. It's also evident that by the time this information reached Craig, it had already passed through *at the very least*, Hippler and Low before reaching Craig, and Hippler would have described it in terms that would not hold him liable for improperly passing on classified materials to someone who wasn't properly cleared to receive them. There's also no guarantee that Hippler even *read* the report, because he very well may have gotten his information from someone else, particularly if *he* wasn't properly cleared to read the report either – which very well may have been the case. He would have needed to establish "need-to-know" just as much as anybody else. Once again, there's nothing *strange* in any of this excepting Salas' faulty interpretation, something that would normally not occur if he had been educated regarding classified materials. Since it's apparent that he understood very well classified protocols at one time, I've concluded, appropriately as far as I'm concerned, that he's simply lying in order to make a point that supports his version of these events. *Again.*

Let's examine for just a moment the bottom line in all of this: *Roy Craig's interpretation of these matters.* Craig found conventional explanations for every UFO case he discusses in his book.³²¹ It's very evident, upon *reading* that book, that the only reason he includes *any* of this discussion is to illustrate how easily and how quickly classified materials can be compromised when they are associated in any way, even peripherally, with UFOs. "Hippler and other officials were appalled that we knew of this incident. They perhaps would have been even more

³²¹ Craig, Roy, UFOs: An Insider's View of the Official Quest for Evidence, 1995.

chagrined if they had known how soon after the incident happened in Montana that word of it and the coincident UFO sightings reached me – from a source on the East Coast. The only type of information that seems to travel faster than the speed of light is rumor attached to a UFO.”³²² You’ll note that Craig, throughout his discussion, also refers to UFO interaction with Echo Flight as “rumor”.

The only reason Echo Flight is mentioned at all in Craig’s narrative is to show why he believes any government conspiracy to keep extraterrestrial visitation a secret would invariably fail, and would likely do so in a very short period of time.

While I could not dismiss the conspiracy theories on the basis of individual or group paranoia, a little thought convinced me that the fact of extraterrestrial visitation, if it were a fact, could not successfully be concealed for long by either the Air Force or the CIA. That conviction was strengthened by the Echo Flight Incident experience of having quite secret information pound upon my own unauthorized ears when a UFO was rumored to be involved in the secret event. I do not believe that human beings with knowledge of an event of such fantastic significance as extraterrestrial visitation would be capable of refraining from revealing that information for long.³²³

Salas’ use of Craig’s memories to establish in any way that a UFO that every mention and every document *insists* was only a sad rumor is actually a point of fact is no more than his usual game of *insistence* backed up by *nothing*. He reinforces belief to no good purpose by twisting known events, opinions, reports, and investigations in order to fit his goal-driven fabrications, and, frankly, it’s shameful, and we should all be a little disgusted.

Craig’s notes indicate that he knew the names of many individuals whom he could have interviewed with respect to rumors of UFO involvement in the missile shutdowns. There were civilian representatives from Sylvania and Boeing who knew the sources of the rumors of UFOs. Their names had been given to him by Fowler. [As we’ve seen, they probably were Fowler, since Sylvania representatives were not part of the original investigation effort.] Fowler also gave Craig the name of Dan Renualdi, a member of the Site Activation Task Force (SATAF) who was a very credible eye-witness. He reported being within a few feet of the object.³²⁴ [So where, exactly is this eye-witness report by this supposed “very credible eye-witness” that nobody else in the entire world has ever mentioned before? Is this another thing Salas just made up out of the thin air of a well-orchestrated bullshit session? Because I’ve got to tell you that a simple Google search of “Dan Renualdi” brings up nothing except Salas’ own new layer of crap...a very credible witness that nobody’s ever heard of and nobody has ever mentioned in support of an incident that the person claiming credibility for this witness very clearly knows very little about is plainly not a

³²² Craig, Roy, *UFOs: An Insider’s View of the Official Quest for Evidence*, 1995.

³²³ *Ibid.*

³²⁴ <http://www.theufochronicles.com/2009/10/air-force-cover-up-deception-distortion.html>

credible witness; show us the testimony first, Bobby, and we'll determine how credible it actually is – you're not exactly the best person in the world to make that judgment.]

In addition, one of the NCOs on the Air Force Technical Evaluation team admitted to seeing a saucer. [Who? When? Where? How? Why is anyone listening to this idiot?] There is no record of Craig interviewing these men. Craig did not ask to know the names of any of the Echo Flight crew on duty at the time of the shutdowns or any maintenance or security personnel at Echo. [And had he asked, Chase would have refused; Craig had no clearance, and was unlikely to get one within such a short period.]

It is important to emphasize that, although he was charged with investigating this incident, Craig failed to conduct or document interviews with any principal witnesses. This is verified by his notes and his own book. By his own admission he simply took the word of Col. Chase that there was no UFO involvement and did not pursue an in-depth investigation as he was authorized and responsible to do.³²⁵ [Craig had no clearance, so he wasn't authorized to do *anything* involving the Echo Flight Incident, so you can't characterize this as a failure of his; more importantly, since UFOs were not involved – there being absolutely no evidence to support such a belief, only *rumors* that seem to have originated with Fowler, and the fact that he didn't know the date of the Echo Flight Incident – Craig didn't even have the *responsibility* to investigate; and as we've already seen, Chase was trustworthy, was already well-known to Craig, and told him that UFOs were not involved because *UFOs were not involved*. More importantly, it wasn't Craig's responsibility to pursue an investigation of UFO interference – it was the responsibility of Project Blue Book; and since we know such an investigation was never initiated, even though standing orders insisted that such an investigation was mandatory under these conditions, it stands to reason that no such incident involving UFOs occurred. Placing the blame for the absence of an investigation for interference of UFOs that were never reported on a civilian who only found about the case in the first place because a NICAP investigator told him about it while getting even the date wrong is just .. well, it's just – it's just *sad*. And kind of pathetic.]

The last few paragraphs of Salas' most recent collection of fiction is also pretty interesting, but only from the point of view of someone examining the self-serving repetition of his former lies. In that aspect, it's most familiar to a high school anthropology paper on Native American Traditions Regarding Mormon Claims – it's an interesting topic of discussion at a party absent of both Native Americans and Mormons, but otherwise it's just so very, very *tiring* ... until you get to the part where Salas sinks his own argument as a result of his own stupidity.

By this time, Chase had already been clued in on how the Air Force wanted the UFO question handled. Chase was Chief of the Operations Division at Malmstrom AFB during the missile/UFO incidents in 1967. On March 16, 1967 Echo Flight was disabled while UFOs were observed near the missile launch sites by multiple witnesses. The Air Force considered this incident one "...of grave concern to this headquarters."³²⁶

³²⁵ <http://www.theufochronicles.com/2009/10/air-force-cover-up-deception-distortion.html>

³²⁶ *Ibid.*

There were no “multiple witnesses” for UFO sightings *anywhere in Montana* for March 16, 1967. The witnesses we’ve already discussed have not confirmed any of this, as we’ve pointed out on many occasions. As for Salas’ pathetic attempts to show that SAC’s level of concern was greater than the message classification asserts, we’ve already established the impertinence of that baseless claim.

A week later on the morning of March 24, 1967 Oscar flight was disabled as a UFO hovered by the front gate of the Launch Control Facility as verified by myself and other witnesses. [Salas keeps claiming that this event has been verified, but it hasn’t. If it has been verified, he should kindly tell us by whom, and what exactly they said so that their testimony can be properly examined. It’s interesting that in his book he lists my father’s name as one of the people who have confirmed his tale of flying saucers, but this simply isn’t true, and I consider it an insult, and a reduction of my father’s entire career to a footnote of another man’s fiction. Until he tells the world exactly what his claims detail, I will be forced to continue asserting that the man is a liar who refuses to discuss in any relevant detail his extraordinary claims; thus far, I’m the only one here who can document every detail of his account, so my credibility, contrary to the many charges asserted in the past by people like Salas and Hastings, is not in question here. Salas’ credibility, however, is, plainly so, and his continuous refusal to discuss any of the charges I’ve made in the past is proof of that.] On the evening of March 24, 1967 a civilian truck driver, Ken Williams, observed a large domed shaped lighted object while driving near Belt, Montana (not far from Great Falls, MT). The object was about a mile to his left and seemed to be pacing his truck at the same speed. Soon the object stopped and hovered for a moment then dropped into a ravine and landed. Williams observed it as it pulsed with a very bright white light.

Later the object was also seen by Montana Highway patrolman Bud Nader, before it finally flew off at high speed. [Nobody ever saw it fly off at high speed; both witnesses report it just went out like a light turned off.] Lt. Col. Chase was notified of this incident about an hour later because of all the UFO sighting reports coming into the base. After discussions with the base commander, Col. Klibbe, he decided to investigate the situation.³²⁷

Chase didn’t “decide” to investigate anything. It was his duty to do so, in order to determine whether or not Project Blue Book should be further concerned. This is what the UFO Officer is *required* to do. In this case, Blue Book was notified, and after their investigation, the single sighting by Williams and Nader was classified as an “unidentified” target. It should also be noted that this system resulted in over 12,000 calls to Blue Book over a twenty year period, an average of over eleven reports per week. Blue Book hardly had the manpower for a thorough investigation of all these reported sightings, so UFO officers were necessary.

By 3:30 am, there had been numerous reports of sightings including some over Malmstrom AFB. That morning, details were put into a message sent to various Air Force offices, including the Office of the Air Force Chief of Staff and the Foreign Technology Division at Wright-Patterson AFB (TDET). Four months later word had filtered back to TDET that there had been some equipment problems during the March 24th sightings. They sent an inquiry to Chase. It stated that:

“Our office has been informed that during the sightings there were equipment malfunctions and abnormalities in the equipment. One individual stated that the USAF instructed both military and civilian personnel not to discuss what they had seen as it was a classified government experiment. Request information on the validity of such statements. If some type of experiment did occur on or about 24 March 1967, please advise.”

Within a few days, Chase replied:

“This office has no knowledge of equipment malfunctions and abnormalities in equipment during the period of reported UFO sightings. No validity can be established to the statement that a classified government experiment was in progress or that military and civilian personnel were requested not discuss what they had seen.”

These are blatantly false statements since I, and others can attest that we were ordered not to talk to anyone about our incident and that our equipment certainly did malfunction; if it had been a military experiment, we would have since had the capability of easily disabling nuclear missiles at will. This correspondence was written after the Condon Committee meeting with the Air Force Base UFO officers. Since Chase was obviously not disclosing the missile shutdown incidents even to another Air Force office, clearly the cover-up was ongoing and he was in the middle of it. By the time Roy Craig came to ask questions about the Echo Flight Incident, Lt. Col. Chase would know what he was expected to do.³²⁸

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS 341ST COMBAT SUPPORT GROUP (SAC)
MALMSTROM AIR FORCE BASE, MONTANA, 59402



REPLY TO
ATTN: GFI BO

3 July 1967

SUBJECT: UFO Observations, Malmstrom AFB Area

TO: Colonel James C. Manatt (TDET/UFO)
Hq Foreign Technology Division (AFSC)
Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio 45433

1. Reference TDET/UFO letter dated 30 June 1967 on above subject.
2. This office has no knowledge of equipment malfunctions and abnormalities in equipment during the period of reported UFO sightings. No validity can be established to the statement that a classified government experiment was in progress or that military and civilian personnel were requested not to discuss what they had seen.
3. A written report on the events that transpired during the alleged UFO reported landing on 24 March 1967, fully documents all findings by the investigating officer. A copy of this report was forwarded to your office on 3 April 1967.
4. If we can be of further assistance to you, please do not hesitate to write.

FOR THE COMMANDER

Lewis D. Chase

LEWIS D. CHASE, Lt Colonel, USAF
Chief, Operations Division

This is a pretty straightforward sequence of events Salas is claiming, but once again he's using evidence that proves there were no equipment malfunctions related to UFOs at Malmstrom AFB as evidence *supporting* such an assertion. If we are forced by the weight of evidence to support this ridiculous association of flying saucers and Echo-November-Oscar Flight equipment failures, which we are fortunately *not*, we would have to also support the proposition that Chase *knowingly* lied to the Foreign Technology Division at Wright-Patterson AFB. Salas is here asserting that Chase lied "to another Air Force office" in order to ensure the success of the cover-up. This, however, is an impossible supposition – another of many that Salas has made and continues to make. The one absolute law in every activity of the Department of Defense is that you don't lie to your own chain of command, and that's what Chase would have been doing here, and that's why it couldn't have happened.

Before the "Foreign Technology Division" at Wright-Patterson AFB was called the "Foreign Technology Division" at Wright-Patterson AFB, it was the Air Technical Intelligence Center (ATIC, which became very influential during the Korean War), and was under the direct command of the Air Materiel Control Department. The Foreign Technology Division would later become the National Air and Space Intelligence Center. It was in 1961 that ATIC became the Foreign Technology Division (FTD); at that time it was also reassigned to Air Force Systems Command. When captured MIGs were taken apart and rebuilt so the Air Force could learn as much about them as possible, it was the Foreign Technology Division that was responsible for the job. But that was only one of its responsibilities. The Foreign Technology Division was in charge of a lot of aerospace intelligence missions. As ATIC, it was in charge of Projects Sign and Grudge. As the Foreign Technology Division, it was in charge of Project Blue Book. In addition, by the spring of 1967, the Headquarters Research and Technology Division staff was consolidated with Air Force Systems Command. *All* of the high technology research and development laboratories were by then interconnected all the way to the top of the Air Force authority structure via Air Force Systems Command, with the Foreign Technology Division running *everything* having to do with UFOs. All of the development by civil contractors of the Minuteman II and III missile systems, all of the new protective systems being incorporated into the guidance and control systems, all of the new silo structures that were being redesigned and outfitted to house the Minuteman II and III systems discussed by Nalty in his histories, *everything* went through Air Force Systems Command. Once again, this is knowledge Salas

should have been aware of years ago. Chase conducted his investigation IAW AFR 80-17, which went into effect September 1966. Excerpts of particularly informative elements in this Air Force Regulation that apply to this portion of Salas' commentary have been underlined by the author of this narrative; I've decided to point them out, since Salas and Hastings are apparently incapable of doing so, or at least that's the impression we get as a result of their ignoring it entirely.

The Air Force will analyze reports of UFOs submitted to it to attain the program objectives. In this connection these facts are of importance:

- (1) The need for further scientific knowledge in geophysics, astronomy and physics of the upper atmosphere which may be provided by study and analysis of UFOs and similar aerial phenomena.
 - (2) The need to report all pertinent factors that have a direct bearing on scientific analysis and conclusions of UFO sightings.
 - (3) The need and the importance of complete case information. Analysis has explained all but a small percentage of the sightings which have been reported to the Air Force. The ones that have not been explained are carried statistically as "unidentified." Because of the human factors involved and because of analysis of a UFO sighting depends on a personal interpretation by the observer rather than on scientific data or facts obtained under controlled conditions, the elimination of all unidentifieds is improbable. However, if more immediate, detailed and objective data on the unidentifieds that have been available and promptly reported, perhaps these too, could have been identified.
3. Program Responsibilities:
- a. Program Monitor. The Deputy Chief of Staff, Research and Development, is responsible for the overall program, evaluation of investigative procedures, and the conduct of separate scientific investigations.
 - b. Resources. The Air Force Systems Command will support the program with current resources within the Foreign Technology Division (FTD) at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, to continue Blue Book effort. Other AFSC resources normally used by FTD [Foreign Technology Division] for this effort will continue to be made available.³²⁹
 - c. Investigation. Each commander of an Air Force Base will provide a UFO investigative capability. When notice of a UFO sighting is received, an investigation will be implemented to determine the stimulus for the sighting. An Air Force base receiving the notice of a UFO sighting may not be the base nearest the locale of the sighting. In that event, the reported UFO sighting will be referred to the Air Force base nearest the sighting for action. EXCEPTIONS: FTD [Foreign Technology Division] at Wright-

Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, independently or with the help of pertinent Air Force activities, may conduct any other investigation to conclude its analysis or findings. HQ USAF may arrange for separate investigations.

- d. Analysis. FTD [Foreign Technology Division] will:
 - (1) Analyze and evaluate all information and evidence reported to bases on those UFOs which are not identified at the base level.
 - (2) Use other Government agencies, private industrial companies, and contractor personnel to assist in analyzing and evaluating UFO reports as necessary.
- e. Findings. FTD [Foreign Technology Division], Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, will prepare a final case report on each sighting reported to it after the data have been properly evaluated. If the final report is deemed significant, FTD [Foreign Technology Division] will send the report of its findings to AFSC (SFCA), Andrews AFB, Wash D.C. 20331, which will send a report to HQ USAF (AFRDC), Wash D.C. 20330.
- f. Cooperation. All Air Force activities will cooperate with UFO investigators to insure that pertinent information relative to investigations of UFO are promptly obtained. When feasible, this will include furnishing air or ground transportation and other assistance.³³⁰

The above paragraph (f.) “Cooperation” is particularly enlightening; these were standing orders that no local chain of command had the authority to ignore, and all of these general orders extended down from the Foreign Technology Division. Lt. Col. Chase, as the Malmstrom AFB UFO Officer, was directly responsible to the Foreign Technology Division at Wright-Patterson AFB. By lying to them, he would have been lying to his direct supervisory control. This is a rank structure that neither he, nor anybody else at Malmstrom AFB, had the authority to circumvent. Lt. Col. Chase would have *never* lied to them, and to suggest that he did so in order to cover-up interference with nuclear missiles by UFOs is not only insulting, it’s absolutely stupid. UFO proponents should be asking themselves, “*who exactly is Salas trying to bamboozle now?*”

Chase didn’t lie. He was an honest man, and he answered his superiors with complete candor. *UFOs had nothing to do with the missile failures.* The information received by the Foreign Technology Division at Wright-Patterson AFB that equipment problems were the result of UFOs sighted on March 24 was incorrect – nothing more than a “rumor” – and when they looked into it, that’s exactly what they discovered. This shows us *absolutely*, in Salas’ own

words, that there were no equipment failures due to the UFO activity on March 24. And if that's true, then it's also certain that Oscar Flight wasn't disabled by UFOs, and didn't even occur on March 24, since Chase would, without any doubt at all, have mentioned it when he was asked about equipment failures by the Foreign Technology Division. Most likely these "rumors" were the result of more insistent noise and crap coming from the NICAP camp, possibly even Fowler himself, who was an investigator with NICAP. This is suggested by the fact that "One individual stated that the USAF instructed both military and civilian personnel not to discuss what they had seen as it was a classified government experiment",³³¹ and NICAP – with its membership consisting, in part, of a lot of people who have acted demonstrably paranoid as hell – is as likely a source of this noise as anyplace else, particularly since we can demonstrate that Fowler was aware of both the Echo Flight Incident equipment malfunctions *and* Project Blue Book's investigation of UFO sightings on March 24-25. He also had the means to perpetrate such a rumor, as well as the motivation to do so in his capacity as a NICAP investigator already affronted by the Air Force's insistence that UFOs were illusory at best.

Wherever these "rumors" came from, there's little doubt that the events described above happened exactly as described: "This office has no knowledge of equipment malfunctions and abnormalities in equipment during the period of reported UFO sightings. No validity can be established to the statement that a classified government experiment was in progress or that military and civilian personnel were requested not to discuss what they had seen."³³² There was no conspiracy, and Chase didn't lie to his own chain of command. The only lies here are those told by Robert Salas in support of the same fiction he's been pushing for years. It's a *joke*, it's always been a *joke*, and it will always be a *joke*. And anybody who believes otherwise does so in the face of insurmountable evidence to the contrary. These people are not heroic purveyors of truth – they slander the memories of men who lack the ability to defend themselves. I can't help but wonder why it took Salas fifteen years to state that Roy Craig was incompetent, Robert Low was a spineless slacker, and Lt. Col. Lewis Chase was a liar, since Craig's book has been available to anybody with the desire to read it since it was originally published in 1995 while Craig was still alive and willing to be interviewed by anyone who desired to do so. Personally, I think the answer is obvious: *he's a shameless coward* who could afford to wait until everybody

³³¹ <http://www.theufochronicles.com/2009/10/air-force-cover-up-deception-distortion.html>

³³² *Ibid.*

who could properly dispute his insults and impressions was *dead*. For the sake of honesty, I should point out that there's no reason at all to believe that Salas might have been aware of Craig's book back in 1995 – *except one*. Way back at the beginning of this narrative, I mentioned an interview that Salas granted UFOCOM, in which he claimed that

It was not until I read an account of the Echo incident in a book that I decided to send an inquiry under FOIA for declassification of information regarding the incident. At that time I believed I was at Echo flight because I could not recall my location. I later learned that I was at November flight. I feel justified in going public with this story because of the declassification of the Echo incident.³³³

I also pointed out that an examination of the FOIA response originally received by Dale Goudie indicated that he had specifically requested information "regarding an incident on or about 25 March 1967."³³⁴ This would fit very well if Salas & Co. sent off their FOIA request after reading *Craig's book* upon its publication in 1995, since Craig does not mention the March 16, 1967 date when the Echo Flight Incident actually occurred, but the March 25 date, which was done in error (possibly as a result of receiving bad information from Raymond Fowler, the NICAP investigator). If this is what actually happened, it's mystifying why Salas would have waited until 2009 to raise any issues whatsoever regarding Craig and the other men he is suddenly so critical of – Robert Low and Lt. Col. Lewis Chase – unless he consciously decided *not* to raise the issue at all, fearful that any opposing arguments would be stronger than his own, resulting in a loss of his own credibility, a cost that was too great to even consider that early in the establishment of his new paradigm. *But then they all died ...* And now?

It is important to emphasize that, although he was charged with investigating this incident, Craig failed to conduct or document interviews with any principal witnesses. This is verified by his notes and his own book. By his own admission he simply took the word of Col. Chase that there was no UFO involvement and did not pursue an in-depth investigation as he was authorized and responsible to do.³³⁵

The tone of this note indicates that Low was simply accepting this rationale for classifying the missile shutdowns as a non-UFO event. According to records of Dr. McDonald, Robert Low never followed up on this request. If Low had followed up on his request and asked for more details, such as the possibility of nuclear explosion EMP from the Air Force, he might have discovered that the U.S. did not test any nuclear weapons in the period from March 10 through April 4, 1967

³³³ <http://www.ufoevidence.org/Cases/CaseSubarticle.asp?ID=1019> - UFOCOM Correspondence, Interview conducted via mail with Mr. Robert L. Salas, maintained at <http://www.ufoevidence.org> since at least 01/2009.

³³⁴ Letter, 18 August, 1995; Curt E. Copeland, CAPT, USAF, Chief, Base Information Management, 341st Mission Support Squadron/IMQDF, Malmstrom AFB; Mr. Dale Goudie, Seattle, WA, 98118.

³³⁵ <http://www.theufochronicles.com/2009/10/air-force-cover-up-deception-distortion.html>

... Low should have realized that if nuclear EMP was truly involved, it would have created widespread havoc throughout our strategic missile forces.³³⁶

Chase lied to Craig about UFO involvement in the Echo incident and did not mention the fact that Oscar flight was disabled on March 24.³³⁷

It's kind of amusing to contemplate how many other people also didn't mention Oscar Flight being disabled on March 24 – like *everybody else on the planet*. None of Salas' statements make any sense at all, so why slander Craig, Low, and Chase? Chase, particularly, was already cooperating with Craig regarding a different sighting. Craig, who knew Chase well, was positive he was not being lied to and mentions this in his book. Chase, in fact, was and always had been an honest man, and there's no evidence *anywhere* that he ever lied about *anything*. He was honest with Craig, and every document, memory, and inference ever written, retained, or made supports this, with the *single exception* being those coming from Robert Salas, who has demonstrably lied on numerous occasions in regard to this very matter. He continues to lie, and continues to twist and break a large compilation of well supported facts to make them fit – poorly, for the most part – into his story, so that little UFO groupies will continue to get wet whenever his name is mentioned, and he can continue “billing” them for the pleasure.

Craig was told that Echo Flight was disabled on the 24th and that was never corrected to him (the actual date was March 16) by anyone in the Air Force because then they would have had to admit that a second flight (Oscar) was disabled under similar circumstances.³³⁸

This is more ridiculous and worthless “logic” leading Salas by the nose from nothing to nowhere. In fact, for someone who claimed for about *eight years* that all of this happened on March 16, Salas is a little bit *too* critical at this point, especially since he wants people to assume that the *one event* he's been constantly redefining for fifteen years now occurred on March 24-25 instead of March 16, as he was insisting for *years*. I understand the man's stupidity, believe me, because it's so apparent – but how the hell does he conclude that correcting the error that Echo Flight failed on March 24 instead of March 16 *forces* the Air Force to admit that Oscar Flight failed under similar conditions, when the Air Force wasn't going to *correct* or *admit* anything to anybody that didn't have both the security clearance for information

³³⁶ <http://www.theufochronicles.com/2009/10/air-force-cover-up-deception-distortion.html>

³³⁷ *Ibid.*

³³⁸ *Ibid.*

access and could establish the “need-to-know”? Both of these requirements were necessary to even *discuss* the matter, and both requirements were entirely *absent* from any conversation anybody ever had with Mr. Roy Craig, a status he specifically demanded upon first joining the Condon UFO Study Group, because he didn’t want authority over what he could and could not say to reside with any person other than *himself*. More importantly, Salas still hasn’t established that *anything at all* happened at Oscar Flight. The absence of any documentation that even *mentions* Oscar Flight missiles being disabled is decidedly mysterious, but only if you assume Salas is telling the truth. If you assume, as any sane man would, that he’s been *lying continuously for 15 years*, changing his story each time someone *proves* the errors inherent to his nonsense until finally reaching that plateau of unbearable dysfunction where the folk tales and legends haven’t yet been verifiably destroyed, the mysterious nonexistence of such documents discussing Oscar Flight is decidedly *normal*. These missing documents are in exactly the same place as the documents mentioning Salas as the “on-duty” watch officer at Echo Flight on March 16, which is in the same place as those documents mentioning Salas as the “on-duty” watch officer at November Flight on March 16, which is in the same place as those documents mentioning a November Flight missiles failure under similar circumstances as those at Echo Flight, which is in the same place as – well, you get it. *They’re missing, because they don’t fucking exist, and they’ve never existed except in the imaginations of fools, idiots, and liars*

Craig was told that Echo Flight was disabled on the 24th as part of the general UFO “rumor mill” possibly created by a NICAP investigator who didn’t know the true facts of the event, because *he was not cleared to receive that information*. It was classified, which is the very *point* of security classification. He was never corrected by anybody because the matter was *classified* – highly classified – and Craig was *not* cleared to receive that information either. And if Craig *did* have a security clearance appropriate for the level of classification – it being SECRET – he would *still* have been refused the information he desired, because the Echo Flight Incident *did not involve UFOs* at all, and unless UFOs were involved he could not have established “need-to-know” as a necessary parameter for access. That’s why Robert Low was also unable to obtain access to the information they wanted, even though he had been granted a SECRET clearance. *Oscar Flight had nothing to do with it*, and the Oscar Flight missiles were certainly *not* “disabled under similar circumstances”; *they were not disabled at all*. There is no

documentation *anywhere*, that such is the case, and there are no witnesses *anywhere* to confirm this story of Salas', because *Salas is lying*, as he has done *repeatedly* since 1995-1996. He said he was at Echo Flight on March 16 – *which was a lie*; He said he was at November Flight on March 16 – *which was a lie*; He said he was at Oscar Flight on March 16 – *which was a lie*; he now claims he was at Oscar Flight on March 24 – *and that is also a lie*. Why would anybody believe what this ignorant, and insulting little man has to say about *anything*? And, in fact, he has already *proven* that nothing happened on March 24-25 that involved *any* equipment malfunctions at all, and we even have the actual letter that says this. That's how absolutely idiotic this man's assertions are!

Roy Craig had refused to look at any cases which might involve a security classification. He simply bought into Chase's explanation and did no further investigation of an incident that was referred to him by credible sources. [Since when is a fucking NICAP investigator without the security clearance to gain access to any of the information necessary to come up with a valid conclusion a "credible" source? And even though Craig lacked entirely any security clearance credentials to get access to the information he wanted, he nonetheless found out who was in charge of the investigation and a rough idea of when the investigation report was coming out, which is a hell of a lot more than NICAP investigator Raymond Fowler or Salas himself were able to come up with; Craig also walked away satisfied that the Echo Flight Incident did not involve UFOs, which is a lot more progress made than Salas could possibly manage.] Therefore, one of the most important cases, the Malmstrom AFB missile shutdowns, which could have had a major impact on the results of the study, was not even considered.³³⁹ [And at this point, my derision and contempt for the man are infinite ...]

And therein lies the cradle of ridiculous assumption, born and sold, slave to the vanity of a single man, resuscitating Jesus even with full knowledge of the futility inherent to that act. This "one of the most important cases" cannot be supported objectively, cannot be imagined creatively, and does nothing at all for any argument requiring necessity of "full disclosure". The UFO believers community should be desperately *ashamed* of this man.

On March 25, 1967 I woke up groggy from my 24 hour 'tour in the hole', as we referred to duty in the underground capsule. [Of course he did – except during those many years when he was telling people he woke up on March 17, 1967.] As I recall that morning, I picked up the Great Falls Tribune and read accounts of UFO reports around the area. Later that afternoon I received a call from one of the airmen who had seen the object at Oscar Flight where we had experienced the strange incident the morning before. He pleaded, no begged me to meet with him to talk about what had happened.³⁴⁰

³³⁹ <http://www.theufochronicles.com/2009/10/air-force-cover-up-deception-distortion.html>

³⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

This is another remarkable lie – one he never even *hinted* at in the fifteen years since breaking his original story – which he continued to break on a regular basis thereafter. Is the general public going to have to put up with this insane crap for the rest of his life? *“He pleaded, no begged me to meet with him.”* And these new memories don’t offend anybody? We’ve already established that his January 1997 version of these events pretty conclusively asserts that all of the these newspaper stories he now claims to have read the next day were actually stories he insisted he read a week later. What he said *precisely* was that

Jim Klotz, the investigator who had submitted the FOIA requests, and I had previously narrowed the time period by retrieving news reports from the Great Falls Tribune about UFO sightings during the early part of 1967. I had recalled reading such reports after my incident. In fact there were many news articles about UFO sightings a few weeks before and one week after the Echo incident.³⁴¹

It’s difficult to believe that anybody would willingly accord him the benefit of the doubt in a world of his own creation where doubt is the only proven commodity. Whether they believe in UFOs or not, I would like to know how many Americans can look at this and say, “wow, that’s convincing,” without *vomiting*. *You got any names for us Bobby?* Anybody we can talk to in order to gauge their credibility and sincerity? *Anything at all aside from this sickening display of mock patriotism from a man who is arguably a traitor to the nation he once served?*

All he wanted to do was talk about it. He had been one of the security guards who had to stand in abject terror in front of this large red pulsating ball of light by our front gate with only a rifle in his hands. He told me unashamedly that he was confused and frightened by what he had seen and he was desperate to speak with me about it.³⁴²

And why would he want to talk to Salas, an *officer*, and not someone in a direct supervisory capacity? Someone else who actually *saw* what he saw? After all, Salas was underground for the entire event and never actually *saw* anything (this, of course, being in our hypothetical universe, not the real one where *nothing happened*). Why Salas and not the leading NCO of the security detachment? Or if he had to speak to an officer, why not the actual commander, CAPT Frederick Meiwald, a man who supposedly witnessed and heard exactly what Salas did, and yet claims that he doesn’t even believe in UFOs? The answer’s obvious –

³⁴¹ Salas, Robert L., "Minuteman Missiles Shutdown", Mutual UFO Network UFO Journal, January, 1997, No. 345, pp. 15-17, cont. 22, 23.

³⁴² *Ibid.*

because it gives Salas more credit as a witness in this imaginary tale, although admittedly, it does nothing for his credibility, which is still floating around zero.

I had to tell him that I had taken an oath not to speak about the incident to anyone and could not meet with him. [This would be the non-disclosure agreement he says he signed immediately after being debriefed; it's interesting that nobody who we can prove was at Echo Flight on March 16 was forced to sign anything like a non-disclosure agreement; both individuals assert that they weren't asked to sign anything apart from their logbooks; more importantly, a non-disclosure agreement isn't legally necessary, because disclosing classified information is illegal already; in fact, during my entire 16-year career in the military, I had a clearance between SECRET and TOP SECRET (SCI), and I was never asked to sign a non-disclosure agreement until I left the military; that's how it's done – if you've got the clearance, *you're supposed to already know the rules.*] As much as anything that has transpired in my life, that conversation has consistently haunted me to this day. [Isn't that sweet ...will somebody please shoot this obnoxious fuck?] I was unaware at that time that the entire flight of ten Minuteman I missiles was also disabled while UFOs were observed over the launch facilities of Echo Flight on March 16, 1967.³⁴³

You know it's funny, but he's never mentioned *this* incident before, either. In fact, in every previous version of this tale, he's stated that he found out about Echo Flight from his commander, Frederick Meiwald while he was still sixty feet underground, well before any face-to-face discussion with *anybody* on the security team, well before the next day, and *definitely* well before March 25, 1967. In fact, in most versions of this story, he's claimed that the telephone call notifying Meiwald of the Echo Flight Incident also notified him that it happened *on the same day!* Not a week later ...

In January 1997: "The Echo crew confirmed that they had spoken to my commander that day and told him of their incident."³⁴⁴

In *Faded Giant*: "After reporting to the Command Post, Fred turned to me and stated that the same kind of missile shutdowns had happened at Echo Flight!"³⁴⁵

In the Disclosure Project: "After I talked to my guard upstairs, my commander talked to the command post. When he finished talking to the command post he turned to me and said, 'The same thing occurred at ECHO Flight.'"³⁴⁶

And now? "I was unaware at that time that the entire flight of ten Minuteman I missiles was also disabled while UFOs were observed over the launch facilities of Echo Flight on March

³⁴³ Salas, Robert L., "Minuteman Missiles Shutdown", *Mutual UFO Network UFO Journal*, January, 1997, No. 345, pp. 15-17, cont. 22, 23.

³⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁴⁵ Salas, Robert and Klotz, James, *Faded Giant*, BookSurge, LLC, 2005, ISBN 1-4196-0341-8.

³⁴⁶ Greer, Steven M., M.D., Director, and Loder, Theodore C., III, Ph.D., "Disclosure Project Briefing Document Prepared for: Members of the Press, Members of United States Government, Members of the US Scientific Community", April, 2001.

16, 1967,” “at that time” equating to “March 25, 1967 ... groggy from my 24 hour ‘tour in the hole’”. ³⁴⁷

This is all so very well-documented, that it seems to suggest that Salas doesn’t care whether he’s caught in another lie or not. Maybe it’s true – maybe after so many lies, they just blend together into a sludgy, long, pudding-filled and totally believable story ...

They too were not allowed to talk about it. James Klotz and I have documented these events in our book *Faded Giant*. There are multiple witness statements and documentation to support these claims. At least for the sake of that airman I spoke with, and for all the other officers and men in the Air Force who have had to keep silent about what they experienced with these objects, I, without reservation, accuse the U.S. Department of the Air Force of blatant, pervasive and a continuing cover-up of the facts, deception, distortion, and lying to the public about the reality of the UFO phenomenon. ³⁴⁸

Oh, lovely, let’s demand full disclosure for the soldiers! For the airmen! *Let’s do it for Jesus!* Robert Salas is an absolutely *sickening* human being; and those who defend this sack of shit – men like James Klotz, Robert Hastings, Steve Greer, and those idiots hiding crowded behind CUFON and NICAP – deserve all the same credit, because those who support and assist a liar without even bothering to do a little research, are not simply *stupid* and *ineffectual*, they are disloyal even to themselves, and commit a disservice to all those who *trust* them. If you want to investigate UFOs – *fine*; but if you can’t even see how this man’s lies hurt the cause you’ve adopted, you’re not going to get very far convincing *anybody* of *anything*. I don’t know if UFOs are real or not, and frankly, until this guy made his claims about my father, I didn’t really *care* a whole lot, but if those supporting the investigation of UFOs are so one-sided in their argument, lack the common sense necessary to make applicable judgments of real situations of any worth, are so ignorant and unable to educate themselves regarding the military aspects of the issue they’re interested in the most, that they *still* believe the story Robert Salas has told in so many different versions, with such changeable aspects of both character and location and time, even when the obvious truth to that story and an outline of the numerous lies told by the man is pounded into their heads, and into their thoughts and into their very *consciousness*, than they deserve to be ridiculed and laughed at as cranks without sense enough to know when someone’s telling them an imaginary story and pissing on their brains at the same time.

³⁴⁷ <http://www.theufochronicles.com/2009/10/air-force-cover-up-deception-distortion.html>

³⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

These people have orchestrated an assault on the American mind, and the fact that they've been allowed to get away with it for 15 years when all of the information necessary to prove it as the garbage it represents is so easily available has to be one of the most pathetic examples of journalistic ineptitude imaginable. People can and should be allowed to believe whatever they want, but they do themselves a disservice when they believe something that is so provably false. And those allowed to profit from their creation of such tinselled dreams should be applauded for enriching the body of America's fictional literary enterprise; but when they promote their works as *history*, they should be appropriately ridiculed, and their works revealed for what they are: the products of either rampant imagination or clinical paranoia.

The notes following are intended to be simple reflections of the author regarding the matters we've discussed. Although intended to present additional information (and to that extent they have been repeatedly fact checked), they lack to at least some degree the footnotes of sources, and some of the details necessary to fit them properly into the original manuscript. I didn't want to completely cut them out, because a lot of the information here, although introduced at some level into the narrative above, nonetheless has some additional enlightening information. I think they have some value, and I didn't want to just dump them. So, I'm just considering it as some sort of *Appendix*, and I'm tossing it in here at the end for others to judge as they wish. I've separated each by a short, centered row of dashes like the one just below. *Cheers.*

Now it's time for a short quiz to gauge your understanding of what constitutes believable evidence ...

Please read the following short narrative and answer the single multiple choice question at the end; the results will not be collated, so be honest, and answer the question to the best of your present ability. Hopefully, you'll learn something new about yourself.

You meet a nice guy named Bobby at a neighborhood cookout, and he seems honest enough, and heck, you're willing to accept what he says as true, because while you don't know him that well, you're a pretty good guy who wants to believe that people are basically honest. But you're not a pushover either. You're a good old, average, level-headed American.

Bobby tells you that Adolf Hitler had survived World War Two, and was still alive well into the 1960s. The burned body discovered by Soviet Union forces in 1945 that everybody assumes was Hitler's body was not really Hitler's body. DNA tests were never conducted, and there's no solid evidence anywhere that he was really dead. In fact, there's a lot of anecdotal evidence floating around that indicates he faked his death, and escaped to Argentina along with a number of other high ranking Nazis at the end of the war. Bobby mentions that he knows this is absolutely true, because he met Adolf Hitler, who introduced himself to Bobby while they were both at President Dwight D. Eisenhower's funeral.

"Now wait a minute, Bobby. I was at Eisenhower's funeral, too, and I know for a fact that you weren't there; Hitler couldn't have introduced himself to you."

"Oh, *wait a minute* – did I say Eisenhower? No, no – it was at President *Kennedy's* funeral. I just got a little mixed up, because they were both Presidents during the same decade. Adolf Hitler was really at *John F. Kennedy's* funeral, so, of course, that's where he introduced himself to me. Because of this, it's plainly obvious that Hitler was alive and well at the time."

"So Hitler wasn't at Eisenhower's funeral ... is that right?"

"Oh, no! He was also at Eisenhower's funeral alright. He went to both funerals – Kennedy's *and* Eisenhower's."

"Good God, man!" you say, surprised despite the creeping doubt. "And you can prove this?"

"Well, *of course* I can prove it. I met Eisenhower's son at a party a few years ago, and he told me that he saw a man who looked a lot like Adolf Hitler at his father's funeral. He thought that was pretty odd, but since he believes that Hitler killed himself in 1945, and his body was subsequently cremated, he didn't think anything of it at the time – he thought he just saw a guy who looked a lot like Hitler. But, believe me, I know it really *was* Adolf Hitler, because when I met Hitler at Kennedy's funeral, he himself told me that he had also been present at *Eisenhower's* funeral. It's plainly obvious, therefore, that he actually survived the war and went to both funerals."

"Oh, of course! *Plainly obvious* ..."

"That's right."

"Can you prove that Adolf Hitler actually *was* at Kennedy's funeral?"

"Well, of course I can! That's a silly question! Dozens of people saw me there, and Adolf Hitler introduced himself to *them* as well. *That proves it* – he was there, and flimsy denials to the contrary are simply irrelevant."

"Clearly ... Okay, who are these dozens of people? I'd like to know whether they saw Hitler, someone who looked like Hitler, or didn't see anybody at all. I mean, this is a lot to take in; it's kind of shocking information, so before I believe you, I think it should be verified."

"I don't understand ... *I just now verified it for you.* I saw him there. He introduced himself to me as Adolf Hitler, and he looked *exactly* like Hitler. Dozens of witnesses saw me there, and also heard Hitler introduce himself. Believe me – *it's all verified.*"

"I know, okay? I just want to know who these dozens of other witnesses are ... for the record, y'know?"

"Well, I don't remember their *names* – it was a long time ago. But it did happen ... Some guy told me a few years later that he actually took a photograph of Hitler while he was standing in attendance at Kennedy's funeral. Unfortunately, it was destroyed while he was trying to develop it. He made a dumb mistake and now it's gone – man, if we only had that photograph it would have convinced the entire *world*. Such shame – such a *damn* shame."

"Okay, that's a little weird. You know, the Smithsonian Institute in Washington, DC still has all of the guest books for Kennedy's funeral, so we should go take a look at them; we'll see your name, and hopefully, we'll see Adolf Hitler's name as well, or at least an alias in Adolf Hitler's handwriting. That ought to be easy enough for us to verify, and then you can write a book about how Hitler survived the war. It'll probably be a best-seller ..."

"Oh, *wait a minute* – did I say *Kennedy's* funeral? I meant *Sherlock Holmes'* funeral. I just had a little memory fart, there. I was at Sherlock Holmes' funeral when I met Adolf Hitler. It was around the same time as Kennedy's funeral, so I got the two mixed up some ... I mean it was just so long ago and all; you can see why I may have forgotten a few minor details."

"Sherlock Holmes' funeral ..."

"That's right."

"Ummm, Bobby, Sherlock Holmes is a *fictional* character in a series of novels and short stories written by Arthur Conan Doyle. He never existed; there's no evidence at all to support the proposition that he was a real person. He didn't exist in any tangible form whatsoever."

"*The Hell, you say.* I was at his funeral – I know for a *fact* that he existed. I was there. I met Adolf Hitler there. Dozens of people saw me there, and heard Hitler introduce himself as 'Adolf Hitler'. You can't argue that he wasn't real, because I know better. *I was there.* I don't recall seeing you there – you didn't go to Sherlock Holmes' funeral, did you?"

"Uhh, *no* ..."

"Well, then how can you possibly assert that it didn't happen? You think I would *lie* about something like that, about Adolf Hitler's survival well after World War Two? This is probably the most important historical mystery *of all time* – I would *NEVER* lie about something like that. Adolf Hitler was alive well into the modern era, and I can *prove* it, because I *saw* him, and dozens of other people saw him. Adolf Hitler was also at Eisenhower's funeral – that's a fact that you just can't deny. Eisenhower's son saw him. He thought it was *ironic* ..."

"But you said he didn't recognize him as Hitler!"

"Yes, he did. He just didn't *believe* it was Hitler. And Adolf Hitler was also at Sherlock Holmes' funeral. I saw him there. I spoke to him. Dozens of other people saw him as well ..."

"Okay, well who else saw him?"

"I don't remember their *names* – it was a long time ago. But I can verify their stories, because I saw him, too. He was at Sherlock Holmes' funeral, and Sherlock Holmes was a real person, and I'm a much more reliable witness of this than you are, because I was actually *there*, and you were *not*. This is an important historical event – Adolf Hitler survived well into the modern era, and, more importantly, he really enjoyed going to funerals. He enjoyed them a whole lot ... *he went to funerals all the time.*"

Please pick the most accurate answer from among the following:

- a. Adolf Hitler went to Dwight D. Eisenhower's funeral.
- b. Adolf Hitler went to Sherlock Holmes' funeral.
- c. Both a and b.
- d. Lather, rinse, repeat.
- e. *Don't be a fucking idiot* – Adolf Hitler killed himself in 1945, and his body was then cremated. The fact that DNA tests weren't conducted is irrelevant, and Bobby's a goddamn liar.

If you picked any answer other than (e), the new thing about yourself that you should learn from this exercise is three-fold: (1) you lack common sense to such an extent that you should be considered legally handicapped at the same level that a learning disabled individual is considered handicapped, (2) unlike most people, you have little grasp of history and the way interconnected events fit into history, and (3) it's very possible that even after reading my narrative describing the Echo Flight Incident and contemplating the evidence that I've presented, you nonetheless feel that Salas' claims of UFO interference is more believable – and that makes you a drooling idiot.

The original FOIA documents acquired by Salas mention that rumors of UFOs were noted and disproved by the Echo Flight Incident investigation team. This does not mean there was a UFO – it just means there were "rumors" about UFOs. The distinction is important, because both Robert Hastings, author of *UFOs and Nukes*, and Robert Salas use these "rumors" to substantiate the existence of UFOs at Malmstrom AFB in the complete *absence* of any eye-witnesses to *any* UFOs *anywhere* in the March 16 narratives that they have produced. It's remarkable that a case considered by many people throughout the country to be one of those few UFO incidents best supported by the strongest evidence available has not produced *a single eye-witness* to a UFO, nor *any documentation whatsoever* from any source at all during the period in question that can *affirm* the presence of a UFO. *Nothing*. The message

transmissions detailing the missile failures at Echo Flight don't even *suggest* that there was an intervention by a UFO on March 16. They simply state that no cause could be readily identified for the missile failures (although there were indications of errors in the guidance and control computers). The only conclusion dictated at the time was official acknowledgement that a far more intensive investigation would be necessary.

All of the action in this dramatic little story happens more in conjunction with the *second* phone call that Salas receives from the leader of the security team, and this should be examined as well. The first version, recorded in Salas' original article in January, 1997, is *very* exciting.

At the time, I believed the first call to be a joke. Five or ten minutes later, I received a second call from my security NCO. This time he was much more agitated and distraught. He stated that there was a UFO hovering just outside the front gate! He wanted to know what he should do. I don't recall what I said except to secure the fenced area. As we were talking, he said he had to go because one of the guards had been injured.

I immediately woke my commander who had been taking his rest period and started to relate the phone conversations. Within seconds, our missiles began shutting down from "Alert" status to "No-Go" status. I recalled that most, if not all, of our missiles had shut down in rapid succession. Normally, if a missile went off alert status, it was due to a power outage at a particular site and the site power generator would come on line and pick up the power load and the LF would come back on line. It was extremely rare for more than one missile to go off line for any length of time. In this case, none of our missiles came back on line. The problem was not lack of power; some signal had been sent to the missiles which caused them to go off alert.

After we reported this incident to the command post, I phoned my security guard to determine what had transpired topside. He informed me that the guard who had approached the UFO had been injured — not seriously. The guard was being removed by helicopter to the base. I do not recall the nature of the injury or how it was incurred. We were relieved by our scheduled replacement crew later that morning. The missiles had still not been brought on line by on-site maintenance. Once topside, I spoke directly with the security guard about the UFOs. The only additional detail he added, that I recalled, was that the UFO had a red glow and appeared to be saucer-shaped. I do not recall any other details about its appearance. He repeated that it had been immediately outside the front gate, hovering silently.

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I have to admit, it was nice on many levels for the flying saucer then under observation by the security detail to go right to the front gate, as if requesting admittance. On the other hand, I can't help but wonder *why* this UFO would have done so; did the pilot just want to say "hello" to the security personnel just before shutting everything down? Keep in mind, that this thing was supposed to have come from *above*, so why interact with the security detail at all? What was the point of this? Or is this just another example of literary embellishment? Since the security detail was *supposed* to be watching the front gate and the double-fencing at the time, I suppose Salas decided it just *had* to be there, or his imaginary witnesses might not have been able to interact with his imaginary flying saucer.

Salas states that one member of the security team was "injured" during the time the UFO was supposedly hovering just outside the front gate. Unfortunately, he still can't name this particular guard, and there are no medical reports or crew logs to suggest that *anybody* was injured at *anytime*. There are, in fact, no documents at all that mention such an incident. Salas adds that this unknown guard that nobody else has ever mentioned and apparently was not treated at any hospital in the area had to be evacuated in a *helicopter*. Again, no pilot has ever come forward to confirm this, and there are no flight logs that might replace at some level the report of such a witness. And while this would naturally be exactly the sort of story that newspapers would just *love* to get hold of, there's no mention of the incident in newspapers at any time either. Imagine for just a moment how many people would have to be involved supporting an incident of this type: the security guard himself, and every security guard that worked with him; the helicopter pilot and other crew members, if necessary, and the standby emergency team, because it's still dark, and the helicopter needs emergency clearance; there would be an ambulance crew on hand, there would be hospital admittance, you would have the medical treatment crew, and all these folks would have their own logs and reports to write, and all would have supervisory support – we're talking about one hell of a secret here! *Jinkers, Scooby – What a mystery!!*

One note of interest here: one of Robert Hastings' supposedly confirming witnesses, Staff Sgt. Louis D. Kenneweg, stated that the base helicopters did not fly at night, and yet, according to Salas, a helicopter was used to evacuate an injured security guard. So who's right and who's wrong?

The time-line of events that Salas breaks down leaves us wondering whether or not the helicopter pilot saw any sign of the UFO, but even that bit of welcome possibility of enlightenment disappears immediately when we metaphorically step back with a disappointing sigh upon remembering that nobody else has ever mentioned a helicopter pilot, no such pilot has ever come forward, and we have no way of proving whether or not such a pilot ever existed. It is so disappointing on so many levels that this UFO case of Best Evidence has so many goddamn witnesses to confirm it actually occurred, but we can only question the *one man* who was apparently running the show. Once again, Salas relies entirely on the “non-witness witnesses” of the event – *all we get is a second-hand report that can never be confirmed nor examined by anybody*. He offers no description whatsoever of the injury, except to say it was not serious (although it was apparently serious enough to warrant an evacuation by helicopter). Presumably, such an injury would be described in the crew logs, but over the course of forty years, no such logs have ever been produced for us to examine, and no witnesses have ever come forward to confirm an injury of *any* type, not even a scratch. Salas *has* been asked about this (from an otherwise friendly interrogator, well-prepared to believe just about anything), and that deserves some examination.

I recall that his injury was minor, either a burn or a cut he received while approaching or retreating from the object, but not due directly as a result of any attack from the object. He was evacuated from the site before we were relieved by another crew. Although we requested documents pertaining to his injury, we were unable to receive any medical records.³⁵⁰

It's also odd that a helicopter would be immediately sent out to pick up an injured airman – a man who, according to Robert Salas, did not have a very serious injury to start off with – but no aircraft were sent out to force an encounter with the flying saucer itself. *On a nuclear missile base!* Thank God everyone was so concerned about that injured airman, but it's decidedly inconvenient that they were so concerned, they neglected to document the incident, make any record of the treatment, or, apparently, *remember* the fact of his existence.

Fortunately for posterity, in a later version of this event, Salas has evidently (again!) remembered additional information for us to peruse.

I did not take this report seriously and directed him to report back if anything more significant happened. At the time, I believed this first call to be a joke. Still, that sort of behavior was definitely out of character for air security policemen whose communications with us were usually very professional.

A few minutes later, the security NCO called again. This time he was clearly frightened and was shouting his words:

"Sir, there's one hovering outside the front gate!"

"One what?"

"A UFO! It's just sitting there. We're all just looking at it. What do you want us to do?"

"What? What does it look like?"

"I can't really describe it. It's glowing red. What are we supposed to do?"

"Make sure the site is secure and I'll phone the Command Post."

"Sir, I have to go now, one of the guys just got injured."

Before I could ask about the injury, he was off the line. I immediately went over to my commander, Lt. Fred Meiwald, who was on a scheduled sleep period. I woke him and began to brief him about the phone calls and what was going on topside. In the middle of this conversation, we both heard the first alarm klaxon resound through the confined space of the capsule, and both immediately looked over at the panel of annunciator lights at the Commander's station. A 'No-Go' light and two red security lights were lit indicating problems at one of our missile sites. Fred jumped up to query the system to determine the cause of the problem. Before he could do so, another alarm went off at another site, then another and another simultaneously. Within the next few seconds, we had lost six to eight missiles to a 'No-Go' (inoperable) condition.

After reporting this incident to the Command Post, I phoned my security guard. He said that the man who had approached the UFO had not been injured seriously but was being evacuated by helicopter to the base. Once topside, I spoke directly with the security guard about the UFOs. He added that the UFO had a red glow and appeared to be saucer shaped. He repeated that it had been immediately outside the front gate, hovering silently.

At least he now remembers who his commander was inside the LCC: CAPT Fred Meiwald. Unfortunately, *his* recollections have never been properly examined by any type of public forum. Apparently, the only person Meiwald ever discussed this remarkable event with was Robert Salas. So even, though Salas has now actually put a *name* to one of his witnesses

(and even then, it was a name he failed to produce when he first published his little tale, waiting 2-3 years to do so), the effect is pretty much the same as if he had remained anonymous.

We sent a security patrol to check our LFs after the shutdown, and they reported sighting another UFO during that patrol. They also lost radio contact with our site immediately after reporting the UFO.

When we were relieved by our scheduled replacement crew later that morning. The missiles had still not been brought on line by on-site maintenance teams.

Again, UFOs had been sighted by security personnel at or about the time Minuteman Strategic missiles shutdown.

Now he has *another* security patrol that supposedly saw a UFO, but it's the same old song and dance – no names, no witnesses, no documents, nothing in fact to support this story. While we do have another witness' name – Frederick Meiwald – he doesn't actually help much, because he never saw any UFOs either. I was able to contact the man, and he told me that he didn't even believe in UFOs. Other than that bit of enlightenment, he refused to discuss the matter, and I promised not to bother him anymore. An examination of Salas' statements is far more interesting, especially the one major difference between the two separate stories he's told: In the first one, he went from being certain he was at Echo Flight, to having doubts about where he was. His memory certainly improves some, but not about *where the event occurred*. In a *later* version, an interview that was conducted with UFOCOM, however, he's much more certain about *location*. He starts off with a simple introductory statement:

Early that morning I received a call from my security guard who was quite frightened as he reported that an unidentifiable flying object was hovering immediately above the front gate. The object was illuminated by a red glow. He told me all the guards were ready with weapons drawn. During our conversation, one of the guards was injured and he terminated the call.

As I was informing my commander of this conversation, many of our missiles became disabled. When we reported this to the command post, they informed us that a similar incident had occurred at another site and they had all of their missiles disabled while UFOs were observed directly over the launch sites.

Of course, nobody at the command post remembers such a conversation. In fact, Salas himself didn't actually hear the conversation, either. His commander, unnamed at the time, is the only person who ever heard what was supposedly said during the call, so there's nothing there to say Echo Flight or otherwise pinpoint a location for him – only his certainty that there were *two*

incidents that occurred at *two* Flights on the *same* date. If memory serves, however, Salas did mention something kind of like that in January 1997.

After reading this statement I recalled something my commander had said during our incident. After we reported the incident to the command post, he had received a call from another LCC. After that call he turned to me and said, "The same thing happened at another flight." With this "new" recollection, I began to question if I was at Echo during the time of our incident since I knew I was assigned to the 490th Squadron, which did not have responsibility for Echo Flight.³⁵¹

Of course, the information that enabled him to date the event for March 16, 1967 was the call "from another LCC." Another LCC isn't the command post. I guess he got that wrong, too – not that it's important; it only lets him *date* the entire event!. But at least by the time of the UFOCOM interview, he's now pretty sure exactly *where* he was when these incidents occurred. In addition, the answers to the questions given him were answered by mail, so he had plenty of time to ensure the accuracy of his responses. And his memory has sure added some new info! The grammar is a bit of a mess, but none of these guys are terribly bright, so don't be too surprised about that. The questions are in bold type.

Do you remember the name of the security guard who phoned you?

Unfortunately, I cannot recall his name. [Of course not.]

How much guards were at the front gate? Did they open the fire on the object?

There were at least four or five guards at the front gate who saw the UFO. They all had their weapons at the ready but did not fire on the object. [And they apparently never mentioned it again either; also, those guards should have fired their weapons. To not do so qualifies as dereliction of duty; the fact that they just stood there is additional cause to doubt Salas' assertions – of course, none of this would matter if there was no UFO.]

What kind of injury had the wounded guard? Who is he? Is there a medical report about him?

I recall that his injury was minor, either a burn or a cut he received while approaching or retreating from the object, but not due directly as a result of any attack from the object. He was evacuated from the site before we were relieved by another crew. Although we requested documents pertaining to his injury, we were unable to receive any medical records. [In other words, "I don't know", "I don't know", and Hell, no...]

Have you, or someone else, requested for air support?

We have heard from other sources that an F-106 was sent to intercept one of the objects, but we have no records to that effect. We, in the Launch Control Center (LCC), did not request air support because of the sequence of events - the UFO left the site within minutes of the report and there was no hostile attack. [If they shut down every missile, that IS a hostile attack. And this guy

was supposed to preserve American liberties? That's one of the problems with this whole narrative – the author lacks the fundamental understanding inherent to military service. If this had REALLY happened, those guards should have opened fire – this all qualifies as hostile. And so we've got another reason to doubt its veracity – as if we needed one more...]

What was the security reaction?

We did have security violations indications at the launch facilities after the incident at the LCC and we dispatched security teams to investigate. The team also reported seeing a UFO over one of the launch sites which departed very quickly. [Who was on that team? What exactly did they see? Where are the logs documenting it? Where are they now, and why haven't they come forward? Why is there no evidence that any of the this ever occurred? Why are you wasting our time?]

Which is the other launch site that has been also visited? Was it in the same time?

The other LCC was Echo - We were at November. These sites are located some 35-45 miles apart. Their incident occurred the same morning. [Perfect declarations, yes, sir, but then you changed both the location and the date after years had gone by.]

Was the incident reported in the chief guard's diary?

The incident was reported in the Security log and my own log as well as that of the Echo crew. [Oh, goody – that makes it so much easier; so where are the logs; why was nothing retained? Has anything that Salas has said been documented? Because, I've got to tell you, nobody has reason to just accept this without some backup – which is exactly what Salas accused Robert Low and Roy Craig of doing; what goes around comes around.]

What is the name and the rank of your commander?

My crew commander was Frederick C. Meiwald who was a Captain at the time. He later retired as a full Colonel. [Why did it take you some years to admit that? Why does he not believe in UFOs, if they played such an important role in his life? Is it possible to confirm that UFOs took out the missiles and still not believe that UFOs exist?]

Is the sighting (and the injury of the guard) mentioned in the recently declassified officials documents or just the problems with the ICBMs?

One of the document we obtained is the 341st Strategic Missile Wing History for the period January-March 1967. This document goes into great detail about the Echo incident but does not mention the "November incident" except to say that members of the security teams at November flight were questioned. There is only one mention of UFOs in that document. It states: "Rumors of UFOs were disproved." I can certainly show that statement to be false by the testimonies of myself, my commander and the other crew. There was no mention in that document about the injury to our guard. [If you can show anything, than why haven't you done so? Is there anything in your claims that have been documented? Why – after a number of years – did you decide that you weren't at November Flight, but Oscar Flight? Do you still think those statements in the history are lies? And if so, why would anybody lie? How long have you been a tool for paranoia? Why are your errors so obvious and easy to counter? Why are you wasting our time?]

Have you received orders to don't speak about the incident?

Yes. Upon returning to the base, we briefed our Wing Commander, George W. Eldgridge in addition to a member of the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) on the incident. After our briefing we were told the incident was classified and we were not to discuss it with

anyone. I followed these orders even into civilian life - I resigned my commission in 1971. It was not until I read an account of the Echo incident in a book that I decided to send an inquiry under FOIA for declassification of information regarding the incident. At that time I believed I was at Echo flight because I could not recall my location. I later learned that I was at November flight. I feel justified in going public with this story because of the declassification of the Echo incident. [Why do you feel justified in releasing information regarding a November Flight Incident, when you have no way to tell whether it's still classified or not? After all, it's attached to a completely different squadron, with a different chain of command. Why did you decide that you must have been at November Flight – what were your reasons? Why are you wasting our time?]

At least Salas is now certain that he was at November Flight. Of course, that certainty doesn't last. Hell, neither does November Flight. It's true, that by 1997, he had reached the conclusion that he had, in fact, never even served at Echo Flight. In the article he wrote for MUFON UFO Journal he states that:

UFOs were sighted by security personnel at our LCC (probably November Flight), at one of our LFs, and by other security personnel at Echo LFs and these were reported separately to the capsule crews at both LCCs.

He still insisted that the event occurred on March 16, 1967, presumably because he could prove UFOs were spotted at Echo Flight in connection with the missile failures that occurred on that date while he was supposedly at November Flight. But why November Flight? Simply because it's mentioned in the command history that remains Salas' starting point. In order to believe anything at all, people need a starting point – that “already confirmed event” that I mentioned earlier. So he's basically grabbing at anything at all that has actually been *documented*, because he has absolutely nothing else to recommend his story – no witnesses, no documents, no reports, *nothing*. And in the military, where *everything* is documented, that's an amazing thing.

The command history that he uses as his starting point mentions November Flight only once, and even then, it's peripheral to the events that occurred at Echo Flight. Forced to admit that he never served at Echo Flight, there's only one other place he can go that still allows him use of the command history as a documented resource: *November Flight*. The document itself has been reproduced above, but the November Flight reference states:

In the researching of other possibilities, weather was ruled out as a contributing factor in the incident.

A check with Communication maintenance verified that there was no unusual activity with EWO-1 or EWO-2 at the time of the incident.

Rumors of Unidentified Flying Objects (UFO) around the area of Echo Flight during the time of the fault were disproven. A Mobile Strike Team, which had checked all November Flight's LFs on the morning of 16 March 67, were questioned and stated that no unusual activity or sightings were observed.

The 801st Radar Squadron, Malmstrom AFB, gave a negative report on any radar or atmospheric interference problems related to Echo Flight.³⁵²

The supposition, the leap of faith if you will, that Salas expects us to take, says that the Mobile Strike Team was sent to check out the UFOs that also visited November Flight and also shut down the missiles located there. His memory of the events is still good, as far as the UFOs go; he just forgot that he *actually* served at November Flight on March 16, 1967, not Echo Flight. In an article for MUFON, he states:


... there would be no reason to query the November Flight strike team (security) about rumors of UFOs in the area of Echo Flight. This is the only reference to UFOs regarding this incident in any of the documents received from USAF and the statement is simply untrue. None of the reports we received from guards or maintenance personnel were ever retracted.

The only problem with this interpretation is the fact that all of these statements came from the initial investigation of the incident, and they were looking for *anything* that might have caused the problems encountered. The only reason needed to question the Mobile Strike Team was the fact that they were *outside* during the time period being investigated. The actual Launch Facilities were miles from each other, and when proximity alarms went off – which occurred often, because they would go off if somebody started kicking at the fence, or if a bear decided he wanted to scratch his back.— the Mobile Strike Team would get in one of the trucks and check out the perimeter of whatever LF alarm had gone off. The documents Salas and Klotz use are very clear about the Mobil Strike Team: it was the only one out there that may or may not have seen something. So they were questioned, because investigations are thorough. And as the Command History makes very plain, they didn't see *anything* that would otherwise alarm them. "Rumors of Unidentified Flying Objects (UFO)" were brought up during the

investigation, and they *had* to be discounted. *This does not mean there was a UFO at November Flight.* It simply means that UFOs were considered a possible outside influence, and in 1967 the Air Force took such things very seriously. So the Strike Team was questioned, and then dismissed as irrelevant. Any other Strike Team that was out – such as the one Salas seems to think he ordered to check out an Oscar Flight LF – would also have been questioned, but we can safely say they were not checking out anything at the time, *because they're not mentioned in any other document anywhere.*

Nalty's assertion that the Echo Flight Incident was the result of an electromagnetic phenomenon similar in effect to that of a high-altitude electromagnetic pulse from a nuclear detonation is scientifically accurate only when interpreted as an internally generated event. If we assume, as apparently Salas, Hastings, CUFON, and NICAP have done, that the event is the result of an UFO, the claim is equivalent to a confirmed *external* event, and that just isn't possible. An external event would not have been capable of affecting only the Launch Control Center's guidance and control system – it would have affected all of the electronic systems within range. Salas has, in fact, admitted this on numerous occasions, and yet still insists, in the face of a complete encyclopedia's worth of combined scientific and experimentally proven knowledge, that the event was nonetheless external. This implies strongly that he's not just a confirmed liar, he's a confirmed *ignorant* liar. Does he think that UFOs are *magic*? Because that's what we're looking at here. The ten launch facilities resourced by the Echo Flight launch control center are separated from each other by ten miles of Montana terrain, an arrangement achieved in order to prevent a nuclear strike on one silo from destroying the operational capability of the remaining missiles. An external event, such as UFO interference, could not have shut them all down – it's impossible. The connective cabling was properly shielded in accordance with electromagnetic compatibility instructions as they were understood at the time, and the silos themselves were equally shielded by twenty feet of concrete and steel, covered by a sprinkling of Montana dirt and ice. Only an internal electromagnetic event could have shut down those missiles as described in the associated literature, and that event had to originate within the launch control facility.

Electronic devices operating normally in their intended environment, without conducting or radiating excessive amounts of electromagnetic energy, or being susceptible to such energy from internal or external sources [such as, for instance, the logic couplers used in the NS-17s and the G&C units at Echo Flight in 1967], are in the state of electromagnetic compatibility, or EMC. Electromagnetic interference, EMI, is radiated or conducted energy that adversely affects circuit performance, and thus disrupts a device's EMC. Many types of electronic circuits radiate or are susceptible to EMI and must be shielded to ensure proper performance. Establishing basic electromagnetic compatibility in any electronic device generally requires two distinct approaches. The first approach is to reduce EMI generated from internal sources. As shown in Figure 1, this is best accomplished by designing an electronic circuit or device so that it inherently generates less EMI. Residual EMI may then be suppressed or contained within the enclosure by appropriate filtering and shielding methods. [Once suppression filters were installed as part of the force modernization scheduled throughout 1967 and 1968 force wide, there were no repeats of the problem that caused the Echo Flight Incident, and the numerous failures of the NS-17 guidance and control sets ceased.] Filtering cables at the point where they enter or leave the enclosure will reduce conducted emissions.³⁵³




Radiated EMI may be eliminated or reduced by the use of shielded enclosures and shielding materials. The second method for establishing EMC in a device is to improve its immunity (or reduce its susceptibility) to interference from external EMI sources. Figure 1a illustrates an EMI-susceptible device. Susceptibility to external EMI may be reduced or even eliminated by designing circuits and choosing components which are inherently less sensitive to interference. As in the case of internal sources, conducted EMI may be reduced with filtering devices on incoming and outgoing leads as shown in Figure 1b, and susceptibility to externally radiated EMI may be reduced with use of effective shielding, as illustrated in Figure 1c.³⁵⁴

Any examination of functional electromagnetic interference must also take into account the properties of and damage resulting from electromagnetic wave fronts or fields. These

³⁵³ <http://www.chomerics.com/tech/EMITHEORY.htm>

³⁵⁴ <http://www.chomerics.com/tech/EMITHEORY.htm>

include the natural, radiative emanations from microminiaturized circuitry, power sources or cables, and fluctuation in the natural field during repeated switching states.



Radiating electromagnetic waves consist of both an E-field (electric) and an H-field (magnetic) oscillating at right angles to each other, as illustrated in Figure 2 [see above]. E-fields are created from voltage sources, such as logic chips or clocks switching between their zero and 5-volt states. H-fields result from current sources, such as motors and transformers.³⁵⁵

Government regulations in most technologically advanced nations prohibit the use of electronic products that emit EMI at frequencies and amplitudes that could interfere with radio and television receivers. Many European nations also require adherence to noise immunity levels. Of course, these levels weren't often tested for in the early 1960s when the equipment used at Echo Flight and in the NS-17s were designed, and when they were, the accuracy of such results was very often in doubt. As a general rule, there are primarily three types of electromagnetic interference problems encountered as a result of modern technology that need to be taken into account during spectrum analysis of whatever environment the electronic equipment is interacting with.

(1) Suppression of internally generated signals to prevent excessive levels of radiated and/or conducted emissions; [this definitely contributed to the problems with both the NS-17s and with Echo Flight; it's probably most responsible for the ambiguity encountered by the investigation team, making it far more difficult to determine the exact mechanism and structure of the electromagnetic interference.]

The FCC in the United States, CSA in Canada, VCCI in Japan, AUSTEL in Australia, and legislation by EU (European Union) member countries all set certain standards for EMI emission

levels that commercial electronic devices must meet before being sold in those countries. Many electronic products sold in the US must be tested and verified or certified for compliance with the FCC's Part 15 regulations. [In 1967, this wasn't the case; these organizations were not even aware that such a wide-ranging problem was developing along and in measure with technological advancements.]

(2) External ambient interference with equipment operation; [this may have contributed to the problems encountered during operations of the NS-17 guidance and control sets, but it certainly wasn't the primary cause, except insofar as the sensitivity to electromagnetic interference in the logic couplers themselves. Had the logic couplers been possessed of a more substantial noise immunity, of course, there would have been no problems. We can say this with confidence, because once the suppression filters were installed, the problems disappeared. This sort of difficulty is mostly akin to interference preventing radio and television reception, the proper functioning of wireless connectivity necessary for proper internet use on your PC, or reasonable reception on your cell phone.]

Many companies establish their own specifications for immunity to EMI over a range of phenomena. These may include electrostatic discharge (ESD), radiated immunity, and electricfast transients (EFT). This is not yet a requirement in the US; however, EU regulations currently do include immunity requirements.

(3) Internally generated emissions interfering with equipment operation; [this is the primary cause of the Echo Flight Incident as specifically documented by Nalty in his highly classified ICBM history, and implied in the command history Salas used to establish an event at November-Oscar Flight that never occurred. As we've already established, Kominski also implied that this was a problem when he affirmed that the investigation was halted because no results were pending – only in an event caused by internal interference would it be so difficult to trace the exact electrical pathway of the fault(s) due to the transient nature exhibited; the best they could do was test each component for susceptibility to EMI, and then apply the necessary hardware to reduce it. This was done, so further investigation was called to a halt. It certainly wasn't called to halt because the Air Force was covering up UFO involvement, as Salas implies. Think about how idiotic that kind of a solution would be for just a moment. Had UFOs actually been involved, the Air Force would have investigated a lot more thoroughly – not called it off the first time they encountered any difficulties. I can't help but wonder why anybody would actually believe that was the case.]

EMI from one circuit can interfere with the function of another within the same system or subsystem. Typically called cross-talk, this problem is the most common source of system susceptibility. Cross-talk frequently occurs in densely packaged mobile or portable equipment.³⁵⁶

[Cross-talk isn't the only problem that can arise from internally generated signals – at least not in 1967. It was an internal signal that took the missiles off-alert, as an effect of the interference – the fault lay in the poor immunity of the system to noise pulsing, which was in turn caused by internally generated electromagnetic interference.]

Salas does casually throw out an over-bearing statement that “None of the reports we received from guards or maintenance personnel were ever retracted”, but he never gave us any statements or reports from guards or maintenance personnel to start off with! He’s making an arrogant statement of fact that can never be supported in any way. And since he would never have been present at any of the interviews with guards or maintenance personnel that presumably would have taken place if an investigation similar to what was conducted at Echo Flight was also conducted at November Flight (*and there’s absolutely nothing anywhere to suggest that such an event occurred or such an investigation was ever undertaken*), he would never know what those individuals reported or retracted. In any investigation of this sort, privacy of those being questioned is zealously protected in case the investigation uncovers reason for prosecution. In addition, Salas wouldn’t be allowed to know what they said or admitted to investigators, because he would have been under investigation as well. In such a matter, it’s important to know whether or not a person being questioned is *lying*, and one of the methods used to determine this is comparison of accounts. This would be a stupid commentary from any source, but it’s particularly stupid coming from a guy that couldn’t *possibly* know what would have been reported in such an interview. These sessions are kept behind closed doors for a reason, and had this interview that nobody ever recorded regarding an event that nobody ever reported actually taken place, Salas would have been the last person the results of the interview would have been discussed with.

Salas is correct, however, in his assumption that this page is important, but not for the reasons he has given. What Salas *should* have taken note of was the preface “In the researching of other possibilities ...” In this command history, it indicates only that other possibilities were taken into account, as well, and – as the history makes very clear – *completely discounted as an explanation for what occurred*. He should have taken into account as well that the author of the command history was a junior enlisted personnel man using as his only source a single, classified document, the “Report of Engineering Investigation of Echo Flight Incident, Malmstrom AFB, Mont – 16 Mar 67”. We don’t have access to that report, but we can certainly make some accurate inferences regarding its contents by what A2C Gamble, the author of the document we do have access to, wrote about it. For instance, we know that the order in which he recorded the main points on this page is not the order in which they appeared on the original document he references. The reference notes he gives at the bottom

of the page make that very evident. In the original document, the "Report of Engineering Investigation of Echo Flight Incident, Malmstrom AFB, Mont – 16 Mar 67", a "check with Communication maintenance verified that there was no unusual activity with EWO-1 or EWO-2 at the time of the incident" is discussed first. The report then discusses the 801st Radar Squadron's "negative report on any radar or atmospheric interference problems related to Echo Flight" follows. The discussion then moves to the rumors of UFOs "around the area of Echo Flight during the time of the fault", stating indisputably that they were disproven, and that a "Mobile Strike Team, which had checked all November Flight's LFs on the morning of 16 March 67, were questioned and stated that no unusual activity or sightings were observed." Following this, the report discusses how "weather was ruled out as a contributing factor in the incident." It ends with a commentary that A2C Gamble *prefaced* the entire discussion with: "The only possible means that could be identified by the team involved a situation in which a coupler self test command occurred along with a partial reset within the coupler." Beyond stating that this would be remote for all ten couplers, no other conclusions are made. This makes it very evident that in the original document, the discussion of UFOs was simply one among many different possibilities that were discussed, and that the closing of the document rested entirely on the technical possibilities tied to the coupler self test command in combination with a partial reset within the coupler. Beyond that, the only valid conclusion that could be reached was that a more technical solution needed to be found, and this would have to be done at the contractor's facility, not on site at Malmstrom AFB.

In 1960 the US Department of Defense (DoD) enacted a comprehensive Defense Radio Frequency Compatibility Program (later renamed Electromagnetic Compatibility Program) that focused the Military Services R&D programs "to provide a means whereby electromagnetic compatibility should be 'built into' military communications-electronics equipment in the research and development stage". In 1966, EMC personnel of the three military departments jointly drafted standards addressing the interference reduction needs of the entire Department of Defense. That effort culminated in 1967 in the issuance of Military Standards 461, 462 and 463.

As a result, approximately 20 basic and subsidiary specifications were superseded. The 461 document focused on requirements and the 462 standard prescribed measurement methodology. Definitions and acronyms were contained in 463. Considerable revision was required and MIL-STD-461A was issued in August 1968. MIL-STD-461 was accepted by the joint services and was also used by many other countries. Eventually, the different military agencies (Army, Air Force,

and Navy) found many items to their dissatisfaction, and thus many revisions were issued by each of the three services until 1989. The most noted difference was the "Pink Copy" issued by the Army.³⁵⁷

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³⁵⁷ Kesselman, Warren, IEEE & Mertel, Herbert, IEEE, "The History of Military EMC Specifications", EMC Standards Activity, <http://www.ieee.org/organizations/pubs/newsletters/emcs/summer00/contents.htm>.